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Preface 
At the time I write, only days after a victory by the Labour Party 
ended eighteen years of Conservative government, explanations for Con­
servative disaster run the gamut. The occasional journalistic references to 
comparable elections (1832 and 1906) have done little to examine the roots 
of this one. My research began in the 1980s, after Margaret Thatcher and 
the Conservative Party had scored their third, successive election victory, 
and now ends appropriately as that same party, after a fourth election vic­
tory under the leadership of John Major, heads into a very uncertain future 
as a rump party without representation from either Wales or Scotland. 
These events, and contemporary British politics in general, are rooted in 
the early twentieth-century response of the Conservative Party to universal 
suffrage and mass politics. 
This work, as a study of popular Conservatism in the 1920s, depends 
on a range of disparate materials. Interested readers may consult the in­
troduction and appendixes D and E for an analysis of the sources, local-
studies methodology, and a descriptive chart of the constituencies 
sampled. The National Unionist Association was the representative body 
of the Conservative Party. At the end of 1924 its name was changed to the 
National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations to reflect the 
decline of the Unionist issue. Likewise, the Unionist Party was the pre­
ferred name of that party before the First World War and remained com­
mon until the Irish Free State was formed late in 1921. Thereafter, as in the 
days of Benjamin Disraeli, the party was usually called the Conservative 
Party. After 19211 have generally used Unionist to refer only to the Scottish 
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Conservatives, whose independent organization was called the Scottish 
Unionist Association. In addition, I have used "Diehard" to refer to Con­
servatives who opposed the Lloyd George Coalition, and "diehard" for 
those Conservatives who were merely on the right wing of the party. 
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Introduction

With the notable exception of biographies, historians of post-1914 
Britain have not paid as much attention to the Conservative Party as they 
have to its rivals. The party has certainly received less attention from schol­
ars than its counterparts on the Continent. Historians of Britain have 
largely dedicated themselves to understanding developments on the Left, 
particularly the rise and fall of the Labour and Liberal Parties. Yet the Con­
servative Party was victorious in thirteen of the twenty-one general elec­
tions between 1918 and 1992. Until 1979 it was probably most successful 
during the period between the two world wars when, alone or as the domi­
nant partner in a coalition, it won five of the seven general elections and 
was in power for all but three years. 
Yet during the two decades following World War I, conservatives faced 
some of the most difficult times and serious obstacles in their history. As 
the war was ending in 1918, the Labour intellectual Beatrice Webb reflected 
on the dangers that lay ahead. She was worried about bureaucracy, uncon­
trollable government spending, and especially Bolshevism. She was con­
cerned that the Bolsheviks would prey on the tensions of "a working class 
seething with discontent, and a ruling class with all its traditions and stan­
dards topsy-turvy, with civil servants suspecting businessmen and busi­
nessmen conspiring to protect their profits, and all alike abusing the 
politician, no citizen knows what is going to happen to himself or his chil­
dren, or to his own social circle, or to the state or the Empire. All that he 
does know is that the old order is seriously threatened with dissolution 
without any new order being in sight."1 These signs of uneasiness and 
fear—expressed by a leading figure in the Labour Party—were endemic in 
the years immediately after World War I. 
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Four features of the political landscape are central to an understanding 
of the turmoil that characterized British politics after World War I and 
shaped the Conservative Party. First, the Unionist Party had demonstrated 
a dismal record of failure after 1905. Second, universal suffrage was estab­
lished by the passage of the Representation of the People Acts of 1918 and 
1928. The 1918 act increased the electorate far more than the 1832,1867, or 
1884 reform bills, and enfranchised millions of women. From the manage­
able Edwardian electorate of about eight million, the number of voters in 
Britain leaped to twenty-one million in 1918 and twenty-nine million by 
1929. Third, the growth of an energized and expanding Labour Party en­
abled it to compete successfully against the two established parties and to 
offer radical solutions for the nation's ills. Fourth, the havoc caused by four 
years of both constitutional and Irish crises, followed by four years of a 
draining and difficult war effort, had disrupted older patterns of govern­
ment and undermined or made irrelevant the traditional Unionist causes 
(preservation of the Union, preservation of the Church, and tariff reform). 
These characteristics of the interwar political scene meant that, for the 
first time since the 1850s, the Conservative Party's existence was seriously 
threatened. Conservatives faced a decade of apparent political instability, 
with five general elections and four changes of government. Conservative 
leaders confronted a daunting combination of difficulties as they tried to 
escape from their wretched prewar experience; yet, in the end, bewilder­
ment did not lead to impotence. One of the most remarkable features of 
politics in the 1920s was the Conservative Party's strong electoral perfor­
mance and control of government. The historian and former Labour M. P. 
David Marquand commented on this conundrum in 1991: "Karl Marx had 
declared that, in Britain, universal suffrage would have as its 'inevitable 
result . .  . the political supremacy of the working class.' After 1918, these 
predictions could be put to the test. Working men had votes; and the self-
proclaimed party of the working class stood ready to receive them. . .  . The 
outcome was two generations of Conservative hegemony." But as the be­
mused Ross McKibbin observes in a recent essay, the extraordinary 
achievement of the Conservative Party seems to be "something we almost 
take for granted."2 
Most explanations for the Conservative Party's successful response to 
universal suffrage and other interwar factors are structural. Some histori­
ans point to remaining anomalies in the franchise and the redistribution 
of parliamentary divisions under the 1918 reform act. Conservatives were, 
for example, assisted by a remnant of plural voting, which decided the 
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outcome of about twenty of the 615 constituencies.3 They also gained as 
many as thirty seats as a result of the 1918 redistribution, which had recog­
nized the growing suburban and middle-class population. Some historians 
also point out that the party profited from the disappearance of the peren­
nially hostile Irish contingent as Sinn Fein first boycotted Parliament in 
1919 and then left altogether when southern Ireland became independent 
in 1922—leaving behind, of course, the dependably right-wing Ulster Un-
ionists.4 Yet although the Conservative Party enjoyed certain structural ad­
vantages under the interwar system, they were considerably less than under 
the less equitable system before 1918. (Under that system, the Unionists lost 
three successive general elections between 1905 and 1910.)5 There is as well 
always the argument that Conservative success, particularly in 1918 and 
1924, was the consequence of those periodic swings that characterize dem­
ocratic elections. 
Historians whose primary interests are often Labour or Liberal history 
suggest that the emerging politics of the 1920s entailed a bipolar Labour-
Conservative struggle in which the Conservatives played a passive role. The 
Conservative Party, in other words, remained powerful by reason of its 
continued existence, "naturally" filling the "necessary" role of protecting 
and representing the status quo. One such student of the period, for ex­
ample, writes that the Conservatives "did not have to strive hard to win" 
in 1929 simply because they were "the defenders of the status quo."6 Some 
political scientists and sociologists claim that a pervasive social deference 
in British society explains the support for the Conservative Party in this 
century, particularly from outside the middle and upper classes. The work 
of the most influential proponents of this approach is useful for under­
standing Tory wage earners, but it tends to ignore both the specific histori­
cal context of the 1920s and the Conservatives' active role. 
In all these theories there is at least the inference that Conservative 
success was natural or inevitable, not a result of the party's actions. There 
is also often an element of incomprehension—or at least a sense that con­
servatism persists because of the public's ignorance (sometimes euphemis­
tically described as its innate conservatism). The most obvious example 
contradicting these rather vague, comprehensive explanations for Conser­
vative success is the party's unsatisfactory performance during the years 
immediately preceding and following the 1920s and 1930s. If voting Con­
servative was not "normal" in 1910 or 1945, why should it have been so in 
the interwar period? 
Structural interpretations provide at best only a partial explanation of 
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why the Conservative Party was so successful in the 1920s. As Frans Coetzee 
observes in his study of Edwardian Conservatism, sobriquets like "the stu­
pid party" reinforce the erroneous notion that the party could as little be 
budged as its fortunes could be changed.7 The Conservative Party had the 
largest number of members in every interwar Parliament except the one 
that sat from 1929 to 1931. Not until the era of Margaret Thatcher would 
the Tories regain the kind of dominance they had enjoyed in the 1920s and 
1930s. Election results in the 1920s were not just chance; they arose from 
the Conservatives' triumph over two other parties. The Conservative Party 
won more than 40 percent of the popular vote in the five general elections 
between 1918 and 1929, and if a two-party preferred analysis is used (with 
votes for the declining Liberal Party redistributed among the other parties 
according to the pattern that was apparently emerging), the Conservatives 
were the preferred party of about 60 percent of voters.8 
How could the Conservative Party secure a popular following despite 
the tumult caused by the disruption of the two-party system, the establish­
ment of universal adult suffrage, and the rise of the Labour Party? This 
neglected question remains largely unanswered. In an address at a Conser­
vative summer school in 1966, Lord Blake commented, "The whole ques­
tion of how the Conservatives managed to acquire the hold over the middle 
ground of politics . .  . in the twenties and thirties is one which would well 
repay further investigation by historians. I do not think anyone has quite 
explained why the Conservatives became, as it were, 'respectable' again to 
middle-of-the-road opinion in a way which . .  . they had not been in the 
period immediately before the first world war. As I say, it would be worth 
investigation." More recently, in a caustic 1993 review of several works on 
early-twentieth-century politics, David Jarvis complains that the "Bald­
winite hegemony remains insufficiently explained, and any combination 
[sic] to the field of postwar politics which touches upon this should be 
welcomed."9 
No one has offered an adequate explanation for the rebirth of Conser­
vatism in the 1920s. Cowling, in The Impact of Labour (1971), a detailed 
study of politics in the early 1920s, draws attention to the shift in the focus 
of politics from Unionism and the Church to Socialism. Cowling's study 
of the response of politicians, journalists, and other leading figures to La-
bour's arrival as the opposition party reveals how Conservative leaders 
tried to combat Labour, at first joining an anti-Labour coalition, then dis­
associating themselves from the Liberal Party and taking up the defense of 
the social order. Cowling concentrates on the world of high politics with­
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out attempting to study the Conservative Party's rank and file, its organiza­
tional and rhetorical response to Labour, or its electoral performance. 
Self's study of the Conservative Party between 1922 and 1932, Tories and 
Tariffs (1986), is also primarily an investigation of high politics. Self's belief 
that tariff reform provided the nexus for interwar Conservatism is, how­
ever, at odds with the results of my research. In fact, protection was a dan­
gerous policy for the Conservatives to espouse, because it threatened to 
undermine their appeal to moderate, middle-class, and female voters.10 
Standard accounts fail to explain that the Conservative Party tri­
umphed in the 1920s by adapting to a new political landscape characterized 
most notably by universal suffrage and the Labour Party. Together the es­
says in Seldon and Ball's Conservative Century provide the best single-
volume history of the Conservative Party. They ably summarize recent re­
search into aspects of twentieth-century Conservatism and, in some cases, 
offer new insights. In The Age ofBalfour and Baldwin (1978), Ramsden de­
scribes the operations, personnel, and policy making of the Conservative 
Party. Ramsden is also one of the first historians to study such neglected 
areas of party history as fund raising and local organization, but he largely 
ignores the phenomenon of popular Conservatism, and his emphasis on 
the period before the First World War slights crucial wartime develop­
ments. In his chapters on the post-World War I period, Ramsden does not 
explain what Pugh describes as "the Conservatives' capacity to adapt and 
maintain a popular constituency."11 
In contrast, Pugh, McKibbin, Jarvis, and Williamson have tried to ex­
plain how the Conservative Party adopted popular political attitudes. In 
The Tories and the People, 1885-1935 (1985), a groundbreaking study of the 
Primrose League, a group loosely connected to the Conservative Party, 
Pugh reveals how social relations and political ideas were mobilized among 
millions of citizens by the first popular political organization in Britain. 
Pugh's research, however, focuses on the late Victorian and Edwardian po­
litical system, not the interwar period. In 1990 McKibbin published "Class 
and Conventional Wisdom: The Conservative Party and the 'Public' in 
Inter-War Britain," one of the first attempts to address the issue of popular 
Conservatism in that period. McKibbin emphasizes the difficulties that 
faced interwar Conservatives and suggests that the party's success resulted 
in part from its ability to monopolize middle-class voters by focusing on a 
perceived socialist threat and, after 1920, committing to deflationary 
policies.12 
In a more recent essay, Jarvis argues convincingly that the 1920s (rather 
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than the Edwardian period or the war years) were "a fundamental disjunc­
ture" in the history of popular Conservatism. In his analysis of Conserva­
tive propaganda, he shows that the party shifted from a Chamberlainite 
campaign aimed at a single working class to a more subtle and varied de­
fense of property and other existing interests. This strategy appealed to 
different elements of the working classes, including women. Williamson 
advances a similar explanation in an insightful 1993 essay. Under Stanley 
Baldwin, he argues, the Conservatives created a positive ideology that 
dominated public life during the interwar period. In Williamson's view, 
Baldwin "created a 'spiritual glue' which evoked 'Englishness,' rural har­
monies, Christian or ethical values, and the Elect Nation, and which called 
for the moralisation of industrial relations and bound all sides to their best 
constitutional behaviour."13 
In this book I attempt to fulfill the demand for an explanation of the 
"Baldwinite hegemony" of interwar politics. My two primary goals are 
(1) to investigate the interwar origins of contemporary British politics and 
(2) to consider the role of the Conservative Party as it became a successful 
mass party during this period. At its heart this work is a reappraisal of the 
Conservative Party that successfully responded to universal suffrage and 
the rise of the Labour Party between 1918 and 1929. It also explains interwar 
politics as they were experienced by Conservative Party adherents and vot­
ers rather than by political theorists, politicians, and what have been 
termed the "articulate radical minorities."14 I have sought to understand 
popular Conservatism between 1918 and 1929 by studying the Conservative 
Party's mass organizations, its propaganda and educational work, and its 
electioneering efforts. In contrast to David Jarvis, I devote considerable 
attention to organizational changes within the Conservative Party, for 
these played a very important role in the party's successful adaptation. 
The records of the Conservative Party members' organization, the Na­
tional Unionist Association, the Women's Unionist Organisation, the Ju­
nior Imperial League and other Conservative Party youth groups, and the 
Conservative wage earners' group, the Labour Committee, are vital sources 
for the party's interwar appeal. These mass organizations were designed to 
appeal to the new electorate. Consequently, I have focused on these popu­
lar organizations and activities of the Conservative Party. I have also relied 
heavily on the records of the regional associations of the Conservative 
Party, which served as liaisons between constituencies and London. In ad­
dition, various Conservative Party popular magazines, pamphlets, leaflets, 
and election addresses show what the world of rank-and-file politics was 
like. I have supplemented this research by consulting the personal papers 
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of such leading Conservatives as Andrew Bonar Law, Austen Chamberlain, 
and Stanley Baldwin. The papers of Viscountess Bridgeman, the first chair­
woman of the Women's Unionist Organisation, her husband, Cabinet min­
ister Viscount Bridgeman, and J. C. C. Davidson, party chairman from 
1926 to 1930, were rich sources of information about Conservative organi­
zations and electioneering. Finally, I also used The Times and The Observer 
as additional sources for developments in the 1920s and for important con­
temporary appraisals of these events. 
In contrast to some other political histories, particularly those dealing 
with Conservative affairs, I have also made use of constituency studies to 
locate popular trends in the Conservative Party. Searching through the 
available local records, I created a representative and manageable sample 
of twelve constituencies. The diverse constituencies reflect the most politi­
cally relevant variables of interwar Britain: geography, rusticity, class, reli­
gion, and party. For eleven of the constituencies, the minute books for at 
least the main association of each constituency have survived. In some 
cases there were also minute books for one or more of the auxiliary organi­
zations and sub-branches. To supplement this research for each constitu­
ency, I consulted at least one local newspaper from among the collection 
at the British Library (Colindale). In a few cases I was able to find and 
study the personal papers of Conservative M.P.s and candidates.15 Inter­
ested readers may consult appendixes D and E for an analysis of the local-
studies methodology and a list of the constituencies, with their chief 
characteristics. 
Conservatives were just beginning to adapt their party to the new po­
litical era when they were thrown into the first postwar general election in 
November and December 1918. The core of this book is a study of the 
sometimes massive organizational, propaganda, and educational activi­
ties of the party, and of its attempts to create popular mass organizations 
that would propagandize and educate voters. These innovations were 
highly successful. The new, socially conservative political organizations for 
women, young people, and wage earners gave the party a solid electoral 
base and a powerful body of volunteer organizers. In 1927 the historian and 
Conservative politician Sir John Marriott noted, "The rapid extension of 
the electorate [in 1918], necessitated the adoption of new methods of politi­
cal persuasion."16 The Conservative Party in fact adapted more successfully 
than either of its rivals. And in the process it became a broad-based party 
that represented moderate and conservative men and women, particularly 
those in the growing middle class. 
Kincardine and 
W. Aberdeenshire 
North 
Sea 
N. Yorkshire 
and Cumbria 
Skiptqn 
Wirral LancastrianMicj. 
North 
The Representation of the People 
Act of 1918 and the General 
Election of 1918 
The Representation of the People Act 0/1918 was principally re­
sponsible for determining the organization and outlook of the Unionist or 
Conservative Party during the interwar era. The Unionist Party, precluded 
from public displays of partisan activity after all parties agreed to an elec­
tion truce in August 1914, stagnated in the areas of organization, finance, 
and membership. The introduction of a parliamentary reform bill in 1917 
revived Unionist activity. Although initially wary of the bill, Unionists in­
terceded to shape the legislation once it was clear that they could not stop 
it. In February 1918 the Representation of the People Act was passed, en­
franchising all men and a majority of women, and redistributing the par­
liamentary seats. Parliamentary democracy had arrived in Britain. 
Party leaders responded to the passage of the reform act by altering 
party structure and organization to follow more popular lines. They 
changed the rules of their governing body, the National Unionist Associa­
tion (NUA). They encouraged the development of popular organizations 
for wage earners and women. Most important, they set up the Women's 
Unionist Organisation (WUO) to bring women into the party. At the same 
time, they continued to support the coalition government headed by Lloyd 
George because they wanted a national government of energetic ministers 
determined to defeat the German menace. Yet Unionist support for the 
government was never absolute, and the coalition did not lead to a long-
term electoral or policy agreement until the party was swept into a general 
election during the euphoria of victory in autumn 1918. In order to main­
tain the wartime spirit of nationalism and ensure the Labour Party's defeat, 
Unionist candidates fought the 1918 election—the so-called coupon elec-
tion—as members of the Lloyd George coalition. The campaign, however, 
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developed into an attack on the defeated German foe and a celebration of 
Conservative ideals. When the results became known on 29 December, the 
Unionists had won a great victory as the dominant partner in a coalition 
of national unity. Yet their position remained insecure because they lacked 
a broad-based party organization. 
The Representation of the People Act of 1918 
The truce among parties and the coalition subsumed prewar controversies 
in a mood of comradeship and a dedication to the overriding task of de­
fending the nation. This nonpartisanship diminished all political parties, 
including the Unionist Party, which lost much of its cohesiveness and 
drive. During Asquith's coalition government, the Unionist Business and 
War Committees in the House of Commons preserved a tenuous party 
identity by expressing unified backbench opinion on certain policies, such 
as universal conscription. Meanwhile, outside Westminister, the Unionist 
Party's membership and organization dwindled. Rank-and-file members, 
activists, and M.P.s volunteered for military service in large numbers, and 
many never returned. More than 125 Unionist agents saw active military 
service. The Junior Imperial League (JIL), the Unionist organization for 
young men, experienced heavy membership losses during the war. By Feb­
ruary 1915 the JIL claimed that 65 percent of its eligible members, including 
its president and secretary, were serving in the armed forces. What re­
mained of the organization was dedicated to the Overseas Forces Reception 
Committee, which assisted 400,000 servicemen from the Dominions when 
they spent their leaves in Britain. The rest of the Unionist organization 
continued to function largely to recruit military volunteers on behalf of 
the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee. It also lent its aid to the National 
War Savings Committee, the National War Aims Committee, and the Red 
Cross. At a time when revenue was falling, these were activities it could 
scarcely afford.1 
The Unionist constituency associations also became dormant during 
the war. A strong branch of the Chichester Unionist Association, for ex­
ample, held only one meeting between 1914 and 1918. Skipton was typical 
of most constituency associations. The agent, Edward Whittaker, was given 
a leave of absence with full pay when he became a captain in the army. 
Local officers were unable to maintain the existing organization in Skipton 
without Whittaker, and by 1916 only a small management subcommittee 
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was meeting. Monetary problems were not unusual. Expenses were gener­
ally low since there were few electoral contests, but subscriptions declined, 
and fund raising was nonexistent. Associations like the one in Camlachie, 
Glasgow, which had a budget surplus throughout the war, worried about 
their falling revenues in the event that the truce ended. Some constituency 
organizations maintained the semblance of fighting trim by redirecting 
their efforts toward charity and war work. In October 1914 Sir George 
Younger, then Unionist whip for Scotland, sent a circular to his constitu­
ency associations suggesting that they hold lectures in connection with the 
war effort and raise money for the Red Cross and other charities. Similarly, 
in the Palmers Green branch association in Wood Green, Middlesex, a La­
dies Committee for the Entertainment of Wounded Soldiers gave concerts 
for soldiers and raised money for soldiers' medical needs.2 
Meanwhile the mobilization of British citizens for the war effort 
changed Unionist attitudes toward the electoral system. The entry of re­
spectable women into the workplace led some Tories to question prevailing 
notions about female suffrage. If women could serve the nation by making 
munitions and nursing the wounded, why could they not vote? Most Tories 
were, however, more concerned about the men who were serving their 
country, whom J. C. Williams described as "for all essential purposes this 
nation." But the increasingly outdated parliamentary register was effec­
tively disfranchising many soldiers and sailors. By June 1916, William Jen­
kins of the Unionist central office estimated that only 60 percent of the 
men entitled to vote were actually on the register. An article in the April 
1916 issue of the Conservative Agents' Journal signaled growing Unionist 
support for franchise reform. Problems with the servicemen's vote, the 
Journal stated, "are so far-reaching, and may have such unlooked-for re­
sults, that we can none of us give too much thought and care to the subject 
in all its bearings." In their meetings Unionist agents demanded that ser­
vicemen voters be given special attention, and during the summer the Un­
ionist War Committee threatened to veto the extension of the Parliament 
unless a register was prepared to retain the vote for servicemen. Yet when 
such a bill was introduced by Walter Long, many Tory M.P.s demanded the 
vote for all enlisted men, even those ineligible under the existing property 
franchises. Long's bill had to be abandoned in mid-August. Concern for 
the servicemen, rather than, as John Turner suggests, for women or politi­
cal tactics led rank-and-file Unionists to the question of franchise reform.3 
The increasing possibility of a general election under the outdated reg­
ister added pressure to the movement in favor of franchise reform. After 
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his bill was rejected by the Commons in August, Long suggested that it 
might be necessary to call an interparty conference to deal with military 
voters. A few days later Lord Selborne, in a letter to Lord Salisbury, noted 
that a measure enacting a separate military franchise would almost inevita­
bly lead to discussion about a broader male franchise, women's franchise, 
and, possibly, even universal suffrage. In hopes of creating a wartime con­
sensus in favor of moderate reform, the Cabinet decided to call a confer­
ence of M.Rs and peers in which the speaker of the House of Commons, 
James Lowther, served as chairman. Thirteen Unionists, including Sir Wil­
liam Bull and Sir Harry Samuel, chairman of the NUA Council, served on 
the committee, which began meeting on 12 October 1916. The support of 
Walter Long, president of the Local Government Board and a respected, 
old-fashioned Tory who had opposed franchise reform before the war, was 
probably crucial in quelling Unionist worries about the conference.4 
Other than the serviceman's question, what were Unionist attitudes 
toward electoral reform? Some Unionist leaders, like Long, belatedly came 
to support female enfranchisement. Long's hope was to remove a highly 
contentious issue from the postwar scene. In addition, as he explained in 
a letter to his brother, the war had changed his perception of women's 
political capabilities. "Women are engaged . .  . in doing work of the most 
strenuous character," he wrote, "and I, at least, am satisfied that I was mis­
taken when I thought that they could not take their part in practically 
every form of government, save actually fighting in the ranks." A few Un­
ionists, for example, Arthur Balfour, Andrew Bonar Law, and Lord Sel­
borne, had long supported women's suffrage. Since 1917 Selborne's wife 
had been president of the Conservative and Unionist Women's Franchise 
Association. The personnel and the periodical of this organization exer­
cised a considerable amount of influence. Lady Selborne, the eldest daugh­
ter of the third marquess of Salisbury, was intellectually impressive and 
solidly Conservative. Through studied moderation Lady Selborne and her 
organization sought to win "quiet domestic women" and conservative men 
over to the cause of suffrage. In the weeks before the First World War had 
broken out, there were indications that the Unionist Party chairman, Ar­
thur Steel-Maitland, might support women's suffrage, probably out of fear 
that outright opposition would endanger the party's chances in the next 
general election.5 
The typical Unionist, however, resisted any extension of the franchise. 
In 1912 Conservative Party headquarters had estimated that universal male 
suffrage would cost the party 103 seats in England and Wales. Most Union­
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ists seemed to hold the political capabilities of eighteen million unenfran­
chised men and women in contempt. The suffrage campaign was also 
hampered by party concerns and widespread irritation with the suffrag­
ettes. Others felt, with the duchess of Atholl, that it was an inopportune 
time for change and that women needed more experience. Finally, the anti-
suffrage movement led by Lord Curzon, F. E. Smith, and other prominent 
Unionists was rooted in the gender ideology of separate spheres, the perva­
sive view that women embodied the emotional side of human nature. This, 
although it made them excellent mothers and nurturers, led them to be 
illogical and unstable, ill-suited for reasoned political analysis and voting. 
Antisuffragists also believed that women were physically incapable of rul­
ing the empire, fighting wars, and maintaining order.6 In their view, politi­
cizing women would destroy their "womanliness" and undermine gender 
roles. As Tennyson wrote in 1847, 
Man for the field and woman for the hearth; 
Man for the sword, and for the needle she; 
Man with the head, and woman with the heart; 
Man to command, and woman to obey; 
All else confusion.7 
Based upon this pervasive view of women, even some proponents of uni­
versal male suffrage, including the future prime minister, H. H. Asquith, 
felt no compunction in opposing the enfranchisement of "the gentler sex."8 
Antisuffragists believed that they were simply recognizing women's innate 
political inferiority. In 1916 most Unionists were in no hurry to expand an 
electorate of only eight million to include eighteen million more women 
and men. On 27 January 1917 the conference reported to the new coalition 
government headed by Lloyd George. Its proposals: a special register for 
servicemen, universal male suffrage based on a simple residency require­
ment, and redistribution of parliamentary seats in Britain (but not Ireland) 
to establish uniform constituencies of 50,000 to 70,000 inhabitants. The 
report also favored the enfranchisement of women older than twenty-nine 
years of age if they or their husbands possessed the local government vote. 
Three months later the government introduced its Representation of the 
People bill, which adhered closely to these proposals while providing a sec­
ond vote under a business or university franchise. Instead of compiling a 
special military register, however, the bill proposed to shorten the resi­
dency requirement for servicemen from six months to one. Most Unionists 
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approved of special treatment for servicemen but were shocked by the bill's 
other clauses. Some expressed their displeasure openly. Sir Arthur Steel-
Maitland, recently rewarded for his work as party chairman with a mere 
(in his eyes) baronetcy and a post under Long, his perennial enemy, at­
tacked the "mad" conference and drafted a highly critical memorandum 
to the NUA Executive Committee. According to him, "The interests of the 
Party have, wittingly or unwittingly, been gravely jeopardized [by its lead­
ers]." The principal agent of the Unionist Party, Sir John Boraston, quietly 
supported the former chairman's attack.9 
The NUA Executive Committee responded on 8 February 1917 by 
forming a subcommittee to consider the report of the Speaker's Confer­
ence. Initially Steel-Maitland served as its chairman, but he soon stepped 
down to allow the new party chairman, Sir George Younger, to head the 
investigation. In its report, presented on 13 March, the subcommittee de­
nied that the present House of Commons, which it called unrepresentative, 
had the right to pursue such a radical measure.10 The proposals in the 
Speaker's Report would enfranchise "the most unstable and emotional ele­
ments in the community, thereby increasing enormously the floating vote 
and the power of the demagogue." If the proposed changes had been in 
place, the subcommittee theorized, the Unionists would have won 105 
fewer seats in the previous election. The subcommittee criticized the redis­
tribution scheme for reducing rural seats and leaving Ireland overrepre­
sented. Only if the House of Lords (or a new second chamber) was 
guaranteed full veto power, the subcommittee concluded, would it accept 
a broadening of the franchise.11 
Other Unionists also voiced criticisms of the report. Sir Edward Car­
son circulated a petition against the Speaker's Report that more than a 
hundred Unionist M.P.s signed.12 The Conservative Agents' Journal pub­
lished hostile articles and letters, including a thorough analysis by the Wir­
ral agent, Alfred Birkett, who argued that Unionists had won only the 
tentative promise of a servicemen's register in return for conceding to all 
the Liberal objectives. He did, however, accept the need for a measure of 
female enfranchisement. According to the Conservative Agents' Journal, or­
dinary Unionists believed that their party had been "diddled" and "hood­
winked" by Liberal trickery.13 There is little evidence that provincial 
Unionists launched their own opposition to the bill, as party organization 
had decayed too much to make such action feasible. One of the few bodies 
to voice its irritation was the Yorkshire Provincial Council, which for­
warded a very critical resolution to the central office and party leaders in 
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late June 1917. Their unhappiness with the party hierarchy was presaged a 
few days earlier by a letter from the Chairman of the Bradford City Associ­
ation to Sir John Boraston. Unionist leaders, he wrote, were "completely 
out of touch" with their members, who saw these "revolutionary propos­
als" as "a gross violation . .  . of the Political Truce.. . . I have yet to meet a 
Bradford Unionist," he claimed, "who does not consider that the Party has 
been sold to the Radical and Labour Forces." The NUA Executive Commit­
tee had already surveyed constituency agents and officials about the Speak-
er's Report and found that respondents were overwhelmingly opposed to 
reform, at least during wartime, although they strongly supported female 
suffrage. The committee encouraged associations to accept the inevitable 
and to look after their own particular interests.14 Active organizations took 
this advice and tried to deal with the impending redistribution. For in­
stance, the Cornwall Provincial Division learned in the spring that the 
county would lose two M.P.s under the bill. Over the next year its chair­
man, J. C. Williams, sought to collaborate with the local Liberal and La­
bour parties to retain at least one of these seats but failed. In Skipton the 
Conservative association tried to exclude the industrial areas of Silsden and 
Cross Hills from its largely rural constituency.15 
Whatever the sentiment of their rank and file, Unionist leaders eventu­
ally decided the issue by refusing to oppose the reform bill. Most party 
leaders were convinced that opposition to a measure that enfranchised val­
iant servicemen and patriotic civilians would undermine the Unionist 
claim to represent all Britons. In a letter written in late March, Long, now 
colonial secretary, emphasized to Sir George Younger that "it would be 
absolutely fatal to the future of our Party" to resist the reforms. The party 
chairman agreed, adding that central office would seek only to modify the 
proposals and strengthen the Lords. When the NUA Council met in April 
to consider both recent events and the executive committee's report of 13 
March, it resolved that it was "strong[ly] in favour of an extension of the 
franchise [!]," if the Lords were reformed. By the time the Representation 
of the People bill went to committee on 6 June 1917, Unionists had shifted 
their focus from opposing to amending it.16 
On 22 May 1917 the NUA Executive revived its earlier subcommittee, 
now with Sir Archibald Salvidge as chairman. Unionist agents were asked 
to inform and assist the subcommittee in its work. To ensure that Unionists 
were not pigeonholed as opponents of reform, the subcommittee informed 
the press, "The Unionist Party is not in any way hostile to an extension of 
the franchise or the general principles of the Bill, but are going to suggest 
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some practical amendments." The twenty-seven-page subcommittee re­
port, which recommended several changes, was approved by the NUA Ex­
ecutive and Council two days after the reform bill went to committee. It 
sought to reinforce plural voting and eliminate both proportional repre­
sentation and alternative voting as detrimental to the Conservatives. All 
soldiers and sailors should be given a special franchise, and conscientious 
objectors should be disfranchised.17 The chairman of the Yorkshire Provin­
cial Division probably best expressed Unionist sentiment when, in Novem­
ber 1917, he attacked conscientious objectors as "anarchists . .  . whose 
object was to destroy the whole National fabric."18 In addition, the sub­
committee argued that rural seats should be given special consideration by 
the boundary commissions for reasons of national security, and Ireland 
should be included in the redistribution scheme. Finally, the report favored 
reform and strengthening the Lords as a constitutional safeguard. A third 
of the subcommittee's proposed amendments were forwarded to Unionist 
M.P.s through Colonel John Gretton. Even after the subcommittee finished 
its work, a group of Unionist agents remained at work guiding Unionist 
M.P.s during the passage of the bill. 
The report of the NUA subcommittee marks the beginning of the Un­
ionists' more pragmatic and constructive approach toward the reform bill. 
Writing to the Conservative Agents' Journal, one Unionist M.P. admitted 
that his colleagues disliked the reform bill. But none of them would oppose 
it "for fear of arousing the hostility of the electorate . .  . especially the 
women who are thirsting for the vote, while a good many are especially 
intent on giving sailors and soldiers the franchise." Their reluctance to re­
ject the bill by no means signified wholehearted Unionist acceptance of 
democratic, majority rule. This is evidenced by Unionists' faith in the spe­
cial role of rural areas and servicemen, and their support for strengthening 
the House of Lords. But some Unionists, most notably Walter Long, be­
lieved moderate reform during the war was essential for preventing unrest 
and revolution afterward. As one Unionist M.P. said during a debate on 
the bill, "The vote is granted nowadays on no kind of fitness, but as a 
substitute for riot, revolution and rifle." Writing in his diary at the end of 
1917, the earl of Crawford, a former Unionist chief whip, described the bill 
as "the strongest if not the sole bulwark between this country and revolu-
tion."19 This pragmatic outlook, the work of Unionist leaders who quelled 
outright opposition, and the nearly universal desire to reward patriotic 
servicemen and punish conscientious objectors served to deflate opposi­
tion to reform. 
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In most respects the Representation of the People Act, which became 
law on 6 February 1918, resembled the Speaker's Report, but Unionists in 
Westminster were able to obtain several important changes. First, they ex­
tended the military franchise to nineteen- and twenty-year-olds. Second, 
conscientious objectors who had not served in noncombat roles lost their 
vote for five years after the war's end. Chairman Younger himself intro­
duced the conscientious objectors' clause on 22 November, and it passed 
with the support of some Liberals. Third, Unionists removed the alterna­
tive vote and limited proportional representation to a few university seats. 
Fourth, the home secretary, Sir George Cave, succeeded in retaining sixteen 
more rural seats than a strict redistribution justified. Taking into account 
the increase in suburban seats, the number of likely Unionist seats prob­
ably increased by about thirty despite the failure to extend redistribution 
to Ireland.20 
Contemporaries regarded the Representation of the People Act as a 
milestone in British politics. On the basis of a six months' residency re­
quirement, the act established universal suffrage for men over twenty years 
of age. It also gave the vote to all soldiers and sailors who were at least 
nineteen years of age. Men who had business property worth ten pounds 
per annum or were graduates of British universities could cast a second 
ballot outside their home constituency. After 1918 business voters were less 
than 1 percent of the electorate in England and Wales and played a signi­
ficant role in approximately two dozen university and city center constit­
uencies (2 percent of the total). Some historians argue that the simple 
residential franchise brought working-class men, particularly the urban 
poor, or "shimmies," as some termed them, into politics. Yet the residency 
franchise also increased the number of young, often single, middle-class 
and working men who lacked any party allegiance, adding a large floating 
vote.21 
Under the reform act of 1918 women thirty years of age and over who 
possessed the local government franchise (or whose husbands did) were 
also enfranchised. They were eligible for the same additional franchises as 
men but until 1928 could exercise only one of their votes in each election. 
In 1918 the enfranchisement of women was the most noteworthy effect of 
the reform act. Some contemporary commentators believed that the intro­
duction of women into British politics would destroy its allegedly rational 
and patriotic character. Viscount Bryce claimed that, in Australia, the left 
benefited from female suffrage because women were "easy victims to any 
representation." The Conservative Agents' Journal predicted some of the 
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undesirable results of Britain's reform act: "The introduction of such a 
large feminine element in the political arena must of necessity bring do­
mestic legislation to the front to the exclusion of Imperial affairs. Prohibi­
tion campaigns, home welfare, equal opportunities for women in the 
labour market, sex equality, free meals for all children, permanent commu­
nal kitchens, free maternity nursing homes for mothers will all make their 
appearance."22 
Except for the failure to establish full female suffrage, the Representa­
tion of the People Act created Britain's first system of universal suffrage, 
increasing the enfranchised portion of the population from 28 percent to 
78 percent. Before the war, voters—exclusively men—numbered fewer 
than eight million. As a result of the reform act the number jumped to 
thirteen million men and nearly nine million women. The reform added 
more than twice the number of eligible voters than any other franchise 
reform. A comparison of the five reform acts shows that the electorate 
increased by approximately 50 percent in 1832, 84 percent in 1867, 88 per­
cent in 1884, 177 percent in 1918, and 33 percent in 1928. It was not just 
hyperbole, then, when Long congratulated Cave on passing "the biggest 
Bill . .  . since 1832." Others made similar comments. In a 1927 politi­
cal science text, the historian and Tory M.P. Sir J. A. R. Marriott stated 
that, compared to the 1918 act, previous reform acts "almost sink into 
insignificance."23 
At a time of general uncertainty and revolutionary upheaval, the spec­
ter of a phalanx of volatile and untested male and female voters who might 
turn to the Liberals or the Labour Party caused considerable anxiety in the 
Unionist Party. Unionists' worst fears would have been confirmed by read­
ing the diary of Beatrice Webb. In a June 1918 entry, Webb mused that 
the reform act would make the Labour Party a powerful force.24 Unionist 
uneasiness was exacerbated by provisions in the act that shifted responsi­
bility for the registration of voters from party agents to local government 
officials, like those who had long existed in Scotland. After 1918 agents were 
no longer able to manage the electorate, which previously had been rela­
tively small and subject to complex, limited franchises.25 In the 1920s Con­
servative politicians enjoyed neither the intimacy with voters characteristic 
of the Edwardian electorate nor the prognosticative and psephological 
tools of post-1945 politics. It is not surprising, therefore, that, in the wake 
of the reform act of 1918, there were many fears about the semieducated 
electorate, its discontent, and its malleability. The trepidation caused by 
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the coming of mass society was not limited to Unionists, as D. L. LeMahieu 
shows, but it pervaded the party after the passage of the Representation of 
the People Act in early 1918.26 
The Conservative Party's Response to the Reform Act 
To avoid predictions like those of Beatrice Webb, most Unionists realized that 
they had to redirect their efforts to attract more voters. By early 1918 the 
Labour Party was already accelerating its planning for the next general 
election. It was especially active in integrating women into the party organ­
ization, hiring Dr. Marion Phillips as Woman Organiser in January 1918. 
Long and other Unionist proponents of the 1918 act may have saved Britain 
from turmoil by timely reform, but they left Unionists with the choice 
between a new kind of mass politics, decline, or even—possibly—a linger­
ing death. At a special private NUA conference called on 30 November 
1917 Bonar Law explained how the momentum of reform had produced an 
undesirably far-reaching bill. But, he cautioned, there was no turning back; 
the Unionist Party must see the reform act as an opportunity "to make our 
Party what Disraeli called it—and what, if it is to have any existence, it 
must be—a really national party."271918 marked the beginning of the ten-
year process of remaking the Unionist and Conservative Party into a party 
suited to the new age of universal suffrage. 
The most important means by which Unionists sought to popularize 
their party was by fostering organizations for women and wage earners 
and by involving more people in the party's operations. In an October 1917 
report, Archibald Salvidge, longtime secretary of the Liverpool Constitu­
tional Association, analyzed women's relationship to the party: 
They will form nearly two-fifths of the parliamentary elec­
torate and the Unionist Party will, of necessity, be com­
pelled to attract them.. . . Their importance in elections 
will be paramount and already the Labour Party are bent 
on a programme which will attract women. There seems 
no reason why women should not be welcomed into the 
Unionist organisation on equal terms with men. 
It is highly probable that Clubs and Branches will have 
to be formed for women or arrangements made for their 
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inclusion in present clubs or a separate meeting night as­
signed to them. Much opposition to such proposals may 
be expected from men. . .  . The bold course of "equal 
rights" for males and females seems to be the best. 
An alteration of the Rules of the Association will be 
necessary and provision made for the inclusion of women. 
It would perhaps be desirable to make some proviso that 
the representation of women on divisional councils be lim­
ited so as to prevent them securing a predominance of 
power in the direction of party affairs.28 
Shortly afterward, Unionists in Yorkshire made the first attempt by party 
members to form women's associations and to place women on party com­
mittees, but they were unable to decide on exact arrangements and awaited 
developments in London.29 
Delegates to the private NUA conference on 30 November 1917 devoted 
considerable time to the question of a women's organization. Some ex­
pressed their distaste for female suffrage and their fears that women would 
join in "an unholy alliance" with Labour. Most of the discussion, however, 
concerned organizational methods. Herbert G. Williams expressed a wide­
spread anxiety that a segregated association would cause internal division 
and waste and would continue the suffragettes' "sex war." He also feared 
that less experienced (and more irrational) women would be exploited by 
"sentimental Socialist [s]." But the organizer of the JIL emphasized that the 
party must accept all women: "You want an organisation that has now to 
take in hand the element that is going to hold the balance of power in the 
future elections in this country. You must take this matter so seriously that 
not only must you be prepared . .  . to put these women upon your Ward 
Committees, and your central electoral organization, but you must be pre­
pared to welcome to your Councils, even to the [NUA] Council that is 
meeting here to-day, the bolder and more active spirits amongst them." 
The consensus was that the Unionist Party had to incorporate female sup­
porters into the party with "the greatest possible co-partnership and co­
operation" between the sexes.30 
Sir George Younger informed the delegates that central office was con­
sidering an arrangement with the existing, autonomous Women's Unionist 
and Tariff Reform Association (WUTRA). The WUTRA was an exclusively 
women's group whose activities were overtly political. In many ways it 
was a precursor of later organizations, but because it had relatively few 
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branches and was not formally connected either to central office or to the 
NUA at the constituency, regional, or national level, it was a poor candidate 
for a universal women's organization. Under its leaders, the countess of 
Ilchester and Mrs. Mary Maxse, the WUTRA maintained only very limited 
operations during the war. By mid-1917 it faced a dilemma. The prewar 
issues—particularly home rule and tariff reform—were no longer critical. 
But there was a promising future for a women's political organization if, 
as expected, women were given the vote. Lady Talbot was elated at the 
WUTRA's prospects. "We shall be an enormous power at every election 
. . . ,  " wrote Lady Talbot, "and . .  . whichever party we support will have to 
rely on our votes and not only on our work as they have done hitherto." 
Such comments worried Unionists already concerned that the women's or­
ganization would put its interests before the party.31 
But the only possible alternative to the WUTRA was the now declining 
Primrose League. Formed in 1883 in honor of Benjamin Disraeli, the league 
was the largest political organization in Britain, with nearly one and one-
half million (mainly female) members in 1900. It supported the Unionist 
Party by mobilizing support for the established order of King, Empire, and 
Church. The league, almost like the Masons, had an arcane system of chi­
valric titles for its officers, and it offered a multitude of honors to members 
who contributed funds or worked on behalf of the organization. Aristo­
cratic and other elite members added luster to local branches. Such mem­
bers led pilgrimages to Disraeli's grave, held social events, canvassed, and 
registered voters. Women often served on executive committees and as 
officers. But the league's national Ladies Grand Council, formed in 1885, 
was largely powerless, and no women were chosen as officers for the regu­
lar national council. This shortcoming may in part explain why, during the 
Edwardian period, the league began to experience problems that worsened 
during the war. Although the leaders of the Primrose League were position­
ing their organization to take advantage of the reform bill in 1917 and 1918, 
many people believed that it was too old-fashioned, which proved to be 
the case. The league never became the women's movement of the Unionist 
Party, and it was increasingly seen as a ceremonial relic of Toryism.32 
In January 1918 Younger devised a proposal for working with the 
WUTRA and forwarded to the NUA Executive two memoranda describing 
a possible Unionist Women's Organisation. The first memorandum, 
"Notes on Women's Organisation under the Representation of the People 
Bill," analyzed two possible methods of incorporating women into the local 
organization. Either women and men could join a single association as 
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equal members, or men and women could form separate district and con­
stituency associations joined by a single executive committee and agent. 
Whichever plan was adopted, Younger urged that women be given full rep­
resentation. He intended to provide women with equitable representation 
in the regional NUA organs and the party conference. In the second mem­
orandum Younger used the model of the 1912 Liberal Unionist amalgam­
ation as a model for creating a women's department in central office from 
the existing tariff group. He also tentatively suggested that a committee 
monitored by the party chairman and principal agent be formed at Central 
Office to oversee women's affairs and avoid gender conflict.33 
These two memoranda became the basis for the Women's Unionist 
Organisation (WUO), and although it initially existed only on paper and 
was overlooked by many Unionists,34 it was the only national organization 
for women closely linked to the Unionist Party. Party leaders were hopeful. 
Younger asked Caroline Bridgeman, a prominent member of the WUTRA 
and the wife of a popular junior minister, to lead the WUO. Concerned 
that the women would be dominated by the principal agent, Bridgeman 
and other WUTRA leaders requested more power and autonomy for the 
WUO than the proposed constitution allowed. This was necessary, 
Bridgeman argued, in order to have cordial relations between men and 
women; Unionist women worked best "where they have a dignified, recog­
nised position."35 Younger agreed to give the WUO complete control over 
personnel and all other matters except finance. WUO leaders would be 
appointed by the party chairman in order to keep the group from becom­
ing just another administrative department. Finally, Younger agreed to 
form a NUA advisory committee to oversee women's affairs, although it 
would have no official powers under NUA rules. The women succeeded in 
obtaining their major demands, and by July 1918 the WUO was operating 
in London, with Bridgeman serving as chairwoman and Miss Goring-
Thomas, formerly a WUTRA official, as secretary.36 
Rank-and-file party members responded to the "Notes on Women's 
Organization." Some seats already had women's branches. Before the First 
World War, five of the twelve divisions in my sample had women's groups 
of some kind. Before the war, the Oswestry Women's Constitutional Asso­
ciation (formed in 1904), whose chairwoman and secretary was Caroline 
Bridgeman, had twenty-six branches and 2,868 members.37 But most wom-
en's branches were much smaller and, like the men's associations, did not 
meet regularly during the war. The situation quickly changed in 1918 as 
women's organizations were established or reorganized in most English 
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and Welsh associations, and women were admitted to parent associations. 
In such constituencies as Oswestry, Bradford Central, Wood Green, and 
Clapham, women did not form their own associations until shortly after 
the war and the sudden November 1918 campaign.38 Among the English 
and Welsh constituencies studied, only in Wrexham, where a women's 
branch was formed in 1923, was there any significant delay. And some Un­
ionists, like those in North Cornwall and Wirral, opted for joint men and 
women's associations, although in both of these cases there were separate 
women's committees under the parent association.39 In any case, the dis­
tinction between joint and separate organizations was often blurred. At the 
1918 annual meeting of the Skipton association, the men demanded a single 
association, and the women agreed, provided they received sufficient 
representation on the executive committee; yet a women's branch con­
tinued at Skipton. Whatever the formal arrangement, WUO branches usu­
ally made their own rules, raised their own funds, and enjoyed general 
autonomy. 
Compared to their achievements in the constituencies, however, 
women were at first unsuccessful at the regional level. Early in 1918, York­
shire Unionists decided to organize women in the party, but they could 
not agree on a plan. Under the influence of Miss Goring-Thomas and Miss 
Thistlewaite, the secretary of the former regional women's group, officers 
from women's branches formed a separate organization. By the general 
election in November, the new women's federation had been incorporated 
into the WUO, and central office had hired Thistlewaite as its first female 
area agent. In Cornwall, WUTRA and Primrose League leaders met in June 
1918 and decided not to form a regional WUO, but encouraged Cornish 
men and women the form joint Unionist associations. The early start in 
Yorkshire and Cornwall later contributed to the WUO's near monopoly 
over the women and the rapid decay of the Primrose League. In most parts 
of the country, however, regional women's organizations were not immedi­
ately established.40 
In Scotland the independent Scottish Unionist Association (SUA) or­
dered an enquiry in November 1917 to find a means of responding to the 
Representation of the People bill. The SUA Executive called for equal treat­
ment of men and women in local organizations. After studying a memo­
randum on reorganization from central office in London, the SUA council 
rejected separate female organizations. Instead it decided in February 1918 
that "the fusion between Men's and Women's Associations should be abso­
lute." It invited existing women's groups to cooperate in forming joint as­
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sociations, while allowing associations to appoint women's committees to 
deal with any strictly female issues. Camlachie Unionists quickly adopted 
the SUA ruling, and merged the women's branch with the men's associa­
tion. Later, after the SUA established a Women's Committee in 1920, Cam­
lachie formed a separate women's committee.41 In Kincardine, however, 
Unionists did not form women's groups, in part because the association 
had fallen into decay during the war and remained defunct until 1923. 
After the passage of the reform act, women were also admitted into 
the previously male local Unionist associations. In 1917 none of the twelve 
divisional associations I have examined had female members, but by the 
end of 1918 all had brought women into their associations and committees. 
Suddenly women gained entry to the sanctum sanctorum of Unionism 
from which they had hitherto been barred. In February 1918 the SUA coun­
cil sent a memorandum to its associations. Echoing an earlier directive, it 
declared, "Women should be admitted to all Associations on the same foot­
ing as men . . .  . [and provided with] their proper share of representation 
[of offices and committees]."42 The memorandum typified Unionists' new 
concern about women's participation. 
Although specific local arrangements varied, associations followed a 
general pattern for incorporating women into the local associations. Usu­
ally women were given seats on a joint council or executive committee in 
proportion to their share of the electorate—usually one-third. Frequently 
these representatives were chosen by the women's executive committee. 
Some association offices, although not the highest post, might be reserved 
for women. In Stockton, for example, the women's branch was allocated 
four of the twelve seats on the executive committee and one vice-
chairmanship. In Wirral, women composed half the polling district repre­
sentatives on the executive committee, a third of the members of the gen­
eral purposes committee, and one of the two vice-chairmen. In Skipton 
and North Cornwall, women were provided with separate facilities in a 
Conservative club that served as the local party headquarters. There were 
occasional conflicts between men and women. In Chichester, the develop­
ment of a women's organization led to an attempt by the men to add the 
women to the existing men's association. This was held off and later re­
pulsed by the women. Such fighting was, however, exceptional, as there 
were social and familial ties between the men and the women, and many 
of the women were already active in public life. When women first at­
tended the Palmers Green branch in Wood Green, six of the seven were 
introduced by husbands who were already officers or members.43 
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Unionist efforts to bring women into the local associations were 
closely tied to attempts to make associations adapt their constitutions to 
the reform act. A February 1918 circular from the SUA summarizes Union­
ist hopes: 
The enlarged size of the constituencies, and even more 
than that, the spirit of the age, render absolutely necessary 
that all classes and interests in sympathy with Unionist 
principles should have a share in the direction of the affairs 
of the [Scottish Unionist] Association, and should be wel­
comed to its deliberations. To ensure this, committees 
should be large enough to enable representatives of all such 
classes and interests to be included, and should meet at 
such times and places as will suit the various members. 
This is the only way to keep in touch and in sympathy with 
the feelings and views of the community. Further, it is ob­
vious that in order to ensure success constant and much 
more intensive work will be required than in the past. In 
view of the fact that all elections are to take place on the 
same day, each Association will require to rely [sic] more 
than ever upon the individual efforts of its members. Un­
less vigorous and persistent propaganda work is carried 
out previous to an election, it will be hopeless to attempt 
to make up the lee-way in the rush of an election.44 
The circular indicates clearly the sense of urgency that characterized Un­
ionist efforts to reorganize the party. That same month Younger asked 
Robert Sanders, unofficial party whip, to reorganize the local associations 
in England and Wales.45 
Rank-and-file Unionists generally appreciated the need to update their 
organizations in response to franchise reform and redistribution. Develop­
ments in the newly formed Shropshire constituency of Oswestry were typi­
cal of associations which adapted quickly. At first there was a conflict over 
which Unionist M.P. would stand for the seat, but this was settled privately 
in favor of the junior minister, William Bridgeman. In August 1918 the 
Oswestry Unionist Association was formed. Membership was open to any­
one who subscribed five shillings or joined a branch association. Branches 
elected the divisional council, and branch members were expected to can­
vass voters, collect subscriptions, maintain registration lists, and, under the 
supervision of the divisional association, prepare for elections. The annual 
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meeting of the divisional council elected officers and the eight men and 
four women who served as an executive committee. In October the new 
executive hired an organizing agent. Women in Oswestry, however, did not 
have a WUO branch until early 1919. Eventually—in 1921—Oswestry Un­
ionists, like a number of other associations, also created the position of 
chairman because the more ceremonial presidency was ill-suited to the 
demanding duties of the post-1918 electorate.46 
These developments at the local level were accompanied by reform of 
the NUA structure and unsuccessful attempts to develop stronger ties with 
wage earners. Unionist leaders tried to bring the party's structure in line 
with the reform act by shifting responsibilities from self-elected groups of 
wealthy and titled men to adherents from all levels of the party. This, it 
was hoped, would create a disciplined but popular force. On 9 April 1918 
the NUA Executive Committee adopted new rules based on the work of an 
investigative subcommittee. There were three major changes to the consti­
tution. Before the war the council, the authority within the NUA that 
elected the managing executive committee, was an elite body of fewer than 
a hundred members. After 1918, provincial divisions—the regional party 
organs—elected more delegates to the council. Second, the larger bor­
oughs (except London, which was its own provincial division) selected del­
egates to the council. Finally, women were allocated one-third of council 
and executive committee seats. The new rules created a larger council of 
719 members, the majority chosen by the provincial divisions (519) and 
large boroughs (108). The rest were officials, agents, nominees of the party 
leader, and delegates from the conference or affiliated groups. Initially the 
WUTRA was asked to select five delegates to the executive committee, but 
after the NUA resumed peacetime operations in April 1919, men and 
women were elected jointly by the council, provided that women formed 
a third.47 
The reform of the NUA in 1918 marked the beginning of a shift toward 
actual geographical and constituency representation in the NUA. Later, 
after the Conservative Party's defeat in the 1923 general election, the NUA 
Executive accepted an altered constitution proposed by Sir Herbert Blain, 
the new principal agent. Blain's aim was to make the body more represen­
tative of the rank and file by shifting the basis of organization from pro­
vincial divisions to constituency associations. The new rules provided 
associations with direct representation on both council and conference. 
The executive committee was still elected by the council, but delegates 
from each area (central office's administrative regions) would elect repre­
sentatives according to the number of constituencies in their region. The 
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three largest provincial cities were given direct representation on the exec­
utive committee, and constituency associations were allowed a third coun­
cil delegate if he was a wage earner. The new Constitution and Rules were 
approved by the 1924 NUA conference and went into effect on 1 November. 
The bloated council—1,762 members—declined in influence, but the 
more representative NUA Executive was an effective administrative body.48 
Unionists also hoped to capitalize on the spirit of wartime unity, which 
seemed to reveal the innate good sense and patriotism of British workers. 
Many Tories embraced the Disraelian vision of a Britain made better by 
economic cooperation and class harmony. The Unionist Party could assist 
in this goal if it brought workers—as well as women—into its organiza­
tion. At the November 1917 NUA Conference, a delegate told Bonar Law 
that the party ought to create workingmen organizers to, as he clumsily 
put it, "pat the working man on the back . .  . make him feel that he is 
something beyond a cog in the machinery of the party and . .  . see if we 
cannot make him a crank-shaft." During late summer 1918, Long repeat­
edly pressed Younger to establish some kind of labor organization at cen­
tral office. Although wage earners often agreed with Conservative aims, 
Long argued, some of their concerns and methods were different, so that 
they needed their own organization. Since there was not enough time to 
complete such a task before the next general election, Younger, the party 
chairman, refused. Only in 1919 did the Conservatives create a wage-
earners' group, the NUA Labour Committee. For the time being, interested 
Unionists were forced to turn to an outside group, the British Workers' 
League (BWL), to attract the support of workers. Inspired and assisted by 
Lord Milner, a number of trade unionists and M.P.s had formed the BWL 
in 1916 to provide a patriotic and imperialist counterpart to the Indepen­
dent Labour Party and Union for Democratic Control. But rank-and-file 
Unionists were wary of the independent group, especially after it became 
the National Democratic and Labour Party in May 1918.49 
The changes outlined above were part of the Unionist Party's response 
to the disruption of war and the passage of the Representation of the 
People Act. Conservatives hoped to create a viable popular organization 
to provide the personnel, enthusiasm, and direction necessitated by near 
universal suffrage. Despite differing approaches to organization, the Un­
ionist intention was to draw women, wage earners, and, as far as possible, 
all new voters into the Unionist Party. They were successful among women 
but not wage earners. Although some Unionist workingmen's clubs sent 
members to local associations, by the end of 1918 very few constituencies 
specifically provided for wage-earner representation, and Unionist efforts 
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in this direction were stymied. Yet the organizational reforms undertaken 
during 1918 marked the beginning of the Unionist Party's evolution toward 
becoming a popular party capable of winning elections in the age of uni­
versal suffrage. 
The Approaching General Election 
Although significant in the future, alterations in the NUA constitution, the 
creation of the WUO, and (failed) attempts to form a workingmen's group 
were not considered sufficient to assure a Unionist majority in the next 
election. The new political system—defined by universal suffrage, wartime 
upheaval, and the rise of Labour—offered uncertainty and danger. Union­
ist leaders, as well as many rank-and-file members, believed that the party 
needed to collaborate with sympathetic elements in other parties to win 
the election and contain the Labour Party. They also felt that the continua­
tion of the Lloyd George government reflected the desire of the British 
people for unity. Unionist leaders hoped to preserve the mood of national 
reconciliation by working with the prime minister and developing a re­
form program that would attract the newly volatile electorate. Beginning 
with a speech to trade unionists on 6 March 1917 Lloyd George assiduously 
publicized his aim of "doing big things." Unionists' postwar vision was in 
part a response to this. At a meeting of Yorkshire Unionists in November 
1917, speaker after speaker applauded a resolution calling on the party to 
address "the legitimate demands of Labour." A Skipton delegate demanded 
that Unionists show wage earners that they were friends.50 
To achieve far-reaching postwar reforms, Unionists felt that petty in­
terests had to be submerged in a party of national unity. In early 1918 one 
M.P., J. C. Butcher, told Yorkshire Tories that he wanted "a rearrangement 
and regrouping of the old parties after the war . .  . [consisting of those] 
who believed in the Empire and in the great future before us, so that all 
might join to repair the ravages of the war and set the country once more 
on the path of prosperity and greatness."51 In October 1917 Archibald Sal­
vidge asked Asquith if he would be willing to lead a "patriotic party after 
the war, made up of the best elements of the old parties? An appalling 
flood of unrest might sweep over Europe when hostilities ceased. Little was 
left of the pre-war questions for Tories and Liberals to fight about. Why 
not combine to build a better Britain for the men who had saved us?"52 
Asquith rejected Salvidge's offer, but many Conservatives and Liberals 
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responded to claims that the alternative to unity, victory, and reform 
was revolution and chaos like that in Russia. Unionist propaganda even 
claimed that left-wingers and pacifists at home were pushing Britain in 
that direction.53 
But some members of the Unionist rank and file were far from ecstatic 
about the Lloyd George coalition. The most notable manifestation of Tory 
dissatisfaction with the coalition was the formation of the National Party 
in August 1917. The ultraconservative M.P. and war veteran Henry Page 
Croft founded the party because he believed that the Unionist Party could 
not pursue a truly nationalist program of tariffs, cooperation with busi­
ness, and eradication of foreign influences. Informed contemporaries 
judged the party a lot of "political mediocrities," and the party's historian 
agrees.54 Although the journalist F. S. Oliver thought the party's popularity 
was the result of public anger with all politicians, Unionist leaders were 
worried.55 Croft attracted disgruntled Unionists like Walter Morrison, a 
wealthy industrialist and former Skipton M.P.56 Unionist leaders were par­
ticularly worried about the financial impact of losing men like Morrison, 
and in mid-September 1917, Bonar Law announced that National Party 
supporters would be opposed by Unionists at the next election. This threat 
and organizational problems soon stifled the young party, but many loyal 
rank-and-file Conservatives still felt that they were being ignored by their 
leaders. At a September 1917 meeting of the National Society of Conserva­
tive and Unionist Agents, an agent warned Unionist leaders that they might 
lose their most active followers. Even after the Unionist principal agent, 
William Jenkins, promised that a party conference would be called, the 
agents reiterated their demand that Unionist leaders "explain [themselves] 
to the Party as fully as possible." Similar statements were made at the Octo­
ber 1917 meeting of the Yorkshire Provincial Division.57 
What caused Unionist discontent? It was partly inspired by personal 
antagonisms and the anger of job seekers who had been elbowed away 
from the trough by coalitionists. More significantly, the nonpartisanship 
of the coalition caused disenchantment among Tories who felt out of touch 
with their leaders and suspicious of both coalition ministers—particularly 
Liberals like Winston Churchill—and the government's compromise poli­
cies. In Tory Democracy (1918), Lord Henry Bentinck argued that Tory ide­
als of nationalism and paternalism were endangered by "cosmopolitanism" 
and selfish politicians.58 Distaste for the coalition was most obvious in 
cases where Conservatives believed that government policies threatened 
national unity. A good example is the controversy over enemy aliens. The 
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popular press soaked up antialien sentiment. The antialien movement 
peaked with a procession on 24 August 1918 in which marchers carried a 
petition signed by over a million persons to Downing Street. The petition 
demanded internment of all enemy aliens. The NUA Executive had already 
asked in July 1918 for "immediate action" against aliens, and the Conserva­
tive Agents' Journal carried articles condemning aliens. Some Unionist 
M.P.s even met with Bonar Law in the House of Commons to receive assur­
ances about the removal of aliens.59 
Party leaders finally responded to the growing discontent among Un­
ionists at a private conference held at Kingsway Hall on 30 November 1917. 
The NUA Executive agreed a meeting was justified by the "need for a clearly 
defined policy [and] . .  . a re-affirmation of Unionist Principles, leading 
up to a National Ideal." At the conference Bonar Law asked delegates to 
concentrate on party reorganization, not government policy. He told them 
to remember that Lloyd George was not only a minister of the crown, but 
also "the leader of the Government, and the leader of the nation, and to 
do . .  . [his task] he must have the support of those who are working with 
him." As patriotic Britons all Unionists should support the prime minister. 
Despite these pleas, delegates criticized the reform bill, Irish policy, aliens, 
and other matters. When a delegate demanded to know what program 
would be adopted if there were a wartime election, Bonar Law stated only 
that the party would support the coalition. Under those circumstances, he 
argued, "There will only be two parties in the country—those who are 
determined to see the war through, and those who are not."60 
The reform act and the possibility of an election shortly after the new 
register of voters was ready in October 1918 had already convinced most 
local Unionists that they had to regroup. With the assistance of Robert 
Sanders, local organizations began reorganizing. At the same time some 
Unionist associations collaborated with local Liberals against Labour. Par­
ticularly in urban areas like Bradford, for instance, the two parties simply 
expanded existing antisocialist pacts. When the Bradford central parlia­
mentary seat became vacant during the war, the Unionist association was 
unprepared and reluctant to contest the seat. After the Liberal candidate, 
Sir James Hill, promised to vote for the Military Service bill and other 
war measures, the Unionist association supported him. Stockton Unionists 
similarly did not oppose a Liberal candidate in 1917 after he made clear his 
support for the coalition.61 
Leaders and party officials may have hoped that reorganization would 
enable them to sidestep some of the difficult questions about the party's 
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future role and policy, but such reform only begged those questions. J. W. 
Morkill, a leading figure in the Skipton association, told the Yorkshire Pro­
vincial Division Executive that, despite the new women's organization and 
other signs of progress, local associations were suffering anxiety and dis­
affection. He suggested that members press party leaders to develop a pol­
icy platform, or they would "be in the cart when an Election took place." 
The members agreed, but could do little more at the time than encourage 
wage earners to join the Unionist cause.62 
Continued demands for a statement of postwar policy eventually led 
to the formation of a Unionist Policy Committee in March 1918. Meeting 
at the Colonial Office, Long, Younger, and the Scottish M.P. Lord Clyde 
quickly drafted a "Heads of Policy" program, which they sent to Bonar 
Law. The one-page document gave pride of place to victory over the enemy. 
In addition it sketched a program for national regeneration through gov­
ernment assistance to business, prohibition of foreign dumping, industrial 
conciliation, and agricultural improvement. It also proposed imperial pref­
erence and federation, revision of the financial clauses for disestablishing 
the Welsh Church, and reform of the House of Lords. Finally, the statement 
mentioned the need for improvement of health and housing and protec­
tion of women and children. In a letter to Bonar Law, Younger suggested 
that the terms of the program not be made public, at least until the term 
of the existing coalition government was fixed.63 
This policy statement was temporarily forgotten when the Germans 
launched their spring offensive in 1918. Only after that crisis passed did a 
general election became a real possibility, particularly after the new elec­
toral register was compiled in October. During the summer Lord Riddell, 
a newspaper owner and confidant of Lloyd George, noted in his diary the 
increasing talk about an election and future relations between government 
parties. The press was already requesting that the government give the new 
electorate a chance to exercise its voting rights, and the successful war 
effort created favorable electoral circumstances for the government. In an­
ticipation of an election, the NUA Executive formed a publications sub­
committee headed by Sir Laming Worthington-Evans. The subcommittee 
tried to secure an adequate supply of rationed paper and consulted central 
office about election literature. The subcommittee's report stressed two 
points. First, there was a crying need for leaflets "from the women's points 
of view." Second, the Unionist Party should fight the election as a patriotic 
opponent of socialism and pacifism. The subcommittee therefore recom­
mended that Labour's proposals and literature be searched for Bolshevik 
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and "pro-German" elements. But the subcommittee could do little until 
Malcolm Fraser, the head of Central Office Publications, finished his war 
work.64 
During the summer and autumn of 1918, Unionist leaders began hold­
ing discussions with coalition Liberals to hammer out an agreement for 
the election campaign most felt was imminent.65 In early August coali­
tion Liberals presented Younger and Bonar Law with an election program. 
After comparing the Liberal program with the Unionist "Heads of Policy," 
Younger concluded that the Liberal proposals for nationalization of rail­
ways, secure land tenure, and national generation of electricity constituted 
unacceptable extensions of government power. He also argued against the 
Liberal proposal for women's legal equality, approving instead the Unionist 
program for protecting women and improving the health of mothers and 
children. Finally, Younger argued that Unionists must insist on tariff re­
form, protection for Irish Protestants, and amelioration of the financial 
consequences of disestablishing the Welsh Church. These issues formed 
major obstacles to an agreement between the two parties. Unionists were, 
moreover, wary of holding a wartime election, because it would strengthen 
Lloyd George's parliamentary position. Younger was "dead against an Elec­
tion in Nov[ember]" because it would be "a huge gamble" while people 
were suffering from shortages and concentrating on the war. In any case, 
he thought that the Unionist organization would not be ready for some 
time. Bonar Law saw "great difficulties in any course" and had no plan for 
the future election.66 
Lloyd George was more decisive, however, and Unionist leaders were 
finding it difficult to halt the slide toward an election. In early September 
Younger submitted a new draft for a coalition program, inserting the main 
points of the Unionist plan into the Liberal document. Lloyd George, Bo­
nar Law, and Younger then discussed the draft, but tariffs remained a stick­
ing point. Many Unionists were also suspicious of the prime minister and 
appalled at the prospect of petty electioneering while the nation was at 
war. Nonetheless, meeting with Lloyd George in late September, Bonar Law 
and Balfour tentatively approved an election for November.67 
By the 8 October meeting of the NUA Executive Committee, the publi­
cations subcommittee was able to report that it had secured sufficient pa­
per, composed a number of leaflets, and nearly completed the Notes for 
Speakers and a guide to the reform act. Yet the NUA Executive still knew 
nothing definite about a general election. A delegate asked about the possi­
bility of a coalition election. Younger, unable to answer definitively, was 
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subjected to a barrage of criticism. A majority of those at the meeting, 
Younger reported to Bonar Law, strongly opposed an immediate general 
election; only a quarter of them actually supported it. Many Unionists 
feared Lloyd George would sell them out to the Liberals. There were re­
newed demands for a statement of Unionist policy, because the absence of 
one retarded the development of the WUO and pushed Tories toward the 
National Party. To save Bonar Law from an embarrassing situation, 
Younger promised the NUA Executive that the party leader would an­
nounce plans very shortly. Younger ended his letter by warning Bonar Law 
of the increasing danger: "The atmosphere was distinctly electrical and 
whatever may be the prospects of an election it is clear that we must with­
out any delay let these people understand exactly where we stand. It is not 
going to be possible to go on much longer in the indeterminate condition 
in which we find ourselves, and there could be no more fatal policy on our 
part than to permit any further unnecessary delay or we may precipitate a 
split amongst our supporters."68 
Yet nothing succeeds like success: by mid-October, with Bulgaria out 
of the war and the German army in France beating a harried retreat, there 
was growing unanimity among Unionists that Lloyd George would be a 
valuable asset. In early September, Long had informed Bonar Law, "I really 
believe the P. M. could issue a manifesto which would bring the great 
masses of Electors to his support and give us a clean cut issue which would 
enable us to get rid of the rotters." It was commonly asserted that Lloyd 
George, because he was "one of the people," was uniquely suited to deal 
with the broadened electorate. And as Robert Sanders noted in a 13 Octo­
ber diary entry, interest in an election had increased, and Lloyd George, 
but not Unionist leaders, was gaining in popularity. Eventually the rising 
tide of support for Lloyd George swept along even Unionists like Steel-
Maitland, who had opposed the coalition government.69 
As the price for preserving the coalition, Lloyd George on 25 October 
agreed to Unionist demands for imperial preference, limited protection, 
freedom for Ulster, and financial revision of the Welsh Church Act. Eight 
days later the deal was outlined in a public letter from the prime minister 
to Bonar Law (who had actually drafted it). This document called for the 
election of candidates willing to support the government in securing the 
peace and carrying out reconstruction. Beyond this overriding task, 
the government pledged to "promot[e] the unity and development of the 
Empire" and to use anti-dumping tariffs and imperial preferences to re­
store the economy. The leaders accepted Irish home rule but rejected "the 
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forcible exclusion of Ulster" from the United Kingdom. Finally, the Welsh 
Church Act was to be revised. In response to Bonar Law's request, Younger, 
Balfour, and Chamberlain all complained that tariff reform should receive 
more emphasis and reform of the House of Lords be mentioned, but they 
agreed that the letter presented an acceptable program. By this time a com­
mittee of Unionist and coalition Liberal M.P.s was already organizing pub­
licity and propaganda for the election. In general, developments during 
1918 reinforce Turner's argument in British Politics and the Great War (1992) 
that disagreements over the coalition program continued until a military 
victory suddenly seemed sure, at which point the Cabinet decided to con­
tinue the coalition and hurriedly assembled a program from existing 
proposals.70 
The General Election of 1918 
Three days after the armistice, the coalition government announced that it 
would hold an election a month hence. On 12 November, at the Connaught 
Rooms in London, Unionists, including the first women delegates to attend 
a party meeting, heard Bonar Law outline the coalition's election program. 
The introduction of women into public affairs, he began, would accentuate 
"two elements which are the basis of our Party: patriotism and stability." 
After pointing out the need for unity in dealing both with the enemy and 
with postwar problems, Bonar Law read the prime minister's letter. The 
rejection of "forcible coercion" against Ulster and the acceptance of prefer­
ence and anti-dumping drew prolonged cheers from the audience. Ac­
cording to Long, the audience responded enthusiastically to Lloyd George's 
letter. Bonar Law finished his speech by reassuring Unionists that their 
party would remain a distinct organization within the coalition. The dele­
gates wholeheartedly approved the resolution of support offered by Bal­
four and seconded by Long.71 
Shortly after this, however, Unionists were disturbed to learn that, at 
the coalition Liberal meeting, Lloyd George had presented the same 
agreement as a Liberal document. Sanders pressed Lloyd George, who 
agreed to publish his letter to Bonar Law and hold a coalition rally at Cen­
tral Hall. The prime minister led the 16 November meeting, inspiring the 
audience with his vision for postwar Britain. Bonar Law followed, pre­
senting a lucid case for the coalition government. The difficulties ahead, 
he said, were as yet unfathomed, and they were approaching the future like 
Representation of the People Act 0/1918 I 35 
"persons passing through a fog." Britain's problems needed to be ap­
proached with efficiency and pragmatism, not partisan rancor. This practi­
cal appraisal of the coalition became the basis for Unionist support of the 
postwar coalition government.72 
After the coalition program was accepted, Unionist leaders resumed 
negotiations to avoid conflicts with coalition Liberal candidates. Unionist 
leaders had been asked by the coalition Liberal whip, Frederick Guest, not 
to contest the seats of 158 Lloyd George candidates, and this proposition 
was accepted in late October. Once a Coalition program was approved, it 
was decided that letters of support signed by Lloyd George and Bonar 
Law—"coupons"—would be distributed to coalition supporters. Most 
coupons went to M.P.s seeking reelection who had loyally supported the 
government regardless of their party affiliation. Nearly all sitting Unionists 
received a coupon. Within my sample, only in Bradford Central and Skip-
ton did nonincumbent Conservatives receive coupons. The Liberal M.P. in 
Bradford Central was an Asquithian opponent of the coalition. In Skipton, 
where the Liberal M.P. was retiring, a Unionist received the coupon after 
his association made it clear that it would contest the seat. Allocation of 
the coupons caused some tension as polling day approached. Unionist and 
coalition Liberal leaders were mutually suspicious, and some local Union­
ists were appalled by central office's recommended Liberal candidates. In 
Wales, for example, Tories protested that coupons were provided for only 
two of their candidates, while Sir Alfred Mond, who was of German Jewish 
extraction, was a coalition Liberal candidate in Swansea.73 
One particularly difficult issue for the Unionist Party was its relation­
ship with the BWL. As part of the drive for national unity, party leaders 
had tried to bring workers to the Unionist Party by allocating seats to the 
BWL. In February 1917 the two groups reached a preliminary agreement 
giving the BWL free contests in ten seats, most of them in Yorkshire. But 
problems soon arose. The interventionist policies of the BWL worried 
some Unionists, and there were also concerns about the reliability of BWL 
leaders. Labour's condemnation of the BWL in early 1918 undermined the 
league's influence. Nevertheless, in March 1918, Sanders forwarded to Bo­
nar Law a list of twenty-four seats—nearly all northern industrial divisions 
hopelessly beyond the reach of regular Unionists—that the BWL wished 
to contest. Unfortunately tensions between Unionists and the BWL con­
tinued, for although some associations were willing to use the BWL and 
its propaganda, few wanted an independent organization for wage earners. 
Suspicions increased when the BWL became an official party, the National 
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Democratic and Labour Party (NDP), in May 1918. Despite appeals from 
frustrated NDP leaders, Bonar Law was unable to improve relations, and 
Guest, who eagerly accepted all allies, became the NDP's patron. Guest 
provided coupons for twenty NDP candidates.74 
In general the coalition arrangements worked reasonably well. One-
third of the constituencies in my sample had coalition Liberal candidates. 
In these seats there were apparently no attempts to adopt Tory candidates, 
although this partly reflected the disorganized condition of the Unionist 
organizations and the unwillingness of many Unionists to return to parti­
san politics. John Bernard Watson, the recently elected coalition Liberal 
M.P. for Stockton-on-Tees, had, for example, already been accepted by the 
local Conservative association when the national agreement was reached. 
In North Cornwall some local Tories spoke on the platform of the coalition 
Liberal M.P, Sir Croydon Marks, and the North Cornwall association 
agreed not to oppose him. Often, as in Kincardine, Liberals were asked to 
give assurances that they would support the coalition government. Occa­
sionally more than a simple assurance was required. In Wrexham, the co­
alition Liberal M.P, Sir Robert Thomas, told Unionists that he accepted 
limited tariffs and modification of the Welsh Church Act. During the cam­
paign he received Unionist support, one Tory lady claiming that God had 
told her to vote for Lloyd George and Thomas! Since Thomas won 73 per­
cent of the vote with a relatively high turnout, he probably drew many 
Tory votes.75 
Most coalition Unionists were favorably received by Liberal voters, but 
there were exceptions. William Bridgeman recounted to his wife the trou­
bles he faced trying to attract Liberals to his candidacy against the Labour 
candidate Tom Morris. After trying to bring prominent Liberals onto his 
platform but finding few takers, he concluded, "The sneaking Chapel Lib­
erals will either abstain or vote for the Labour man." In early December, 
Bridgeman wrote a letter to the local Liberal newspaper inviting Liberals 
to attend his meetings—and putting them in the difficult position of re­
jecting an appeal for national unity. A number of Liberals began showing 
up at Bridgeman's meetings, and two of them even sponsored a favorable 
resolution. But many Liberals supported Morris, who was a moderate 
trade unionist and a Nonconformist. Similarly, the Unionist candidate in 
Wirral, Gershom Stewart, faced no Liberal opposition because he was a 
confirmed Free Trader, but the Liberal association refused to endorse him, 
and shortly after the election began denouncing Unionist dominance of 
the coalition.76 
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Contrary to some accounts of the election, the leaders of the Coalition 
Government did not set out to exploit the war victory with a jingoistic 
election in 1918. Until the last weeks before the election was announced, 
planners assumed that it would occur in wartime, and that it was justified 
by the reform act of 1918 and the need to strengthen the government in its 
task of defeating Germany. Even after an armistice was declared, Unionist 
leaders approached the election in a restrained mood and with a reason­
ably clear platform of wartime Conservatism. Early in the election the call 
for continued national unity dominated. The victorious prime minister, it 
was asserted, would lead Britain toward peace and prosperity. The coali­
tion parties wanted, as Morgan writes, "a mandate for peace, reconstruc­
tion, and reform." Only as the campaign developed did it become a 
referendum on the victorious wartime coalition and the need to punish 
Germany.77 
Initially the most noticeable feature of the campaign was a general 
unwillingness to abandon the euphoric unity of wartime for politics as 
usual. In Skipton the Craven Herald opposed any election leading to a re­
vival of "Party" and "the old game of the 'Ins' and the 'Outs'—that sham 
fighting which rests not on any real divergence of principles and aims but 
in interests and ambitions." A journalist for the Glasgow Herald expressed 
similar views, but hoped that the coalition would be a means to avoid such 
pettiness by laying "the foundation-stone of a new political party in which 
will be incorporated the best elements of the three existing parties—sanely 
and moderately progressive in policy and steering a course between Bol­
shevism and extremism on the one hand and laissez faire and reaction on 
the other." Most observers noted the public's unconcern; Bridgeman feared 
that the election would be "fearfully dull."78 
The Unionist campaign emphasized the nation's successful war effort 
under the leadership of Lloyd George. In a few cases Unionists proclaimed 
support for a coalition party and spoke of the need to be both Liberal and 
Conservative, but generally the person of the prime minister was central 
to the Unionist campaign. Election Notes, a campaign periodical published 
by central office, ascribed Unionist support for Lloyd George to the "ut­
terly inadequate" Asquith government and their faith in Lloyd George's 
"boundless fire and energy,... rare imagination and fervour, and . .  . pow­
ers of vivid and forcible expression." They pledged their "hearty and un­
swerving support" to the Welshman during the uncertain times ahead. 
Watching the electioneering, C. F. G. Masterman, a former Liberal col­
league of Lloyd George, described "the lorries of the Tory candidates . .  . 
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jogg[ing] sadly through the rain plastered with requests to vote for X [Un­
ionist candidate] and Mr. Lloyd George; with a very small X and a very 
large Lloyd George. No appeal appeared for the other member of the Du­
umvirate: 'Vote for X and Mr. Bonar Law.'" Central office even provided 
Unionist candidates with posters like the one Masterman described. As 
they sought to win the votes of the huge number of unaligned and new 
voters, candidates emphasized their ties to Lloyd George. An advertisement 
for Sir Arthur Du Cros, a coalition Conservative candidate, in the Clapham 
Observer claimed, "Every Vote for Sir Arthur Du Cros is a Vote for Lloyd 
George." Bradford Unionists bought a whole page of the local newspaper 
to display "the[ir] Lloyd George candidates." Some Unionist candidates 
printed facsimiles of their coupons; most, like Colonel Richard Roundell, 
claimed to be "out-and-out supporters] of the Coalition Government." 
One journalist jokingly suggested that coalitionists should sue for copy­
right infringement anyone who incorrectly used the coalition coupon.79 
Election literature, including the aptly entitled "7 War Winners," 
praised the achievements of the coalition government in war and at home. 
One series of leaflets credited the government for the nation's economic 
prosperity and high wages, the closer cooperation within the Empire, and 
the reform act of 1918. Election Notes elaborated coalition plans for agricul­
tural and health reforms, soldiers' pensions, business and labor coopera­
tion, and women's advancement. Unionist propaganda claimed that nation 
and Empire would be protected and promoted by the safeguarding of "key 
industries" and imperial trade preferences.80 
Publications denigrating wartime enemies and noncoalition parties 
abounded. Numerous references to "Hun treachery, rapacity, and barba­
rism" evoked anti-German sentiments. One leaflet recalled Wilhelm II's 
1908 statement that the British were "mad as March hares" not to trust 
Germany, and claimed that the former emperor was hoping for the defeat 
of the coalition government. Aliens were already a major concern—many 
believed that they threatened Britain's unity—and the National Party's 
campaign heightened antiforeign sentiment. Xenophobia unquestionably 
played a role in the Unionist campaign. In Clapham the war veteran Henry 
Hamilton Beamish campaigned to enthusiastic crowds as an independent 
Conservative and candidate of the National Federation of Discharged Sail­
ors and Soldiers. His platform was a patriotic and xenophobic nationalism. 
Even against Unionist and Asquithian candidates, he polled 19 percent of 
the Clapham vote. Although extreme in his sentiments, Beamish was not 
the only Conservative to voice xenophobic sentiments. For instance, the 
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Bradford Central candidate, H. B. Ratcliffe, demanded an end to the "great 
bands of penniless alien immigrants who competed with the British 
worker for work."81 
Conservative election literature also demonized the anti-coalition La­
bour Party as pacifist, pro-German, and Bolshevik. Voting for Labour, Un­
ionist literature argued, would bring Bolshevism and attendant social and 
political chaos. For female voters, this meant the prospect of a "Bureau of 
Free Love." A prime target of Unionist attacks was Ramsay MacDonald, a 
former proponent of negotiated peace. In Chichester the Labour candidate 
F. E. Green was repeatedly forced to deny that he was a pacifist or a sup­
porter of Ramsay Macdonald. Ratcliffe also tarred his Labour opponent 
with the MacDonald brush and contrasted such pacifists with men of ac­
tion like Lloyd George. In Wood Green the Unionist candidate, Godfrey 
Locker-Lampson, suggested that electors vote for the coalition to maintain 
Britain's dominant position in the world and keep the country from La-
bour's "wrong and rotten policy." Yet among the twelve seats in my sample, 
only in Camlachie, Glasgow, was Bolshevism the overriding issue. Here 
the Unionist M.P., Halford Mackinder, opposed by the teacher and ILP 
candidate, Hugh Guthrie, told voters that the election was a contest be­
tween moderate Coalitionism and Bolshevism.82 
Unionists used jingoism and scare tactics to win votes, although cen­
tral office's recommended tactic was to appeal to voters to preserve na­
tional unity. The best means of achieving this goal was to elect a Commons 
that would aid Lloyd George and the coalition in securing peace and re­
form. Voters were in effect asked, as Sir Arthur Du Cros phrased it, to 
reward the government's victory with "a blank cheque." They "fought for 
liberty and justice," he said, "and now that the fighting has ceased, [they] 
must leave it to Mr. Lloyd George and a coalition Government to see us 
through the rest of the difficulty."83 
Evidence from the constituencies shows that Unionists began their 
campaigns on this patriotic note. For those who had served in the armed 
forces, the approach was straightforward. As Sanders recorded in his diary, 
his supporters voiced their opposition to the Labour candidate very sim­
ply: "Sanders went to fight and Plummer did not." Whenever his war 
service was mentioned, Lord Edmund Talbot drew hearty cheers from 
the crowd. Other candidates dredged up their every contribution to the 
war effort. Part of Mackinder's election address dealt with his involvement 
in such war work as recruiting and the War Savings Scheme. He also 
claimed to have invented the concepts of "national manpower" and "key 
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industries," expounding on them in his scholarly publications. Du Cros 
pointed to his efforts in raising troops, developing air defenses, and pro­
ducing motorcycles for home defense. He also credited himself with en­
couraging his employees to join the armed forces, providing jobs for 
veterans, and paying for 150 military ambulances.84 
Toward the end of November there was an upsurge in the xenophobic 
and retributory mood of the campaign. The return of British prisoners of 
war, in particular, brought the question of punishing the defeated enemy 
to the fore. The Unionist War Committee had been pressing the issue of 
German treatment of British POWs since July 1918, but only in mid-
November did the POW story begin to emerge. At that time the first POWs 
stumbled across Allied lines in France in a state of "utter emaciation and 
feebleness" after walking from their camps in Germany. The first shipload 
of prisoners arrived in Hull on November 17. Stories of atrocities and bar­
barous treatment of Allied POWs quickly began to circulate. Initial as­
tonishment was followed by outrage at the Germans. On seeing some freed 
American POWs, a newspaper correspondent in France wrote, "As I looked 
back on them, boys who had once been sturdy soldiers, I wondered how 
any decent man can ever look upon a German without the greatest loath­
ing." At public meetings and in the press there were demands for the pun­
ishment of those responsible: the Kaiser, other German leaders, and the 
German people.85 
As a result of the developing POW story and the growing demand for 
action, politicians were forced to deal with the fate of alleged war criminals 
and the possibility of making Germany pay indemnities. Neither Conser­
vative nor coalition Liberal leaders were eager to open debate on a policy 
toward the defeated Germans, but it proved impossible for the government 
to remain mute. After the Cabinet considered the matter, Lloyd George 
finally addressed the question of punishment in a speech at Newcastle on 
29 November. The Kaiser and Germany should be brought to justice, he 
said, for the damage they had caused and the crimes they had committed. 
He gave special attention to the plight of the POWs, but remained cau­
tious, making no rash promises. A Glasgow Herald editorial praised the 
speech, noting that, for many voters, this issue "overshadows altogether 
the political issues of the General Election."86 
By the time of the prime minister's speech, calls for punishing Ger­
many and deporting aliens were increasingly common in the constituency 
campaigns. Speaking at the Clapham Constitutional Club on 25 November, 
Du Cros stressed the need to teach the Germans a lesson, even if it took 
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twenty years and forced Britain to disregard the League of Nations. The 
next day Bridgeman noted the increasing number of questions about Ger­
many and aliens. On 28 November he told his wife, "Vindicative action 
against Germany is the great cry—and huge indemnities etc." That same 
day Colonel Roundell told a crowd how angry the sight of returning POWs 
made him. It would be just, he said, to try the Kaiser and his associations. 
"He would not give them the honour of being shot," Roundell continued, 
"but would have them hung from the top of the highest tree as the dirty 
common felons they were (applause)." Later this anti-German sentiment 
seems to have led Roundell to advertise in the Skipton paper that he was 
for "The Outing of the Undesirable Aliens and no Further Innings For 
them in This Country." On 29 November, a Wood Green newspaper re­
ported that Locker-Lampson, the Unionist candidate, was "strongly in fa­
vour of shutting out aliens and alien goods, and the punishment of cruel 
enemies, including the Kaiser." Yet the next day some voters pressed 
Locker-Lampson to take an even more aggressive stance. Ratcliffe's cam­
paign in Bradford Central also took a decidedly anti-German tone at this 
time.87 
By early December the campaign reports coming into Unionist head­
quarters showed that the question of German indemnity dominated public 
interest. The only other issues approaching it in intensity were related 
ones—the punishment of war criminals and the removal of aliens. Realiz­
ing the depth of anti-German sentiment, Sir William Bull, Unionist M.P. 
for Hammersmith, issued the following political poem on polling day: 
The German Fleet, as you all know, 
Is safely moored at Scapa Flow; 
The crafty Huns will have to pay 
And your friend BULL will show the way. 
Vote for BULL should be your cry 
As you'll discover bye and bye, 
He'll do his best to get the fruits 
Of Victory over German Brutes.88 
Such "hang the Kaiser" rhetoric sometimes excluded other questions from 
discussion. According to a newspaper report, during a 29 November 
speech, Steel-Maitland questioned Macdonald's claim that Britain should 
seek friendship with Germany. Steel-Maitland then addressed the crowd: 
"'Can you imagine yourself going hand in hand with a gentle German?' 
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asked the speaker. (Voices: 'Yes, with a knife in the other hand.' 'Send them 
here we'll deal with them.') 'I am all for housing reform,' he continued, 
'but I think the first thing we have got to do is to keep our own house to 
ourselves. We have got to make the Germans pay. The criminals who have 
been responsible for all this mischief have got to be brought to justice.' 
(Cheers, and a voice, 'Hang them first.')"89 
Yet attacking the defeated enemy was certainly not an exclusively Un­
ionist tactic, and most Conservative candidates did not completely forget 
their earlier platform statements. Steel-Maitland's audience also listened 
to Locker-Lampson speak on copartnership, care for veterans, and land 
reform. During early December Colonel Richard Roundell spoke to Skip-
ton voters about Imperial preference, safeguarding, agricultural improve­
ments, housing, and better wages. A full-page advertisement in a Bradford 
newspaper listed Lloyd George's achievements and asked "every right-
thinking Elector" to support "the most Progressive and Energetic States­
man now serving Britain" by voting for "THE LLOYD GEORGE CANDI­
DATES." The city's Unionists held a "Coalition Rally" two days before 
polling day. In case there was any confusion, a full-page advertisement 
showed photos of the coalition candidates centered over copies of their 
coupon letters, with a message telling women that these were "Lloyd 
George's Bradford Men." Beside the newspaper's report of the coalition 
rally was a headline about two local Labour candidates: "Fritz's Candidates. 
Two Bradford Bolshevists. A Talk About Leach and Jowett. Kammerads in 
Arms." Unity and leadership remained potent elements of the Unionist 
election campaign.90 
During the election coalition candidates faced only two difficult ques­
tions: the minimum wage for agricultural laborers and conscription. Some 
Unionists were criticized because they had voted to give agricultural labor­
ers twenty-five instead of thirty shillings as a minimum wage. During the 
last days of his Oswestry campaign, Bridgeman was attacked on this issue. 
He believed that it cost him agricultural voters. Conscription was a prob­
lem because of Labour's claim that the government would continue it 
indefinitely. Unionist candidates vigorously denied this. Roundell's adver­
tisements stated, "Colonel Roundell Is Strongly Opposed to Conscription. 
Pledged Against Conscription. Pledged Against the Germans. Pledged for 
the Sailor, Soldier and Worker of this Country." Both issues put Conserva­
tives in the unusual position of having to defend themselves and the gov-
ernment's record and program.91 
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Because 1918 was the first parliamentary election in which women 
voted, they received special attention. They were certainly among the most 
eager campaigners and voters. Lloyd George used female speakers, includ­
ing Christabel Pankhurst, and he held a special meeting for women at 
Queen's Hall. Many candidates held public meetings for women. One-fifth 
of Mackinder's meetings took place in the afternoon and were set aside for 
women. Central office distributed several leaflets for women during the 
election. One told them to cast their vote for the coalition, saying, "You 
Are A Trustee for the Silent," those foully treated, imprisoned, wounded, 
and killed by Germans. Other material contained civics lessons for these 
first-time voters. "To Women Voters" informed women it was their duty 
not to form a women's party. They should trust the Unionist Party and 
its program for Empire, religious education, housing, and better working 
conditions to look after the nation's best interests. A WUO leaflet claimed 
that that organization would give special attention to the interests of 
women at work and at home, to the health and welfare of children, and to 
equal pay for women. Similarly, in one of his leaflets Neville Chamberlain 
promised to provide child-care centers, assistance to women unable to sup­
port their children, and better homes, because "an attractive home means 
a contented husband."92 
At the close of the campaign, Unionists were hopeful but very unsure 
of the outcome. In their reports to central office, Unionist area agents 
made generally optimistic forecasts but noted that the absence of a reliable 
canvass of the new electorate meant any prediction was guesswork.93 Nev­
ertheless, the party's forecast for the number of seats won by coalition 
candidates matched the outcome: 473. Included in this total were 332 con­
servatives. Fifty Conservatives who had not received coupons were elected. 
Excluding Sinn Feiners, who never attended Parliament, more than half of 
those newly elected M.P.s were Unionists. The Conservatives won 111 more 
seats than in the previous election of December 1910. In contrast, Asqui­
thian Liberals and the Labour Party won only thirty-six and fifty-eight 
seats, respectively. 
The party's success in 1918 led Unionists like Long to argue that the 
election was really more a Unionist than a Coalition victory, and some 
historians have echoed this interpretation. Kinnear claims that Tory gains 
were largely a result of the improved position of the party between 1910 
and 1914, combined with the effects of the 1918 redistribution. There are, 
however, good reasons to question this thesis. In his analysis of election 
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results, Turner argues that Unionist claims of a Conservative victory "by 
their own efforts were grossly exaggerated," pointing out that the coalition 
coupon and—to a much lesser degree—the program attracted support, 
especially from women and Liberals, and that the Unionist Party had little 
to do with its own success, which largely resulted from the existence of the 
coalition.94 Although there is evidence to support most of Turner's state­
ments, the 1918 election did tentatively establish the postwar electoral posi­
tion of the Unionist Party. 
Election results in the constituencies I have scrutinized show that a 
large number of votes went to the coalition parties, particularly the Union­
ists. The seven Conservative candidates (all recognized by the coalition) 
who faced opponents won a majority of the vote, polling on average 61 
percent of the popular vote. Even in 1924, the best election for the Conser­
vatives between 1918 and 1929, the party's candidates in these seven seats 
won less than 55 percent of the popular vote. In 1918 the Unionists even 
won the urban seats of Bradford Central and Camlachie, which by 1924 
were safe Labour constituencies. In Skipton the Coalition Conservative 
candidate defeated a Liberal by 2,281 votes, winning 55 percent of the vote 
in a seat that had been strongly Liberal in the past. Since the four divisions 
where coalition Liberals were not opposed—North Cornwall, Wrexham, 
Stockton, and Kincardine—were considered safe Liberal seats in 1918, the 
Conservative Party sacrificed very little there. Only in Oswestry did the 
coalition Conservative not perform very well. Against a strong Labour 
candidate, Bridgeman won only 59 percent of the vote in a traditionally 
Tory seat. 
The national pattern closely corresponds to my sample and reinforces 
the argument that the Conservative Party benefited materially from the 
coalition—to the particular disadvantage of Asquithian Liberals.95 In two-
way contests with Liberal opponents Conservatives averaged more than 
72 percent of the vote, compared to less than 66 percent against Labour 
candidates. Over the whole country, Unionist candidates won an average 
of 58 percent of the popular vote in contested seats. Coalition Unionists, 
however, averaged nearly 60 percent of the popular vote, compared to less 
than 45 percent for Conservatives without coupons. The twenty-two Tory 
candidates who ran against coalition candidates won only 34 percent of the 
vote. Clearly coalition Conservative candidates won more votes than did 
unaligned Conservatives, especially those who faced coalition opponents. 
Although the type and location of sample constituencies may have influ­
enced these comparisons, the wide variety of seats involved should make 
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up for any such influence. Low voter turnout (57 percent)—due primarily 
to the servicemen's vote—may have affected the results, although there is 
no evidence that it did. 
This analysis of the election results suggests that the Unionist victory 
was more the product of the coalition than of a swing from the Liberals to 
the Conservatives or the consequence of the 1918 redistribution. But Turn-
er's statistical analysis seems to lead to an overemphasis on the electoral 
pact itself. True, most of the constituencies that Unionists did not contest 
in 1918 were barren ground throughout the interwar period, and the party 
did not waste resources on these probably hopeless seats. Yet a close study 
of the campaign indicates that the coalition's program of national unity 
and regeneration, as well as Unionist ideology and imagery, drew voters. 
This explains the extremely high proportion of the vote that went to Un­
ionists, particularly coalition Unionists, who benefited from the prime 
minister's popularity and the war, which vindicated their vision of the na­
tion. Without the coalition's war record and the electoral arrangements 
neither the Unionist Party nor the coalition Liberals could have performed 
as well as they did. The 1918 election was really an ephemeral success, and 
the Conservative Party's triumph a fragile one. The Conservatives had yet 
to establish a long-term response to the democratic age. As we know from 
the work of Morgan and Kinnear,96 coalition leaders were unable to create 
a permanent anti-Labour party of Liberals and Conservatives, a failure that 
led to the collapse of the coalition government in October 1922. As a result 
the Conservative Party had to accelerate the development of popular or­
ganizations and political tools for the age of universal suffrage. 
The Women's Unionist Organisation 
and the Role of Women in the 
Conservative Party 
The enfranchisement of women under the Representation of the 
People Act of 1918 created considerable trepidation in the ranks of the Con­
servative Party. In 1923 the earl of Dartmouth penned a few lines for his 
friend Caroline Bridgeman, the chairwoman of the Women's Unionist Or­
ganisation (WUO). His poem reflected contemporary concerns about 
women's role: 
I've been thinking I've been thinking 
now that women have the vote 
That they should wear the breeches 
and the men the petticoat. 
For with these womens [sic] Institutes 
They'll run us off our legs 
And the men will do the cooking 
While the cocks will lay the eggs.1 
Apprehension was not limited to Conservatives. Asquith commented on 
the female voters he encountered during his Paisley by-election in 1920: 
"They are for the most part hopelessly ignorant of politics, credulous to 
the last degree, and flickering with gusts of sentiment like a candle in the 
wind."2 
Continuing neglect of the history of the WUO and of women in the 
Conservative Party reflects the mixture of discomfort and condescension 
about women in politics. In a recent work on female Conservative voters 
in the 1980s, Campbell noted, "The first thing to say about the Tory woman 
is that we think we know what she is, and yet she is a remarkably unstudied 
political animal. We take her for granted, and we don't take her seri­
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ously.... The right depend on her but don't take her seriously for sexist 
reasons, and the left can't stand her and don't take her seriously for equally 
sexist reasons."3 Political partisans who tend to support the existing social 
and political system are not likely to attract progressive-minded feminists. 
Those who, like Campbell, are interested in right-wing movements often 
search for signs of "abnormal" development to explain why certain groups 
failed to support the "correct" cause. 
During the period from 1918 to 1929, the leaders of the Conservative 
Party created a successful mass organization for women, the WUO. The 
WUO was the largest, most active political organization in interwar Brit­
ain, and Conservative politicians were aware of its benefits to their party. 
In April 1921, there were already 1,340 women's branches in England and 
Wales; within a year there were more than two thousand. Attendance at 
WUO conferences increased from approximately four hundred at the first 
in 1919 to 2,314 by 1924 (by which time there were 4,067 WUO branches in 
England and Wales). Membership figures either were not kept regularly or 
were lost, but just in the southeast area of England there were 104,681 
members (16 percent of voting women) in 1926. Other areas apparently 
boasted higher percentages of women voters in their branches. By the late 
1920s, central office claimed that there were approximately one million 
WUO members. By contrast, at its peak in 1926 the Women's National 
Liberal Federation had only 919 branches with 88,000 members. The La­
bour Party was more successful, but had at most 250,000 members in 1,867 
women's sections.4 
The high membership figures demonstrate the Conservative Party's 
ability to attract women. By the end of the decade there was no question 
about the WUO's value. Chamberlain's 1931 investigation of the party's or­
ganization concluded that the WUO was an overwhelming success.5 It be­
came the most important organization contributing to the party's success 
in the interwar years. The WUO developed a network of local, regional, 
and national bodies that the Women's Department in central office aided 
with its staff of female speakers, organizers, and area agents. WUO 
branches carried out a wide range of political and social activities that both 
attracted members and gave substantial assistance to the Conservative 
cause. The organization provided a pleasant atmosphere for its primarily 
middle-class members, most of whom were wives and mothers. In their 
activities, members were guided by an enlarged understanding of women's 
roles even as they rejected feminism for home and family. 
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Development of the Conservative Women's Organization 
In the creation of a strong organization for Conservative women, three 
women played decisive roles: Caroline Bridgeman, viscountess Elveden, 
and Marjorie Maxse. Bridgeman, the first head of the WUO, was reserved, 
but generally respected for her sense of duty, party loyalty, and organiza­
tional and speaking abilities. The regard in which male colleagues held 
Bridgeman helped reinforce the WUO's position in its early years. Like her 
husband, William, Caroline Bridgeman came from an ecclesiastical family 
and possessed a strong commitment to public service. During the war she 
had helped provide hospital care for soldiers and worked for the Women's 
Land Service Corps. Despite a respite from February 1919 to April 1921 
because of poor health, Bridgeman served the WUO as chairwoman from 
its inception in 1918 until 1924. In recognition of her many contributions, 
she was made a D.B.E. in 1924, and in 1926 was elected the first chairwoman 
of the Council of the National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associ­
ations (NUCUA). A woman who regarded herself as her husband's adju­
tant, she withdrew from politics after he retired in 1929. 
Gwendolen Guinness, viscountess Elveden (countess of Iveagh from 
1927), served as WUO chairwoman from 1924 until 1933. Elveden (1881­
1966) came from a political family. Her father, the earl of Onslow, was 
president of the Board of Agriculture under Balfour, and her sister married 
Edward Wood, third viscount Halifax. Elveden campaigned extensively on 
behalf of her husband, Rupert Guinness, heir to the Guinness interests and 
the earldom of Iveagh. With her excellent memory and hardy but lively 
personality, she was a better public speaker and organizer than her hus­
band. She worked on behalf of the National Prisoners of War Fund (for 
which she was recognized in 1920 with a C.B.E.) and was interested in the 
farming industry and the Empire. After her husband succeeded to the 
Iveagh title in 1927, the countess was elected to his former seat of Southend. 
This burden, in addition to her new responsibilities for the Elveden estate, 
caused some worry that she was not devoting enough attention to her 
WUO duties. This concern notwithstanding, she was a popular and effec­
tive chairwoman. In 1930 she was appointed one of two deputy party chair­
men, and after her resignation in 1933 she was made a vice-chairwoman of 
the NUCUA council, with responsibility for the WUO.6 
The fact that the WUO continued to flourish despite Iveagh's other 
duties was due in part to the head of the central office Women's Depart­
ment, Marjorie Maxse (1891-1975), who expanded and professionalized the 
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central organization. Maxse came from a family of public servants; she was 
the cousin of both Leo Maxse, editor of the National Review, and General 
Sir Ivor Maxse, the distinguished World War I commander. During part of 
the war she worked in a French military hospital. In 1921 she joined the 
central office Women's Department and became the first WUO Adminis­
trator two years later. Maxse used her position to develop the WUO and 
the Women's Department. As a consequence of the 1927 Reorganisation 
Committee headed by Lord Edward Stanley, she was appointed deputy 
principal agent in spring 1928. This ensured that the WUO would have a 
powerful and secure place in central office, free from the excessive interfer­
ence of the principal agent. It was also a recognition of the WUO's impor­
tance to the Conservative Party. From 1931 until her retirement in 1939, 
Maxse also assumed the position of central office's Chief Organisation 
Officer. Sir Geoffrey Shakespeare, the former minister and Maxse's col­
league in postwar charitable work, recalled Maxse's organizing skills, stead­
iness, and determination to further the interests of the Conservative Party.7 
The progress of the Women's Department reflected the growing im­
portance of the WUO after 1918. Before the war the only women central 
office employed were clerical workers, but a 1928 list of staff shows fourteen 
female area and visiting agents and a dozen salaried female speakers and 
organizers. At first these women had much lower salaries than their male 
counterparts. Then in 1923 Mrs. Costello, a professional speaker, com­
plained that she and her colleagues had no hope of rising above an annual 
salary of £150, roughly what a female clerk made, even though she was 
college educated and well trained as a lecturer and speaker. By 1928 Cos­
tello and the other women speakers were given raises bringing them up to 
the men's level. The hiring of additional staff, in addition to these raises, 
increased the budget of the Women's Department to nearly £12,000 in 1928. 
The most important members of the expanding department were the fe­
male area agents. They worked in tandem with the male agents to stimulate 
and broaden women's political interests while improving the women's or­
ganization in England and Wales.8 
The Women's Department was also in charge of the monthly Home 
and Politics, which began as a four-page magazine in September 1920. 
When a regular eight-page party magazine, Popular View, appeared in May 
1921, Home and Politics became the women's edition of this magazine. In 
June 1923, however, a NUA Executive subcommittee decided that Home 
and Politics should be published separately by a female editor. The maga-
zine's circulation increased rapidly, passing 100,000 by the January 1925 
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issue and 200,000 by June 1927. In 1928, the last year before the general 
election, its annual circulation was greater than 2.5 million, more than 
twice that of the men's monthly, Man in the Street. In part the improve­
ment was due to the "localisation" of the magazine by associations. In Wir­
ral, for instance, attaching a local cover and inserting local news boosted 
circulation from a thousand to sixteen hundred copies monthly.9 In March 
1924 the party gazette, Gleanings and Memoranda, also began carrying a 
women's column. 
Although some articles in Home and Politics were the same or very 
similar to those in other party magazines, there were differences. Wives 
of M.P.s or members of the House of Lords, WUO leaders, and women 
prominent in public life were often featured, though it was always pointed 
out that the home duties of these women were more important than their 
public activities. For example, the March 1923 cover rather unsubtly 
showed Lady Sykes and her newly christened baby, the grandchild of An­
drew Bonar Law. Princess Mary and her son were on the cover of the next 
issue. Although the family-and-home ethos dominated the magazine, en­
tertainment and opportunities for women were not excluded. The October 
1928 issue contained several such new features, including a serialization (of 
The Thirty-Nine Steps) and a "Careers for Women" column. Too light­
hearted an approach, however, was unacceptable. A column on housekeep­
ing tips and fashion was begun in June 1923. It was rationalized by the 
claim that "the housewife always likes to look her best and to have her 
house attractive," but was withdrawn after some readers complained that 
the material was superficial.10 
As the WUO expanded across Britain after World War I, there were 
clear signs that it was the most successful and active of the Conservative 
organizations. In April 1919 a full slate of WUO delegates was admitted to 
the NUA Executive, and in June women were voted onto the important 
publications and speakers subcommittees. During 1919 a women's advisory 
committee was formed in order to keep the NUA Executive "in complete 
touch with the Womens [sic] side of the Organization." Originally the com­
mittee comprised female members of the NUA Executive plus women cho­
sen by the party leader or co-opted by the advisory committee. After the 
WUO began developing a network of regional or area committees in 1920, 
these also sent delegates.11 
The key contribution of the WUO to the Conservative Party was its 
local organization, which enjoyed continued growth throughout the 1920s. 
As the Lloyd George coalition first disintegrated and then collapsed in 
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October 1922, the WUO expanded significantly. The number of WUO 
branches rose 71 percent, from 2,100 to 3,600, during the year preceding 
the WUO conference of May 1923. Unfortunately, most branches seem not 
to have kept or published membership figures. The progress of the Stock­
ton branch, however, is better documented than most. It began with eighty 
members in 1921 and slowly grew to two hundred eighty in 1923. After the 
Conservative candidate Harold Macmillan's surprisingly good perfor­
mance in 1923 and success in 1924, membership passed one thousand. The 
number of members was sixteen hundred in 1926 and reached nearly three 
thousand after the equal suffrage act of 1928. Branch income rose from 
seven pounds in 1921 to thirty-seven in 1924 and more than eighty in 1926, 
despite the depressed local economy. The information available for other 
branches indicates that the Stockton organization was fairly typical. The 
Oswestry WUO, for instance, recorded steady growth from 2,549 members 
in 1924 to more than 4,000 in 1929.n 
Rarely were detailed records kept of the polling district and ward 
branches of the divisional WUOs. Bradford Conservatives noted with 
pride in 1921 that every ward in their city had a "strong and virile [!]" 
WUO branch with a total membership of thirteen hundred in the city. 
After less than two years of existence, the Oswestry WUO claimed twenty-
three branches. Yet particularly in the rural or suburban divisions, some 
wards or districts did not have WUO branches. Among the rural seats in 
my sample, only the Wirral WUO could claim to cover the whole constitu­
ency, and this only after a central women's committee was formed in 1923. 
The Wirral WUO was so successful that it contributed more money to its 
parent association than any other women's branch in Cheshire, Lancashire, 
or Westmorland. Sparsely populated rural areas, where it was difficult to 
maintain a political organization, tended to have a greater number of small 
branches. Unlike their opposite numbers in the Labour Party, however, 
at least some WUO members had automobiles, which made organizing 
considerably easier. Branches varied in number of members from a hand­
ful in a village to several hundred in a county town or city ward. In 1926, 
the Launceston polling district branch had 500 members, and the Skipton 
town WUO, after re-forming and establishing a monthly social night, re­
corded a membership of 570.13 
Although separate WUO branches were the norm in organizing Con­
servative women, women were linked to the parent constituency associa­
tions by numerous means. In some cases—this was the prevailing model 
in Scotland—they simply joined the existing male branches and divisional 
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associations. More commonly women created separate divisional branches 
and sub-branches that paralleled the existing male organization. Men and 
women then formed a joint divisional executive committee. In 1924, for 
instance, the Stockton WUO was "amalgamated" with the men's associa­
tion to reduce expenses and duplication of work. In fact, this meant the 
creation of a joint executive, as the women retained their own officers. 
Most common were separate women's organizations that elected represen­
tatives to the executive committee of the male divisional associations, the 
de facto parent association. Arrangements at the district or ward level de­
pended on local wishes and feasibility, particularly the number of poten­
tial members.14 
As men gradually accepted the WUO branches, cooperation between 
men and women improved. In areas where women did not form separate 
branches, they usually established their own committees or councils, in 
some cases hiring women organizers. In North Cornwall, Conservative 
women, who had their own sub-branches, established a women's commit­
tee in 1925. With the assistance of the new M.P. and the men's association, 
the committee hired a woman organizer. Two years later the women 
formed a more formal women's council. Developments in Scotland also 
demonstrate the combination of autonomy and cooperation. Wary of pre­
war difficulties with women's groups, the Scottish Unionist Association 
(SUA) decided in 1918 to integrate women into the men's associations. Nev­
ertheless, the next year the SUA Eastern Division hired a woman organizer, 
Jeanette Martin. There were worries that this would lead to "the old trou­
blesome separation," and Martin was instructed to consult local officials at 
all times. The arrangement worked so well, however, that in December 
1924 two assistant women organizers were hired. All were to be paid by the 
women's subcommittee established in 1923.15 
In the Scottish constituencies women could already form their own 
committees, and in many cases the committees maintained separate fi­
nancial accounts. During its reorganization in 1923, the Kincardine associa­
tion authorized the formation of a women's canvassing subcommittee that 
gradually assumed responsibilities for most women's concerns. Camlachie 
Unionists went even further, deciding to reorganize the women's subcom­
mittee as a "women's branch" in 1926. Some Unionists remained skeptical 
of such autonomy. This was a factor (money was another) both in the 
decision of the Kincardine Unionists not to appoint a woman organizer in 
1928 and in the curtailment of the SUA women's organization. After Jean­
ette Martin resigned in 1929, the work of the women organizers was re­
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stricted, and the SUA Eastern Division women's subcommittee ceased to 
meet regularly. A woman adviser continued, however, to oversee speakers 
and maintain contact with local women's groups.16 
WUO Activities 
WUO branches carried out a wider range of political, educational, and so­
cial activities than their parent (or men's) associations. During one meet­
ing of the Wrexham WUO, the executive discussed obtaining its own 
offices, ordering a thousand copies of Home and Politics to be sold by 
branches, organizing a trip to London, holding a fete at the home of the 
president and chairwoman, Mrs. Ethel FitzHugh, and planning a fund­
raising bazaar. As the 1928 SUA Annual Report pointed out, women's con­
tributions were essential to the Conservative Party: "Women electors view 
their responsibilities seriously and show keen interest in general political 
questions, throwing themselves heartily into . .  . organising, canvassing, 
speaking, and other political work, thus rendering good, efficient, and loyal 
service to the Party."17 
The WUO did not, however, sponsor female candidates. There were 
few women candidates for the House of Commons. Their numbers grew 
during the 1920s, but amounted to only 4 percent of the total in 1929. Be­
tween 1918 and 1929 there were only forty female Conservative candidates; 
thirteen were elected. Although the Conservatives put forward the fewest 
women candidates, their rate of success was considerably higher than that 
of Liberal or Labour women candidates. The number of Conservative 
women M.P.s nearly equaled Labour's—and surpassed the Liberal Par-
ty's—but the paucity of female candidates was a concern within the party. 
Delegates to the 1921 NUA conference heartily recommended increasing 
the number of women candidates. In her speech supporting the resolution, 
Lady Astor, the first woman to enter the House of Commons, attacked the 
prejudices that kept women from contributing their talents to Parliament. 
Sir George Younger, the party chairman, pointed out that selection was the 
prerogative of constituency associations, which were reluctant to choose 
women. At the 1923 WUO conference the principal agent, Sir Reginald 
Hall, made the same point.18 
Most of the reasons for the small number of women M.P.s are straight­
forward. Although less a problem in the Conservative Party than in La­
bour, the biggest obstacle to women was that they were often chosen for 
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the most difficult seats. Women were less willing or able to spend years 
campaigning in hopeless seats before being selected for safer ones. And 
fewer women than men became candidates in part because fewer wanted 
political office or were able to devote enough attention to politics because 
of responsibilities at home. Some felt that women could not command 
the voters' respect. Finally, many women simply did not have the financial 
resources to pay election expenses and subsidize the local associations. For 
instance, Dame Helen Gwynne-Vaughan, a former commandant of the 
Women's Royal Air Force, was able to contest a Labour seat in Camberwell 
only because of the assistance of the Conservative London Municipal 
Society.19 
Although not supporting great numbers of them in Parliament, the 
Conservative Party did depend on women to maintain its position in local 
government. At the 1923 NUA conference, two delegates emphasized that 
Conservatives were not among the "shrieking sisterhood" of irrational, 
emotional women. Women, they argued, could govern sanely and justly 
without resorting to "grandmotherly legislation." The expense of local 
elections was much lower and could be covered by the association's fund 
raising. In addition, local government seemed to suit the many women 
who were especially concerned with domestic issues. WUO members 
prized experience in local government, and such experience legitimized the 
role of women. Mrs. Annie Arnold, for instance, was probably chosen as 
the first chairwoman of the Bradford WUO because she was a city coun­
cillor. The role of Conservative women in local government has been an 
enduring one: Hills estimates that in the 1970s nearly one-quarter of Con­
servative local government candidates were women, compared to one in 
eight for Labour.20 
The WUO's main political contribution was not providing candidates 
for office but carrying out the work of mass politics. Women routinely 
handled the thousands of polling cards, envelopes, and other materials that 
had to be circulated—often at short notice—in elections. The Conservative 
Agents' Journal admitted that such activities' success "stands or falls on . .  . 
whether or not there is a good women's organisation in the constituency." 
If not for women, agents would have been forced to hire extra staff and rely 
upon more expensive bulk mailings. The most important work of WUO 
members, however, was canvassing and the distribution of literature. By 
the mid-i92os, members were experienced and systematic in their work. 
Female activists' method of canvassing was described in detail at the 1924 
conference of the Primrose League. Younger, less experienced women went 
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from house to house, distributing literature and noting voters' intentions 
on canvassing cards. Supporters were encouraged and supplied with litera­
ture. Seasoned workers then spoke to all voters marked as doubtful; if there 
was time, they attempted to win over opponents as well. Women distrib­
uted a great deal of party literature. During a municipal election in Glas­
gow, one women's branch handed out twenty thousand leaflets. Within 
hours after the North Cornwall association suddenly adopted a candidate 
during the 1923 election and scheduled a rally in Launceston, the local 
WUO branch had distributed fourteen hundred handbills around the 
town.21 
The object of canvassing was as much to bring voters into contact with 
the Conservative Party and present a positive image of the party as to ob­
tain information. Consequently, it was important, as Caroline Bridgeman 
emphasized at a meeting of the Oswestry WUO, to call on all voters and 
listen to their concerns. Keeping in touch with voters and addressing ques­
tions as they arose, Bridgeman told another meeting, depended on women 
using their talent for "talking to the voters sympathetically." Harold Mac­
millan noted in his autobiography that Lady Dorothy Cavendish became 
an expert canvasser in Stockton because she, though an aristocrat, had "the 
art of being natural, simple, and a little humble." Agents recognized that 
WUO branches were vital to canvassing because of their ability to tackle 
issues and get information from voters.22 
In addition to propaganda and canvassing, Conservative women 
devoted much effort to educating fellow members and voters. WUO 
branches devoted so much attention to the education of members and oth­
ers that the annual reports of the SUA dealt with education in a section 
entitled "Women's Work." WUO members seem to have liked educational 
work because they preferred to avoid public confrontation and rhetoric. 
Many Conservatives asserted, as the Wood Green agent said, that "if prop­
erly taught the principals [sic] of constitutionalism the large majority of 
woman [sic] would vote for constitutional government, [because] they 
were essentially patriotic and full of love for home life and the true welfare 
of the Country." In Home and Politics the WUO tried to teach Conservative 
ideals and warn readers of the dangers facing Britain. During the years 
immediately following women's enfranchisement, the WUO was especially 
active in distributing leaflets that propounded the Conservative or tradi­
tional point of view on the constitution and contemporary issues.23 
Many WUO branches had educational facilities. In 1920 the GUA 
women's committee instituted Wednesday afternoon lectures so successful 
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that they continued throughout the decade. Over time the limited curricu­
lum of economics, politics, and constitutional history was expanded to in­
corporate more contentious matters such as social reform and women's 
issues. Lectures on housing proved especially popular. Typically a local no­
table or the women's area agent spoke to an audience of women about 
current political issues, particularly social questions. In 1925 the Kincardine 
women's committee arranged for Jeanette Martin to give talks across their 
division. Martin followed her afternoon seminars on organization with po­
litical discussions and, in the evening, a public address. In North Cornwall 
two hundred women (and their children) attended a meeting of the Laun­
ceston WUO in autumn 1925. There they met the M.P.'s wife and looked at 
materials for an Empire food campaign. Then a speaker gave a talk about 
socialism, the recent Widows and Orphans Pensions Act, and the need for 
lower workers' wages to speed home construction. The meeting concluded 
with a recipe for eggless Christmas pudding and a rendition of "God Save 
the King." Two years later the branch organized a circle to study commu­
nism, education, trade unionism, and other current topics.24 
Women went to Conservative conferences, "schools of study," and the 
Conservative Party College (initially located near Northampton) to receive 
a more thorough education. Women delegates often considered party con­
ferences educational experiences. Almost half the delegates sent by constit­
uency associations to NUA conferences were women; a majority of them 
were not officers and attended only one conference.25 Delegates had a sense 
that they were involved in real political discussions as they shared informa­
tion and experiences. One representative described the conference as "the 
happiest time of her life." On their return home delegates shared their 
knowledge, sometimes providing detailed reports of the meetings and 
discussions.26 
In late 1923 the SUA Eastern Division established schools of study in a 
few locations. Women from the area around each school enrolled for two 
to four days of intensive instruction. The inexpensive schools were popular, 
helping to awaken interest and educate organizers. By the end of 1925, they 
had spread across Scotland, and one advanced school in Edinburgh was 
giving courses on foreign policy and international trade. Some WUO area 
committees in England and Wales also organized schools, but many more 
women attended courses at the Conservative College. By 1928 there were 
nearly six hundred women attending the college.27 
The WUO's large political role grew in part from its success in organiz­
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ing the social activities that did so much to make the interwar Conservative 
Party a popular organization. At WUO branch meetings, women could 
socialize as they enjoyed inexpensive tea and snacks. This practice carried 
over into the parent (or men's) associations, which before the war had been 
limited to political activities—interspersed with smoking concerts and 
club activities. In the 1920s Conservative associations instituted "American 
teas" (rummage sales), whist drives, garden parties, dances, group outings, 
and other activities. Social functions drew new members and helped keep 
old ones because they were an enjoyable way to meet the M.P. or candidate 
and learn about Conservatism. A single beach outing organized by the 
Wrexham WUO in 1923 attracted nine hundred people. And although 
membership dues did produce revenue, social events were better at fund 
raising. In January 1929, for instance, the Bradford Central WUO made 
£37 from their raffle and annual dance.28 
The epitome of branch activity in the 1920s was a whist drive and sum­
mer garden party at the home of a local notable. Both activities could be 
profitable. A branch in Wrexham, for instance, made nearly £17 from a 
whist drive. This card game was also popular because competitors could 
win prizes. And for a fee of only a shilling or two, women could enjoy 
several entertaining hours with friends or spouses. Mixed socials were used 
to attract members, and at least one women's association adopted evening 
whist tournaments so that men would come.29 Both garden parties and 
whist drives were far more attractive to WUO members than the smoking 
concerts and clubs popular in the old Unionist Party. 
A strong social life also provided opportunities for propagating Con­
servatism and strengthening the WUO. At a 1925 dance and whist drive in 
Bradford Central, for instance, Sir Anthony Gadie spoke about the govern-
ment's successes in foreign policy, pension reform, and safeguarding. Be­
cause social gatherings also served to integrate people from different classes 
and backgrounds, many associations tried to keep admission fees low 
enough to attract members of the lower-middle and working classes. Asso­
ciation officers, M.P.s, and their spouses donated money and prizes or 
officiated at events. Allowing children to attend made it possible for more 
mothers to come, and this tactic undoubtedly brought more women into 
the Conservative Party. Once it became accepted practice to rely on women 
to organize Conservative socials, WUO branches profited financially and 
developed more esprit de corps. The Conservative Agents' Journal admitted 
in 1925 that women were essential for social events and suggested that 
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WUO branches receive their "fair share of the proceeds." Meanwhile, in 
their party work WUO members learned management and leadership, 
characteristics not usually encouraged in women.30 
The WUO and the Party 
Despite women s success, there was friction between the WUO and the rest 
of the Conservative Party. The most important causes of tension were Con­
servative clubs, female organizers, and the relationship of WUO branches 
to divisional associations. With few exceptions, members of the prewar 
clubs were men. The integration of women into local associations brought 
the clubs under female scrutiny since a great deal of party activity took 
place in clubs, the social center of local conservatism and often the head­
quarters of the organization. In 1922 the secretary of the Association of 
Conservative Clubs (ACC), Frank Solbe, argued strongly against women's 
admission into clubs. According to him, clubs would have to undertake 
expensive renovations and their camaraderie would be destroyed. He fur­
ther asserted that separate women's clubs would be hard to sustain— 
women would not drink enough to make them profitable. Instead Solbe 
encouraged clubs to lease a room—maybe just for afternoons—in which 
women could meet separately.31 
As a rule women, although they could use the facilities, were not wel­
come in clubs. There were exceptions, however. The Launceston Constitu­
tional Club had already begun accepting women by 1922, and the local 
WUO had access to some rooms (it was unable to secure their exclusive 
use). When neighboring clubs expanded their facilities, WUO branches 
received rooms. An unusual situation obtained in the Cornish town of 
Camelford, where the club's rules were changed to admit women as full 
members, forbid gambling and drinking, and offer members tea, whist, 
and lectures.32 
Men's reluctance to admit women into their clubs led some women to 
try to establish their own. The Chichester Social and Conservative Club 
for women was formed in 1924. Soon two hundred members were at­
tending Friday gatherings featuring addresses, music, and the ubiquitous 
tea. In Edinburgh the SUA formed a luncheon club for young women; in 
Birmingham Mrs. Neville Chamberlain developed a strong women's club 
movement; so-called Fuchsia clubs were formed in some areas of London. 
Elsewhere—most notably in Wrexham—WUO branches were unable to 
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form women's clubs. The club problems prompted the Bromley agent, 
Lieutenant Colonel Walter a Beckett, to propose at the 1925 NUA confer­
ence that separate women's clubs be formed. The resolution passed by only 
a small majority. Beckett later raised the matter in an article for the Conser­
vative Agents' Journal He argued that women could sustain clubs with fund 
raising and dues. After less than a year, the women's club in his division 
had hundreds of members, and he urged other agents to act before women 
joined other parties. In Beckett's view, clubs aided women's work and 
served as "a fitting, official recognition of their constant and untiring work 
for the cause."33 
Another source of tension between the WUO and the rest of the party 
was the position of women organizers. Their number rose rapidly during 
the 1920s, striking terror into the hearts of some Conservative agents. In 
September 1923 the editor of the Conservative Agents' Journal, Elton Halli­
ley, argued that the question of women organizers "affect [ed] the very 
foundations of all organisation," because by setting up an authority in the 
division separate from the agent and the main association, it raised the 
specter of an independent women's organization. Halliley's editorial gener­
ated considerable comment. One writer pointed out that an experienced 
and tactful agent could easily monitor inexperienced female secretaries. 
Other agents, however, demanded action, and the National Society of Con­
servative Agents expressed its concern to the WUO. The principal agent, 
Sir Reginald Hall, pointed out in a circular to the associations that first, 
both the agent and the female organizer were under the constituency asso-
ciation's supervision. Second, the WUO posed little threat of disunity, 
since the female central office agents, unlike their male counterparts, were 
almost exclusively concerned with organizational details. The Women's 
Department, Hall emphasized, "is not a woman's movement in any way, 
nor does it seek to obtain or divert funds for feminist purposes; neither 
has it ever been the idea of any Central Office Woman Agent to advocate 
the appointment of Women Agents."34 
The question of women organizers again caused concern in 1926 and 
1927, when a National Association of Conservative and Unionist Women 
Organisers attempted to form. The project was eventually shelved, in part 
because it again raised thorny questions about women's position in the 
Conservative Party. In 1926 the National Society of Conservative Agents 
recommended that its provincial unions admit full-time, paid women or­
ganizers as associate members. Several unions rejected the proposal, how­
ever, and women organizers attending the 1927 WUO conference decided 
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to form separate bodies wherever the male provincial unions did not ac­
cept them. On the one hand, these problems show, as Sylvia Pankhurst 
argued, that party officials could be obstacles to women's progress. On the 
other, it demonstrates that the Conservative Party was gradually accepting 
professional women workers. A further indication of this change was the 
examination for women organizers given in January 1928. Half of the more 
than two dozen applicants passed the test to become the first female orga­
nizers certified by any party. Since then the number of female agents has 
increased, and today one-third of Conservative agents are women.35 
The third major source of controversy concerning the WUO was 
whether its branches should be separate or combined with the men's or­
ganization. The columns of the Conservative Agents' Journal show that this 
issue worried many agents because their positions depended on the au­
thority they exercised over the whole constituency organization. In 1918 
central office recommended the formation of separate WUO branches 
linked to the parent or men's association by a joint executive committee. 
Addressing his colleagues in East Anglia, an agent presented the case in 
favor of such an arrangement: "Women require a different type of speaker, 
different arguments, different methods of propaganda. Separate Associa­
tions should produce a spirit of rivalry, and healthy rivalry generally proves 
a mutual stimulus, creates more interest, gives greater vitality, means better 
work, and secures more funds; and what people can be induced to pay 
for, they will generally work for. The Central [constituency] Association of 
which the Agent is Secretary must be the controlling power; the women 
must have full liberty in the internal management of their own Associa­
tions; but in ideals, and in policy, there must be no dividing line. In all 
essentials UNITY: in non essentials LIBERTY: and in all things CHAR-
ITY."36 Rules could not create such a model organization, however, and 
differences continued. 
In summer 1920 the central office chief organizing agent, Leigh 
Maclachlan, and the Northwest Area agent, Robert Topping, sparked a 
long-running debate in the Conservative Agents' Journal over the relation­
ship between the WUO and the rest of the organization. Maclachlan ar­
gued that neither control nor unity of command was endangered by the 
WUO as long as it did not have a separate role in policy making or election 
management. By segregating men and women, however, the Conservative 
Party would get more members, more money, and more activity. Women 
needed their own groups, Maclachlan argued, in order to accommodate 
their routines and satisfy their distinct interests and attitudes. Failure to 
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recognize this, he added, would alienate women, who might then join 
other parties or nonpartisan groups.37 
Robert Topping quickly published a critique of Maclachlan's analysis. 
Topping accepted the establishment of women's sections in each associa­
tion in order to make meetings convenient and encourage discussion, but 
he thought that an independent organization posed a grave danger to the 
unity of local parties. The reform act of 1918 had made men's and women's 
positions legislatively equal. Gender segregation would be counterproduc­
tive, would encourage feminist attitudes and give rise to conflicts over pol­
icy, candidate selection, and other matters in which unity was essential. 
Far from being healthy, Topping claimed the existence of an independent 
women's group spurred the "most dangerous of all rivalry—women ver­
sus men."38 
The articles by Maclachlan and Topping did not go unnoticed. One 
agent agreed with Maclachlan, provided that each division had only one 
agent and that the men's chairman had exclusive control during elections. 
The overriding aim was to educate women voters, he wrote, and this could 
best be achieved if women were autonomous: "They want to learn much 
about politics; this we see and hear on all sides, but they want to learn in 
a simple, direct manner specially suited to their needs, their instincts, their 
own view of life, a method which would not appeal to many men's associa­
tions. Their enthusiasm too, so marked and so telling, differs widely from 
any enthusiasm shown by men, that 'sixth' sense which they possess— 
intuition—is also far better realised and utilised in a separate system, and 
above all—and this is an all-important point—they will be far readier to 
provide efficient workers . .  . than if there were but one Association." In 
contrast, another contributor pointed out that many areas that had had 
independent women's branches before 1918 were opting for joint associa­
tions. A woman organizer countered that the "eminently feminine trait 
which makes women take a special pride and interest in furthering the 
cause of something which they manage 'on their own'" would be crushed 
if there were joint associations.39 
To guide participants toward a consensus, the editor of the Conserva­
tive Agents' Journal suggested as a model the typical household and its ac­
cepted gender roles: 
The husband and wife discuss their joint affairs, but he 
would be a foolish man indeed who would interfere with 
his wife's discretion or initiative, or meddle with those 
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details of the home which a wife is perfectly capable of at­
tending to on her own responsibility.... In the constitu­
ency, as in the home, there should be for the well-being of 
the whole two separate working departments, the details 
of their individual management being entrusted to the care 
of those best fitted by temperament or training to deal with 
them. Interest a woman in the details of personal responsi­
bility and management in her own home, and we all know 
how happy the result can be; interest women in the care of 
their own political home, and the trust will be repaid a 
thousandfold.40 
In 1924 the WUO again came under scrutiny as a result of the disas­
trous tariff election of 1923 and the increasing number of women organiz­
ers. The newly appointed WUO Administrator, Marjorie Maxse, assured 
London agents in April 1924 that the WUO wanted "to teach women to be 
voters and Conservative voters, not to create a feminist movement within 
the Conservative Party." In a short but cogent article that appeared a few 
months later in the Conservative Agents' Journal, she claimed that fusion of 
men and women's associations demoralized the women, reduced WUO 
membership, and decreased the quality and quantity of the organization's 
work. She ridiculed fears of disunity and conflict that resulted from "the 
inability to realise that woman is a reasoning being just as anxious to serve 
her party as a man, and with no desire to take but to give. And the reluc­
tance to give women the responsibility of organising women, and of pro­
viding them with a legitimate sphere for their aspirations, has lost to the 
Conservative Party large numbers of active workers whose influence might 
have materially affected the issue. This attitude of distrust has done incal­
culable harm to our party, and has helped to swell the ranks of that legion 
of non-party and feminist organisations where women feel they will make 
their voice heard and their influence felt."41 
Maxse's exposition was supported by Halliley, who recommended that 
his fellow agents do everything possible to cultivate those women's 
branches linked to men's organizations by joint executive committees. To 
calm the agents Maxse also agreed to send them copies of all notices and 
circulars issued to local WUO officers. The debate did not cease in 1924, 
but women's invaluable and loyal work over the years and the success of 
the party in the 1924 election allayed fears. Gradually agents realized that 
autonomous women's branches enhanced the associations' revenue and 
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output. Agents and male officers accepted the WUO's independence, 
allowing Women's Department officials to encourage female volunteers to 
feel that they were vital to the party's progress. By the later 1920s most 
agents recognized that the WUO and the other party organizations did not 
undermine their authority so much as increase it by placing "an army 
corps of voluntary workers" in their hands. Agents signaled their accep­
tance of the WUO by allowing its branches to hire organizers, and by 1927 
nine-tenths of WUO divisional associations had their own organizers.42 
Although the WUO and the Women's Department strove to maintain 
autonomous responsibility over the women voters, for practical reasons 
there was a great deal of cooperation with other elements of the party. 
Many people continued to hold reactionary views on gender that shaped 
relations between the WUO and the rest of the party. Some Conservatives 
appraised women and their activities in ways indicating that they viewed 
women as flawed men. In the Conservative Agents' Journal, one agent wrote 
that women were so affected by their "senses" that they voted according 
to the physical attractiveness of candidates. Some central office officials, 
including Maclachlan, chief organizing agent and then principal agent 
from 1920 to 1928, did not fully appreciate women's contribution. Agents 
sometimes used WUO organizers for menial tasks and resented women's 
"too prominent part." This attitude was not appreciated by women, who 
considered their work of equal (and possibly greater) value than men's. 
Consequently, disagreements over the relationship between the WUO and 
the rest of the Conservative organization persisted.43 
In Stockton, gender segregation sometimes made it difficult for the 
parent or men's association to find out women's views. For instance, during 
1923 there were problems with the selection of a candidate and a dispute 
over some property in the association offices. After a joint executive com­
mittee was formed in 1924, the Stockton men seemed to accept greater 
cooperation—especially since the women did much of the work. Initially 
WUO members only lightly chided the men. As the next general election 
neared, however, they became less accommodating and resolved, "There 
should be more co-operation between the officers of the men's section and 
themselves than hitherto. It was felt that the men are leaving the greater 
part of the work to the women and that they are not doing as much as they 
should in the General Work of the Election." Similar problems arose in 
Chichester, where WUO branches did much of the work—and provided 
much of the association's funds. There women sometimes complained 
about male sloth, one WUO executive threatening to resign in 1922 because 
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of it. When twin independent men and women's associations were replaced 
by autonomous branches in 1926, the new rules allowed any Conserva­
tive who paid a small subscription to join. Because there were more fe­
male than male members, some men complained that they would be 
"swamped" by the women.44 
There was no easy solution to the tensions within the Conservative 
Party, because they grew from accepted gender roles. Antagonism gradu­
ally subsided during the 1920s, as the WUO strenuously avoided feminism 
and men accepted a greater role for women. The clearest indication of 
women's progress in the Conservative Party was their increased responsi­
bility and power. They were, for example, given equality of representation. 
In 1926 seven men and women each were chosen for the executive commit­
tee of the Clapham association. Sometimes the practice was simplified by 
selecting married couples. Women were even admitted to the elite finance 
and management subcommittees that supervised day-to-day operations. 
Women began attending the finance and general purposes committees of 
the Kincardine association and the Yorkshire Provincial Division in the 
mid-i92os. From its incorporation in 1919, the Wrexham WUO held sev­
eral places on the finance and management subcommittee of the main 
association, although women did not have equal representation. Occasion­
ally there were setbacks. In 1924 the composition of the management sub­
committee in Skipton was altered to include only the most prestigious and 
active leaders of the association, all of them men.45 
At the district and ward levels, women's growing power was even 
clearer. Since branches were smaller, men and women often formed joint 
bodies. As women became more confident and more numerous, they also 
became more active. A good example of this development, although it falls 
outside the period discussed in this book, involves the Penycae branch in 
Wrexham. Within a year and a half of its formation in May 1929, the mem­
bership of the branch contained more women than men, and shortly there­
after Edmund Wright stepped down as chairman in favor of Mrs. Thomas, 
who assumed the title "Madam Chairman." Less obvious, but nonetheless 
notable, were the increasingly frequent contributions women made in 
mixed gatherings. By the mid-i92os, for instance, it was common for 
women members of the conservative council in Bradford to propose and 
second candidates for offices and to take part in discussions of policy or 
organization. In contrast to the prewar situation, men in the 1920s were 
learning to work with their female colleagues.46 
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Contrary to the view of some feminist historians that women's suffrage 
produced very disappointing results, Conservative appreciation of the 
WUO and of women meant that the party paid them special attention.47 
A common theme of Conservative campaigns throughout the 1920s—se-
curity, safety, and peace—was intended to appeal to women. Bonar Law's 
brief election address in 1922, which doubled as the party manifesto, stated 
the nation's "crying need [for] tranquillity and stability." Caroline Bridge-
man echoed this in Home and Politics, promising voters peace abroad, 
goodwill at home, and a steady administration. By appealing to morality, 
order, prosperity, and peace, the Conservatives claimed to offer women an 
opportunity to reject "politics" and restore domestic bliss.48 
This positive message was coupled with negative, antisocialist claims. 
In leaflets like "The Danger of the Class War" and "Call a Spade a Spade 
and the 'Labour' Party also by Its Proper Name—'Socialist,'" happy fami­
lies were threatened by dirty, bearded, scowling bomb-throwers. In other 
words, a vote for Labour was a vote for revolution and class warfare. 
Such claims were routinely made. Even during the tariff election of 1923, 
many Conservative candidates pointed to the socialist bogey. Sir Henry 
Keith, the candidate for Camlachie, claimed, "Behind the [Labour] party 
the driving force is revolutionary propaganda and irreligious socialism. 
The[ir] aim . .  . is to disintegrate society, to banish religion, and destroy the 
sanctity of family life." During the 1924 campaign, Conservative literature 
informed women that Bolsheviks would treat them and their children like 
cattle. They also claimed that divorce, abortion, prostitution, and child 
molestation were common in the Soviet Union.49 
Except in 1923, when they offered tariffs rather than security, the Con­
servatives were usually able to appeal to women voters. Concerned about 
the potential effect of protectionism on women voters, Conservative litera­
ture tried to reassure them that there would be no new food duties. The 
Conservative manifesto of 1923 also promised lower sugar and tea duties. 
At the same time, central office leaflets like "Protection Means a Full 
Purse," and "Where's the Sunday Dinner?" denied that food would be ex­
pensive and emphasized that protection would lead to a stable home life 
by creating jobs for men. As the wife of one Conservative candidate argued 
in an amendment to her husband's election address, "Work is the first 
essential for the happiness of our family life." Finally central office deve­
loped a series of leaflets that some small newspapers also carried. "Over 
the Garden Wall" consisted of rather stilted conversations between a WUO 
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Table 1 
Conservative Vote in Constituencies with (1) More and (2) Less than 
Average-Sized Female Electorates 
Conservative Vote in Each Election (%) 
Constituencies 1918 1922 1923 1924 1929 Average 
1. More female voters 61.3 56.2 42.4 55.4 45.4 52.1 
2. Fewer female voters 61.1 42.2 41.6 52.3 40.5 47.5 
member, Mrs. Brown, and her neighbor, Mrs. Jones. The leaflets tried to 
persuade housewives and mothers to support tariffs that would create a 
more secure and prosperous home life.50 
An analysis of election results from 1918 to 1929 shows that the "safety 
first" theme probably worked, but protectionism alienated many women. 
Table 1 divides the constituency sample into two groups of six, representing 
seats with higher (group 1) and lower (group 2) than average proportions 
of women voters. Group 1 constituencies averaged a Conservative vote 
more than 4 percent higher than did those in group 2. Group 1 seats also 
often had more middle-class or rural voters, who tended to vote Conserva­
tive in any case. Turner argues that both class and gender were important 
to constituency results; it is difficult to know which was more significant.51 
Conservatives were apparently able to draw women voters in the origi­
nal "safety first" campaign of 1922, but not in the tariff election of 1923. In 
1922 the average Conservative poll in group 1 divisions was about 56 per­
cent, compared to 42 percent for group 2 ones. This was the largest gap in 
the five elections between 1918 and 1929. In 1923 the Conservative vote in 
group 1 divisions fell dramatically to slightly more than 42 percent, though 
dropping only slightly in group 2 divisions. The different results can be 
attributed partly to the more frequent three-way contests in group 1 seats. 
But even group 1 seats with the same number of candidates in 1922 and 
1923 (Clapham, Chichester, Skipton, and Bradford Central) showed pro­
nounced decreases in support for the Conservatives. Group 1 constitu­
encies also tended to be among suburban and middle-class divisions. 
Nationwide such divisions overwhelmingly rejected protectionism in 1923. 
Although their role remains unclear, many Conservatives blamed 
women for the outcome of the 1923 election. Before the election, Austen 
Chamberlain warned his brother that protection was risky and might panic 
women, who tended to focus on household costs. After the election 
The Women's Unionist Organisation I 67 
Younger, the former party chairman, claimed, "It is the women who have 
done it. They have been frightened by the stories of dearer food, . . . and 
have swung right over." Other Conservatives challenged this interpretation. 
Caroline Bridgeman pointed out that protection was rejected before the 
war—when women did not have the vote. In any case, she stated, Conser­
vative leaders should have recognized the party's dependence on women. 
Her colleague, Lady Frances Balfour, reiterated this point in a Home and 
Politics article: "It is not particularly useful to shout, 'We fell because the 
woman voted wrong.' That element of how women will vote is one of the 
things which must be taken into account in all future calculations. If that 
had been foreseen, other counsels might have prevailed. So much for the 
women who are in fault with the party who have lost in the gamble. Does 
anyone think of the seats lost, kept, or won by the women's vote—if people 
will still insist on separating the sheep from the goats?" Lady Astor and 
the editor of the Conservative Agents' Journal agreed wholeheartedly with 
Balfour.52 
In the following year a high turnout among women may have helped 
the Conservatives win. Whether this is true or not, Conservative women 
were happy to credit their gender and the WUO for the party's triumph, 
repudiating earlier criticisms. After 1923, Conservative leaders did not re­
peat the mistake of offering tariffs to women voters. Protectionism was not 
mentioned, and imperialism took a back seat in Conservative literature, as 
central office limited its imperial appeal to exhorting women to buy prod­
ucts from the Empire. In 1926, for instance, the WUO published the Empire 
Cookery Book, which included more than seventy recipes using imperial 
products.53 
In addition to the emphasis on safety first, the party also tried to lure 
women with promises of social reform. In 1922 Conservative candidates, 
recognizing popular discontent over overcrowding in many large cities, 
were very careful to mention social reforms, particularly housing, in their 
addresses. The 1922 Campaign Guide also detailed the party's views on 
housing and its claim to have inaugurated housing policy with the slum-
clearance legislation of the late nineteenth century. The housing issue, 
however, became more prominent because in 1920, even as a serious short­
age loomed, the government loosened rent controls and allowed rents to 
rise. Women suffered most from this change. In many areas, for example, 
Strathclyde in Scotland, they spearheaded agitation against rising rents. 
During the election Bonar Law even went to Glasgow and promised to 
investigate the matter.54 
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In later elections the Conservatives continued to use social reform to 
draw women's support. After the disastrous election of 1923, Conservative 
leaders carefully crafted the "Statement of Principles and Aims" in their 
program, Looking Ahead (1924), to appeal to women. The party offered a 
scheme of integrated pensions during the 1924 election that became the 
Widows, Orphans, and Old Age Pensions Act of 1925. The act expanded 
and integrated existing insurance schemes, creating compulsory or "all­
in" and contributory insurance. Under the legislation, widows, dependent 
children, and orphans of individuals insured for health received pensions 
by right. Old-age pensions were bestowed on all men and their wives at 
age sixty-five instead of seventy. During the campaign, Conservatives also 
pointed to the success of Neville Chamberlain's Housing Act of 1923, which 
had led to the construction of 150,000 homes by private companies at half 
the cost to taxpayers as Labour's Housing Act (1924). Again appealing to 
women voters, the 1924 Conservative manifesto promised to create a royal 
commission to study rising food costs. A food council was in fact estab­
lished by the Board of Trade. It promulgated guidelines for reasonable 
pricing, though it had no enforcement power.55 
The Ethos of Conservative Women 
The Conservative appeal to female voters and the growing cooperation be­
tween the sexes were largely due to the ethos of Conservative women, who 
avoided "sex antagonisms" and accepted a subordinate (although larger) 
role. By the late 1920s men had recognized, as Maxse pointed out in the 
Conservative Agents' Journal, that "there was no organisation of women to­
day which is less 'feminist' than the Women's Unionist Organisation." The 
Conservative junior minister, the duchess of Atholl, told a WUO meeting 
in 1926 that they should take pride in their particular contribution: "They 
must not be ashamed of doing little things and doing them faithfully, when 
working on behalf of a great cause. They could not coerce men to attend 
to the little details of a great campaign, and it would be a dreary world if 
men were to do exactly the things which the women did. Let them continue 
working systematically and thoroughly, believing if they kept on steadily, 
and quietly, and effectively, they should ensure an ever-increasing measure 
of cooperation from the men." During the interwar period women of all 
parties suppressed feminist tendencies in favor of loyalty to their party. In 
Women and the Labour Party (1918), Henderson specifically attacked "femi­
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nist agitation . .  . which tended to emphasise . .  . sex-antagonisms." Like 
their Conservative counterparts, Labour women were expected to arrange 
meetings, prepare refreshments, and carry out other mundane tasks. In the 
Labour movement, the emphasis had long been on the home as men's ha­
ven from work.56 
The position of women in the Conservative Party was based on the 
Victorian notion of separate gender spheres. At the core of this ideology 
was an emphasis on women's childbearing, nurturing, and civilizing tasks. 
As Frances Cobbe wrote, "So immense are the claims on a Mother, physical 
claims on her bodily and brain vigor, and moral claims on her heart and 
thoughts, that she cannot, I believe, meet them all, and find any large mar­
gin beyond for other cares and work. She serves the community in the 
very best and highest way it is possible to do, by giving birth to healthy 
children.... This is her Function.... No higher can found; and in my 
judgment it is a misfortune . .  . when a woman . .  . is lured by any generous 
ambition to add . .  . any other systematic work; either as breadwinner to 
the family, or as philanthropist or politician." Before 1914, some Conserva­
tives believed that women could be politically active, but only in a subordi­
nate, "female" role. In an 1890 speech to the Ladies Grand Council of the 
Primrose League, one of the leading women in the organization, Lady Jer­
sey, described the division of political labor that derived from innate gen­
der differences: "We don't wish to govern the country. Our efforts tend 
towards two things. We want, so far as lies in our power, to assist in placing 
men in the Government who we think will lead our country in the paths 
of peace and prosperity—and we want to lead all who come within the 
sphere of our influence and to bring up our children in those principles of 
religion and devotion to their country and of patriotism which will make 
them good men, and therefore, good citizens."57 
Most Victorian Unionists believed that any transgression of women's 
"natural" role would utterly destroy first femininity and then masculinity. 
In 1893 the Reverend Whitwell Elwin wrote to the teenage granddaughter 
of Bulwer-Lytton, "The gentleness, the tenderness, the refinement, the deli­
cacy of a woman are her charm, and the traits to which she owes the chival­
rous homage of the man. He is bound to treat with courteous deference 
the soft graces which demand his protection as well as his admiration. But 
when the woman apes the action of the man her claim upon his chivalry 
is gone. She has come down from her eminence, and has converted herself 
into an inferior and very trumpery sort of man. Nothing out of nature 
pleases. A masculine woman is a deformity." Women who accepted their 
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femininity, with its limitations, would be admired and protected by men. 
Such views on gender remained intact in the early twentieth century. The 
antisuffrage poster "Always Make Room for a Lady," depicted hysterical, 
aggressive women and a petticoated man. After receiving a prosuffrage del­
egation in 1910, Asquith complained to his Cabinet colleagues that its only 
male delegate, Charles MacLaren, was effeminate. Sir Almoth Wright, a 
leading antisuffragist, pointed out that politicizing women would confuse 
gender roles and create "one vast cock-and-hen show."58 
Most prewar suffragists and female activists accepted the notion of 
separate spheres and gender differences but wanted to enlarge woman's 
role because her special character and knowledge were needed to deal with 
Britain's social problems. In 1913, Mrs. Emmeline Pankhurst wrote that she 
wanted to give "a larger meaning to those duties which have been women's 
duties since the race began. . . . After all, home is a very, very big thing, 
indeed... . [It] is . .  . everybody in the nation." Before 1914, women who 
participated in philanthropic or political work were ultimately most con­
cerned with the family and the moral condition of society. In such prewar 
conservative groups as the Girls' Friendly Society, members were also mo­
tivated by the hope of maintaining social and political arrangements. Next 
to the Primrose League, the Girls' Friendly Society was the largest Conser­
vative women's group, with about 250,000 members by 1913. Rather than 
bestow insurance benefits like their male trade unionist counterparts, the 
Girls' Friendly Society provided moral guidance and instruction to girls 
and young women. Members tried to integrate them into the existing sys­
tem in part by presenting the British nation as a sort of extended family. 
This approach depended on a deference that was rapidly disappearing; the 
organization never engaged in partisan politics.59 
The emphasis on family and the notion of separate spheres permeated 
the Conservative women's movement after the war. Normally these ideas 
were unarticulated, but occasionally they were expounded with some clar­
ity. In 1922 Edythe Glanville, a member of the NUA Executive, wrote an 
article for Home and Politics, "Eve and the New Age." She asserted: "Men 
and women are the poles of society; they are opposite, but not opposed; 
different, but complementary. Neither has any interest permanently diver­
gent from the other. . . . Eve, the maiden, may gain individuality by the 
approximation of her status to that of Adam, yet what if the result be to 
make it unduly difficult for a man to maintain a wife and family? If true 
happiness lies in alliance with one's true mate can anything which dimin­
ishes the chance of such a union be in fact a benefit?" Three elements un­
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derlie this sort of analysis. First, women are innately different from men. 
Second, these difference allow women to be, as Lady Glentanar phrased it, 
"keepers of the home, a n d . .  . the future race.. . ." Third, men, the stronger 
sex, protect women who act in a properly feminine manner. In a separate 
article, members of one WUO branch described the female outlook: 
"Woman herself is never ruled by reasoned judgment, but is led more or 
less by conviction and belief in the ideal. Her nature is deeply rooted in 
the past; her character is moulded, the progress and prosperity of the race 
developed by the sympathy, service and devotion of man to her needs; her 
purpose and destiny exalted, her power extended, and her position and 
status improved by the spread of Christianity."60 
Home, husband, and children dominated the WUO ethic, but this 
outlook broadened after 1918 to include social, economic, and even inter­
national questions. A January 1921 issue of Home and Politics argued for 
women's greater political involvement: "The State more and more con­
cerns itself to-day with questions which are within the sphere of the 
'Home,' such as health, education, welfare, housing and so on. Women, 
too, are intimately interested in the cost of living, prices, rates and taxes as 
keepers of the domestic purse. Wider questions have also a 'Home' aspect. 
War, with its dreadful toll of killed and maimed . .  . may involve the loss 
of the bread-winner and increased responsibilities upon the women for 
education and up-bringing of the children Enough has been said to 
show the close connection between the 'Home' and 'Politics.'" In an August 
1921 article on Lady Muriel Helmsley, a member of the WUO advisory 
committee, the magazine outlined the goals of Conservative women: "The 
home and the children have always been woman's sphere of interest. The 
vote has added to her duties. She now has the power of defending and 
advancing home life, which is the very basis of our civilisation. To do the 
Socialist justice he knows that his cause will advance but little unless he 
destroys the home, and orders our lives from birth to death." While they 
pursued political goals, Conservative women upheld traditional female 
roles. Even Lady Astor, who was sometimes criticized for brusqueness, was 
a supporter of traditional gender roles. During her successful campaign in 
1919, she denied that she was "a sex candidate" or feminist, and emphasized 
that she was a mother who wanted to help the nation's women and chil­
dren. Conservative women came to espouse a wider notion of separate 
spheres, altering the rhetoric of politics, removing some of the old gender 
barriers, and developing their own issues as they went.61 
After World War I women became, as most suffragists had hoped, the 
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matrons of society, crusading for greater morality and spirituality at home 
and in society. This did not mean an acceptance of feminism, but a recog­
nition of the growing role of government and the need to guide the evolu­
tion of the family, on which rested the fate of the nation. The importance 
of the 1918 reform act, the 1922 Conservative Campaign Guide explained, 
is not that so many more electors are placed upon a regis­
ter, but that the advice and opinion of the homemaker are 
being asked as complementary to those of the bread­
winner. Such co-operation has, in fact, become urgently 
necessary, since legislation concerns itself increasingly with 
domestic life, and the child is viewed as an asset to the 
State. The problems of a changeful time need the co­
operation of the woman, who sees them from the kitchen 
and nursery window, with the man, who looks through an 
office or workshop. Help and counsel, too, are due from 
that large body of women who do social service, paid or 
unpaid.... [They have] prepared the ground for our mod­
ern rapidly established organisation for betterment of con­
ditions, and the care of the weak, the sick, and those who 
go astray.62 
Their concern with the home led WUO members to propose moderate 
reforms that would improve conditions in Britain but preserve the govern­
mental and economic system. They saw their particular contribution to 
Conservatism as eradicating the discontent on which Labour preyed and 
engendering national unity. Women, it was claimed, had more sympathy 
for the problems facing families and were in closer touch with people's 
spiritual and moral concerns. Mrs. Neville Chamberlain told a mass meet­
ing of women at the 1920 NUA Conference, "If men had a fault—she did 
not say they had—(laughter)—she thought they were inclined too much 
to regard politics as entirely a matter of brains, and to leave out of it that 
human element and that personal touch which came so instinctively to 
women (applause). No matter to what class they belonged, they would 
enter into the lives of others, and in those lives they would always find the 
same troubles and sorrows, the same domestic affections, the same love of 
beauty, the same desire for greater knowledge of something higher and 
better that they found in themselves. That was the ground on which they 
should meet, and it was a ground on which Bolshevism could find no foot­
hold." "Women," she reiterated, "were specially able to fill a gap that had 
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not yet been filled by men—(applause)—and introduce into our poli­
tical affairs . .  . sympathy and understanding." Mrs. Chamberlain herself 
cycled around Birmingham meeting her husband's constituents and vis­
iting neighbors.63 
WUO members were involved in social reform activities, including 
maternity and health care, housing, and local government, although this 
sometimes produced conflicts with other sections of the Conservative 
Party. At the 1923 NUA conference, Lady Selborne moved a resolution in 
favor of pensions for needy widows with children. She argued that the state 
must assist mothers of "the respectable working class" who lost their hus­
bands. Many such women, she argued, had devoted themselves to raising a 
family before they received any job training—except possibly for domestic 
service. The meeting passed the resolution. The Stockton WUO branch 
was particularly proud of its Mrs. Mark, who spoke to the 1925 NUA con­
ference about her work reducing maternal mortality. During 1928 a series 
of articles in Home and Politics discussed the invaluable role of women in 
local government and encouraged others to get involved.64 
At times reform-minded WUO members contradicted accepted Con­
servative principles. During the 1923 NUA conference, Lady Astor moved 
raising the school-leaving age for unemployed youths from fifteen to six­
teen, but another WUO member opposed the resolution because it would 
hurt industry and undermine proper work habits. The conference rejected 
the proposal, which they probably also considered too costly. At the 1925 
SUA annual meeting, the duchess of Atholl and other women proposed 
that boys be prohibited from street trading. The resolution was defeated 
after F. A. Macquisten, a lawyer and proponent of laissez-faire economics, 
attacked the idea as an infringement on freedom and capitalism. In May 
1928 the WUO conference supported the passage of a factory bill that op­
position from businessmen had stalled. (The women's request was not ad­
dressed.) Middle- and upper-class members of the WUO occasionally 
expressed opinions that threatened working men and women. For ex­
ample, the same WUO conference that supported factory reform was also 
in favor of longer shop hours. And to increase the supply of domestic ser­
vants, the Southeast Area women's committee proposed in 1925 that 
childless women be taken off the dole.65 
Although the WUO was avowedly nonfeminist, it was not, a central 
office speaker told a group of Chichester women, averse to "making a fuss" 
in order to secure its objectives. The branch chairwoman agreed and 
pointed out that male legislators were naturally more interested in matters 
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related to their own sex. The differences between male and female Conser­
vatives centered on the different standards of conduct and morality for 
men and women. Although they were Conservatives first, WUO members, 
like many women activists, intended to extend the sphere of women's oper­
ations by restricting men's. Hollis describes women's point of view before 
the war: "Only when the streets were safe for respectable women, literally 
and metaphorically, could women come out of the home into the public 
domain. That meant not just repressing the outward and visible signs of 
brothels, gin palaces, and obscene windows. It also meant challenging as­
sumptions about men and women's sexual and social nature. . . . They 
would if they could raise women to the public standing of men and men 
to the moral standards of women. . . . This meant inhibiting, as well as 
prohibiting, men's baser urges, in order to expand the public space avail­
able to women." For Conservatives like Sir Reginald Banks, such notions 
were irritating and intrusive: "Woman has rather rudimentary notions of 
abstract right and justice; she has a motherly, not to say, grandmotherly, 
attitude towards Man, and would be quite prepared to vote for compulsory 
woollen drawers, statutory hours for going to bed, and anything that will 
keep him safe at home. She is strong for the abolition of all temptations— 
except herself." This "motherliness" led women to an interest in temper­
ance, sexual morality, and legal equality.66 
After 1918 Conservative leaders recognized that they had to take into 
consideration women's views on temperance. Lady Astor was a leading 
prohibitionist, and she played a key role in the passage of the 1923 Intox­
icating Liquors Act, which prohibited the consumption of alcohol by mi­
nors. That same year the WUO successfully pressed the government to pass 
the Dangerous Drugs Act to end drug use among children. Some WUO 
members favored the prohibition of alcohol as in the United States, or at 
least the local option to do so. Nearly all WUO members believed that 
wartime restrictions on pub and club hours had proven their worth and 
ought to be retained. There was a heated debate at the 1926 NUCUA con­
ference when the delegate from a Tory club moved that these restrictions 
be lifted. Another (male) representative offered an amendment shelving 
the question. He noted, "The managers of their party organisation knew 
pretty well what was happening throughout. . . the country, and they knew 
that the greater part of the active work carried on for the party was done 
by the women's organisations, and they should bear in mind the fact that 
if they antagonised one club member because the restrictions were not 
removed how many women were they going to annoy by removing them! 
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(Loud applause.)" Despite the plea of the ACC chairman, Sir Herbert 
Nield, the amendment passed. WUO members also called for the reform 
of public houses to make them respectable enough for women and chil­
dren to patronize.67 
The most important instance of WUO intervention on a sexual or 
legal issue was the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1922, which mandated 
a prison term for statutory rape. Both Lady Astor and Caroline Bridgeman 
pressed the government to accept the measure as one that would advance 
"the moral standard of men." In July 1922 the WUO advisory committee 
asked the NUA Executive to inform party leaders, "the Unionist Women 
take a keen interest [in the bill] . .  . and trust they will see that it passes." 
The Executive took action, and the measure was quickly adopted. Among 
less notable examples of WUO involvement, at least one WUO branch 
publicized the alleged "white slave traffic" in European women. At the 1924 
SUA conference, women passed a resolution calling for an investigation 
of the sexual abuse of children. WUO members generally did not favor 
liberalizing divorce, but they did support the Matrimonial Causes Act of 
1923, which gave women the same right as men to seek divorce on grounds 
of adultery. That same year the WUO also supported passage of the Bas­
tardy Act, which increased the financial liabilities of fathers of illegitimate 
children. The WUO encouraged the second Baldwin government to pass a 
series of lesser measures requiring husbands to provide for abandoned or 
abused spouses and children, granting mothers equal rights of guardian­
ship, and declaring that children born out of wedlock were legitimized by 
their parents' later marriage. In fact, all of the women's legislation passed 
during the 1920s was the work of the Conservatives or the predominantly 
Conservative coalition.68 
Underlying the WUO's role was the belief that women had a special 
place in the existing social and political system and a unique ability to 
contribute to its preservation. To the WUO member, the family was both 
the basis of the social and political order and the key to women's security. 
In her 1931 text Women and Politics, the duchess of Atholl argued that 
Christian marriage raised women above the level of "child producing ma­
chines" by creating "a union of mind and character [and], best of all, a 
partnership in service." The responsibilities of marriage and family, she 
wrote, engendered "the finest elements in a man's character." During a par­
liamentary debate on divorce law reform in 1920, Lady Astor argued 
against divorce on demand: "In the Christian world it is the spiritual aspect 
of marriage that the law attempts to protect, . . . that makes marriages 
76 / Chapter Two 
happy. .  . [and] has elevated the Western woman." These statements would 
have been regarded as commonplace among WUO members who, ac­
cepting their role within an ordered and "civilized" society, expected to be 
harbored from predation and hardship.69 
Considering the WUO's conservative ethos, Tory women's fear of Bol­
shevism and socialism was warranted and not, as Campbell suggests, the 
product of paranoia. The British press printed stories of "bestial orgies" 
and other atrocities during the early years of Soviet rule; Conservative pub­
lications carried those reports. There were stories that many Soviet women 
and children were abused, raped, and murdered by hoodlums or radicals, 
and of Red soldiers being barracked with schoolgirls. Revolutionaries were 
also credited with "nationalizing women" and using them like "breeding 
animal [s] on a stud farm." A commonly cited story concerned an early 
1918 proclamation in the Caucasian town of Ekaterinodar. The so-called 
Ekaterinodar Mandate set up detailed regulations that abolished marriage 
and allowed men to use women as sanctioned by the authorities. The bi­
zarre but true Ekaterinodar document became a Conservative leaflet in 
1920.70 
For Conservative women, who believed that marriage and other social 
institutions protected them, outrages in the Soviet Union and questioning 
of gender roles in the west made them cling more firmly to their traditional 
beliefs. In her 1921 work World Revolution, the protofascist and antima­
sonic crusader Nesta Webster claimed that "free love," supposedly advo­
cated by radical thinkers, encouraged rape. She also argued that feminists 
were drawing themselves "into a plot of which they will be the chief vic­
tims. Women have obviously far more to lose than men by the destruction 
or even by a decrease of civilization." Webster was not associated with the 
WUO, but her views were not unlike those of WUO members. In 1921 a 
Conservative leaflet allegedly quoted a Russian as saying, "In our Russia 
there is no God, no religion, no Czar, no money, no property, no com­
merce, no happiness, and no safety." Home and Politics asserted that Bol­
shevism sanctioned quick divorces, in which the loyal wife was humiliated 
as she was exchanged for a younger "fluffy and attractive" woman or a 
purer comrade.71 
Fears like these were linked to what some observers believed was an 
increasing lack of respect for femininity and motherhood. In the Primrose 
League Gazette, the wife of the Conservative activist H. G. Williams wrote 
that Labour supporters attacked her as she accompanied her husband dur­
ing a campaign tour just before the 1924 election. She described her attack­
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ers as "insensate creatures" without concern for feminine frailty. The 
Conservatives warned women that feminist liberation would lead to their 
abuse and exploitation by a radical elite, as well as the destruction of the 
family by a "Ministry for Babies." Preposterous as they were, such state­
ments reflected the Conservative reaction to the rise of the Left and the 
changing position of women.72 
Conservatives associated traditional gender roles with social stability 
and security for women, leading them to describe radical threats to the 
established order in terms of their effect on established gender roles. Before 
the war, its opponents often conceived of female suffrage as a threat to 
masculinity and femininity and portrayed suffragists either as the domi­
neering, masculine wife, or as the asexual, fanatical spinster. In 1871 Punch 
cast the belief that female activists were not feminine in an epigram: 
The Women who want Women's rights, 
Want mostly, Women's charms.73 
After the war, Conservatives continued to believe that radicalism broke 
down gender roles. In Democracy and Labour (1924), a Tory historian 
warned against the revolutionary impact of what he called "anarchic indi­
vidualism." The search for personal freedom leads to social chaos and, he 
claimed, "the leadership of the long-haired man" and "the short-haired 
woman."74 
Conservatives used these gender stereotypes to attack their opponents. 
In one particularly mean-spirited attack, Home and Politics printed a very 
unattractive photo of Mrs. Asquith above the caption, "She has been told, 
she says, that she would always be young enough to make love and to in­
spire." A 1922 leaflet, "The Wallflower," was typical of the Conservative ap­
proach. The cover pictured a masculine and unattractive "Socialist 
woman" waiting for a dance partner. The leaflet warned readers, "Don't 
Have Her For Your Partner. Vote Unionist. Safety First!" Although de­
signed to win votes, the leaflet also demonstrates Conservative concerns 
about gender roles.75 
Some of the clearest evidence for the Conservative view of women is 
contained in a series of "Plays for Patriots" published between 1924 and 
1926 and performed by party organizations. In the first of the three plays, 
Look Before You Leap (1924), Mrs. Climber marries a socialist schoolteacher 
named Mr. Hector and turns against her former employer, Mrs. Faithful. 
By the end of the story, Mrs. Climber, "dejectedly, plainly dressed with 
78 / Chapter Two 
bobbed hair," according to the Labour dress code, has lost her savings to 
Mr. Hector, and her sons have become Socialist ruffians. Roly-Poly Revolu­
tion was written in 1925, as coal miners were poised to call a national strike. 
It portrays the effect on the home of labor agitation and "red revolution." 
In response to the selfish bravado of her husband, Bill Gunter, who has 
joined the miners' strike, Mary launches a domestic revolution. Bill is left 
floundering as he attempts to make his dinner and a roly-poly pudding. 
Lady Monica Waffle's Debut (1926) shows how a young lady of good back­
ground is treated by socialists. Lady Monica cooks waffles for a gathering 
of socialists only to be rewarded with contempt and rudeness. The obvious 
lesson of the three plays is that the existing order recognizes the special 
place and characteristics of women, while radicals and socialists reject 
them.76 
Reiterating an old saying, the Wood Green agent told his WUO branch 
that "the hand that rocked the cradle, rules the world," and Conservative 
women considered their role as "mothers of the Empire" vital. Party litera­
ture and WUO records show the emphasis that women Conservatives 
placed on motherhood. An April 1924 contributor to Home and Politics 
argued that children should be given "a sound knowledge of Christian 
principles as the foundation of national character; . .  . loyalty and patrio­
tism should be instilled into them." To achieve these ends WUO members 
participated in both Conservative and non-party youth groups. They also 
demanded censorship of the press and of films to stop "the poisonous 
teachings" of the Left and the "immoral and unhealthy literature . .  . which 
has as its object the perversion of the morals of the young." Conservatives 
were particularly worried by films, which were thought to be dangerously 
powerful propaganda. WUO members were concerned with allegedly anti-
British and anti-imperial films from America, whose characters implicitly 
criticized the British social elite. Representative of their concern was a 1925 
resolution from a women's area committee calling for more home-
produced films "on the line of British ideas and morality and founded 
upon traditions of Imperial Unity." Such demands by WUO members 
helped to pass the Cinematograph Films Act of 1927, which set a minimum 
quota for the number of British films exhibited. The WUO was not, how­
ever, able to secure passage of bills to curb the Socialist Sunday School 
movement.77 
Women's integration into politics in the 1920s did not free them from 
gender limitations and condescension. Asquith, for instance, blamed the 
Liberal defeat in the Spen Valley by-election of 1920 on gullible women 
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who swallowed the promise of free sterilized milk, and Hugh Dalton sug­
gested to his wife in 1919 that women's votes would be won if a candidate's 
oratory made them cry. Others thought that good looks drew women, 
while ugliness repelled them. Lord Esher actually made the ridiculous 
claim that Winston Churchill's defeat in the 1922 election was the result of 
his looking "so damned ugly" when angry.78 
Despite progress, women's role remained circumscribed. Lady Astor's 
career as an M.P. gives some good examples of men's negative reactions 
to a woman in politics. As a consequence of what was considered Astor's 
aggressiveness and lack of party loyalty, her relations with other Conserva­
tives were strained, and her determined pursuit of women's issues raised 
the specter of gender antagonism. When her projects met opposition, she 
attacked opponents as reactionaries and misogynists—hardly a womanly 
tactic! In 1922 she created the Consultative Committee of Women's Organi­
zations to advance women's demands, and in 1929 she tried to gain the 
support of female Labour M.P.s for a women's party. Because her manner 
contradicted the definition of womanliness and angered some Conserva­
tives, the fact that she was often well informed about the issues scarcely 
counted. Sibyl, Lady Stanley, wife of Lord Stanley, heir to the Derby estate, 
JIL chairman, and deputy party chairman, also alienated some Conserva­
tives with her stridency.79 
Yet despite their failure to capture many positions of leadership in the 
party and their outright rejection of feminism, Conservative women 
changed the character of politics and improved the position of women. 
Women's political involvement rearranged the hierarchy of issues and poli­
cies. To be successful, political parties had to offer policies acceptable to 
women. By 1929, Conservative leaders clearly recognized this. In making 
preparations for the election, they decided, for instance, that longer hours 
for Conservative clubs had to be sacrificed to female opinion. More impor­
tant, the duchess of Atholl was placed on the Cabinet policy committee 
specifically to deal with "questions affecting the interests of women." Post­
war politicians also had to be more concerned with their public and private 
morality, so as not to offend women, who were the custodians of religion 
and morality. Conservative women felt that the traditional male values and 
heroic stances associated, for example, with Lloyd George and Winston 
Churchill counted less than a sterling character. Lord Birkenhead's coarse 
behavior, for example, accelerated his decline in popularity after 1918. He 
even attended at least one session of a WUO conference while intoxicated, 
provoking disgust and anger. The M.P. for Wirral, John Grace, was forced 
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to retire in 1931 because his marriage had ended in divorce. Meanwhile, 
politicians like Baldwin and Macmillan benefited by meeting women's 
moral expectations.80 
The life and career of the duchess of Atholl (1874-1960) exemplifies 
the accepted role of Conservative women in the 1920s. Lady Astor once 
complained that the duchess did not "see straight about women," and it is 
true that she was neither a suffragist before 1914 nor a feminist after 1918. 
She was, however, active in public life before the war, and after it ended 
she won local office. When Lloyd George visited Blair Atholl in 1921, he 
suggested that she run for Parliament, and two years later she was elected 
from her home constituency of Kinross and West Perthshire. When she 
was appointed the parliamentary secretary to the Board of Education in 
1924, she became the second woman—and first Conservative woman—to 
hold a government post. In contrast to Astor, Atholl was politically success­
ful and respected by Conservative Party leaders and members in part be­
cause of her dedication and talent. The shy junior minister had problems, 
however, handling the overbearing and priggish president of the Board of 
Education, Lord Percy, and she disagreed with his cost-cutting measures.81 
Like many other women, the duchess of Atholl refused to sacrifice pri­
vate concerns for the sake of her public life. She believed that the primary 
duty of women was to nurture the "character and individuality" of others, 
and she avoided feminism and gender conflict. Lord Riddell approvingly 
noted that she dutifully accepted her husband's control over Blair Atholl. 
She believed in the "union of mind and character,... [and] partnership in 
service" that was the core of Christian marriage. The duchess of Atholl 
embodied a new ideal of Conservative womanliness: traditional female ac­
tivities and attitudes combined with adventurousness and political savvy.82 
During the 1920s the leaders and members of the WUO maintained 
the notion of separate gender spheres. They believed that it provided them 
with a role in public life and in their party while protecting them as 
women, wives, and mothers. The historian must be careful not to use 
present-day criteria in condemning these "Women in Hats" as staid and 
backward. Their participation in politics allowed Conservative women to 
redefine the legitimate concerns and activities of women. Could anyone 
have imagined Edwardian Primrose dames arguing the merits of birth con­
trol? Yet the majority of WUO members at their 1931 conference supported 
a resolution in favor of providing birth control information to married 
women at government welfare centers. During the mid-i92os several La­
bour women's conferences also passed resolutions in favor of dispensing 
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birth control information, but they were ignored by Labour leaders. More­
over, in 1930 the Labour Government decided to provide information only 
to women for whom pregnancy posed serious health hazards. And in 1936 
Labour members on the Liverpool council opposed the distribution of 
birth control information by the local clinic. Not until 1967 did unmarried 
women gain access to birth control information at state clinics.83 
Lisa Tickner's assessment of the prewar suffragists applies just as well 
to WUO members. These women "did not argue for the right to be unwo­
manly," Tickner writes, "but rather the right to define its terms."84 The 
WUO enabled Conservative women to engage in politics without trans­
gressing accepted feminine roles. In so doing, they were able to avoid that 
greater vulnerability that they believed would result from challenging the 
social order. 
Women's enfranchisement produced neither the catastrophe predicted 
by antisuffragists nor the Utopia envisaged by suffragists. The Conservative 
Party attracted female voters and created a strong women's organization. 
The WUO ethos suited the mood and aspirations of many women in 
the interwar period. In 1923 Lady Lawson-Tancred, one of the first women 
magistrates, explained why in Home and Politics. She wrote, "The great 
majority of women are essentially home lovers, and few women are utterly 
devoid of the instincts of motherhood. They will not neglect or forsake 
their domestic occupations for the public platform and the police court. 
What they are doing is to extend their knowledge and experience into a 
wider field." From 1918 the Conservative Party supported assistance to 
mothers and children, not sexual equality. Beatrice Campbell, a Marx­
ist and a feminist, has labeled the WUO ethos a "celebration of . .  . 
subordination."85 
Most Conservative women in the interwar period had no interest in 
escaping from what they regarded as their natural function. They perceived 
feminism and radicalism as threats to their persons and to their roles as 
wives and mothers, and they embraced motherhood, domesticity, and 
womanliness. After World War I, the Conservative Party mobilized women 
by supporting an enhanced version of their traditional gender roles and by 
offering stability, protection, and assistance to women and their families. 
With this approach, the party attracted more female volunteers and voters 
than any other. Today it continues to have both the greatest number and 
highest percentage of women members. Public opinion polls since World 
War II show that more women than men vote Conservative. Only in 
the two mid-1980s elections did this pro-Conservative tendency among 
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women voters disappear, but it reappeared in the 1992 general election.86 
The Conservatives' long-lived success with women dates from the 1920s, 
when the party successfully developed the Women's Unionist Organisa­
tion, offered limited but real opportunities to its members, and carefully 
appealed to the conservative values and traditional gender expectations 
of women. 
The Junior Imperial League 
and the Young Britons 
Next to the WUO, the most important organizations of the post­
war Conservative Party were its youth groups, the Junior Imperial and 
Constitutional League (JIL) and the Young Britons, neither of which has 
so far been the object of a historical inquiry. (Ramsden's history of 
the Conservative Party during this period mentions the JIL only in pas­
sing.) The JIL and the Young Britons were not the largest youth groups 
in interwar Britain, being outnumbered by the nonpartisan Boy Scouts 
and Girl Guides, with their more than half a million members. But the 
JIL was the largest political organization for young people, and it was 
considerably more popular than other parties' counterparts. By 1929 
there were about 2,000 branches and 200,000 to 300,000 Imps, as JIL mem­
bers were known, compared to fewer than two hundred youth sections in 
the Labour Party. For younger children the Conservatives in 1925 created 
the Young Britons, which grew to 470 branches and 49,000 members 
by 1929. * 
Although founded before the First World War, the JIL blossomed after 
1918, gaining popularity and attention during the 1920s. By adding more 
appealing social activities to the JIL's other functions, Conservative leaders 
were able to attract youths and use their enthusiasm for the often mundane 
tasks of organizing, canvassing, distributing literature, speaking, and office 
work. The JIL also provided a forum in which young people could learn 
about politics, carry on political discussions, and develop their political 
talents. Conservatives saw the JIL as an important body for propagating 
their views, especially among Britain's youth, and securing votes for their 
party. The SUA Eastern Division noted in 1929, "The future existence of all 
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the political parties depends on the youth of the nation, and it is imperative 
that no effort of ours should be spared in making an attractive appeal to 
them to join the Unionist Party."2 
The North Cornwall constituency offers an excellent demonstration of 
the JIL's character and appeal. A JIL branch was formed in the town of 
Stratton in 1926. During the inaugural meeting, the president of the Strat­
ton Conservative and Unionist Association emphasized that the JIL would 
"train the young to fight Communism and . .  . instil them with noble ideals 
so as to enable them to deal with their enemies in an honourable way."3 
The constituency agent then spoke on the JIL's role in developing support 
for the Empire. After the speeches came a dance, with music provided by 
the Launceston Imps Orchestra. The evening ended with forty-six youths 
enrolling in the new Stratton branch. Such social and educational activities 
brought young voters into the Conservative Party and mobilized them for 
political work. 
Development of the Junior Imperial League 
The JIL was established during the Edwardian age, but it did not become a 
successful mass organization until passage of the reform act of 1918. Mem­
bers of Britain's Conservative male elite met in July 1906 and created the 
JIL to promote imperialism and tariff reform and to encourage young 
men's interest in politics. The JIL was an ad hoc organization administered 
by members of the Junior Constitutional Club and dominated by wealthy 
London contributors. In 1907 Henry M. Imbert-Terry (1854-1938), a histo­
rian, former Unionist candidate, and past chairman of the NUA council, 
became chairman of the JIL, a position he occupied until 1927. During his 
long tenure, Imbert-Terry devoted himself to the JIL, using his connections 
in the Conservative Party to ensure the continuing importance of the JIL. 
In 1908 the JIL began adding branches in the provinces. Three years later 
its leaders decided to make the JIL an official Conservative organization in 
order to ease its financial problems and quell conflicts with the regular 
Conservative organization. Central Office provided funds to hire Henry 
Hardman Cannell (1864-1926) as a full-time JIL organizer. In return the 
JIL accepted central office's authority and added the Conservative trea­
surer, chief whip, and party chairman to its council and executive. When 
war erupted in 1914, the JIL had about 70,000 members in 300 branches. In 
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Scotland some associations formed junior branches, and the SUA Western 
Division formed the Junior Imperialist Union (JIU) in 1910, but the num­
ber of youth branches was small.4 
After four years of decline, JIL leaders in 1918 faced the task of reviving 
and adapting their organization to combat socialism. Conservatives wor­
ried about youth because of the interest Marxists and socialists took in 
education and propaganda. In 1901 a Russian police official had claimed to 
notice that Marxists were transforming young people into "a special type 
of semi-literate intelligent, who feels obligated to spurn family and religion, 
to disregard the law, and to deny and scoff at constituted authority." After 
the war, British Conservatives were similarly quick to allege, "Seditious 
teaching . .  . is spreading and inculcating thoughts and educating the 
young in a way subversive of law and order, and against King and Country." 
Conservatives were genuinely shocked by what they considered pervasive 
socialist and anti-imperial subversion. The WUO was particularly dis­
turbed by a popular culture which "pervert[ed] . .  . the morals of the 
young." The problem became worse, Conservatives thought, when nonpar­
tisan youth groups like the Scouts turned away from their original imperi­
alist, patriotic, and warrior ethos.5 
Conservatives saw evidence of subversive and immoral activities in 
many areas of British life. They campaigned against foreign films, which 
often, they believed, had a bad influence on children. A 1924 article in 
Home and Politics described the "active propaganda" of these films, which 
degraded human beings, portrayed the upper class as cruel and extrava­
gant, and undermined values dear to Conservatives. During the second 
half of the 1920s the NUCUA repeatedly demanded action against "subver­
sive" and "anti-British" films, and the Baldwin government eventually 
passed the Cinematograph Films Act of 1927, which set limits on the exhi­
bition of foreign films.6 
To Conservatives the most offensive forms of subversion were the So­
cialist Sunday Schools, the Communist Sunday Schools, and the Young 
Comrades' League of the Communist Party. Of the three, the largest was 
the Socialist Sunday Schools, which was founded in 1891 in Glasgow and 
had 140 branches by 1925. Both the Proletarian Sunday Schools and the 
Communist Sunday Schools were postwar creations that were less popu-
lar—but even more hostile to the existing economic and political system— 
than the Socialist Sunday Schools. Conservatives tended to view these 
schools as part of a plan to win power by corrupting the young. In 1926 
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Lord Birkenhead, then a Cabinet minister, told a JIL meeting that the 
groups were part of a Soviet conspiracy to deceive youth "with pernicious 
and poisonous doctrines." The schools, though few in number, were dis­
proportionately disturbing to Conservatives, who were already concerned 
about unpatriotic and immoral currents in British life. As their numbers 
increased after 1918, Conservatives became even more worried. By early 
1921 the Primrose League Gazette was warning of the "insidious propa­
ganda" of these schools, which denounced all authority except the revolu­
tionary party. If these schools and youth groups were not stopped, the 
magazine claimed, children would never become "hard-working, decent 
and law-abiding men and women, fit to take their place among the citizens 
of Britain." By 1927 Home and Politics even claimed that these subversive 
groups were creating "a race of hooligans, neurotics and drug maniacs." 
Central to Conservatives' worries was their fear, articulated by one WUO 
leader in Popular View, that seditious, blasphemous, and immoral groups 
would undermine "the Christian home . .  . the foundation of a patriotic, 
right-thinking community."7 
During the 1920s, Conservatives proposed a number of ways to deal 
with allegedly subversive activities affecting British children. Quite a few 
Tories wanted to ban some materials used by local educational authorities. 
There were also largely unsuccessful attempts to organize Conservative 
teachers. Other proposals included patriotic courses in schools and en­
dowed chairs of patriotism in the universities. Such outlandish notions 
were ineffective, however, because relatively few professional teachers were 
responsible for spreading socialist ideas. Some Conservatives also de­
manded the legal suppression of groups like the Socialist Sunday Schools. 
In 1924 Conservative backbenchers and peers introduced a Seditious and 
Blasphemous Teaching to Children bill that would have established a pro­
cedure to root out such schools, but party leaders did not support the bill.8 
After the First World War most Conservatives regarded their own 
party as a valuable tool for fighting leftists. They realized the need to draw 
young people into the Conservative Party. In particular they regarded the 
JIL as the best tool to promote "patriotism, love of country, interest in 
historical episodes, with their attendant morals; fundamental Constitu­
tional principles, [and] interest in the Empire and all that it stands for." 
The JIL could provide youths with a thorough grounding in Conservative 
values and ideas—the best method of protecting young people from so­
cialism and securing Britain's future. Central office decided that adoles­
cents and young adults who were in the "danger zone" between fourteen 
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and twenty-five should be recruited vigorously for the JIL, whose task was 
to instill Conservative and patriotic values, provide a knowledge of politics 
and economics, and train its members to work on behalf of the Conserva­
tive Party. By this method, not only would JIL members be made immune 
to the "attractive promises and . .  . appearance of profound knowledge" 
characteristic of socialism; they also would be empowered to fight it.9 
JIL leaders were eager to accept their antisocialist mission. In an Octo­
ber 1919 circular asking branches to re-form, JIL leaders emphasized the 
constant effort needed to uphold "the principles of domestic justice and 
liberty which are now menaced by the actions of self-seeking and seditious 
demagogues." JIL leaders began distributing antisocialist literature from 
central office and other party organizations. By 1920 the JIL's primary aims 
were to protect private property and liberty, prevent class warfare, and 
combat left-wing parties. Because of its new emphasis on antisocialism, 
the JIL was soon recognized by Conservatives as a key component of the 
party organization.10 
The first postwar meeting of the JIL council in December 1919 found 
a weak organization with only fifty active branches. JIL leaders decided 
that they needed to admit girls and young women because "there was a 
great future for the League if we can bring to bear on the Women electors 
the same influences as we had, in the past, on the male element." Branches 
were firmly encouraged to admit female members, although they could 
maintain separate sections for the two sexes. Shortly thereafter the JIL ad­
mitted women representatives to its council and executive committee. 
Gradually women were appointed to the important publications and fi­
nance committees and were chosen as delegates to the NUA. To avoid 
problems between young men and women, and to ensure the cooperation 
of the WUO, the JIL Executive formed a subcommittee to handle women's 
issues. By 1922 the meritorious conduct of women was already being noted: 
"The inclusion of women in . .  . the League has proved of the greatest value 
both in increase of members—many Branches having more than doubled 
their membership—and in efficiency, the ladies having taken part readily 
in political as well as in the social activities of the League. In no case has any 
difficulty arisen through the inclusion of female members." The addition of 
women to the JIL was a boon, and it later enabled the organization to 
take responsibility for the younger women enfranchised by the reform act 
of 1928." 
The vast majority of local branches readily accepted young women and 
formed joint branches. In this respect the JIL differed from most of the 
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senior associations and from some foreign youth organizations. For 
instance, the Italian Fascist Party segregated girls, gave them very little 
training, and allowed them to engage in only those activities that prepared 
them for motherhood. In the JIL, however, young women were integrated 
into the organization and its activities. Typically they formed at least one-
third of the local executive committee, although they were not generally 
selected as chairwomen. In part the success of the integration reflected 
young men's willingness to hand over to young women the "female work" 
of organizing socials, sewing for fund-raising efforts, working with chil­
dren in the Young Britons, and generally using their "woman's influence 
for good."12 
In contrast to the members of the WUO, the young women of the JIL 
joined the men in activities, including all sports except football. As a male 
member noted in a letter to the JIL magazine, "the modern girl with her 
fair outlook on general affairs, and her interest in matters of welfare, hous­
ing, etc., is a great asset." He added that some of the success of JIL activities 
was due to the attraction between the sexes. Yet the JIL offered young 
women more than a dating service. It provided them, one young woman 
noted, with "Work for their Country, for the greatest Empire that the world 
has ever seen, work for the welfare of their fellow beings, and work for our 
future children."13 
Some JIL branches created separate male and female sections that held 
joint social events. The Oswestry WUO formed female branches of the JIL 
closely tied to the WUO. But this arrangement seems to have left male 
JIL members floundering, either unwilling or unable to operate separately. 
Originally there were separate branches in Stockton, but they were consoli­
dated into a joint branch in 1923. The most notable exception to the joint-
branch format was in Lancashire and Cheshire, where the existing fed­
eration of youth organizations affiliated with the JIL in 1920 but retained 
considerable autonomy. The Lancashire and Cheshire federation refused 
to admit girls and women, despite repeated requests. Its leaders warned 
against interfering with WUO branches and undermining political activ­
ism by allowing the sexes to socialize. Only after the 1924 election did the 
Lancashire and Cheshire federation recognize that its style of operation 
was a serious obstacle to progress. At that time, despite opposition from 
older members, the younger generation of men and women who were tak­
ing control of the federation encouraged female membership in the joint 
branches.14 
Because of the JIL's potential as a popular youth group, Conservative 
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leaders and organizers were eager to develop it and integrate it with the 
regular party. Under the NUA rules of 1920, the JIL was allowed to elect 
two delegates to the NUA council. When Sir Malcolm Fraser became prin­
cipal agent the following year, he cultivated the JIL by attending its meet­
ings and praising its work. He named Cannell, the JIL organizer, to the 
post of central office agent for junior organizations, improving Cannell's 
and the JIL's position while gaining more influence over them. In spring 
1920 the JIL finally started a magazine, the Junior Imperial League Gazette. 
It gave branches an opportunity both to learn about the work of other 
branches and to make money by selling magazines, but it unfortunately 
provided little of interest to young readers. Because of the low circulation 
figures and the financial drain, in mid-1921 JIL leaders agreed to make the 
Gazette an edition of the new Conservative magazine, Popular View. To­
ward the end of 1921, Fraser also appointed a canvassing agent for the JIL 
and encouraged the NUA conference at Liverpool to double the JIL's repre­
sentation on the NUA council. Despite these gains, the uncertainty and 
infighting characteristic of the coalition period hampered the JIL's revital­
ization. At the JIL dinner in April 1922, for instance, the Diehard leader 
Lord Salisbury spoke on the need for "a pure Conservative Government" 
even though the party, of which the JIL was a component, supported the 
coalition government.15 
After the fall of the coalition, Conservative leaders redoubled their 
efforts to develop the JIL. At the 1922 NUA conference, H. G. Williams 
attributed the electorate's ignorance largely to young voters. Concerned 
about "insidious and incessant Socialist propaganda" among the young, 
delegates supported "a wide extension of the operations of the Junior Im­
perial League as an effective method of counteracting the pernicious work 
of extremists among the younger members of the community." The JIL did 
enjoy an immediate revival after 1922, and Cannell, the organizing secre­
tary, reported in June 1923 that interest in his organization was greater than 
at any other time in its history.16 
In early 1923 Fraser and the party chairman, Sir George Younger, in­
creased the JIL subsidy from central office from £500 to £800 per annum 
and agreed to hire a clerk for the youth organization and to put more party 
officials on its governing bodies. Among the more important officials were 
Philip G. Cambray and A. T. Rivers, heads respectively of the publications 
and finance departments. The JIL gained further recognition when its 
chairman was made a permanent member of the NUA Executive, and, in 
1924, JIL representation on the NUA council was again increased, from 
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four to six. By 1924, JIL leaders were certain that their organization "has 
now succeeded in impressing on the authorities, both at the Central Office 
of the Party, as well as in the various constituencies, the absolute necessity 
of the League, and the indispensable assistance which such an organisation 
can give in promulgating the political principles upon which good govern­
ment depends." With the party's recognition and assistance, the JIL grew 
rapidly. It added thirty-nine new branches—including Bradford and Os-
westry—in the first three months after the December 1923 election. During 
August, September, and October 1924, the JIL distributed more than 
100,000 copies each of "The Objects of the League" and the JIL member­
ship form.17 
In the years after the 1924 election, the JIL underwent significant 
changes in its leadership, duties, and organization. A younger, postwar 
generation took control. After a prolonged illness, Cannell died in August 
1926. Although saddened by the loss of their respected organizer, the JIL 
Executive quickly filled the vacancy with Captain A. G. Mitchell, a former 
Conservative agent at Burton-on-Trent. Mitchell had been Cannell's assis­
tant for a year and also enjoyed the confidence of the party chairman, F. S. 
Jackson. Less than a year later Imbert-Terry retired as JIL chairman. He 
was replaced by Edward Montague Cavendish, Lord Stanley (1894-1938), 
who served until 1933. Imbert-Terry had become something of a liability, 
alienating some Conservative leaders by his egotistical behavior. Stanley, a 
decorated war veteran, was a different sort of leader. He and his beautiful 
wife, Sibyl, embodied the Imp ideal of youthful vigor. As heir to the power­
ful earl of Derby, respected Lancashire M.P., Conservative junior whip, and 
a rising star in the party, Stanley was also a more important political figure 
than Imbert-Terry. The selection of Stanley in 1927 was an indication 
of the changes affecting the JIL and a sign of the rising influence of a 
new generation of Conservatives.18 These younger leaders of the JIL suc­
cessfully responded to the passage of the Representation of the People Act 
of 1928. 
As an equal-suffrage bill was being prepared in 1927, Conservative 
leaders gave the JIL responsibility for recruiting young women who would 
be enfranchised. At a March 1928 rally celebrating equal suffrage, thou­
sands of Imps gathered at the Albert Hall and its overflow meeting in 
snowy Hyde Park. The JIL president, Lord Plymouth, told Imps that they 
must "educate the young people . .  . [and] spread amongst them the prin­
ciples of patriotism and loyal citizenship and constitutionalism." Anticipat­
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ing this challenge, the May 1927 conference of the JIL had raised the age 
limit for members from twenty-five to thirty, a change that helped the JIL 
establish its authority over younger voters. Branches could also more easily 
keep older members to serve as officers.19 
Recognizing the increased importance of the JIL, the new party chair­
man, J. C. C. Davidson, again increased central office's financial support in 
1927. He paid the JIL's outstanding debts and increased its budget by 50 
percent. Central office also took over production and distribution of JIL 
literature and provided regional organizers. Between 1921 and 1927, central 
office's financial assistance to the JIL increased from £500 to £1,200 per 
annum, exclusive of salaries for the organiser and his assistants. By 1930, 
budget and salaries for the JIL were almost £1800, triple the 1924 figure. In 
part this reflected the organization's more ambitious propaganda efforts, 
particularly its magazine. In May 1925 the inadequate Junior Imperial 
League Gazette was replaced by Imp. Imp was a true JIL magazine with 
articles specifically for members and contributions from Imps across the 
country. Monthly circulation jumped from 7,000 first to 14,000, then 
to almost 30,000 after central office halved the magazine's price in Octo­
ber 1927.20 
Another major development in the postwar JIL was its system of re­
gional and constituency bodies. Area federations were originally author­
ized in 1911, and after the war JIL headquarters promoted their formation 
and provided affiliated federations with representation on the council and 
executive. The affiliation fee was also lowered. Federations served several 
purposes. First, they promoted ties between branches, especially within the 
area. Second, central office could assign a professional organizer to each 
federation. Third, through NUA's provincial divisions, JIL federations were 
able to cooperate more readily with the rest of the Conservative organiza­
tion. In 1925 there were six affiliated federations; by 1929 every area in En­
gland and Wales had a federation.21 
In addition to developing regional federations, JIL leaders decided to 
establish divisional councils and to incorporate the JIL into the local Con­
servative organization. (Initially most JIL branches were only loosely tied 
to their senior association.)22 Despite concerns about overbearing constitu­
ency agents, the 1926 JIL conference decided that branches should adapt 
to the Conservative Party's divisional organization. Under the JIL rules 
adopted in 1928, divisional councils became the focus of activity. By the 
end of 1929 all but forty-four of the parliamentary divisions (excluding 
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Lancashire and Cheshire) had councils. North Cornwall was typical. In 
December 1928 local Conservatives formed a JIL divisional council com­
posed of two delegates from each of the thirteen branches and the officers 
of the regular Conservative association. In addition, JIL delegates were 
added to the governing bodies of the senior association.23 
The JIL was a significant presence in each of the ten English and Welsh 
seats in my sample. Clapham was particularly fortunate in having the 
JIL organizer and proponent J. H. Bottomley as divisional agent. He 
ensured that a JIL branch offering a range of social activities and polit­
ical support was in operation by 1921. The example of Clapham showed 
the importance of local Conservative agents, officers, and candidates or 
M.P.s to the success of JIL branches. In Stockton a thriving JIL branch 
was formed with the assistance of the agent, a member of a prominent 
Conservative family, and the chairman of the local labour committee. 
The existence of a Bradford Central branch was in large measure the 
work of the Bradford agent. In North Cornwall, Conservative leaders, 
including the young M.P. A. M. Williams, worked hard between 1925 and 
1929 to form JIL branches in the rural division. Across Britain local Con­
servatives valued the JIL, as Cuthbert Headlam once noted, particu­
larly for its ability to rejuvenate associations with "younger and fresher 
blood."24 
In Scotland the youth organizations were separate from the JIL, and 
the two regions of the SUA—western and eastern—had their own groups. 
There was a JIU in the west; in the east, Junior Unionist branches were 
joined in 1930 to form a Junior Unionist League. Despite the assistance 
of the prewar Unionist Workers' League, there were relatively few junior 
branches in Scotland, although the number did increase during the 1920s. 
The youth organization developed more quickly in the west, where the JIU 
had eighty-two branches in 1925, although by 1929 the eastern SUA was 
catching up, with ninety junior branches and a youth magazine. In that 
same year there were 219 junior branches and 20,000 members in all of 
Scotland. A particularly successful group of juniors was the Camlachie JIU 
branch, revived in 1921. The branch held regular lecture series and musical 
entertainments, and demonstrated an aptitude for political work. It mem­
bership grew continuously, reaching more than 250 in 1929, even though 
the senior association was experiencing problems. The Unionist associa­
tion in rural Kincardine and West Aberdeenshire established its first junior 
branch in 1925; as more branches formed, the juniors took on such new 
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responsibilities as fund raising. The senior association also included ju­
niors on their committees. Scottish Unionists tended to press junior 
branches to become part of senior associations.25 
Although it gained new responsibilities and a degree of independence 
during the 1920s, the JIL remained subordinate to the Conservative Party, 
particularly at the local level. In a speech to the JIL council before the war, 
Steel-Maitland, the party chairman, had emphasized branches' duty "to 
place their services at the disposal of the Unionist Agent for their own 
Constituency and . .  . the party." This dependent relationship continued 
after the war, and the JIL did not take independent policy positions. But 
both Imbert-Terry and Sir Alan Sykes, chairman of the Lancashire and 
Cheshire Federation of Junior Conservative and Unionist Associations, 
strongly opposed the Lloyd George coalition. In a January 1922 letter to 
Austen Chamberlain, Imbert-Terry claimed that he was voicing a general 
opposition to the government within the party and the JIL: "Day by day 
it is forced upon me that unless some definite announcement is made 
most speedily as to the attitude our Party will assume at the coming Elec­
tion with regard to the Coalition, we shall meet with widespread disas­
ter. Agents and workers come into my Office every day declaring that 
they cannot keep their Organizations together; some large and ener­
getic branches of the [Junior Imperial] League have completely withered 
away.... Others have separated from the Senior Associations which sup­
port the Coalition." Other sources do not corroborate Imbert-Terry's 
claims, and the JIL never took a stand on the issue. As early as 1919, how­
ever, the JIL Executive had claimed that the absence of "a clear statement 
of present Party policy" was retarding growth.26 
The growth of the JIL occasionally created tensions with the rest of 
the party, especially the WUO. Some associations dominated their JIL 
branches. Oswestry WUO leaders, including the WUO chairwoman, Caro­
line Bridgeman, created a JIL branch for girls. WUO leaders attended JIL 
meetings, and JIL officers were included on WUO governing bodies. Under 
this arrangement, the JIL branch was expected to contribute money to the 
WUO. Although nominally self-governing, the JIL branch was obviously 
dominated by the WUO.27 But most JIL branches were able to avoid such 
domination. They could, for example, deny admission or charge punitive 
fees for older Conservatives who refused to transfer to senior associations. 
Experienced and diplomatic Conservative agents were essential to prevent 
open conflict and maintain friendly ties between the JIL and senior associ­
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ations. Lord Stanley's appointment as deputy chairman of the Conserva­
tive Party in 1927 also eased tensions. Although Davidson, the party 
chairman, worried about greater tensions between the JIL and the WUO, 
Stanley protected the JIL's interests without openly challenging those of 
any other party organization.28 
JIL branches depended heavily on older Conservatives, especially 
WUO members. Developments in North Cornwall were, as usual, typical. 
The members of one WUO branch, for instance, played a decisive role in 
the formation of a JIL branch by gathering names of potential JIL members 
and serving as officers pro tern for the juniors. Another nearby JIL branch 
was organized with the aid of a WUO leader. An important reason that JIL 
branches did not seek too much independence was their financial depen­
dence. Relatively few JIL branches had meeting places of their own. The 
West Kirby Imps raised enough money to open a club and headquarters in 
1927, but they were an unusually successful branch in a wealthy middle-
class area. Oswestry Imps obtained a hut only because Lady Harlech, the 
local WUO president, provided both the land and the money. Senior asso­
ciations also often provided subsidies for JIL branches' operations and ed­
ucational activities. In 1928 and 1929, the Chichester association granted 
five pounds to a JIL branch and paid for a JIL member to attend the Con­
servative College. Wrexham seniors assisted their youth branch by ob­
taining office space and literature. They also paid for a delegate to attend 
a JIL conference. The Bradford Central JIL, in an ill-fated bid for indepen­
dence, nearly went bankrupt after moving into its own facility. It was even­
tually forced to return to the local party offices.29 
Despite financial problems, the JIL was a popular, primarily middle-
class, youth organization. In some areas its growth was inhibited by the 
existence of other youth groups, but by 1929, there were nearly two thou­
sand youth branches. Evidence about the number or type of person who 
joined the JIL is unfortunately scanty. In part this reflects the transient 
nature of any youth organization. From the information that is available, 
however, at any moment in the later 1920s there were probably about 
250,000 members in the JIL and many others who participated without 
joining.30 
Like the Conservative Party in general, the JIL asserted that its mem­
bership and outlook were universal, not class-based. Although most Imps 
came from the middle class, the organization claimed to include many 
working-class members. One branch even reported that its three hundred 
members were the children solely of Durham miners! Formal restrictions 
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on members were few. They had to swear an oath to maintain the Consti­
tution and the Empire, uphold liberty and national unity, and improve the 
condition of the people. Branches were advised to demand a one-shilling 
annual subscription. Branch events and meetings were usually scheduled 
for the evenings, when most young people might be free from school, 
work, and other responsibilities.31 
The cost and time required for full participation in the JIL, however, 
would have strained the resources of the average worker, who was making 
less than two pounds per week. One model winter program outlined in 
Imp included dancing lessons costing five shillings, several dances costing 
at least one shilling each, a two-shilling entrance fee for carnivals and whist 
drives, and an annual ball and dinner, each of which cost four and a half 
shillings. Members were also often expected to contribute refreshments 
and other items. And some activities, for example, mock debates and par­
liaments, required an education beyond that of many wage earners. The 
quintessentially elitist activity of the JIL was the annual dinner at the Con­
naught Rooms in London. Although they did not have to wear evening 
dress, those who attended did have to pay seven shillings for the meal— 
plus transportation and accommodation. Because of these practical ob­
stacles, the JIL, like the rest of the Conservative Party in the interwar pe­
riod, had a predominantly middle- and upper-class membership, which 
may have caused southern England to be overrepresented.32 
JIL Activities 
Because of its popularity, Conservative leaders recognized that the JIL was 
"a real and live force in the affairs of the nation" and an important tool in 
combating the Labour Party and socialism.33 They gave the group three 
tasks: (1) to bring young people into the Conservative Party, (2) to teach 
them Conservative principles, and (3) to use them for political work on 
behalf of the Conservative Party. With its mixture of social, political, and 
educational activities, the JIL attracted young people and encouraged them 
to develop a Conservative outlook. Once recruited, JIL members provided 
a considerable amount of the volunteer labor needed for propagandizing 
and electioneering. As they became adults, Imps transferred to the regular 
party organization, which benefited from the infusion of experienced, en­
ergetic, and enthusiastic workers. 
The primary function of the JIL was the political education of British 
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youth. With the assistance of such older supporters as H. G. Williams, the 
JIL organized classes in London soon after the war to teach public speaking 
to young Conservatives. Classes were begun in other parts of Britain as 
well. In Glasgow eighty juniors participated in a single course on public 
speaking during the winter of 1921-22. JIL branches also sponsored lectures 
and study circles on economic and political topics. The syllabus of one 
Glasgow branch included lectures on labor, trade unionism, housing, po­
litical economy, direct action or syndicalism, socialism, and Conservative 
Party policy and organization. Students were warned strongly that direct 
action was dangerous to unions, the state, and liberty. The JIL magazine 
offered suggestions for courses. One issue gave course outlines that taught 
students to recognize the merits of British rule in India and the threat 
posed by a Labour scheme to abolish the monarchy. During 1927 alone 
there were one hundred study circles and classes for Imps. Lantern lectures 
and, later, films were often used to teach about the Empire, the Constitu­
tion, Bolshevism, and politics. Although political subjects were the most 
common, Imps also heard lectures about such topics as the beauty of na­
ture, local history, and the modern woman.34 
The JIL's educational task was frequently aided by lively debating. Dur­
ing the winter of 1923-24, the Stockton branch had classes on capitalism, 
"the Bolshevik Labour Party," and public speaking. Spirited debates on the 
merits of Capitalism and Socialism followed, with the lecturer adopting 
"the Bolshevik position" as Imps challenged him. This format was later 
repeated as certain Imps represented "the Clyde Brigade" of ILP M.P.s or 
"the Bolsheviks." The adventurous Bradford Central branch actually de­
bated real socialists. "Hat night" was an amusing and popular form of de­
bating in which each Imp delivered an impromptu speech on one of a wide 
range of serious or humorous topics drawn from a hat. Members of one 
branch, for example, spent an evening debating prohibition, hairstyles, the 
age of sexual discretion, women councillors, equal suffrage at twenty-
one, Sunday boxing, test matches, reparations, and the navy. There were 
also opportunities to consider contemporary political and social con­
cerns, among them the position of young people and men's and women's 
proper roles.35 
The mock election or parliament was another educational activity. 
North Cornwall Imps held an election in which three male and three fe­
male candidates presented election addresses dealing with local issues like 
housing and public works. The Stockton JIL organized a mock parliament 
that lasted for several weeks. Various members portrayed the speaker of the 
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House of Commons, Stockton's M.P. Harold Macmillan, and such Labour 
figures as the passionate M.P. for Middlesbrough, "Red Ellen" Wilkinson. 
During the sessions Imps introduced and debated bills on safeguarding, 
housing, and the trade union political levy. These exercises increased 
knowledge and respect for the Constitution, "English virtues," and modern 
Conservatism while also training JIL members to assist the party.36 
For the most active members, the premier reward was the Conserva­
tive Party College, where students received a thorough grounding in Con­
servative principles and policies. During the college's second session, in the 
summer of 1924, fifty JIL branches sent students; the next year sixty 
branches sent Imps. At the college, students heard distinguished lecturers 
and discussed political economy, constitutional history, public speaking, 
and party operations. They also had opportunities for recreation and social 
activity that promoted camaraderie. Recognizing the merits of the institu­
tion, the JIL Executive asked the college to design special Imp courses in 
1927. JIL leaders also arranged for central office to pay for at least seventy 
JIL students to attend. Of the 370 Imps at the college in 1927, more than a 
third received scholarships. Many Imps were inspired by their two weeks' 
training and recreation. Imp noted in 1928 that graduates understood that 
"the work of the world is done by the enthusiastic.... who blaze the trail 
and break down obstacles and carry the lethargic crowd along with them." 
Students often returned to their branch with a new sense of purpose.37 
Although JIL conferences and rallies had other purposes, they also de­
veloped Imps' political knowledge and enthusiasm. Branches could send 
delegates to the organization's annual dinners and conferences. For youth­
ful Conservatives these events were memorable occasions where they 
might at least glimpse the Conservative leaders. Imps could move and sec­
ond resolutions at the JIL conference—an unusual privilege for young 
adults in a party largely dominated by elderly gentlemen. Observers some­
times lampooned young and inept speakers, but the party benefited from 
the image of youthfulness and enthusiasm they contributed. Meanwhile 
JIL members had an opportunity to learn the rules of conduct that were 
the rudiments of good government. Such exercises were practical lessons 
in responsible democratic politics or, as Imp phrased it in May 1925, "gov­
ernment from the Imps, by the Imps, for the Imps."38 
One of the greatest thrills for Imps was to hear Stanley Baldwin, who 
spoke regularly at JIL gatherings. On these occasions Baldwin, who was 
committed to educating voters, often expounded his favorite themes of 
citizenship and service. In particular, he tried to create trust in the British 
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system of government by emphasizing those traditional "John Bull" values 
of which he was the exemplar. Baldwin's speeches, many of which were 
printed in popular collections, often dealt with public morality. In a De­
cember 1924 speech at the Albert Hall, he appealed to "a widespread in­
stinct in the British people," urging them to take a "stand on public right 
and a law of nations . .  . rather than with Machiavelli . .  . to moralise 
our public intercourse." Baldwin especially deplored manipulative rheto­
ric. In March 1924 he told members of the Cambridge Union that he had 
a "positive horror" of rhetorical flourishes. He claimed that rhetoric poses 
a grave danger to democracy because it "stirs the emotions of the ignorant 
mob and sets it moving." Baldwin's speeches seem to have had the effect 
he hoped for. Even a critic like Charles Masterman, the Liberal M.P. and 
writer, was attracted to what he considered a "public-school schoolboy" 
and his "public-school traditions."39 
One of the most memorable of Baldwin's addresses to the JIL was de­
livered at the Albert Hall Rally in March 1928. Enthusiastic Imps greeted 
Baldwin with a powerful "Imp Whisper," their name for their deafening 
roar of enthusiasm. The prime minister spoke of public service as its own 
reward. The progress of Britain and the world, he claimed, depended on 
British democracy, and the Imps could help create the necessary individual 
character, national unity, and imperial purpose. He exhorted them to "take 
up the torch from the hand of the generation that drops it. Make it give 
a brighter light than we have been able to; carry it further with stronger 
step, so that we may feel, when our time comes to hand it on, that you 
will do your duty, and pass it on to the generation instructed by you 
which will do yet better, so that in time long distant, and after our puny 
lights have been extinguished, the kingdoms of the world may be flooded 
with a light which we only see to-day in our dreams." Response to what 
at least one old Conservative regarded as "the best political meeting that 
had ever been held" was appropriately enthusiastic. Leaflet, phonograph, 
and film versions of the speech were later used for recruitment and 
campaigning.40 
Imps aided the Conservative Party directly by working at the mundane 
and time-consuming tasks of mass politics. Initially their political activity 
was confined to distributing materials at NUA conferences. In 1921, how­
ever, newly revived JIL branches distributed literature, spoke, and provided 
manual labor to contribute to the victory of Conservatives in London's 
local election. Thereafter the JIL remained very active in the metropolis 
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and even campaigned for JIL candidates in later local elections. Outside 
London, JIL leaders carefully developed the Imps' knowledge and nurtured 
their enthusiasm for canvassing, speaking, and such unexciting tasks as 
addressing envelopes. Imps served as stewards, singers, and other highly 
visible personnel at meetings, where they gave the party a youthful and 
progressive image. They were also encouraged to reconnoiter and harass 
the opposition.41 During the tariff election of 1923, Imps used their own 
campaign song, set to the tune of "Yes, We Have No Bananas": 
Yes! we've got no employment, 
We've got no employment to-day. 
We've dumping, tub-thumping, 
And business all slumping, 
In spite of what Free Traders say. 
We've got the old "open door" system, 
It ain't 'arf given us a twistin'. 
O, yes we've got no employment, 
But Protection is coming hurray.42 
There is no way to measure how much political work the JIL did, but one 
branch in West Ham, for instance, claimed that it performed three-
quarters of the work for the 1922 and 1923 campaigns of Captain David 
Margesson, later a chief whip.43 
Less important to the JIL's political role were its direct financial and 
membership contributions to senior associations. Most JIL branches were 
financially dependent, but they sometimes raised funds for the party. After 
the election defeat in 1929, the North Cornwall JIL raised enough to pay a 
substantial part of the senior association's debts, but this was far from typi­
cal. Instead of money, JIL branches sent many of their best members on to 
the senior associations. As Lady Dorothy Macmillan told the Stockton 
WUO in 1926, the JIL educated youths in "a sense of duty and loyalty to 
the country, so that when they arrived at the age of men and women they 
could join the Senior Organisation." Some JIL members also chose careers 
in the Conservative Party. This respectable profession, the March 1928 Imp 
stated, "offer [ed] a very varied and interesting life and sufficient remunera­
tion to ensure personal independence."44 
The Imps' political importance must be kept in perspective. The JIL 
was never so independent as to put forward its own candidates for public 
office. Only senior associations could adopt official candidates although 
ioo / Chapter Three 
some Imps contested elections. Some Imps felt that this was too restricting. 
One JIL member wrote to Imp, "Every young Conservative should be made 
to feel and know that here is a systematic means of providing an outlet for 
his or her abilities, and that in the Conservative Party there is nothing 
tangible or intangible, that is prejudicial to their reaching any position, 
even the highest, within the Party. If there be such an intangible obstacle, 
purge i t . . .  . If tangible, e.g., older people whose minds are unable to move 
forward beyond 1900, relegate them to their true sphere of Bumbledom!" 
Such hostility toward older Conservatives was not typical, but Imps did 
not want to be the stooges of the regular party, and they sometimes chafed 
at their limited role as an educational organization for young people, 
which was more circumscribed even than the WUO's.45 
Another more common criticism of the JIL was its members' limited 
political commitment. One contributor to Imp complained that political 
activity was infrequent or even nonexistent—unless followed by a dance 
or social. Imps, he insisted, must answer the call for "Service, not self" by 
spending less time on trivialities and more on social and political issues. 
In the late 1920s there were several unsuccessful attempts to remove the 
name "Imp" from use because it "implied playing at politics" and belied 
the organization's serious work for the Conservative Party. Many JIL lead­
ers and members were aware of the long-standing problems and tried to 
ensure that socializing did not overwhelm other activities. Imps were 
strongly warned against admitting non-Conservative youths and allowing 
their branch to become "a weekly free social club."46 
The JIL also encouraged branches' political work. The JIL Handbook 
claimed, "The most virile Branches, even in the matter of social and sports, 
are those which make political service their first and foremost aim." Some 
branches used incentives to encourage and maintain political work. The 
Stockton JIL, for instance, held Monday night dances at the Maison de 
Danse; Imps who attended the previous JIL meeting were admitted for half 
price. To ensure that no one wholly escaped the politics, all dancers had to 
take a ten-minute intermission to hear a political address. But Conserva­
tives in Stockton (and elsewhere) did not make too many demands, be­
cause they wanted converts, and popular organizations like the JIL could 
not be too restrictive. JIL leaders also tried to encourage political activity 
by bestowing awards. The JIL branch whose report best integrated politics 
with other activities won a set of the Westminster Library of political texts. 
Every year each branch could award Special Service Bars to its most active 
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members, whose names were added to the JIL Roll of Honour. Beginning 
in 1924, the two most effective branches also received special awards 
(Simner Shield and Gould Cup) at the annual meeting.47 
As the JIL grew, its leaders recognized that social activities were crucial. 
"Leavening political propaganda with social entertainments" were effective 
in attracting and keeping members who might otherwise have found poli­
tics too dull. Social activities also raised money while encouraging com­
radeship. For these reasons successful branches frequently held dances, 
offered community singing, and gave theatrical performances in winter­
time. Some of these entertainments, for example, the Empire tableaux, 
were exercises in propaganda and education. In good weather there were 
outdoor activities. Some Imps went on excursions, on cruises, or to sum­
mer camps, but these activities were too expensive for many branches. In­
stead, members took part in sports during the warmer months. Branches 
often competed against each other. Beginning in 1930, the JIL held a Na­
tional Sports Gathering at the Crystal Palace. Sports created an esprit de 
corps and served a didactic purpose. "The admiration of skill, of close 
cooperation, of sacrifice of self... and [doing] one's best for the side one 
represents," Lord Harris argued, "all these are good moral lessons, quite as 
worthy of study as any literary treatise." The tenets of good sportsmanship 
even reinforced the Conservative ideology of obedience, hierarchy, imperi­
alism, and heroism.48 
Although the JIL was much more than a social organization, the social 
component suited the mood of the postwar young. Young men and women 
could have a good time without interference from stodgy seniors—even if 
an activity were outlandish or bizarre (for example, fund-raisers in which 
Imps dressed as Ku Klux Klansmen and performed "Hollywood-style hold­
ups"). The Imps' enthusiasm and energy were demonstrated by their 
"Whisper" and by jazz bands with names like the "Syncopated Imps" or 
the "Imp-possibles." And, of course, they enjoyed meeting JIL members of 
the opposite sex. Remembering her one summer as an Imp, a woman re­
called in i960 that she joined "because I was 15 and the girl I was friends 
with was a sophisticated 16 and she said it was the best social club in the 
district and . .  . all the best looking boys belonged." JIL leaders understood 
the importance of a successful social event. According to the ]ILG, gather­
ings with "large attendance, a splendidly-decorated room (with our be­
loved flag everywhere), good music, the latest dances, and hosts of pretty 
girls" were the keystone of the JIL's popularity. Imbert-Terry told the 
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NUCUA conference in 1927, "It was his experience that where the boy was 
there would the girl be also—("Hear, hear," and laughter)—and even in 
the present day a shingled head and ornamented pyjamas did not make a 
boy. (Loud laughter.)"49 
The social, educational, and political activities of the JIL that attracted 
members, created camaraderie, and awakened a social sense or service 
ethos also brought the energy of youth to the Conservative cause. JIL so­
cializing helped re-create the unity and purity of purpose associated with 
the "pals battalions" of the Great War, and the organization sought "to 
keep alive that flame of service and sacrifice for the common good." Some 
Imps claimed that the JIL fulfilled their desire for unity, idealism, and 
activism. At their best, JIL branches integrated entertainment with edu­
cational and political activities. The model winter program of the Pres­
ton branch included a full schedule of political addresses, debates, mock 
parliaments, and speaking classes. At the same time, however, members 
could attend dancing classes, dances, concerts, whist drives, carnivals, 
plays, and other entertainments. Some social events raised funds for politi­
cal work or for students attending the Conservative College. Other money 
was given to senior associations or to charities. By providing young people 
with meaningful activity in an autonomous organization, the JIL led them 
into Conservatism and made them feel that the party was open to their 
ideas and aspirations.50 
The Young Britons 
The Young Britons was founded to include children younger than fourteen, 
the minimum age for membership in the JIL. After World War I most Con­
servatives believed that a Conservative training could scarcely begin too 
early, but in the absence of action by the WUO or the JIL, the only national 
Conservative organization for children was the Primrose League's Junior 
Branch. The Primrose Juniors (or Buds, as they were sometimes called) 
was formed before the war but lost most of its members and funds after 
1914. In the 1920s the Primrose League revived the group, with Mrs. Austen 
Chamberlain as president and the former Bradford M.P. Sir Ernest Flower 
as chairman. In early 1926 the Primrose League began publishing a 
monthly magazine, the Primrose Bud, for the organization.51 
The development of the Buds was supposed to counter socialism by 
teaching morals, discipline, and patriotism to middle-class children. They 
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"should be taught," the Primrose League Gazette stated, "that social service 
does not consist only of working for the benefit of the poor. They should 
be taught to think for others in everything, boys . .  . to give up their seats 
in tramway cars and trains to women and old people. Children should be 
taught. . . not to ask for the help of servants... . They should be trained 
too, in the spending of their pocket money, and reminded that when they 
go abroad each one of them is responsible for the fair name of England." 
History—which supposedly showed how Britain's virtuous political lead­
ers and explorers had upheld individual liberty, protected the state, and 
built the Empire—was the primary educational tool. The Buds also had 
a full sports program, culminating in a meet at the Crystal Palace that 
thousands of participants and spectators attended. The Primrose Jun­
iors proved to be one of the Primrose League's few successful postwar 
innovations.52 
After the 1924 election, Conservative leaders realized that they had to 
develop their own children's group to complement the JIL and combat 
"the pernicious teachings of the Socialist and Communist Organisations." 
The Conservatives wanted an organization like the Buds, or even the Boy 
Scouts and the Girl Guides, that would attract all children and turn them 
into upstanding, patriotic, and imperialistic youths. Of course, they also 
hoped that the children would gravitate toward the JIL and the Conserva­
tive Party as they grew older. Though not intended to be an overtly Conser­
vative organization, the Young Britons would serve as "the first link in the 
chain" leading to Conservative Party membership.53 
Aided by JIL and WUO leaders, the Conservative principal agent, Sir 
Herbert Blain, founded the Young Britons in mid-1925. Any child between 
the ages of six and fourteen could, with parental permission, join the new 
group. Publicly Conservatives were careful to present the Young Britons as 
a nonpartisan educational and recreational group that taught citizenship. 
In fact, however, it was avowedly Conservative and antisocialist. According 
to the group's 1931 handbook, members were usually children of Conserva­
tive parents, and only older youths and adults who were members of local 
Conservative associations could act as officers or helpers. Furthermore, the 
aim of the Young Britons was to "instill. . . into the minds of children love 
of their country, pride in our traditions and ideals, and a simple realisation 
of Conservative principles" to combat allegedly unpatriotic, left-wing ele­
ments in Britain. Within a year the Young Britons had become an estab­
lished part of the Conservative organization, with 24,346 members in 259 
branches, and its own magazine, the Young Briton. In 1927 central office 
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appointed Allan Hand, a former agent and the successful organizer of 
Durham County Conservatives, as Young Britons organizer. The organiza­
tion continued to grow, and by 1929 there were 471 branches and nearly 
50,000 members.54 
Although the Young Britons officially administered their own 
branches, the organization depended wholly on the JIL and especially the 
WUO. It was natural for WUO members, many of whom were mothers, 
to take an interest in the children's organization. The WUO vice-chairman, 
Lady Muriel Newton, and WUO Administrator, Marjorie Maxse, were 
named national officers of the Young Britons, and each provincial WUO 
advisory committee had considerable authority over the Young Britons. 
Conservative women were essential to the formation of Young Britons 
branches, and they provided much of the needed direction and assistance. 
The first branch of the Young Britons in Cornwall was formed by the 
Launceston WUO early in 1926. WUO officers ran the Young Britons 
branch with some assistance from the JIL. Women in Kincardine and 
Stockton were also instrumental in creating and managing their local 
branches of the Young Britons. The men's associations, on the other hand, 
were notoriously negligent.55 
WUO branches were strongly advised not to monopolize the Young 
Britons or exclude the JIL. The JIL was active in the Young Britons because 
it hoped to enroll Young Britons members as they grew up. In 1927, Lord 
Stanley and his sister-in-law Maureen, Lady Stanley, became officers of the 
Young Britons. Later the JIL and the Young Britons exchanged representa­
tives to encourage greater cooperation. Unfortunately, however, the JIL did 
not provide as much support as leaders of the Young Britons had hoped. 
Imps cooperated on some activities, such as Empire Day, and guided chil­
dren who were moving up to the JIL. But compared to the WUO, JIL lead­
ers treated the Young Britons casually.56 
During the 1920s, Scottish Unionists developed their own organization 
for children. Initially the SUA had taken no action except to approve patri­
otic and imperialistic—but ad hoc and nonpartisan—"Children's Circles." 
Shortly before London formed the Young Britons, Glasgow Unionists es­
tablished Young or Junior Unionist associations for eight- to sixteen-year-
olds. By giving entertainments and simple lessons, Young Unionists aimed 
"to help boys and girls become good citizens, with love for their country 
and a wish to serve it." The 1924 SUA conference encouraged local associa­
tions to form Young Unionist branches in order to counter socialist activ­
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ity, especially the Socialist Sunday Schools. Within a year there were 
twenty-five Young Unionist branches, some of which had hundreds of 
members. Both Kincardine and Camlachie had children's branches. In ru­
ral Kincardine several towns had branches, while in urban Camlachie there 
was only one, very active, branch. The success of the Young Unionist move­
ment was demonstrated toward the end of the 1929 election when one 
thousand members celebrated Empire Day with a parade and ceremony at 
Glasgow's Cenotaph in George Square.57 
The most notable feature of the Young Britons was its role in teaching 
patriotic and imperial values in order to combat what were considered 
corrupting Socialist and "foreign" influences in postwar British culture. 
The magazine Young Briton, the "Who Knows" leaflets, and other material 
were carefully designed to counter the teachings of groups that were "at­
tempting to instil class hatred into young minds, [and] carry on teaching 
subversive to morals and good conduct."58 Without the Young Britons, its 
proponents claimed, Britain was headed for moral anarchy, dissolution of 
the family, and the destruction of the Constitution and the Empire. The 
tone of the Young Britons was didactic, and it pervaded the group's litera­
ture and activities. 
Young Briton was the children's organizations' most important educa­
tional weapon. In early 1925 Home and Politics, the WUO magazine, began 
offering historical lessons and stories for children. For instance, the May 
1925 issue contained the play Under One Flag, written by Una Norris, a 
central office staff member. Several characters representing England and 
various dominions recited vapid dialogue showing the friendship among 
the nations of the Empire under the mother figure Britannia, while the 
strong-willed Ramana, representing India, gets lost after refusing Britan-
nia's lead.59 In October 1925 the children's column was moved from the 
women's magazine to Young Briton. The new magazine skirted obviously 
partisan issues in favor of material about Britain's history, heroes, Consti­
tution, and Empire. Young Briton tried to demonstrate that Britain had 
progressed because of its tradition of liberty and Conservative government. 
It occasionally presented a simple analysis of a political issue, such as the 
Locarno Treaties, that it deemed a national question. The magazine con­
tained suggestions for didactic recreations like a British Empire Stores toy 
that allowed children to buy goods made in the Empire and learn about 
the benefits of Empire.60 The "Betty and Billy" cartoon in each issue 
showed readers a part of the Empire. 
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Young Britons branches also used patriotic leaflets and pamphlets 
from central office. A typical example was the pamphlet Union Jack. 
According to the pamphlet, the crosses and colors of the flag represented 
praiseworthy qualities and the kingdom's unity. "Our flag," it stated, 
"calls on all the members of the British Empire to stand united . .  . for 
freedom, truth, justice, righteousness, and brotherhood, all members of 
one family living happily together, loving one another." The "Who 
Knows?" leaflets were also popular. Each leaflet gave insight into some 
symbol of British authority—one such was the "bobby"—in order to re­
inforce its legitimacy.61 
In their activities, Young Britons branches attempted to make patriotic 
lessons enjoyable, but they were sometimes very heavy going. Every meet­
ing began with community singing and a short lesson sent from headquar­
ters. Afterward there were games and crafts, followed by a carefully scripted 
rendition of the national anthem, including salutes. All the elements of a 
branch meeting were intended to provide recreation for the children while 
inculcating patriotic and moral values. In 1926, at the first event of the 
Launceston branch of the Young Britons, A. M. Williams, the Conservative 
M.P., told the children that "they could not really be happy unless they did 
work, and if they could learn to enjoy their work, then they were sure of 
a happy life." The children, however, seemed to enjoy more the tale of 
St. George and the dragon. They were told that the dragon represented 
sin, which was destroyed by the honorable and good St. George. St. George 
was the model for all children who wished to make something of their 
lives.62 
Young Britons leaders emphasized imperial themes because they saw 
imperialism as ideal for neutralizing socialism and class warfare. The high­
light of the Young Britons year was the celebration of Empire Day with 
parades, rallies, and pageants. Because Empire Day was 24 May (and also 
Queen Victoria's birthday), it was used to contrast Conservative values 
with the alleged Red celebrations on 1 May. Branches held military drills 
designed, as one historian notes, to teach children "the duties and respon­
sibilities attached to the high privileges of being subjects of the mightiest 
Empire the world has ever known." Another popular activity was the Em­
pire Tableau, in which Young Britons wore costumes representing colonies, 
dominions, the armed forces, and supposed British qualities. On the stage, 
characters arranged themselves around the central figures of Britannia and 
John Bull as the narrator described the glories of the united Empire. Young 
Britons also performed plays like Flag of the Free, in which Britannia tells 
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the history of the Union Jack as children appear dressed to represent parts 
of the Empire (e.g., sheaves of wheat for Canada, a sailor's uniform for 
England).63 With the Empire gathered before her, Britannia recites, 
Go take this flag. In honour raise it high. 
Wherever it does float, justice shall reign, 
And peace and unity. Men shall be free. 
Beneath the glorious standard of our realm.64 
The imperial message was pervasive. When, for instance, children saluted 
the flag at the close of a branch meeting, they were grouped in "domin­
ions." All these activities emphasized imperial unity and showed children 
that "the British Empire was really something to be proud of."65 
Despite some success, the Young Britons faced several serious prob­
lems. First, many Conservatives were wary of undermining or duplicating 
the work of other patriotic organizations like the Primrose Juniors and the 
Scouts. In places—Wood Green and Skipton, for example—the Conserva­
tive association preferred cooperation with the Primrose Juniors to form­
ing Young Britons branches. Other Conservatives sometimes failed to see 
the rationale for a nonpartisan Conservative youth organization when 
groups like the Scouts served that purpose. 
Second, the Young Britons depended on the other Conservatives' aid. 
Was it necessary to give children a separate organization, or could they be 
incorporated into the WUO or JIL? Considering that most members were 
probably children of Conservative parents, how effective was the Young 
Britons? Did the Conservative Party need a group to educate children from 
already Conservative households? 
Third, there was an underlying conflict in the Young Britons' aims. On 
the one hand, the organization was supposed to teach British values to 
all children, regardless of their parents' political affiliation or social class. 
Participation in the Young Britons did not constitute membership in or 
direct aid to the Conservative Party. The small subscription fee, halfpenny 
magazine, and inexpensive activities allowed children from all social classes 
to participate. But on the other hand, the Young Britons was designed to 
teach Conservative principles and funnel children into the Conservative 
Party. The hope was that the group would win over children of non-
Conservative parents, even though this contradicted the emphasis on 
traditional authority. Although children were supposed to obtain their par­
ents' consent before joining the Young Britons, the 1928 conference decided 
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not to require written consent because they "would probably lose an op­
portunity of winning non-Conservative children for the movement."66 For 
all of these reasons, the Young Britons sometimes seemed an unnecessary 
drain on associations and central office. As a result, the Young Britons lost 
some funding and its magazine after the party reorganization of 1931.67 
Despite its shortcomings, the Young Britons continued to operate until 
World War II. In a 1927 Home and Politics article, an Imp correspondent 
explained the importance of the Young Britons. The Conservatives, she 
wrote, had a mission 
to rescue the children from the darkness of Communism 
and bring them into the Young Britons' movement. Take 
them out into the countryside and show them the wonder 
and beauty of her lanes, her woods and her fields; take 
them out on the sports fields, and let them feel the thrill 
. .  . when smiting the cricket ball. . .; teach them her songs 
of the sea, of love and of home, hymns and her songs of 
praise, and tell them of the men and women who gave their 
lives that they might enjoy these things. 
Once the children learn to love Britain the disease of 
Bolshevism will be powerless to affect their healthy bodies 
and souls and they will grow up proud to be called British 
men and women.68 
The Young Britons met the Conservatives' desire for an organization to 
instill patriotism, morality, and discipline among children in order to fight 
Socialism and subversion. 
For Imps and Young Britons, membership in a Conservative youth 
organization satisfied several needs. It provided social activities and friend­
ships, learning experiences, and political opportunities. Despite their lim­
ited impact on the Conservative Party's programs and policies, these 
organizations gave youths an identity as members of a Conservative British 
community. With its typical interwar imagery, the Imp anthem, written by 
Imbert-Terry to the tune of "The Old Brigade," is an accurate expression 
of the ethos of the young Conservatives: 
We are the hope of the coming age, 
The light of the rising morn, 
Gaily we welcome the battle gage 
Aglow with our might newborn. 
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No chill of the years our soul [sic] dismay 
All wide the horizon gleans, 
Illuming our hearts with its lustrous rays, 
The sun of our Empire beams. 
Then join in our triumph of glory, 
As won by our Fathers of old; 
Washed by the sea, this realm of the free 
We Imps mean to guard and hold. 
Spread o'er the world in the bloodstained fields 
We gave of our brightest and best, 
Each corner of victory mutely shields 
The bones of a brother at rest. 
Shall we make naught of their warrior sleep, 
Make dust of each glorious grave? 
By the vastness of Empire we vow to keep 
The Freedom they died to save! 
Then join in their triumph of glory, 
May their fame through the ages be told. 
Won by the free, the World's liberty, 
We Imps swear to guard and to hold.69 
Conservative youth groups were undoubtedly less influential and smaller 
than the WUO, but they were the largest political organizations for young 
people in interwar Britain. During World War II, the JIL and Young Britons 
disappeared as their patriotic, imperialistic ethos collapsed. But before 1939 
these youth groups helped preserve among some Britons an underlying 
faith in their nation's imperial mission and illustrious historical develop­
ment, both allegedly threatened by left-wing extremists. 
The JIL did not consider itself a policy-making body, and the rest of 
the Conservative Party felt no compunction about the group's lack of di­
rect influence at Westminster. Nevertheless, the JIL contributed to the par-
ty's success in attracting the support of an electorate created by universal 
suffrage. Youth groups formed the base of the mass organization that the 
interwar Conservative Party comprised. With these popular organizations 
for younger and future voters of Britain, the Conservative Party projected 
its influence into the lives of ordinary electors. The party also successfully 
used the Young Britons, the JIL, and the WUO to attract hundreds of thou­
sands of children, young adults, and women, giving Conservatives a solid 
organization for the modern political system and guaranteeing it a larger 
share of the vote. 
The Labour Committee, 
Trade Union Reform, and 
Conservative Wage Earners 
Between the two World Wars the Conservatives attempted to de­
velop a popular organization for wage earners, the NUA Labour Commit­
tee. Although sociologists and political scientists have studied the larger 
phenomenon of working-class Conservatism, only one chapter in a disser­
tation has looked at the working-class organization of the Conservative 
Party. The NUA Labour Committee was an important part of the Conser­
vative response to the full enfranchisement of wage earners and the in­
creased power of the working class after 1918. * 
The NUA Labour Committee, responding to the growth in size and 
influence of trade unions—and their closer links to the Labour Party— 
tried to attract wage earners by offering them a different political identity. 
Compared to other interwar Conservative organizations, however, the La­
bour Committee was relatively unsuccessful. Although large numbers of 
wage earners voted for Conservative candidates then (and continue to do 
so now), the Labour Committee was never able to attract a significant 
number of wage earners into the Conservative organization. Local labour 
committees existed in only a third of the seats in England and Wales, and 
these often had fewer than twenty members. The Labour Party was far 
more successful in mobilizing wage earners and their resources through 
the trade unions. 
The problems confronting the NUA Labour Committee were due less 
to policy differences with the regular Conservative Party than to adminis­
trative conflicts and social divisions. First, because the committee main­
tained a network of branches that were quasi-independent from local 
associations, it was not fully accepted either by rank-and-file Conservatives 
or by organizers. Second, class and gender divisions were a nearly insur­
no 
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mountable obstacle for the Labour Committee. The Conservative Party of 
the period relied on its largely middle-class, heavily female, organization. 
These rank-and-file Conservatives came to dominate the Conservative 
Party, particularly at the local level. They were reluctant to welcome an 
alien group, male wage earners, particularly if it was to be admitted as a 
distinct, autonomous organization. They were also not very interested in 
working-class candidates. And workingmen were often less attracted to the 
local associations than to traditional Conservative clubs, which at least 
provided tangible benefits for working-class members. 
The shortcomings of the Labour Committee did not destroy working-
class support for the Conservative Party, which depended more on con­
servative social and political values than on workers' role in the party. 
Working-class Conservatism was based on deference and the desire for na­
tional unity. 
In addition, some workingmen and women supported the Labour 
Committee and the Conservative Party because they wanted to alter some 
of the privileges the prewar Liberal government had granted to trade 
unions. In fact this issue, the legal status and privileges of trade unions, was 
the primary concern of the Labour Committee and its members during the 
1920s. The Labour Committee particularly objected to what it considered 
the politicization of trade unions. Its members helped to maintain the 
pressure for trade union reform and ensured that the Trade Disputes and 
Trade Unions Act of 1927 dealt with trade union contributions to the La­
bour Party. On this issue the Labour Committee played a crucial role, one 
that forces us to question the traditional interpretation of the 1927 legisla­
tion as a punitive response to the General Strike.2 
Development and Structure of the Labour Committee 
Since the mid-nineteenth century there had been Tory workingmen's groups, 
most notably the Conservative clubs, which had about two million mem­
bers by the early twentieth century. Many clubs were affiliated with the 
Association of Conservative Clubs (established 1894), which encouraged 
them to offer educational and political activities for members. The political 
value of these clubs, however, was limited: the typical older married man 
who joined a club was more interested in games, music, conversation, and 
cheap beer than political activity. The result, observers often noted, was 
that clubs created good card and billiards players—not Conservative 
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volunteers. After the war some Conservative associations tried to mobilize 
clubs in their area, but to little effect. Even in Wrexham, where clubs were 
components of the party organization, and Lancashire and Cheshire, 
where Tory workingmen's groups were very active before the war, clubs 
contributed little to the Conservative Party. Only Sir Archibald Salvidge in 
Liverpool, where anti-Catholicism remained a powerful force, was able to 
rely on a strong network of political clubs. By 1931, because the clubs were 
not doing their part, central office had cut all subsidies to them.3 
Before the war the only other major organization for Conservative 
workingmen was the National Conservative League (NCL). The NCL was 
founded in 1884 as a loose federation of workingmen's lodges and was 
completely independent of the NUA. Lodges followed Masonic practices, 
with secret initiation rites and titles, and they served as a sort of friendly 
society, operating limited insurance schemes. As political organizations 
they had the same failings as the clubs. Most lodges were dissolved during 
the war, including the national Grand Lodge, nominally headed by the 
Duke of Somerset. In northern parts of England, however, they were re­
vived after the war and were at least loosely connected to the local associa­
tions. During the mid-i92os Allan Hand, who later became the Young 
Britons organizer, formed many lodges in Durham County, and by 1925 
there were seventy branches and several thousand members in northern 
England. Hand claimed that the friendly society and Masonic elements 
attracted workingmen. Other Conservatives, however, were less enthusias­
tic. The M.R for Barnard Castle, Sir Cuthbert Headlam, thought that his 
local lodges were politically inactive and contained too many dreary old 
Tories. In general the lodges were ill-suited to the age.4 
During World War I the establishment of universal male suffrage and 
the rise of trade unions and the Labour Party convinced many Conserva­
tives that they had to establish a new, avowedly political organization for 
wage earners. Conservatives were worried, as the Conservative Agents' Jour­
nal pointed out, that "nearly all workmen are now joining Unions of one 
kind or another and . .  . unless some steps are taken to enlist their interest 
in the Unionist or Constitutional Labour programme there is great danger 
of their being swept bodily into the political bag of the Independent La­
bour Party." Many Conservatives believed that they had to incorporate 
Britain's presumedly patriotic wage earners into the party. In February 
1918, the Lancashire Provincial Division's council revived its trade union 
organization, the Conservative Labour Committee. Working with constit­
uency agents, the Lancashire labor organizer used subscriptions and dona­
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tions to establish antisocialist committees in unions and clubs. Because 
the committees were linked to divisional associations, and the whole or­
ganization was supervised by the Lancashire Provincial Division, the la­
bour committee managed to avoid the institutional and class segregation 
characteristic of earlier wage-earner groups. A number of Conservatives in 
other regions expressed interest in setting up such a group, but to no 
effect.5 
At a 20 May 1919 meeting of the NUA council, the chairman of the 
Lancashire labour committee, John Whittaker, suggested that his organiza­
tion be adopted throughout Britain. In a memorandum presented to the 
NUA, Whittaker argued that the Conservative Party needed a group to 
mobilize trade unionists against "the tide of Socialism and . .  . revolution­
ary doctrines." The group could also be used to encourage Conservative 
workingmen just as the Labour Party encouraged its members. An investi­
gative subcommittee of the NUA Executive agreed that a committee should 
be formed to educate wage earners, gather working-class opinion, bring 
Conservative wage earners into the party, encourage them to take action 
in their unions or cooperatives, and field working-class political candi­
dates. The NUA Executive asked local associations to form such commit­
tees. It also appointed the members of the subcommittee to the new NUA 
Labour Committee, which elected Whittaker chairman. They hired the 
Scotsman Robert Mathams, a war veteran and former central office agent 
for Lancashire, as labour committee organiser. The president of the Feder­
ation of British Industries, Sir Vincent Caillard, and central office made 
funds available for the Labour Committee.6 
In its first years the Labour Committee was most concerned about 
discouraging revolution and socialism and politicizing trade unions. The 
NUA council recommended training more working-class speakers to at­
tack Labour Party policies, particularly nationalization. The Labour Com­
mittee organized a national conference of wage earners and put forward 
resolutions condemning nationalization of mines and railways, deploring 
municipal socialism and syndicalism, and supporting retrenchment and 
tariffs. Because of a railway strike the conference was canceled, but nine 
hundred men and women from seven northern counties attended a March 
1920 meeting where delegates passed resolutions against nationalization, 
direct action, and excessive government spending. They praised unions "as 
an instrument for the well-being o f . .  . wage earners" and claimed that 
Conservatism was compatible with "genuine, loyal, and life-long support 
for trade unionism." Trade union and cooperative members were told it 
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was their duty (1) to stop Labour supporters from using those organiza­
tions for political purposes and (2) to work against radicals, who were 
causing domestic instability and destroying the British way of life.7 
In the five years following its creation, the Labour Committee made 
slow progress. In part this was because its role in and relationship to the 
Conservative Party remained unclear. The local and regional organization 
was linked to the national Labour Committee, in practice remaining 
largely separate from the regular Conservative organization. During the 
coalition years this was sometimes useful, as antisocialist wage earners 
could work on the committee without having to join the Conservative 
Party. In 1920 the editor of the Conservative Agents' Journal described the 
Labour Committee as "a hybrid organisation . .  . informing when it desires 
to do so the existing Unionist Organisation of the considered views of 
working men . .  . exercising a watchful eye on the operations of the local 
Trades Union branches, while elastic enough to welcome into its ranks 
men who would not dream at present of enrolling . .  . [in] the Unionist 
Party Organisation." The editor added that agents should be able to control 
committees by pulling strings and handling finances. Agents were less con­
fident of their power, and in some constituencies associations asserted con­
trol over their labour committee by designating its members. Labour 
committees also irritated some Conservative women because they gener­
ally excluded women and often operated like workingmen's clubs.8 
Another perennial concern was real wage earners' lack of influence. In 
the early years very few served on the Labour Committee. After the fall of 
the coalition government in October 1922, the NUA conference, expressing 
grave concern about the Labour Party and its "insidious and incessant So­
cialist propaganda," urged greater efforts to bring wage earners into all 
levels of the Conservative Party. Similar views were expressed at all levels 
of the party. The NUA Executive soon tried to encourage provincial divi­
sions to elect more working-class delegates to the NUA council so that 
there would be a larger pool of wage earners for the Labour Committee.9 
Complaints resurfaced in later years. In October 1923, the 1923 NUA 
conference heard that the upper echelons of the Conservative Party were 
inaccessible to wage earners. A few months later, after their defeat in the 
election, Conservative leaders returned to the problem. In a Home and 
Politics article Caroline Bridgeman, WUO chairwoman and wife of a for­
mer Cabinet minister, emphasized the importance of making the party 
"thoroughly democratic . .  . bringing into it representatives of all ranks of 
life . .  . ensuring that the working man and working woman shall be in a 
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position to take an active part in its management." But Conservative activ­
ists and central office officials largely ran the Labour Committee. Neither 
Mathams nor Whittaker was a wage earner. The Conservative Party's chair­
man, deputy chairman, principal agent, chief organizing agent, and the 
NUA secretary were also key members of the Labour Committee.10 
The Labour Committee also failed to promote working-class candi­
dates. In 1923 one agent argued in the Conservative Agents' Journal that 
although the adoption of workingmen in appropriate constituencies 
should "follow as a matter of course the formation of. . . Labour Commit­
tees," he could see no "vigorous and sustained" efforts to elect Conservative 
workingmen. A year later the NUA conference at Cardiff devoted much 
time to discussing this matter. In a long speech, a member of the NUA 
Executive moved a resolution demanding more wage earners as candidates. 
She implored the delegates to rid themselves of the biases that kept them 
from selecting wage earners, claiming that the absence of workers from the 
Conservative delegation to Parliament was a major reason that working 
people identified with the Socialist Party. After the 1924 election, the NUA 
Executive made a similar request, but associations refused to change their 
practices. A final problem facing the Labour Committee in its early years 
was the lack of its own publication. Instead it had to beg space from other 
Conservative magazines for Labour Committee news. Beginning in August 
1921, Popular View included a column, "Workshop Talks," which was 
gradually given over to the Labour Committee. In late 1922 the Labour 
Committee gained access to the Democrat, the weekly magazine of the 
"nonpolitical" General Federation of Trade Unions.11 
The absence of a periodical became one of the less serious of the La­
bour Committee's problems when Sir Herbert Blain became principal 
agent in March 1924. After the unexpected death of Mathams in April 1924, 
Blain appointed G. E. M. Walker, Matham's assistant, as the new organizer. 
Blain then launched an investigation of the Labour Committee, presenting 
his findings to the NUA Executive in July 1924. In his report, Blain argued 
that the Labour Committee had failed and would never succeed without 
major reforms. He found that there were only eighty-eight labour commit­
tees in England and Wales, some of them not even affiliated with the NUA 
Labour Committee. Except in Durham, Northumberland, Lancashire, and 
Glamorgan, many committees were paper organizations with an "almost 
negligible" and "quite unrepresentative" membership. Local Conserva­
tive associations and agents were often indifferent or hostile to the com­
mittees, which they considered threats to their organization, while Tory 
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workingmen held the committees in contempt. The Conservative Party 
would never attract wage earners, Blain claimed, unless it showed an ability 
to cooperate and a willingness to accept working-class members at every 
level of the party, "right up to the Executive Committee and . .  . Parlia­
ment." Blain suggested a number of reforms. First, labour committees 
should be made more representative by electing members from the sub­
branches of Conservative associations. Second, committees should become 
advisory organs of the association's executive committee. In return, associ­
ations were expected to offer workers opportunities in the party and select 
them as candidates for political office. Finally, Blain suggested that the 
NUA Labour Committee take an advisory role and co-opt more wage 
12 earners.
The NUA and central office supported Blain's proposals, but they met 
with only moderate success. The former coal miner, Gwilym Rowlands, 
became Labour Committee chairman when Whittaker stepped down in 
1925. The new NUA rules adopted in mid-19 24 allowed divisional associa­
tions to send a third delegate to the NUA council if he was a wage earner. 
Baldwin gave his blessing to the reforms in his speech at the 1924 NUA 
conference. He hoped that the changes would provide workers with "a lad­
der by which a man, whatever his means or his origin, may hope, by the 
exercise of his own natural ability, to render service to his country into 
whatsoever office he may be called." And Home and Politics acclaimed the 
"magnificent conference" as proving that "One of the chief and abiding 
appeals of our Party is that it can truly claim to be desirous of the welfare 
of each and every class; and it is hoping in a short time to claim, even more 
truly than before, that it is also 'representative' of all classes." Yet at an 
early 1925 meeting of the NUCUA Executive, the party chairman, F. Stanley 
Jackson, complained that many associations had still not established la­
bour committees. Blain again circularized the divisions. He declared the 
results satisfactory; by mid-1927 the number of divisions with committees 
had doubled. But this number still included only a third of the seats in 
England and Wales, and the labour committee in London still had few 
13 wage earners.
Under Blain's direction the Labour Committee also encouraged the 
development of provincial committees, but without a great deal of success. 
As a result of reforms in 1925, the Lancashire and Cheshire labour commit­
tee (the two provincial divisions were consolidated in 1925), which re­
mained strong throughout the 1920s, elected a working-class chairman and 
women members. It also began meeting on Saturdays for the convenience 
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of its wage-earner members. Outside Lancashire and Cheshire—and other 
regions where labour committees were already established—progress was 
limited. The Yorkshire provincial division recognized the need for more 
working-class men and women members, and it formed a (weak) provin­
cial labour committee. Few rural regions had such committees because 
there were few unions and little industry.14 
In Scotland, an independent Workers' League had existed since 1910. 
It was headed by a former apprentice wood turner from Glasgow, William 
Templeton, who served as M.P. for Banff from 1924 to 1929. The league was 
particularly interested in tariff reform and, like the NCL, was organized as 
a network of lodges. After the war it became the Unionist Workers' League 
(UWL) and was loosely tied to the SUA. In return for financial assistance 
and accommodation at Unionist headquarters in Edinburgh, the UWL 
conformed to the policy laid down by the Scottish whip and the SUA. At 
the time of the 1924 general election, Unionist leaders decided that the 
UWL should concentrate solely on party propaganda and education, and 
its magazine, Common Sense, was discontinued. In effect the UWL became 
a subcommittee of the SUA Executive. Its lodges were closed and its activi­
ties limited to propaganda work requested by local associations. It contin­
ued to decline, rejecting merger with the Scottish juniors in 1925, and 
finally disappearing in 1928.15 
Both the UWL and the Labour Committee were considerably less im­
portant than the women's and youth organizations. Labour committees 
were fairly common in working-class seats, particularly if, as was com­
monly the case, the seat was dominated by the Labour Party. Yet by the 
end of the 1920s, less than half of the constituencies in my sample had 
active labour committees. Clapham had one, possibly as a result of the 
activities of its energetic agent, J. H. Bottomley, but virtually no other Lon­
don association did. In North Cornwall the Conservatives formed a labour 
committee only in 1925. The advisory committee was composed of a work­
ingman chosen from each of the constituency's five districts. Three were 
quarrymen from the Labour stronghold of Delabole, one was a railway 
worker, and the last was a gardener.16 
In the industrial and mining seats of Wales and England, labour com­
mittees were reasonably common. Greenwood estimates that in 1939, after 
a difficult decade for the Labour Committee, more than a quarter of the 
divisions in northern and northwestern England, Yorkshire, and Wales had 
labour committees; in central office's Northern Area, almost two-fifths of 
constituencies had committees. Wrexham Tories provided representation 
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to wage earners in 1921, and in the following year the executive elected 
delegates to form a "Unionist Labour Wing," which served in an advisory 
role. The two industrial seats of Bradford Central and Stockton had active 
labour committees. The Bradford Central committee, formed in 1920, in­
cluded several branches and workingmen's clubs, and was part of a city­
wide labor organization that had hundreds of members. The committee 
taught constitutional principles and encouraged the advancement of wage 
earners in the Conservative Party. The Stockton organization, revived and 
reorganized after the war, sent delegates to the first Labour Committee 
conference in 1920 and formed its own committee in 1925. The committee 
benefited from the strength of the NCL, which had three lodges in the city 
and strong support in the rest of the county. During the 1920s, the Stockton 
committee had about forty regular members; membership increased in the 
early 1930s.17 
Even associations without labour committees made some efforts to 
attract wage-earner support and participation. Until the North Cornwall 
labour committee was formed, the association rules mandated the election 
of wage-earner representatives to the executive and allowed the waiver of 
subscription fees in hardship cases. In response to suggestions from central 
office, the Chichester association claimed that a labour committee was un­
necessary, because branches were required to elect wage earners to the ex­
ecutive committee. The Skipton association's rule also reserved places on 
the executive committee for workers. Oswestry Tories, however, twice re­
fused to form a labour committee, alleging that it would foment class 
divisions.18 
To encourage wage-earner participation in Conservative activities, 
working-class representatives were sometimes paid or reimbursed for their 
expenses. The Skipton and Oswestry associations altered their rules to pay 
for needy delegates to attend local, regional, or national meetings. In re­
turn, delegates were expected to work on propaganda and other activities. 
Under the rules adopted by the Chichester association in 1924, the expenses 
of a wage-earner delegate to the NUCUA council were paid. The same 
practice was followed in North Cornwall, but other local and regional or­
ganizations either did not help or did so on an ad hoc basis. Yorkshire 
Tories decided in 1924 to bring working-class members onto the provincial 
executive and send them to the NUA council. After estimating that the 
annual cost would be about thirty pounds per delegate, they instead opted 
to select "a good working man" only if another member would pay.19 
Another practical issue that hampered Conservative efforts to increase 
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wage-earner representation was meeting times. Workers who depended on 
an hourly wage could not leave work to attend party meetings, but the 
middle-class members of most associations preferred to meet on weekday 
afternoons. Conservative women especially liked this arrangement because 
they often had to be home early to cook dinner. Saturday was impractical 
because it was shopping day. The dilemma was insoluble. The Yorkshire 
provincial division changed the time of general meetings from weekday 
afternoons to Saturdays, but the powerful committees continued to meet 
as before. When the Chichester association tried to hold meetings in the 
evening, so many members protested that the association returned to after­
noon meetings. In late 1924 the NUCUA Executive decided that action on 
this issue was useless, but it did ask local associations to pay wage-earner 
delegates who attended national party meetings. Because they were being 
asked, in effect, to select more costly delegates, local Conservatives sent few 
wage-earner delegates to the NUCUA.20 
The Labour Committee and its local branches were involved in differ­
ent Conservative Party activities with varying degrees of success. Labour 
committees contributed to the general efforts of the local associations by 
distributing propaganda and holding public meetings. In 1929 labour com­
mittee members handed out almost 1.3 million leaflets in factories and 
clubs across the country.21 Most labour committees, however, did not have 
enough members to do the same sorts of tasks as the women's and youth 
groups performed. 
More important, Labour Committee leaders realized their organiza-
tion's success depended in large measure on providing equality of opportu­
nity for wage earners to advance in the Conservative Party. To achieve this 
goal, the Labour Committee sponsored educational programs and encour­
aged wage earners to run for local office. The Labour Committee used 
education to rouse wage earners from political apathy and turn them 
against socialism. Members could study a variety of subjects for their own 
pleasure or to equip themselves as Conservative workers. The Stockton 
committee learned about the economics of coal mining and the possibili­
ties of reviving the local shipbuilding industry, as well as the dangers of 
socialism and the glories of the Empire. Some members also volunteered 
to work with the JIL. Beginning in 1920, the NUA Labour Committee orga­
nized summer schools at which Conservative workingmen and -women 
attended courses on politics and economics. They were taught by scholars 
like the M.P. and historian J. A. R. Marriott; the editor of the Edinburgh 
Review, Harold Cox; and the economist Sir William Ashley. The Labour 
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Committee also played a crucial role in establishing the Conservative Col­
lege. Such schools gave wage earners the chance to take part in political 
work and, possibly, become candidates for local or national office.22 
Unfortunately, the Labour Committee had few successful wage-earner 
candidates. In Lancashire and Northumberland, a number of labour com­
mittee candidates were elected to local councils and boards. The Bradford 
committee sponsored its chairman, Jonas Pearson, as a successful candi­
date in a board of guardians election and as an unsuccessful Conservative 
candidate in the 1923 general election. In 1922 the Wrexham association 
considered a workingman candidate but decided instead to continue sup­
porting its coalition Liberal M.P. To encourage the adoption of wage-
earner candidates, central office offered subsidies to divisional associations 
who picked from a list of working-class candidates. The poor response led 
Younger to create a fund for wage-earner candidates. This also failed to 
have much effect, however, and the next party chairman promised only to 
try to convince associations that they should adopt wage earners.23 
As proponents of workingman candidates grew frustrated, they in­
creased pressure and encountered greater resistance. In 1928 Gwilym 
Rowlands, a candidate in four hopeless contests, attacked hypocritical 
Conservatives who "cheer working men on that [Conference] platform 
when there were safe seats going [to others]. They took jolly good care they 
did not invite them [wage earners] to fight. He was satisfied that they had 
in their party working men quite equal to the best Labour men in the 
House of Commons. (Applause.) We want to follow them in trade union 
and Labour matters in the House of Commons and tell people what we 
know from experience. Give us that right and privilege to fight where we 
can do more work than we are doing from outside." The resolution passed 
easily, but probably quite a few of the delegates agreed with another 
speaker who thought that politically ambitious workingmen should make 
their own way rather than "expecting Lord Somebody or Lady Somebody 
to be constantly nursing and carrying . .  . [them] about." The efforts of 
NUCUA and central office were largely unsuccessful. In the 1929 election 
there were only three Conservative workingmen's candidates, and none 
was elected. Except for William Templeton, no Conservative wage earners 
were elected until Rowlands finally won Flintshire in 1935.24 
The reasons for the failure to adopt working-class candidates were 
both financial and social. Most associations lacked the money to pay candi­
dates' expenses. Candidates were expected to pay these expenses them­
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selves; if possible, they should also contribute to the association and other 
local activities. In addition, most Conservatives were insensitive to the 
workingman's view. In 1921, for instance, the Labour Committee was 
shocked to find Conservative M.P.s opposing subsidized fares for M.P.s. 
Conservatives did not want working-class candidates. Between 1922 and 
1924 there was enough money for associations to adopt such candidates, 
but only ten workingmen were selected in three general elections. And all 
of the candidates except one (in Walsall, Birmingham) were adopted in 
hopeless seats. There is good reason to blame, as one observer put it, "the 
rocklike snobbery of Conservative constituency associations, which have 
almost invariably tended to confuse aspirants from the unions with delin­
quent ex-butlers looking for a reference." The Labour Committee removed 
selection of wage earner candidates from its list of official aims in the 
1930s.25 
Despite its failures, the Labour Committee made sure that Conserva­
tive leaders understood its position on several issues, particularly trade 
union reform. In common with other Conservative workingmen, labour 
committee members generally objected to restrictions on "sinful" activi­
ties, especially those on alcohol consumption imposed during the war. 
Newport Conservatives claimed that the restoration of "pre-war liberties" 
would actually reduce the number of socialist open-air meetings. At least 
one labour committee asked the chancellor of the exchequer, Winston 
Churchill, to liberalize gambling rather than restrict or tax it. For both 
issues, however, public opinion, particularly among women, dictated that 
nothing be done.26 
A more serious concern was unemployment compensation and other 
forms of state assistance. The chairman of the Bradford labour committee 
tried to have the Yorkshire provincial division pass a resolution in favor of 
allowing those on part-time unemployment benefits to receive their 
money with their usual paycheck. His intent was to lessen "the moral de­
generation and great inconvenience" of the existing method of distribu­
tion. But the provincial division did not take any public action. Under the 
guidance of Allan Hand, labour committees in Durham advised Conserva­
tive workingmen before they went to the sometimes hostile bodies that 
dispensed unemployment benefits. With the assistance of their M.P., the 
Stockton labour committee dealt with unemployed persons who had lost 
some or all of their benefits. They also suggested to the government and 
Lord Blanesburgh's 1925 Unemployment Insurance Committee a number 
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of practical changes in the insurance system. For example, the committee 
requested special consideration for necessitous areas and the exclusion of 
servicemen's pensions from all means calculations.27 
Trade Union Reform 
By far the most important issue for the Labour Committee in the 1920s was 
trade union reform, particularly the political levy collected by unions. 
Scholars have not generally studied popular attitudes toward the trade 
unions even though they have been a key institution during the twentieth 
century. What little work has been done tends to look at this issue from 
the perspective of trade union and Labour Party leaders. Because of its 
importance for the Labour Committee and popular Conservatism after the 
First World War, trade union reform needs to be fully explained and ana­
lyzed. Moreover, the persistent demands of some Conservatives for legisla­
tive action undermines the traditional interpretation of the Trade Disputes 
and Trade Unions Act as a punitive response to the General Strike.28 
Two pieces of prewar Liberal legislation were central to the debate over 
trade union reform in the 1920s. The first, the Trade Disputes Act of 1906, 
provided wide-ranging civil immunity for unions and facilitated the 
greater use of picketing. A few years later the courts decided in favor of a 
trade unionist and railway worker, W. V. Osborne, who refused to pay his 
union's compulsory political levy. The Liberals then passed the Trade 
Unions Act of 1913, which prohibited unauthorized compulsory political 
levies, but allowed unions to engage in politics and to collect levies if a 
majority of members approved. The law also allowed an individual trade 
unionist to exempt himself from a levy, but it left the matter in the hands 
of union officials who, perhaps inevitably, tended to prevent such "con­
tracting out" even if they had to resort to intimidation or harassment. (In 
fact, Osborne was ejected from his union.)29 Nevertheless, before the war 
the union problem did not appear to be very serious. 
The situation changed as the power of the unions increased dramati­
cally during and after World War I, and unions took a more aggressive 
political stance. By 1929, trade unions' contributions to political causes 
were twenty-four times their 1913 level. In part this was due to the rising 
union membership, but a more important factor was the Labour Party's 
decision to triple affiliation fees for unions between 1917 and 1920. In addi­
tion, during the unsettled early postwar period, strikes were common and 
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often had a political slant. As a result public opinion, particularly Conser­
vative opinion, increasingly subscribed to the belief that unions had too 
many privileges and too much power with which to threaten the freedom 
of the individual and the safety of the community. Workers who were 
members of the Labour Committee were especially interested in trade 
union reform. They felt that they suffered unfairly because of their political 
convictions and wanted to stop what the Stockton committee termed "the 
Socialist element in Trade Unions" who were "using the [union] Branches 
for political purposes." Trade union reform remained a major issue 
throughout the 1920s.30 
The Lloyd George government gained a measure of safety from the 
general strike under the Emergency Powers Act of 1920, but there were 
demands for further measures. The Cabinet considered—and rejected— 
legislation to outlaw strikes and establish compulsory strike ballots. A co­
alition government whose ministers included former radical reformers like 
the prime minister was unlikely to restrict the unions. Lloyd George and 
most of his ministers wanted to appease labor in order to ease tensions and 
undermine the demand for nationalization. The government indicated its 
unwillingness to pursue trade union reform when it denied time on the 
legislative agenda of the Commons to the Trade Union Ballot bill of 1921. 
Outside the Cabinet, some Conservatives suggested compulsory arbi­
tration, prohibition of sympathetic strikes, limits on picketing, and other 
reforms aimed at protecting the community from "abuses" of union privi­
leges. Proponents of such measures argued, as Eden Philpotts stated in 
1921, that the existing laws allowed "a handful of men—many declared 
revolutionists—to suspend the industrial life and squander the means of 
a nation." Lawyers, who filled the back benches of the Conservative Party, 
regarded legal privileges for any corporation (except the legal profession) 
as "unEnglish." In the early 1920s Conservative M.P.s, particularly diehards 
like Sir Frederick Banbury, introduced a half dozen private members' bills 
aimed at restricting the Trade Disputes Act. They failed, however, to attract 
the support of Conservative leaders, who feared that such bills would turn 
wage earners against the party. As a contributor to the Conservative Agents' 
Journal warned in 1923, "drastic legislation, or undue interference, would 
easily upset the labouring population, who are very sensitive about what 
they regard as their rights and privileges." Instead, moderates should be 
encouraged to take control of the unions.31 
After 1921 the number of strikes and the syndicalist threat diminished, 
and the Labour Party gained votes, turning Conservative attention from 
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strikes to the electoral threat of Labour and its union backers. Many Con­
servatives, including those in the NUA Labour Committee, began to de­
mand that unions separate their industrial and political operations. This 
suited Conservative workingmen, who regarded the right to strike as sacro­
sanct but were disenchanted with their unions' support of the Labour 
Party. Among the skilled trades in particular there was a large minority of 
what one Conservative leader called "respectable old boys" who opposed 
such political activity. About 15 percent of the members of the National 
Union of Railwaymen, Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers, and Amal­
gamated Engineering Union received exemptions from the political levy. 
In contrast, only 0.1 percent of the unskilled laborers who were members 
of the National Union of Agricultural Workers, the National Union of Gen­
eral Workers, and the Transport and General Workers Union received ex­
emptions. George Barnes, a former secretary of the Amalgamated Society 
of Engineers and a former Labour leader, expressed a typically conservative 
craft union mentality in his 1924 memoirs. "Labour representation," he 
wrote, "means practical participation in the life of the nation and not a 
sounding of abstract theories on the one hand or the furtherance of sec­
tional Trade Union views on the other." Barnes claimed that extremists had 
"intimidated and over-ridden the common sense, and made havoc with 
the interests of the . .  . rank and file . .  . [and] enabled the woolly-headed 
and the truculent to foment trouble."32 
Initially the Labour Committee and the NUA, in hopes of wresting 
control of the unions (and cooperatives) from the Labour Party, did not 
take a decisive stance on legal reform. The 1920 NUA conference tabled the 
question of union political levies, while the Labour Committee printed 
booklets of exemption forms that were distributed to local labour commit­
tees and wage earners. Once it recognized the Labour Party's strength in 
the postwar unions, the NUA Labour Committee moved to try to protect 
antisocialist wage earners and reduce union political activity by challeng­
ing the political levy procedure. Instead of contracting out, the Labour 
Committee wanted union members to contract in. Union members would 
no longer be expected to contribute to a political fund unless they signed 
an agreement so stating. Besides aiding Conservative trade unionists, re­
form of the political levy would cut out some Labour Party revenue. But 
most Conservative wage earners—Greenwood's assertions notwithstand-
ing—were more interested in assuring individual (i.e., their own) liberty 
and depoliticizing the unions than in weakening them or the Labour Party. 
In a 1923 lecture to a primarily trade unionist audience at the Conservative 
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College, F. J. C. Hearnshaw gave voice to Conservative workingmen's dis­
gust: "What is quite intolerable, wholly tyrannical, and utterly incompati­
ble with the elementary principles of democratic freedom, is that a person 
should at once and the same time (1) be compelled, on pain of economic 
ruin and physical violence, to join and remain in an association, and (2) be 
compelled without any redress to subscribe to and support whatever politi­
cal action it may choose to take." Reform of the political levy enjoyed wide­
spread support among Conservatives, including trade unionists.33 
In February 1921 the Labour Committee finally took action by sup­
porting the Milnerite Conservative M.P., Henry Wilson-Fox, who intro­
duced a private member's bill for contracting in. The government opposed 
the bill, which was then dropped. But the NUA Executive pursued the is­
sue, and both NUA and SUA conferences approved contracting in and se­
cret balloting for trade union political funds. On 10 February 1922 Colonel 
Ernest Meysey-Thompson introduced a private member's bill for trade 
union reform that received an enthusiastic response from Conservatives. 
Under his bill a union would have been required to obtain at least a 60 
percent approval rate (from a minimum of half its members) in a secret 
ballot before it could pursue political objectives. The bill also would have 
compelled unions to create separate political funds and to collect political 
contributions only from members who contracted in each year. During 
the bill's second reading on 19 May, the former Conservative junior minis­
ter Sir James Hope argued that the bill was no more than an attempt to 
disengage the legitimate interests of all trade unionists from politics. In a 
vivid attack on "Prussianism," Balfour attacked procedures that imperiled 
freedom and forced a union member "to contract into his liberty." Despite 
Labour's claim that the bill was an attack on unions, it passed the second 
reading.34 
During the late spring and summer of 1922, Conservative organiza­
tions voiced their support for the Meysey-Thompson bill. The NUA coun­
cil asked the government to provide facilities to enable the bill to be passed 
before the summer recess. In a Democrat article reprinted in the Conserva­
tive Agents' Journal, Mathams, the Labour Committee organizer, urged ev­
ery Conservative M.P. to support "the cause of free men" by voting for the 
bill. Only by protecting individual liberty, he wrote, could "the headlong 
impetus of majority impulse" be contained. Conservatives around the 
country gave the bill their strong support.35 
When the session ended in August without the bill's passage, Conser­
vatives blamed socialist union officials, but they also expressed irritation 
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with the government. Trade union reform was becoming a test of the mer­
its of coalitionism. Central office and many Conservative groups pressed 
for change even as senior Conservatives expressed fears that the issue 
would prove a divisive one at the NUA conference scheduled for November 
1922. Lord Derby, among others, warned Austen Chamberlain that failure 
to pass the bill would have very serious consequences. The chief whip, Les­
lie Wilson, also supported the bill and noted that William Appleton, a for­
mer lacemaker and the secretary of the General Federation of Trade 
Unions, thought the bill had the support of many trade unionists. Wide­
spread Conservative interest in this issue was made clear only days before 
the coalition's fall. On 10 October, a coalition supporter, Sir William Bull, 
joined with an anticoalitionist, Sir Arthur Steel-Maitland, to push a strong 
resolution for reform through the NUA Executive.36 
If any doubts remained about the level of Conservative support for 
trade union reform after the fall of the coalition, these were quickly re­
moved at the NUA conference in December 1922. Delegates welcomed a 
resolution demanding action to relieve trade unionists who were being 
forced to support "Labour-Socialist principles." In a letter to Bonar Law, 
the new prime minister, Younger stated that ending the levy was a "very 
strong desire amongst thousands of Trade Unionists." The introduction in 
February 1923 of a private member's bill by Lieutenant Colonel Martin 
Archer-Shee raised hopes, but Baldwin, the chancellor of the exchequer, 
took no immediate action. During the summer the NUA council again 
demanded action. The party's principal agent, Sir Reginald Hall, suggested 
to Baldwin, now prime minister, that he collaborate with the Labour Com­
mittee on the issue. Although the NUA conference welcomed another re­
form resolution in October 1923, the country was soon thrown into a tariff 
campaign during which the political levy issue virtually disappeared.37 
Conservative demands for trade union reform recurred after the 1923 
election. Charles Ainsworth, a Lancashire cotton manufacturer, introduced 
a moderate private member's bill addressing only contracting in and the 
separation of political funds, but it was defeated by Liberal and Labour 
M.P.s during its second reading. In spring 1924, proponents of union re­
form were very concerned with the outcome of the Conservative leaders' 
conference, or shadow cabinet, which was setting future party policy. The 
NUA Labour Committee sent material and offered advice to the conference 
that made it clear that both branches and regular associations wholeheart­
edly supported reform. A central office memorandum, probably prepared 
by Mathams, warned party leaders that failure to change the levy would 
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cause "a breaking away from the Party . .  . of a large body of Conservative 
workingmen." Finally, after the Labour Committee sent another memo­
randum detailing union officials' many alleged abuses of the law, and the 
NUA Executive and party chairman added pressure, the shadow cabinet 
finally adopted trade union reform. In Looking Ahead, Conservative leaders 
stated that a trade unionist must "be free to exercise his own unfettered 
discretion as to whether or not he should contribute to any political levy 
through his union." The party was endorsing contracting in.38 
After seeing their party win a tremendous victory in the 1924 election, 
Conservatives expected trade union reform, but the government neither 
spoke nor acted on the issue. A number of Conservative organizations then 
demanded that the pledge made in Looking Ahead be honored. The Labour 
Committee gathered experts to draft its own bill. In February 1925, Bald­
win formed a Cabinet committee to study reform. Birkenhead was chair­
man, and Baldwin and the chief whip, among others, were members. 
Before the Cabinet committee could make much progress, however, the 
Scottish barrister F. A. Macquisten introduced a private member's bill re­
quiring annual contracting in and protecting union funds from political 
misuse. Conservatives across the country, the NUCUA council, and 1922 
Committee of Conservative M.P.s expressed support for the bill.39 
But Conservative opposition to Macquisten's bill was not wholly lack­
ing. The Unionist association in agricultural Kincardine, on the advice of 
the local M.P., was one of a few to oppose the bill. More significant objec­
tions came from influential Conservatives who, like the editor of The 
Times, Geoffrey Dawson, and Duff Cooper, a member of the young, mod­
erate "YMCA" (or do-gooder) faction of the party, considered the bill un­
necessary, inopportune, and provocatively partisan. Although limited in 
numbers, these were supported by Baldwin and such key ministers as Birk­
enhead and Neville Chamberlain. On 25 February the progressive M.P. 
Noel Skelton led a deputation of twenty Conservative M.P.s to inform the 
prime minister of their opposition. The structure of the Conservative Party 
ensured that senior ministers would decide the bill's fate, and Macquisten, 
not wishing to challenge his leaders, met with Neville Chamberlain to de­
vise the government amendment for the second reading.40 
The compromise amendment that Baldwin later introduced recog­
nized the merits of reform but refused to sanction a private member's bill 
on such an important issue. Macquisten considered this only a temporary 
delay, but Baldwin wanted to put off the question indefinitely in order to 
foster a more reconciliatory spirit at home. The prime minister set the 
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stage for the bill's second reading with a speech at Birmingham on 5 March. 
Returning to an old theme, Baldwin decried suspicions between employers 
and workers, and urged them to seek "a truce . .  . that we may compose 
our differences, that we may join all our strengths together to see if we 
cannot pull the country into a better and happier condition."41 
The second reading of the Macquisten bill was accompanied by a 
number of notable speeches, including Baldwin's eloquent and emotive ap­
peal, and half a dozen maiden efforts. In moving the second reading, Mac­
quisten appealed to British fair play, which was violated by "political 
conscription," a "festering sore in the side of trade unionism." After the 
bill was seconded, Baldwin moved the government amendment. In this 
often quoted speech, he focused on the wider issues involved and on his 
hopes for Britain. He effectively stilled the urges of his party by tapping 
into "Englishness." Baldwin recalled the idyllic conditions at his family's 
business—before the arrival of corporations, unions, and strikes. The fu­
ture, he claimed, would be decided by a new partnership of employers 
and unions, whose recent progress in that direction the bill threatened to 
undermine. Baldwin asked his party to drop the bill as "a gesture" toward 
"the removal of suspicion in the country." Some Tories considered the 
speech curious, but, according to The Times, this "very typical En­
glishman" made a "profound impression" and swayed opinion in favor 
of conciliation.42 
Because Baldwin's intervention virtually ensured that the bill would 
be shelved, the remainder of the debate was anticlimactic. In his maiden 
speech, William Templeton criticized the bill's sponsors for redressing mi­
nor problems while allowing union leaders to continue their political activ­
ities. In another maiden speech, the Tory M.P. Cuthbert Headlam accepted 
the amendment but warned Labour not to ignore this opportunity: "If we 
can do things without legislation which will lead to better relations be­
tween employers and employed, we should do our best in that direction. 
If it is found to be impossible to do what we wish without a change in the 
law, then we must have the courage to bring forward a Bill which will revise 
the whole question of the position of trade unionists under the law. This 
is not a subject for a Private Member's Bill, and I hope it may become the 
duty of the Government to bring forward a Bill dealing with the whole 
subject." During the debate, M.P.s who had introduced the bill and mem­
bers of the 1922 Committee of Conservative M.P.s announced their accep­
tance of the amendment, which passed in a straight party vote.43 
Many Conservatives were nonetheless unhappy with this outcome, 
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particularly as labor relations worsened. Sir Philip Stott, a leading figure in 
the Labour Committee, expressed great disappointment and, unable to 
turn the party against Baldwin, temporarily withdrew from the NUCUA 
Labour Committee and Executive. Others regarded the setback as tempo­
rary and waited for a more opportune moment that would allow the gov­
ernment to introduce its own bill. The Labour Committee made it clear 
that it would not abandon the political levy and that it expected the gov­
ernment to fulfill the party's pledge. And during the months after the bill's 
defeat, Conservative interest in trade union reform increased because of 
developments in the coal industry. After weeks of rising tensions and a 
threatened general strike, the government appeared to surrender to coal 
miners' demands by agreeing on 31 July to pay a nine-month wage subsidy. 
A Trade Unions Congress (TUC) conference in September 1925 aggravated 
Conservative anger over the episode. The outbursts of some delegates, 
which later appeared in Conservative literature, proved to many Conserva­
tives that extremists were abusing union privileges in order to "attain So­
cialist and Communist ends."44 
As a consequence, proponents of reform acquired added support, and 
they began to extend their demands to include the prohibition of sympa­
thetic strikes and closed shops as well. The more aggressive mood was evi­
dent at all levels of the party. Delegates at the NUCUA conference in 
October 1925 advocated a change in the political levy. They erupted into 
"loud and prolonged applause" when a representative demanded that the 
government, elected by antisocialist voters, end the extremists' strangle­
hold. Baldwin's conciliatory tactics had failed, Macquisten told delegates, 
and further offerings would weaken the party and destroy the Empire. In 
response the party chairman vowed to take up the issue rather than "sacri­
fice justice on the altar of political expediency."45 
The conference's positive response led Macquisten publicly to accuse 
Baldwin of using weak "Christian Scientist methods" and abandoning his 
promises. Macquisten vowed to introduce another political levy bill. His 
new bill, introduced on 20 November, was quickly dispatched, but in Feb­
ruary 1926 the NUCUA council reiterated its support for contracting in 
and reducing "the political activity of Trade Unions." Several Cabinet 
members also expressed displeasure at recent events and began to consider 
the need for secret strike ballots, penalties for sympathetic strikes, and re­
stricted picketing. Birkenhead stated in October 1925 that the government 
might have to give "complete reconsideration of the exceptional legal status 
conceded to trade unions [which] seem[s] to me, under the influence of 
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extremist elements, to have been grossly abused." In a speech made on 4 
November he warned, "We, and we alone, not the trade unions, not the 
Communists, not the employers, are the trustees of the community as a 
whole, and if and when the threats of industrial anarchy imperil that cause, 
there is no responsibility of intervention from which we shall shrink and 
there will be found little which we have not thought out and prepared 
beforehand." In other words, even the present conciliatory government 
would have to act if there was a general strike.46 
Support for reform increased dramatically after the General Strike 
(4-12 May 1926). Shortly after the failure of the Meysey-Thompson bill, 
Barnes had predicted that no union bill would ever succeed, "providing 
that the Labour Party confines itself to constitutional methods and takes 
steps to clear itself of revolutionary verbiage." The General Strike, by ap­
pearing to demonstrate the unconstitutional and revolutionary views of 
union and Labour Party leaders, pushed trade union reform into the lime­
light. During the crisis, central office distributed more than three million 
pieces of antistrike literature. Conservative leaders were careful to portray 
their cause as a struggle for the Constitution. In a BBC speech Baldwin 
asked listeners, "Can there be a more direct attack upon the community 
than that a body, not elected by the voters of the country, without con­
sulting the people, without consulting even the Trade Unionists, and in 
order to impose conditions never yet defined, should dislocate the life of 
the nation and try to starve us into submission?" Baldwin's handling of the 
crisis was widely approved, and he received hundreds of supportive letters. 
Bradford Conservatives, for instance, expressed "admiration and pride" 
and agreed with the government's rejection of the "organised assault upon 
the rights, liberties and freedom of the citizens." An NCL lodge in Stockton 
claimed that reform was now necessary "to make further attacks on our 
liberties, our King and our Constitution for ever impossible."47 
Shortly after the General Strike ended, the Cabinet formed a commit­
tee under the chairmanship of Lord Chancellor Cave to consider trade 
union reform. Leading moderates within the party, for example, Harold 
Macmillan, Lord Swinton, and Neville Chamberlain, advocated measures 
that would include arbitration procedures and generally promote coopera­
tion between workers and owners. In October 1926 the NUCUA conference 
demonstrated, however, that rank-and-file Conservatives were more inter­
ested in legal restrictions. One delegate introduced a motion in favor of 
conciliation and arbitration, but it was easily defeated. The collapse of the 
General Strike had reassured Conservatives that their way of life would not 
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be "destroyed by a Socialist Junta sitting at Eccleston Square," but it also 
made them even more eager to purge unions of extremists and foreign 
ideologies. For six weeks after the General Strike, The Times and other 
newspapers printed countless letters demanding action against levies and 
illegal strikes. At their annual meeting, Wirral Conservatives claimed that 
dangerous revolutionaries "secure the key positions in the industrial Trade 
Union organisations, and are filling many important posts in the organi­
sations of the Socialist party itself. When the Trade Union machine, largely 
immune from the legal consequences of its actions, is used by Extremists 
to threaten paralysis and stoppage of vital public services . .  . [it] involves 
the public welfare, [and] it calls for the attention of the present Govern­
ment." Typically Conservatives demanded contracting in, strike ballots, re­
stricted picketing, more legal liabilities on unions, and the end of "foreign 
propaganda."48 
By early summer Conservatives had made it clear that they expected 
reform. The government responded with reassurances. At its 22 June 1926 
meeting the NUCUA council gave much attention to union reform and 
agreed on several immediate changes in the law. First, they demanded the 
right to work and the balloting of workers before they went on strike. Sec­
ond, they requested that all unions provide audited financial accounts. 
Third, despite the resistance of Sir Robert Sanders, a former minister and 
party organizer who did not want to embarrass the government, the La­
bour Committee asked for the repeal of the 1906 and 1913 acts. The council 
was reassured by what one observer described as a "rather indiscreet but 
much approved speech" by Birkenhead, who broadly hinted that the Cabi­
net was planning a reform measure. Meanwhile Lord Cave asked the La­
bour Committee to poll members in order to present their views to the 
Cabinet committee. In the House of Lords, Cave shelved Lord Banbury's 
new reform bill on 20 July, but he held out the promise of a more construc­
tive government bill.49 
But many Conservatives remained wary of the government's attitude, 
and their concerns surfaced at Conservative meetings in the autumn. At 
the NUCUA conference in October 1926, delegates repeated their demands 
and asked for immediate action. On behalf of wage earners, Stockton's 
James Gardner warned, "If the Government let us down this time I am 
seriously thinking of what my future political views shall be, and there are 
thousands more like me." Another delegate simply instructed the leaders 
to "Get on with it or get out." A particularly hostile motion criticizing 
the government's lassitude was withdrawn only after the party chairman 
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promised action. Six weeks later the SUA conference passed its own list 
of union reforms, including secret strike ballots, restricted picketing, and 
separate political funds. The Primrose League and the National Citizens' 
Union (which had gathered forty thousand signatures on a proreform 
petition) made similar statements. Even after the chief whip stated on 11 
November that the government intended to present a bill in the next ses­
sion, Conservatives remained uneasy; four days later the Labour Com­
mittee again demanded legislation to make unions "purely Industrial 
Organisations."50 
Working methodically to devise an acceptable bill, the Cabinet consid­
ered almost every issue. All the ministers wanted to outlaw general strikes, 
restrict picketing, and prevent intimidation, but they differed on several 
issues, particularly compulsory strike ballots and contracting in. Eventu­
ally the Cabinet dropped strike balloting as an unworkable and needless 
interference in union activities. Based on their knowledge of rank-and-file 
opinion, central office informed the Cabinet that contracting in and the 
separation of political funds were essential. These changes would reduce 
unions' political activism and protect individual unionists' rights. A few 
Conservatives opposed these changes, but the Cabinet decided to adopt 
contracting in.51 
The government finally introduced the Trade Disputes and Trade 
Unions bill on 4 April 1927. The first of its five main clauses declared illegal 
any nonindustrial strike designed to coerce the state or community; the 
second protected trade unionists who refused to join illegal strikes and was 
retroactive to the General Strike; the third prohibited picketing individuals 
or property in an attempt at intimidation; the fourth required trade unions 
to create separate political funds and adopt contracting in; and the fifth 
prohibited civil servants from joining trade unions affiliated with outside 
bodies (e.g., the TUC) or espousing political objectives. In its analysis of 
the bill, The Times, hitherto hostile to reform, emphasized the bill's reason­
ableness and fairness, and applauded the Cabinet's moderate, conservative 
approach. It would be a "perversion of language," The Times stated, to con­
sider the bill "an 'attack' on trade unionism."52 Furthermore, it argued, 
even contracting in was not repressive: if it did not reduce the number 
of trade unionists contributing, then it was irrelevant, while if it had a 
demonstrable effect, then contracting out was unjust. 
Parliamentary debate on the bill was long, legalistic, and often heated. 
In moving the second reading on 2 May, Attorney General Sir Douglas 
Hogg was constantly interrupted by Labour M.P.s, particularly union lead­
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ers who resented what they considered an attack on their authority. One 
particularly keen heckler, John Jones, the general organizer of the National 
Union of General and Municipal Workers, had to be removed from the 
chamber for calling Hogg a liar. Baldwin made a largely ineffective speech 
during which he, too, was treated discourteously. Labour M.P.s like John 
Clynes claimed that the bill was an attempt to cripple unions and the La­
bour Party, and repeated their earlier vows to repeal it as soon as possible. 
Among the moderates who supported the bill, Macmillan and Leslie Scott 
suggested that it should be part of a progressive program of reform and 
conciliation. George Spencer, a Labour M.P. and leader of a breakaway 
union of moderate Nottingham miners, gave a moving account of his own 
victimization and attacked the machinations of union leaders who used 
their organizations for selfish, non-union, and political objectives. Conser­
vatives applauded Spencer and claimed that the bill would satisfy the many 
wage earners who considered it "a charter of freedom and liberty . .  . 
[which would] release them from the tyranny under which they are 
suffering."53 
The committee and report stages in the Commons and the proceed­
ings in the Lords produced only one significant change in the bill. As soon 
as the bill was introduced, the Labour Committee and some Conservative 
M.P.s declared that employers' lockouts should be subject to the same re­
strictions as strikes. The idea generated widespread support, and the gov­
ernment decided to make the change itself in committee. In the House of 
Lords, opposition parties fought the bill by linking it to recent proposals 
for second-chamber reform. Lord Arnold claimed that the bill was part of 
the Conservative Party's "double attack" on the Labour Party's financial 
and electoral base. Most peers, however, greeted the bill favorably. They 
joined the bishop of Durham in praising the bill as a safety measure against 
unions that had established "a ubiquitous, cruel and continuing tyranny, 
degrading to the character of their members and very perilous to the State." 
On 25 July, after eight days of debate and discussion, the Lords passed the 
bill. Its minor amendments protecting dependents from intimidation and 
loosening prohibitions against civil servants in unions were adopted by the 
Commons, and on 29 July 1927 the Trade Disputes and Trade Unions bill 
became law.54 
No one was certain how the public would react to Labour's outcry 
against the legislation, but Conservatives were reasonably confident. In 
February 1927 Man in the Street had noted that Labour was preparing "its 
big guns" and claimed that they would "make a terrific noise but their 
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destructive effect is likely to be very small." During the debates most Con­
servatives agreed with Sir Robert Sanders, the new chairman of the NU­
CUA council, who thought that the measure would be received "with 
enthusiasm." One Tory peer claimed to see the telltale signs of Labour's 
failure to generate any support on the melancholy faces of opposition peers 
who returned from public tours. Even the normally cautious Baldwin 
told Thomas Jones that he thought most workmen would welcome the 
55 measure.
Meanwhile, Labour was trying to mobilize working-class opinion. At 
least one Tory union member criticized the bill, and others were concerned 
that it marked the start of a drive to cripple unions and repress wage earn­
ers. After the bill was introduced, Conservatives began their own campaign 
to win wage-earner opinion. They aimed to ridicule Labour's protests and 
tap the widespread desire for security and stability. Central office distrib­
uted material like the cartoon "A Perfect Scream," which depicted the 
unions as a dirty and choleric boy trying to avoid Mother Baldwin's cleans­
ing bath. Conservatives also appealed to trade unionists by portraying their 
leaders as, in Macquisten's words, a "priesthood" trying to evade "the law 
of the land." In a May 1927 article in the Conservative Agents' Journal, 
G. E. M. Walker suggested that Conservatives present the bill as protection 
against insecurity and the abuse of strikes and political funds, and he urged 
agents to use workers and Labour Committee members for the campaign.56 
Central office produced informative and analytical booklets, but it was 
chiefly concerned with popular leaflets and pamphlets, of which nearly 
nine million were distributed by the end of May. One North Cornwall 
branch association handed out a thousand leaflets during a month of cam­
paigning. A single leaflet explaining the bill to trade unionists accounted 
for almost one-fifth of those distributed nationwide. Central office also 
organized a movie van tour, with a "talkie" of Hogg explaining the bill. 
They distributed Spencer's speech at the second reading and other broad­
sheets and posters. Much of the material went to special campaigns in a 
hundred marginal seats. Some regions also organized activities. In both 
southern Wales and the eastern Midlands, hundreds of trade unionists 
gathered to convey their support for reform by listening to leading Conser­
vatives explain the bill. The SUA carried out a campaign blanketing Scot­
land with hundreds of thousands of pieces of literature.57 
The actual effect of the Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act was lim­
ited. Only the provisions regarding civil servants and the political levy were 
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ever implemented, and the civil servant clause was relatively unimportant. 
Contracting in reduced the portion of the union membership paying polit­
ical levies from three-quarters to one-half. Eventually, however, trade 
unions compensated for the drop in funds by drawing on reserves and 
increasing the levy paid by union members who contracted in. The views 
of interwar Labour leaders and some historians notwithstanding, the fig­
ures indicate that quite a few trade unionists were forced to contribute to 
unwanted political activities before 1927, and a significant portion of Brit-
ain's wage earners favored reform.58 
The views of Labour leaders like Ernest Bevin and the Bradford ILP 
activist Frederick Jowett have skewed our assessment of the Trade Disputes 
and Trade Unions Act. Before the bill was introduced, Labour assumed a 
heroic posture—some of its M.P.s even pledged to abstain from alcohol 
and tobacco for six months if the bill was passed! They continued to claim, 
in Jowett's words, that the act was part of "a planned capitalist offensive 
against the working class." Bevin, the founder and head of the largest trade 
union in Britain, attacked the measure "as an act of petty vindictiveness 
inspired by class and party spite." As foreign secretary under Clement 
Attlee, Bevin took great pleasure in pressing for its repeal in 1946. His biog­
rapher largely accepts Bevin's version of the reform, asserting that the "sav­
age piece of legislation" was popular only with reactionaries and big 
business. Some historians argue that the act was responsible for the Con­
servative defeat in 1929. In fact, only in regions like southern Wales, where 
a large part of the population was already suffering from long-term hard­
ship and economic dislocation, was the act seen as vindictive. The postur­
ing of Labour leaders created a heroic myth that triumphed after 1939, but 
it did not reflect popular opinion in the 1920s. The TUC and Labour were 
unable to mobilize majority opinion against the measure. Somewhat to his 
surprise, the Conservative Party chairman, J. C. C. Davidson, found that 
the populace generally approved the act, which may even have revived the 
government's waning popularity.59 
The leaders and members of the Labour Committee should receive 
some credit for the trade union legislation. They persistently advocated 
reform, particularly contracting in, through public resolutions and private 
advice to Conservative leaders. The Labour Committee's work ensured that 
the issue was not displaced either by moderate pragmatists, who preferred 
to abandon it altogether, or by reactionaries, who were eager to hamstring 
Britain's trade unions. That a significant number of wage earners were able 
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to express support for reform through the network of labour committees 
undermined trade unionists' claims that Conservative policy was directed 
against the working class. 
After the passage of the Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act, the 
Labour Committee supervised the implementation of the new laws. For 
instance, it publicized attempts by the National Union of General and Mu­
nicipal Workers to maintain its political fund by raising other fees. One of 
the Labour Committee's few new missions was a vain attempt to halt the 
politicization of cooperative societies. Since the formation of the Coopera­
tive Party in 1917, cooperatives affiliated with Labour had been a perennial 
problem for Conservatives. In 1922 the Cooperative Party agreed to an elec­
toral arrangement with the Labour Party, and the Cheltenham Cooperative 
Conference in mid-1927 approved the affiliation of the Cooperative Party 
with the Labour Party. Some Conservatives saw the Cooperative Union as 
a "half-way house to Socialism," but most simply objected to political ac­
tivity by cooperatives. In contrast to the trade union question, however, 
few practical remedies—and no legislative solution—were available.60 
Conservative Wage Earners 
Many members of the interwar working class identified with Conservative 
policies and attitudes, as both support for trade union reform and election 
results indicate. Although Labour's popular vote included many non-trade 
unionist men and women, it averaged only slightly more than four million 
votes in the four elections between 1918 and 1924. Union membership, 
however, ranged from a peak of more than eight million in 1920 to nearly 
five million in the late 1920s. Only after equal suffrage was enacted in 1928 
did Labour's vote reach or exceed the number of trade unionists, but even 
then it was only about half the estimated fifteen million adults in Britain 
who were wage earners. A large proportion of the working class clearly did 
not vote Labour in the 1920s, and the Conservative Party was just as clearly 
drawing votes from beyond its middle- and upper-class core constituency. 
In 1929 it polled eight and a half million votes, more than Britain's entire 
middle- and upper-class population.61 
Thanks to the work of Nordlinger, McKenzie, and Silver in the late 
1960s, we know something about the nature of working-class Conserva­
tism. Despite the jibes of left-wing critics, Tory wage earners were not 
ignorant or somehow historically immature. The historian and former La­
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bour M.R David Marquand criticizes the reigning interpretation, devel­
oped by labor historians, that the working-class Tory was "somehow an 
aberration or an anachronism: a pale and ghostly figure sliding inexorably 
toward the margin of history, not a robust, red-blooded creature, with 
as much sociological staying power as his Labour-voting, dues-paying 
neighbours."62 Conservative wage earners were attracted by three major 
social and ideological elements of Conservatism: nonpolitical trade union­
ism, deference, and patriotism or a desire for national unity. 
First, as the trade union reform controversy revealed, a substantial 
portion of workers objected to the increasingly politicized postwar unions 
and felt that the original nonpartisan aims of unions and cooperatives were 
being subverted. This explains William Appleton's views on trade union­
ism. In common with many other skilled craftsmen, Appleton admired the 
"sane or business trade union," which ignored politics. He regarded the 
American Federation of Labor as the model of this kind of trade union. 
Appleton took pride in his organization's ability to serve trade unions 
while avoiding "grandiloquent, but non-trade union and financially 
unsound enterprises." He supported copartnership, profit sharing, and 
worker participation, and contemptuously rejected "yellow unions." The 
former Labour leader George Barnes, who was involved in the highly 
skilled and exclusive engineering trade, held similar views.63 
In a recent essay, Jarvis seems to indicate that this respectable, self-
sufficient, and non-party trade unionism was largely a creation of imagina­
tive propagandists working within the Conservative Party, but the trade 
union issue and the agitation for reform suggests otherwise. Conservatives 
successfully marshaled wage-earner support for their cause by identifying 
their party as the defender of the English workingman and his traditions. 
In many public statements echoing his famous March 1925 speech in the 
House of Commons, Baldwin praised the English people as "born and bred 
into the qualities of individuality, initiative, enterprise, thrift, common 
sense, moderation, calmness, kindliness, brotherliness, honesty, respect for 
the law, and love of freedom and justice." In so doing the prime minister 
attempted to retain the traditional hierarchy while merging with it a new 
democratic emphasis on individual responsibility. It is true, however, that 
workingmen's support for the Conservative Party was regularly under­
mined by the party's sometimes conflicting appeals to women and middle-
class voters. Sometimes Baldwin could get support from all the new con­
stituencies, but holding together several distinct versions of Conservatism 
was a very difficult task.64 
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A second reason behind working-class support for the Conservative 
Party was social deference. Deference toward one's betters was based both 
on regard for the superior training, education, and socialization of this 
group and on faith in the benefits of cooperation in an organically con­
ceived society. Sociological studies of working-class attitudes show that the 
allegiance of Conservative wage earners, in contrast to Labour supporters, 
is based in part on their regard for the Conservative Party's ability to har­
monize divergent social and economic interests. The Conservative belief in 
mutual dependence and deference reveals itself in the loyalty of rank-and-
file members to party leaders and in the emphasis on consensus deci­
sion making. Deference, which remains an important component of the 
working-class outlook, was not a sign of political immaturity, for it perme­
ated all parties. For instance, Arthur Ponsonby claimed that he was selected 
as a Labour candidate in Sheffield precisely because of his self-described 
middle-class upbringing. The Conservative Party between the wars bene­
fited from what Nordlinger describes as wage earners' "normative satisfac­
tion with a . .  . perceived lack of influence," even though it often did not 
bring them working-class members or volunteers.65 
A final, key source of Conservatism among wage earners was patrio­
tism and the desire for national cohesion. Tories rejected what they consid­
ered a "self-interested calculus" and assessed policies by what they claimed 
were the nation's interests. In 1913 F. E. Smith succinctly defined the Con­
servative view: "The conception of unity is at the bottom of the Tory atti­
tude of mind. It is nothing but the instinct of patriotism, the sense that 
the nation is a single unit, and not a haphazard collection of individuals, 
and that the unit must at any cost be strengthened and preserved." After 
the Great War, Conservative Party propaganda cultivated the notion that 
only its leaders had the ability and the experience to lead the nation and 
protect its interests. The Labour Committee and the Conservative Party 
declared that true progress was "possible only by the good will of all sec­
tions of the community, and not at the expense of any one section, be it 
rich, or be it poor." Baldwin was an especially powerful advocate of stability 
and harmony based on English traditions and Christian values. As he told 
one audience, "The country represents the eternal values and the eternal 
traditions from which we must never allow ourselves to be separated."66 
Conservatives alleged that the Labour Party was dominated by self-
seeking leaders, abnormal individuals, and leftist foreign interests. Tories 
claimed that Labour was not a national party, but a class party. They ex­
ploited any disreputable incident involving Labour, such as the gifts Ram­
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say MacDonald received from the owner of McVitie's biscuits in 1924, to 
accuse the Labour Party and union leaders of using their positions for per­
sonal benefit. Conservatives also marginalized Labour supporters by call­
ing them maladjusted. In the late 1940s, the Conservative M.P. and minister 
Nigel Birch described the Labour supporter as someone who "is continu­
ally sweating and whining about his condition, [and] has an exceptionally 
good face for a grievance." The Labour Party, the argument went, was a 
bogus title for a group of incompetents, socialists, and revolutionaries who 
sought class conflict, nationalization of property, and the destruction of 
the British way of life.67 
Conservative leaders consistently claimed that the capital levy—a one­
time progressive tax on all capital—proposed by the Labour Party imme­
diately after World War I, would hurt workers who had worked hard to 
save money or buy homes. Conservatives in Bradford even arranged for 
Ben Tillett, the Labour M.P. and leader of the Dockers' Union, to speak 
against the levy during the 1922 election. At the start of the 1923 election, 
Younger, the former party chairman, urged Conservative candidates to ex­
ploit the capital levy issue "for all it is worth." In September 1923, the NUA 
published The Capital Levy: Its Real Purpose, written by the laissez-faire 
Liberal Harold Cox. Cox tried to demonstrate that a levy would be unjust, 
would penalize patriots who had bought war bonds, and would destroy 
capitalism and leave the way clear for socialism. Like other Conservative 
candidates, Locker-Lampson told voters in Wood Green that the levy was 
"crazy" and proved that Labour was "bankrupt in ideas, and utterly un­
fitted to govern a great civilised community."68 
Conservatives also believed that revolutionaries and foreign ideas and 
individuals controlled Labour, never hesitating to use such claims during 
elections. The Campaign Guide for the 1922 election claimed that pro-
Germans, pacifists, and revolutionaries dominated Labour and were en­
gaged in unconstitutional activities to undermine the state. Labour's 
pledge to lighten the demands of the Versailles Treaty was construed as 
recklessly pro-German. Conservatives attempted to tap antiforeign senti­
ment among working-class voters. In 1925 the Stockton labour committee 
chairman, James Gardner, suggested a "Britain for the British" campaign 
to develop imperial trade and shipbuilding and to deal with the alleged 
problem of "3000 aliens in receipt of the dole." Conservative literature of 
the mid-i92os claimed that the more radical trade union leaders were con­
trolled by Moscow and were trying to use strikes to destroy the British 
nation. Such allegations may have attracted some wage earners. Although 
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a longtime member of the ILP, Barnes criticized "foreign" theory and rhet­
oric. In his memoirs he described going to a prewar meeting of socialists 
where he was "belaboured with words about exploitation, proletariat, 
bourgeois and others of learned length and thundering sound just then 
imported from Germany."69 
Along with their nationalist rhetoric, Conservatives tried to appeal to 
wage earners with imperialism. The party's propaganda argued that trade 
within the Empire improved the economy at home, relieving unemploy­
ment and increasing wages. The 1922 Campaign Guide claimed that Britain 
exported more than eight times the value of goods for every inhabitant of 
Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and Canada as the country exported 
to the United States, Germany, and the Soviet Union. Many leaflets and a 
regular column, "An Empire Note-Book," in the party magazine, Man in 
the Street, stressed the Empire's economic importance.70 
The view of the Empire that Conservatives offered wage earners was 
an idealistic one. In his memoirs John Buchan, the M.P. for the Scottish 
Universities and chairman of the Conservative and Unionist Educational 
Institute, reflected on his interwar ideal of imperialism: "I dreamed of a 
world-wide brotherhood with the background of a common race and 
creed, consecrated to the service of peace; Britain enriching the rest out of 
her culture and traditions, and the spirit of the Dominions like a strong 
wind freshening the stuffiness of the old lands. I saw in the Empire a means 
of giving the congested masses at home open country instead of a blind 
alley." Other Conservatives expressed similar feelings. Baldwin's colonial 
secretary, L. S. Amery, argued that the British Empire was a force for inter­
national cooperation more promising than the relatively untried League of 
Nations. In a May 1927 essay, he claimed that the "British League of Na­
tions," rooted as it was in history, was stronger than its counterpart in 
Geneva. He also argued that the Empire could have a more positive effect 
because of its "ideals and principles . .  . of ordered freedom, of the suprem­
acy of law over arbitrary power, of fair play and toleration, [and] of trustee­
ship for the weak."71 
Conservatives hoped that imperialism would encourage patriotism 
and undermine the appeal of socialism. For Conservatives like the prospec­
tive candidate for Camlachie, P. D. Ridge-Beedle, imperialism acted as a 
moral tonic against the prevailing "weak-kneed, slouching, vacillating, un­
decided attitude." All Britons, Ridge-Beedle claimed, could rest in the 
knowledge that they deserved to rule the inferior peoples of the Empire. 
As one historian of the British Empire, John MacKenzie, explains in his 
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work on popular imperialism, many Conservatives saw imperialist rhetoric 
as a unifying force that drew the classes together under Conservative lead­
ership. Yet after the First World War imperialism was less powerful than it 
had been, and the failure of protectionism in 1923 meant that the imperial 
message was almost exclusively rhetorical.72 
The difficulty of the 1923 general election demanded that Conserva­
tives use every rhetorical element they could think of to mobilize working-
class support. First, they claimed to have a solution for Britain's social ills. 
During a stop at Bradford, Baldwin expressed concern for the effects of 
unemployment. The uncertain economy was undermining society, con­
suming workers' savings, "destroy[ing] the very springs of thrift in the 
people themselves," and generally breeding despair. Under these condi­
tions, Baldwin said, "extremists" would be able to "sow their poisonous 
seeds" of hatred and class warfare. The solution was protectionism. Con­
servatives provided specific examples of the results of free trade versus tar­
iffs. One leaflet detailed free trade's destructive effect on twelve industries. 
But, Conservatives said proudly, the protection of domestic motor vehicle 
manufacturing under the Safeguarding of Industries Act (1921) had led to 
large increases in production. Wage earners were told that the high stan­
dard of living enjoyed by American workers was due to protection. Candi­
dates invariably mentioned any local industry that might benefit from 
protection. Jonas Pearson, trade unionist, chairman of the Bradford labour 
committee, and candidate for Bradford Central, relentlessly attacked the 
importation of French gabardines, which was hurting worsted producers 
in his city. In Wrexham, Edmund Bushby printed a letter from the manager 
of a steel works warning of layoffs if steel producers were not protected.73 
Second, Conservative propaganda appealed to working-class patriot­
ism. Central office rewrote the wartime song "Keep the Home Fires Burn­
ing" to a tariff theme: 
Keep the Home Fires Burning 
Keep for British earning, 
Wages that the Foreigner would steal away. 
Stand for Home and Neighbour. 
Spurn all foreign labour, 
Baldwin's way's the British way, and it's bound to pay.74 
The leaflet "It's Your Money They Want, But It's Work British Labour 
Wants" stated that importers and foreign manufacturers benefited from 
free trade at the expense of British workmen. Conservatives even accused 
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foreigners and importers of financing the Liberal campaign. In Skipton the 
Conservative candidate, Colonel Roundell, said that he wanted to protect 
workers from "the Foreign Black-Leg who robs you of your Wages and 
destroys your industry." In his election address the Clapham candidate, Sir 
John Leigh, reproduced a NUA leaflet alleging that Labour was controlled 
by the suspicious-sounding, "foreign" Socialistische Arbeiter-Inter-
national, i.e., the Second International.75 
Going by their defeat in the 1923 general election, the Conservatives 
failed to win working-class voters to a tariff program. Nationally the poll 
for Conservative candidates in contested seats declined from 49.6 percent 
to 43.6 percent, and the number of Conservative M.Rs fell dramatically 
from 345 to 258. In some working-class divisions, however, results were 
better than in 1922. The Stockton Conservatives claimed a moral victory 
when their first postwar candidate, Harold Macmillan, missed victory by 
only seventy-three votes.76 And although there were fewer Conservative 
M.Rs from predominantly industrial regions, their numbers declined less 
there than in such areas as the southwest and the heavily middle-class 
southeast. The decrease in Conservative support in the mostly working-
class and Conservative West Midlands was relatively small even though the 
number of M.Rs fell from thirty-six to thirty. In other working-class areas 
such as Lancastria, the Mid-North, the Northeast, and Strathclyde the rela­
tively stable position of the Conservatives was largely due to the party's 
earlier problems in those regions. 
The protectionist campaign attracted relatively few Labour voters, but 
it alienated many middle-class male voters and women from all classes. 
For instance, in the fifteen predominantly working-class seats with straight 
Conservative-Labour contests in 1922,1923, and 1924, the Conservative vote 
dropped from 46 percent to 41 percent between 1922 and 1923. In the 1924 
election, after the Conservatives had abandoned tariffs, they won 44 per­
cent of the vote in these seats. For every working-class voter the Conserva­
tives gained with the tariff program, they lost more than one middle-class 
or female voter. In the 167 predominantly middle-class southeastern and 
London seats, Conservative M.Rs fell from 132 to 97. In the London metro­
politan area the drop was particularly notable. Conservatives had held 68 
of the 96 metropolitan seats before the election; after it, they held 46. The 
1923 election demonstrated that any appeal to wage earners must not 
threaten the Conservative Party's core of middle-class and women voters. 
After dropping protectionism, the Conservative Party was able to retain 
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the primary elements of its appeal to workers—trade union reform, defer­
ence, and nationalism—throughout the 1920s. 
After 1927, however, the NUCUA Labour Committee gradually lost its 
importance. Initially this did not affect local labour committees, but later, 
during the 1930s, the number of constituencies with committees fell from 
more than one-third to less than one-quarter. The Conservative Party's 
greater strength and the stability of the government, both of which made 
a wage-earner organization less vital, were partly responsible for this trend. 
The Labour Committee's decline changed its relationship with the party. 
After the trade union issue was settled, the national committee was de­
moted to a largely administrative role, and in 1929 local committees be­
came strictly advisory bodies of the Conservative associations. Without a 
national issue to motivate members, the Labour Committee also lost its 
direction, and some members abandoned the movement. As a result of 
Chamberlain's party reorganization in 1931, the Labour Committee became 
no more than a subcommittee of the NUCUA Executive, wholly elected by 
and as dependent on it as any administrative subcommittee. Central office 
downgraded the Labour Department as well by incorporating it into the 
Publicity Department.77 
These changes meant that the NUCUA Labour Committee had to 
abandon its goal of becoming a popular organization for Conservative 
wage earners. Henceforth, it was largely a skeleton body handling literature 
for the working class. By most criteria the Labour Committee failed to 
attain its goals. It sponsored few wage-earner candidates, and it was unable 
to establish a broad base of support. These failures resulted mainly from 
two factors. First, the Labour Party was identified as the working-class and 
trade union party, forcing the Conservative Party on the defensive. Second, 
Conservative attempts to organize wage earners were inevitably under­
mined by the party's dominant character and outlook. To mobilize and 
organize middle-class and women voters after the war, the Conservative 
Party had to adopt their views and prejudices. This meant facilitating their 
domination of constituency parties, selecting them as candidates, arrang­
ing Conservative activities according to their sensibilities, and rejecting 
policies that undermined their electoral support. 
Despite its courtship of the middle-class and female vote, however, 
the interwar Conservative Party, like its post-World War II descendant, 
continued to draw a significant portion of the working-class vote. During 
the 1920s the activities of the Labour Committee at least demonstrated 
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that working-class voters could be Conservatives. As a Unionist magazine 
inelegantly noted, "genuine, loyal, and life-long support for trade union­
ism is not incompatible with political opinions which are not those of the 
'Labour' Party."78 The debate on trade union reform validated this asser­
tion. Many wage earners were attracted to the Tory ideology of respectable 
and nonpolitical trade unionism and national unity, and they responded 
to Conservative claims that the Labour Party could not provide capable or 
stable leadership. 
The similarities between the 1920s and the era of Margaret Thatcher 
are obvious. In both cases union power was curtailed dramatically by legal 
reforms, widespread unemployment, and the decline of unionized indus­
try. In his survey of recent British history, Morgan notes the analogous 
public response to "irresponsible" union activism and the parallels be­
tween the coal miners' strike of 1984-85 and the General Strike of 1926. In 
both cases, "The old legend of. . . workers' solidarity and union power . .  . 
[was] exploded . .  . [after] a long, and indeed largely popular campaign 
. .  . to undercut union monopoly in the labour market, and to exorcize 
memories" of union domination. In both periods Conservative attempts 
to develop working-class groups (a Conservative Trade Unionist Organisa­
tion was formed in 1978) were only partially successful.79 In spite of its 
limited membership and achievements, the Labour Committee assisted in 
the Conservative Party's adaptation to the age of universal suffrage in a 
way that suited the ethos of the interwar Conservative Party. 
Conservative Party Propaganda 
and Education 
Propaganda and education were two of the most important polit­
ical tools for the Conservative Party in dealing with voters after the First 
World War. Party publicity was not a completely new development. For 
some years the Conservatives had used traveling agents to address public 
meetings and had published pamphlets and leaflets for election campaigns. 
Shortly before the war the veteran journalist Malcolm Fraser was hired to 
organize the party's publicity. These efforts were minor, however, com­
pared to postwar propaganda and educational work. In 1927—not an elec­
tion year—the NUCUA published nearly twenty million pamphlets and 
leaflets and more than six million copies of the various Conservative maga­
zines. At about the same time the Yorkshire provincial division spent 
nearly seven hundred pounds, more than a third of its ordinary budget, 
and North Cornwall Conservatives one hundred pounds from their mea­
ger resources, on propaganda.1 
After 1918 the Conservative Party's educational efforts were as impres­
sive as its propaganda. Before 1914 the party made no concerted effort to 
educate the electorate, which was relatively small and highly politicized. 
After 1918 the Conservatives were challenged by an influx of voters and an 
influential socialist message. Many working-class educational institutions, 
for example, were becoming Labour's preserve, providing a socialist, or at 
least leftist, education to tens of thousands of students every year. Conser­
vatives needed to counteract this trend and recognized that their party was 
becoming more dependent on its rank and file, which had to be trained 
for modern political operations. Education was therefore crucial to the 
success of the interwar Conservative Party. The Conservatives created a 
network of lecture courses, study circles, and schools to educate voters in 
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politics and ideology, and train volunteers. At the pinnacle of the educa­
tional system was the Conservative College. The party also printed a wide 
array of educational materials. Year in and year out during the 1920s—and 
the interwar period generally—Conservatives devoted their resources to 
education in an unprecedented manner. 
Although historians have largely ignored the focus on education, the 
importance of propaganda has not gone unnoticed. The manipulative na­
ture of propaganda makes it an attractive explanation for the Conservative 
Party's dominance in interwar politics.2 Certainly Labour Party leaders saw 
Conservative mass persuasion as an attempt by the monied elite to delude 
"the uneducated" and undermine democracy.3 Conservatives, or at least 
their leaders and organizers, appreciated the power of propaganda when 
appropriately used, but they also recognized the utility of education for 
increasing party members' and voters' political knowledge and for train­
ing volunteers. 
Propaganda 
There were several reasons for the increased interest in propaganda and ed­
ucation after 1918. Even before the war, an influential political scientist at 
the London School of Economics, Graham Wallas, had argued in Human 
Nature in Politics (1908) that accident, sentiment, and habit were decisive 
factors in politics, particularly in democracies. During World War I, the 
impressive effects of propaganda on a mass audience vividly demonstrated 
the validity of Wallas's ideas. In 1923 a contributor to Nineteenth Century 
and After noted that practices like Lloyd George's prewar use of publicity 
stunts were becoming common because of the war and the advent of film. 
Educated Britons had a high regard for propaganda partly because the Ger­
mans were willing to attribute their defeat to Allied propaganda. The "stab 
in the back" theory developed by General Ludendorff in 1919 and later 
popularized by Adolf Hitler blamed Germany's defeat on domestic unrest 
inspired by British propaganda. Sir Campbell Stuart's Secrets of Crewe 
House (1920), Arthur Ponsonby's Falsehood in War-Time (1926), and the 
American Harold Lasswell's groundbreaking Propaganda Technique in the 
World War (1927) emphasized the power—for good and evil—of propa­
ganda. Philip G. Cambray, head of central office publications from 1921 to 
1927 and briefly deputy director of publicity, grounded his book The Game 
of Politics: A Study of Principles of British Political Strategy (1932) on an un­
Conservative Party Propaganda and Education I 147 
derstanding of propaganda as warfare. If anything, Britain's leaders tended 
to overemphasize propaganda's effectiveness.4 
Modern psychology added a new luster to propaganda. After the de­
bate over shell-shocked soldiers, popular interest in Freud, Havelock Ellis, 
and other pioneers of psychology grew rapidly among the educated public. 
For many politically active Britons, psychology offered a view of humanity 
that was deeply disturbing even as it buoyed their interest in propaganda. 
In 1923 Wreford attacked propaganda for its denial of human qualities: 
"Propaganda is a great and never-ceasing force operating... upon the mal­
leable minds of m e n . . .  . Evil propaganda is that which being interested, 
strives to appear disinterested; which influences, pretending merely to in­
form; which stultifies, claiming to educate; which is overt, but accom­
plishes fell work secretly as a thief. And indeed it is a thief, for it steals away 
our judgment and so confounds our conscience. And if we are con­
scienceless, who then are we? We are of no account, for conscience is the 
soul." For conservative-minded members of the cultural and political elite, 
the specter of propaganda was worrying because, as Wyatt noted, it facili­
tated "appeal[s] to the animal in man, wrapped up in a mantle of demo­
cratic phrases." They also feared its power to incite revolution and chaos.5 
Psychology's apparent view of humans as irrational was in keeping 
with postwar fears about the mass electorate. Conservatives were made 
uneasy by the confusion resulting from the passage of the Representation 
of the People Act, the increased number of unaligned voters, the rise of 
Labour, and the chaotic party situation. They faced an unknown and seem­
ingly unknowable electorate which, under the provisions of the reform act, 
had to be polled in a single day. At the same time they saw a growing 
Labour Party with allegedly superior propaganda capabilities. Labour lead­
ers recognized the need for propaganda and engaged in continuous propa­
ganda efforts, particularly the highly visible public meeting, but their 
efforts were more imposing in appearance than in fact. Conservatives wor­
ried that the Labour Party was winning the battle for voters' minds. In 1924 
Noel Skelton, a leading moderate Conservative M.R, wrote that the 1918 
act had given power to a "sensitive, receptive, [and] plastic" electorate who 
threatened to destroy both of the older parties. Inexperienced voters were 
drawn to Labour only because, he argued, they craved "mental nourish­
ment" Even an experienced advertiser and propagandist like the Conserva­
tive M.R Charles Higham referred to the "shrewd and almost ceaseless 
activity" of Labour's propaganda machine, which flooded the country with 
"socialistic literature."6 
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Conservative leaders perceived propaganda as both a significant threat 
and a potential tool. In Looking Forward (1920), Higham proposed a "State 
Publicity Department" that would "harmonize" British politics by aligning 
the unwieldy electorate with the state. "Public opinion is the cement that 
holds the State together," he wrote. "Democracy left to judge complicated 
matters without guidance, or the latest data, or the most trustworthy infor­
mation, given in tabloid form, is like a great ship without steering-gear on 
the high seas. . . . At present we are simply drifting. We have a democratic 
theory of government... and a thoroughly autocratic neglect of the judg­
ment of those people whose will we contend is all powerful." Higham's 
faith in publicity and education reflected the trend among Conservatives. 
As an early 1930s Morning Post editorial stated, "History suggests that of all 
weapons the idea is the most potent for good or for evil. Sound concep­
tions of life have made nations great; false conceptions of life have brought 
them to destruction.... A nation acts as one when it is inspired by the 
unity of a great tradition of duty and of patriotism; it may tear itself to 
pieces under the influence of a subversive philosophy.... If, however, there 
is danger in false ideas, there is safety in true ideas . .  . and in this way . .  . 
the intelligent may defeat the intelligentsia with their own weapons." Pro-
nay notes that in the 1920s all political leaders accepted propaganda "as 
one of the many new, disagreeable but unavoidable facts of postwar politi­
cal life, alongside others such as an 'immature' mass-electorate and incipi­
ent class war fuelled by 'Bolshevik agitation.'"7 
After the fall of the coalition and the defeat of the Conservatives in 
the 1923 general election, Conservative leaders struggled to develop a more 
effective system of propaganda and education. They increased their lead 
over Labour's leaflet and pamphlet production, distributing more than 
twice Labour's output in the 1929 general election. But not until 1929 did 
the Conservative literature distributed exceed the level of either of the 1910 
elections. Election propaganda was, the editor of the Pall Mall Gazette 
noted in a 1923 memorandum to Baldwin, one of the "methods of the 
Victorian age." Launching a blitz of literature during a hectic election cam­
paign, he argued, was largely ineffective, especially with an unreliable mass 
electorate. The Conservatives needed a coordinated effort employing a 
continuous and widespread approach.8 
More than anyone else, the party chairman from 1926 to 1930, J. C. C. 
Davidson, spurred the development of an innovative program of Conser­
vative propaganda and education. Under him the publicity budget more 
than doubled, from £22,000 in 1926 to almost £50,000 in both 1928 and 
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1929. Davidson was also able to create a large fund for antisocialist propa­
ganda by appealing to City businessmen. In addition, he reorganized cen­
tral office by creating an autonomous publicity department in 1927. By 
early 1928 the department had sixty staff members. It was headed by Sir 
Joseph Ball, a former barrister and veteran operative of MI5. Sir Patrick 
Gower was hired in February 1928 as its deputy director. Gower replaced 
Cambray, who had been caught scheming against party leaders. In contrast 
to Cambray, a librarian, Gower was a respected civil servant who had 
served as private secretary to several prime ministers. He also had connec­
tions in the advertising and publicity industry. In February 1928 Davidson 
named the energetic area agent Robert Topping as principal agent. David­
son complained that Topping's predecessor, the aged Leigh Maclachlan, 
was "ignorant.. . of new forms of propaganda" and "opposed to education 
altogether in any shape or form."9 
The new regime in central office recognized the need for extensive and 
continuous propaganda and education. In an early 1927 memorandum to 
Davidson, Ball emphasized the dangers presented by Labour's influence in 
the unions and cooperatives and by subversive, left-wing elements. He also 
noted the public's dislike of some government policies. Ball argued that 
the Conservative Party must pursue "an intensive propaganda campaign, 
carefully planned and co-ordinated on the most modern lines." He out­
lined a program to use newspapers, leaflets, posters, canvassers, cinema 
vans, outdoor speakers, and other tools to reach voters at home and at 
work, at every time of day and day of the week. Such systematic propa­
ganda, he said, depended on using hundreds of thousands of party workers 
who would be educated in day classes, by correspondence courses, and 
in schools.10 
During this period the SUA also revamped and expanded its propa­
ganda organization, and propaganda grew faster than any other item in 
the SUA budget. While the organization spent less than £3,000 on propa­
ganda in 1923-24, in 1925-26 it spent more than £5,000, and by 1928-29 the 
figure approached £9,000. For most educational and propaganda efforts, 
the SUA depended on London, but it did develop a major training pro­
gram, for the simple fact that, after 1918, the Unionists needed thousands 
of trained party volunteers to combat Labour. Typically the 1925 annual 
report for the SUA Eastern Division urged members in all constituencies 
to "spare no effort... in face of the persistent and widespread propaganda 
which is being untiringly carried on by the Socialist Party." In 1925 Union­
ists formed the Scottish 1924 Club "for the express purpose of training 
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speakers, and also of providing through a very complete reference library, 
the means of acquiring knowledge of all the political and social questions 
of the day." Two years later the SUA Eastern Division also hired someone 
to coordinate its propaganda and education.11 
Conservatives used all the propaganda tools available: professional and 
amateur speakers, pamphlets and leaflets, posters, the press, magazines, 
performance propaganda, lantern slides, and films. In the mid-i92os cen­
tral office claimed that its speakers addressed almost six million people. 
Because of its high costs and low impact, the party let the Speakers Depart­
ment atrophy during the 1920s, and by 1928 its staff had dwindled from a 
prewar high of 160 to 39. Increasingly the Conservatives relied on amateur 
speakers trained locally or at Conservative schools, although in 1928 central 
office still had to budget a minimum of £9,000 per annum for speakers' 
salaries.12 
In the 1920s the Conservative Party increased its lead over Labour in 
the production of election literature. Distribution of NUA election leaflets 
mushroomed from eighteen million in 1922 to twenty-six million in 1923, 
thirty-six million in 1924, and more than ninety-three million in 1929. In 
this last election the SUA also distributed millions of leaflets on its own. 
By comparison, Labour's distribution of literature during this period in­
creased only from fifteen to forty-three million. Not until 1929, however, 
did the Conservatives establish a national format for candidates' election 
addresses, although Labour adopted one in 1922. The Conservatives also 
only belatedly responded to Labour practices by deciding in 1927 to pro­
vide literature for municipal elections. Within a few months, 426,040 pam­
phlets and leaflets were used for local elections. Conservative experts had 
long questioned the utility of small posters, and following the advice of 
professional advertisers, central office in 1929 switched to the much larger 
and more expensive hoardings posters, which consumed a quarter of the 
publicity budget for the election.13 
More significant than the increase in election material was the growing 
use of Conservative literature between elections. The NUA spurred leaflet 
purchases with subsidies and inexpensive bulk rates for leaflet series. In 
1920, for instance, they offered a series of twelve leaflets on nationalization; 
more than four million such leaflets were circulated. During the second 
half of the 1920s, production of pamphlets and leaflets averaged more than 
ten million items annually. Pamphlets and leaflets were relatively inexpen­
sive and could be distributed through constituency associations, the WUO, 
the JIL, and the Labour Committee. On the negative side, as Philip Cam­
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bray wryly noted in 1932, mass production of literature sometimes seemed 
to benefit the wastepaper dealers more than the party. Obviously, high pro­
duction levels did not guarantee an avid readership, but careful distribu­
tion by skilled volunteers reduced waste.14 
In contrast to pamphlets and leaflets, the more expensive posters were 
rarely used. In 1925 central office began a poster subscription service that 
lowered the cost of each poster. More effective designs helped, too; posters 
began to enjoy a modest success, and more than fifteen thousand were 
distributed in 1928 alone. The Conservative Party was not, however, able 
to follow the standard but expensive commercial practice of displaying 
posters continuously. Except for elections and notices of meetings, posters 
made up only a small part of party propaganda.15 
A central feature of Conservative propaganda after the Great War was 
a wide array of periodicals. These provided a steady stream of information 
and propaganda for supporters and unaligned voters alike. In 1919 central 
office resumed publication of its gazette, Gleanings and Memoranda, which 
carried a mass of political information. Similar was the Conservative 
Agents' Journal, which was made available to non-agents in 1926. Both were 
specialist publications with a circulation of only one or two thousand cop­
ies per month. The popular Conservative magazines that started up after 
1918 were far more significant. As Adams Gowans Whyte, the head of cen­
tral office magazine propaganda, noted in the Conservative Agents' Journal, 
"The real productive work of propaganda, as of organisation, must be done 
in the intervening quiet periods" between elections. The popular party 
magazines were designed "to meet th[is] need for steady educative work." 
The magazines were sold in bulk to associations at the rate of less than half 
a penny per copy. With price markups or the addition of local copy and 
advertising, associations found that the magazines were an inexpensive but 
effective propaganda tool.16 
The first official Conservative magazine, founded in 1919 and driven 
out of business within a few years by three magazines created by central 
office, was the SUA's People's Politics. The first magazine to follow was a 
women's magazine, Home and Politics (1920). It reached a monthly circula­
tion of 100,000 in 1925 and (after it was given a separate female staff) 
200,000 in 1927. Popular View (1921) and its youth edition, the Junior Impe­
rial League Gazette (1921), followed. In June 1924 Home and Politics passed 
Popular View to become the Conservative magazine with the largest circu­
lation, and central office soon replaced Popular View with two new maga­
zines, Man in the Street (1924) and The Elector (1924). Man in the Street was 
152 / Chapter Five 
an improved version of Popular View, with better graphics and cartoons 
and lighthearted features on gardening, sports, and even political notes 
penned by a football player, "Centre Forward." Yet the magazine did not 
attract many male readers, and monthly circulation remained about 
100,000.17 
The Elector, however, gained a large readership. From the perspective 
of central office, The Elector had the benefit of being financially self-
sustaining, unlike both Home and Politics and Man in the Street. Local as­
sociations liked The Elector because it was an inexpensive, leaflet-style 
magazine useful for general propaganda. Its circulation increased rapidly, 
reaching an average of about 180,000 copies per month in 1926. The SUA 
decided in 1924 to distribute The Elector because it was inexpensive. In May 
1925 the Junior Imperial League Gazette was replaced by the aptly named 
Imp, an upbeat magazine that proved somewhat more popular with youth­
ful readers.18 
Increasingly associations "localized" party magazines by adding a 
cover and local material to the regular magazine. The practice was particu­
larly prevalent among strong WUO branches like those in Wirral and Os­
westry, and it led to substantial increases in circulation. Adding local 
advertisements paid for the magazine as well as for local production work. 
The JIL also encouraged its regional and constituency groups to localize 
Imp, although relatively few did. When localizing first became popular in 
1926, there were 62 local editions of Conservative magazines; by early 1929 
there were 180. A few associations even attempted to operate their own 
magazine, but these were usually too heavy a drain on resources. Despite 
disappointments, however, it was a golden age for Conservative monthlies. 
Party magazines enjoyed a combined monthly circulation of more than 
three-quarters of a million by the late 1920s. After 1929 the magazines de­
creased in both numbers and circulation, and today there is one magazine, 
whose circulation is only 80,000.19 
The Conservatives also exploited national and local newspapers. Their 
many complaints notwithstanding, after 1918 Conservatives generally ben­
efited more from the press than the other parties. They could depend on 
the support of the Morning Post, Daily Telegraph, and, usually, The Times 
and The Observer. In the 1920s these four newspapers had a combined aver­
age daily circulation of one million. Frequently the Conservatives were also 
supported by independent Conservative newspapers—the Daily Mail, the 
Daily Express, the Weekly Dispatch, the Evening News, and, until it was sold 
in 1925, People. Together these papers had a daily circulation of at least 
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six million. The newspapers backing the Liberal and Labour Parties had 
circulations of less than two million and one million, respectively.20 But 
because daily newspapers depended on brisk sales—inspired by sensa­
tional reporting—they were more effective in promoting stunt campaigns 
than in developing lasting support for any party. The Conservatives also 
had the support of a majority of the provincial newspapers, such as the 
respected Yorkshire Post, Western Mail, and Glasgow Herald. 
In some cases the Conservative Party's influence on the British press 
rested on financial investment, but more commonly it depended on sup­
port from individual owners and editors. Reliable and wealthy Conserva­
tives continued to purchase and operate local or regional newspapers in 
the interest of the party, and Conservative leaders often used their personal 
connections to newspapers. For instance, Lords Kelmsley and Camrose 
(the Berry brothers) owned the largest newspaper combine in Britain, and 
they worked closely with Conservative leaders during the 1920s. Local asso­
ciations and newspapers also often worked together. In Skipton the agent 
managed the Craven Herald. In other cases local Conservative newspapers 
provided space for regular articles from or about the local association. Lo­
cal Conservatives paid the press for advertising, on which newspapers de­
pended. If their relationship became strained, as it did in Kincardine and 
West Aberdeenshire, there could be difficulties for both. Access to reliable 
national and local newspapers gave the Conservative Party an advan­
tage in leading (not directing) public discussion and undermining the 
opposition.21 
In addition to its informal contacts, the Conservative Party had an 
effective press department in central office. This quiet operation was begun 
by Malcolm Fraser shortly before the war in order to supply confidential 
material and advance copies of speeches to newspapers. Subscribing news­
papers also received articles that many provincial editors published. By 
1927, about 250 newspapers in Britain subscribed to the service. Beginning 
in 1924 central office used Industrial Publicity Service Ltd. to funnel mate­
rial into the more independent or non-Conservative newspapers. Some of 
the material, such as the column "Our Member," was carried by dozens of 
local newspapers. In addition, central office retained a staff of correspon­
dents who wrote letters to provincial newspapers. In 1924 E. J. Moyle, the 
head of the press department, commented that these activities were in­
tended only to help journalists who otherwise would be "compelled to 
write their own personal opinions . .  . [causing] mischief . .  . which is 
difficult, and often impossible to counteract." As the Conservative junior 
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minister Philip Lloyd-Greame noted in 1921, "the art of propaganda" de­
pended on concealment, and the work of the press department was a par­
ticularly artful means of influencing public opinion.22 
Conservative propaganda was not limited to the print media; the party 
also used newer techniques, including radio, performance propaganda, 
lantern slides, and, most important, films. The Conservatives benefited 
from the noncommercial BBC. Although both Lloyd George and MacDon­
ald were renowned public speakers, they were ill-suited for radio, and, at 
least in the case of MacDonald, generally indifferent to its potential. In 
contrast, Baldwin told J. C. W. Reith in 1925 that radio was uniquely able 
to mobilize the public. For both Reith and Baldwin, radio was an educa­
tional tool, an "integrator for democracy." Baldwin's carefully refined 
speaking style was particularly well suited to radio.23 
The Conservatives largely failed to develop gramophones and public 
address systems for propaganda use during the 1920s. They made only two 
gramophone records during this period. The first was a recording of the 
1928 JIL rally; the second was the "Stanley Boy" record used during the 
1929 election campaign. They also failed to tap the potential of public ad­
dress systems to amplify radio broadcasts, records, or speeches. The tech­
nology enabled a large number of people to hear a speech—and it had the 
added virtue of drowning out distractions and hecklers. One agent who 
used a "propaganda car" with a public address system during the 1924 elec­
tion proposed the construction of a fleet of such vehicles. According to his 
estimate, each fully equipped car would cost about £350, with running 
costs about £200 per year. Except for one van, however, the Conservatives 
did not develop mobile public address systems until the 1930s.24 
On a different tack, central office promoted the use of propaganda that 
entertained while conveying a political message. At public meetings and 
fetes, one local association displayed life-sized wax figures vilifying the op­
position and glorifying Conservative leaders. Performance propaganda was 
more common. During the 1920s central office issued staging instructions 
for plays and pageants to local associations. The "Plays for Patriots" series 
was reputed to be especially popular among youths. These one-act plays 
were simple to stage but entertaining. They were, wrote one Conservative 
magazine, "good Conservative and patriotic propaganda . .  . [under] a 
thick layer of jam."25 
Conservative community singing also combined entertainment and 
propaganda. In 1927 female members of the Conservative London Munici­
pal Society created a Conservative Musical Union. Mrs. Baldwin was ap­
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pointed president, and Davidson chairman. The Musical Union organized 
the first annual "Festival of Song" in May 1927, and the women made a 
great effort to include Conservative youths and wage earners. Using the 
model of the eisteddfod, the event involved competitions of soloists and 
choirs who sang traditional British songs and recited British ballads. Orga­
nizers claimed that the event did more than promote musical talent. It also 
tapped "a deep and genuine patriotism" and "the unity and harmony for 
which Conservatism stood." Central office decided to expand the group, 
making it a national organization, and distributed song sheets with both 
traditional and new songs, such as "Motherland of the Free" which was 
actually set to the music of "The Red Flag." Community singing became 
very popular in some local associations. In Oswestry it was an integral part 
of the local organization, which even sponsored some participants.26 
An even more common propaganda practice was lantern shows, which 
combined lantern slides with lectures. The magic lantern had long been a 
source of entertainment and education; the Conservatives adapted it for 
propaganda. In 1919 central office offered slides with lectures detailing the 
government's achievements and the dangers of Bolshevism. These slides, 
which could be obtained free of charge, were immediately booked for 120 
showings in local associations. The Primrose League soon produced lan­
tern lectures for children on its history, the Union Jack, St. George, and 
the Navy. Later central office created lantern lectures entitled "The British 
Empire," "Parliament," "Progress under Capitalism," "A Day in the Life of 
a Member of Parliament," "The Air Force and Its Duties," and "Agricul-
ture—A Year on the Land." In the mid-i92os the Primrose League also 
offered lantern lectures on South Africa, Canada, and even birds.27 
Lantern lectures were an effective and popular propaganda tool. Be­
tween December 1924 and April 1925, central office's lectures were booked 
more than 400 times. The same period in 1925-26 witnessed more than a 
thousand bookings. During a two-month period in 1925, the JIL recorded 
fifty bookings for its own lantern lectures. Local associations frequently 
booked imperial lantern lectures, and according to Home and Politics, these 
shows demonstrated "the might of the Empire, the size and wealth of it, 
its value to us at home, what it can produce and grow for us, Imperial 
Preference . .  . the need for Imperial Defense, and last, but not least, Emi­
gration and Overseas Settlement Schemes." In addition to their educational 
value, lantern lectures were entertaining. This was particularly true in rural 
areas with few other sources of entertainment. Some associations even 
purchased their own magic lantern.28 
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One of the most important and innovative developments in Conserva­
tive propaganda was the production and distribution of motion pictures. 
Film was ideally suited to publicity and propaganda because it provided 
what Higham called the "arresting image" that "epitomizes, dramatizes, 
and simplifies." Because the Conservatives were in government for most of 
the interwar period, they were in a position to influence the British Board 
of Film Censors, whose secretary had formerly worked on wartime film 
propaganda and was continuing to serve on the Committee of Imperial 
Defence (CID) subcommittee on censorship. The Conservative Party had 
other links to major film manufacturers and exhibitors. Newsreel compa­
nies eagerly filmed Conservative personalities like Baldwin because they 
were popular. Several leading newsreel producers were even on close terms 
with Conservative leaders.29 
But Conservatives were not able to use the commercial cinema for 
direct propaganda. Producers and exhibitors were businessmen who did 
not want to lose customers by bringing overt partisanship into their enter­
tainment industry. In 1928, for example, the JIL found that only nineteen 
cinemas in the country would show their trailer. Almost by default, there­
fore, the Conservative Party was forced to create its own film production 
and distribution system. They responded to the lack of venues by devel­
oping portable units to show films in public halls or outdoors. In this they 
may have been inspired by the "cinemotor" tours organized by the Na­
tional War Aims Committee in 1918. Using a van and portable equipment, 
the committee showed films in industrial centers to 160,000 people per 
week at a weekly cost of only £14. By war's end the committee had twenty 
vans touring the country.30 
The Conservative Party began using cinema vans relatively early. Just 
before the 1924 election, a central office van toured East Anglia and south­
west England. At the rear of the heavy pantechnicon was a screen on which 
films were projected from within the vehicle. Because the screen was 
hooded, it could be used for daylight screenings. After a film was shown, 
a speaker delivered an address and answered questions. Two years later the 
Junior Carlton Club provided central office with a second van that had a 
portable projector for indoor screenings as well as a fixed platform for 
speakers and a display of Empire products. Generally the films shown were 
on imperial or military subjects; the Navy League's Grand Fleet at Sea and 
Pathe's Empire's Sure Shield are two examples.31 
The early cinema van tours evoked an enthusiastic response, particu­
larly in rural areas. Among a village population of six hundred, four him­
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dred might attend a screening. Two or three meetings could be held each 
day, one of them in the afternoon for women and children. Because the 
van was mobile, films could be shown to many people over a large area. 
Finally, outdoor screenings drew larger crowds and included fewer con­
firmed Conservatives than did indoor meetings. Many associations were 
eager to host a cinema van, even paying the substantial fee required. In 
Oswestry, for instance, the Junior Carlton Club van was booked for three 
and a half weeks in 1927. The association declared the results so "eminently 
satisfactory" that they brought the van back the next year. Considering 
the effectiveness of a van, the cost (£30 to £40 per week), shared by host 
associations and central office, was low. Conservative leaders became con­
vinced that cinema vans should be fully exploited for propaganda.32 
The Primrose League seems to have experimented with filmmaking 
immediately after the war, but central office's film department, created in 
1926, was the first systematic attempt by any party to produce films. Early 
films showed Cabinet ministers at work and demonstrated government 
successes, particularly in housing. Although Austen Chamberlain, among 
others, complained about the unseemliness of being shown on screen like 
a Bovril advertisement, these "intimate peeps" on film introduced the pub­
lic to ministers. Central orifice also made a series of cartoons ridiculing 
opposition leaders, and an animated film, Red Tape Farm (1926), attacking 
Lloyd George's plan for land reform. Central office was fortunate to sign 
an exclusive deal with one of the few British animators of the period.33 
When Davidson took control of central office in 1926, he accelerated 
the development of film propaganda. His most important contribution 
to filmmaking was the purchase of the rights to an early sound system, 
phonofilm, which recorded a synchronized audio track onto standard film 
stock. Before the end of 1927, he had a phonofilm van built and sent it on 
a national tour. It screened films of party leaders' speeches, including Sir 
William Joynson-Hicks (on the General Strike) and Sir Douglas Hogg (on 
the trade union reform bill). In 1927 central office made phonofilms of 
Baldwin, Earl Beatty (on disarmament), and Neville Chamberlain (on 
housing and pensions). Sir Laming Worthington-Evans and Leo Amery 
were also phonofilmed, and the JIL made and screened a phonofilm of its 
1928 Albert Hall rally.34 
By 1928 Davidson regarded the cinema vans as "the most powerful 
agency at the disposal of the Party . .  . one which neither the Liberal nor 
the Socialist Party possesses." With the assistance of a wealthy contributor, 
Davidson purchased and staffed nine more phonofilm vans and a dozen 
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vans similar to the Junior Carlton Club's. By the May 1929 election, central 
office had a fleet of twenty-three cinema vans. One phonofilm van opera­
tor toured nine northern cities and towns in eighteen days, drawing an 
average audience of five hundred people at each screening—and more on 
Sundays and in the last days of the campaign. R. A. Butler, standing as a 
candidate for the first time in 1929, found that in his constituency films 
generated more interest and a more varied crowd than public meetings.35 
When the films department was placed under the direct control of the 
director of publicity in 1928, it had only one full-time staff member. Most 
of the work went out to private firms, which took advantage of central 
office's inexperience by overcharging it. When central office was reorga­
nized in 1930-31, it was found that the films department and its vans had 
lost more than £10,000 just in the first nine months of 1930. The newly 
named director of publicity, Patrick Gower, established the autonomous 
Conservative and Unionist Films Association in autumn 1930. Under the 
close supervision of Sir Albert Clavering, a former war propagandist and 
leading cinema owner, the unit controlled film production and exhibition 
but was funded by central office.36 
Educational Efforts 
The Conservative Party's educational efforts were associated with but dis­
tinct from propaganda. Much of the party's activity—particularly among 
women and young people—included educational elements. Here, how­
ever, I discuss only Conservative efforts to teach economics, politics, and 
history, and to train volunteers for modern political activity. Conservatives' 
interest in education was spurred by many of the same concerns as their 
interest in propaganda. In an early 1919 memorandum to the Primrose 
League ruling body, Sir Alan Sykes warned that they could no longer de­
pend on old methods. "There is undoubtedly," he wrote, "a demand for 
the instructional side in addition, and such things as speaking classes and 
lectures and discussions on the current topics of the day need organising." 
Universal suffrage necessitated more educational work. As a Conservative 
magazine noted in 1927, "Every man and woman is a joint governor, for 
good or bad, in the greater Empire that has grown out of it [Britain]. If 
that power is in the hands of unthinking and ignorant men and women, 
the decline and fall of the British Empire and of British civilisation will be 
the next chapter in the world's history."37 
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There were two further reasons for Conservatives to consider the need 
for education. First, educational institutions attended by wage earners were 
increasingly under Labour's control. Every year during the 1920s the Work­
ers' Educational Association, Ruskin College and other labor colleges, and 
the Fabian and ILP summer or weekend schools gave thousands a socialist 
education. These institutions sometimes received government funding, but 
they had close ties to trade unions and the Labour Party, both of which 
supplied students and money. As a Conservative magazine pessimistically 
noted, "The Socialist schools . .  . grow like mushrooms in the night under 
the manure of Trade Union funds." It was clear to Conservatives that they 
had to counter leftist influences in many educational organizations. Sec­
ond, the Conservative Party was increasingly dependent on volunteers who 
served as organizers and conduits of information. These rank-and-file 
members had to be trained for modern politics at Conservative classes and 
schools. As a consequence, education was, as the SUA said in 1926, "prob­
ably the most important and essential part of modern political organisa­
tion." It was certainly as important as propaganda to the party's success.38 
Conservative educational efforts were of two types. General courses 
not directly intended to train volunteers made up the first type. Conserva­
tives wanted to create educated, "reasonable," and antisocialist citizens. To 
carry out this objective, Conservatives across Britain organized lectures 
and discussions on a range of topics. Both party members and new or 
unaligned voters were encouraged to attend lectures and study groups 
where they learned about the Constitution, economics, and current affairs. 
This enabled the party to educate hundreds of thousands of citizens who 
were eager to transcend their provincial horizons. 
The first attempts to organize classes took place in Scotland. In early 
1919 the GUA began offering regular lectures. These proved so popular, 
particularly among women, that the GUA created a series of weekly after­
noon or evening lectures. By the mid-i92os the weekly lecture was a fixture 
of the local political scene. Sometimes each lecture was on a separate sub­
ject. Councillor Mary Snodgrass gave a "Housing" talk in 1926 that drew 
almost 150 students. In other cases the GUA held a series of lectures on a 
single topic. In autumn 1924, for instance, there was a ten-week course on 
the history and prospects of the Constitution, and a six-lecture sequence 
on "Economics and Politics." In England there were also attempts to 
develop courses. The Primrose League began organizing fortnightly anti-
Bolshevik classes in late 1919. In 1921 the WUO asked the writer and 
pamphleteer H. G. Williams to give morning lectures to London women. 
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Williams lectured about industrialization, trade unionism, Marxism, Capi­
talism, and democracy in industry, among other topics.39 
Many constituency associations organized their own educational ac­
tivities. One Scottish association held a week-long series of lectures entitled 
"The Class War," claiming to demonstrate that "Socialism was a policy of 
[the] work-shy" and that cooperative societies were better. Other associa­
tions opted for weekly meetings on general topics. Debating societies 
sometimes served educational purposes. In 1921, for instance, the Clapham 
agent organized a popular group that debated the Empire, tariff reform, 
trade unions, profiteering, socialism, Bolshevism, Ireland, and the political 
role of young people. Chichester Conservatives also held debates during 
which, in addition to the usual topics, members discussed national health 
insurance and medicine, the excess-profits tax, the Ruhr crisis, roads, and 
capital punishment. In many seats, however, education was ad hoc and 
dependent on members who volunteered to give lectures.40 
To ensure that general education courses were available to all Conser­
vatives, central office and the SUA encouraged constituencies to form study 
or reading circles that discussed a variety of historical and contemporary 
issues. Nonpartisan study circles were already proving popular, particularly 
among young people and women. The SUA took the lead in 1920 by devis­
ing a syllabus of twelve sessions. The success of the program, particularly 
among women in rural areas, encouraged the SUA to form more study 
circles. Such groups, SUA leaders hoped, would "prove of interest in places 
where there was little chance of amusement in the winter evenings, and 
afford opportunity for mutual self-education in the fundamental prin­
ciples of Politics." The SUA also began collecting materials for a lending 
library for study circles.41 
The NUA and central office also recognized the merit of study circles 
and encouraged their formation after the fall of the Lloyd George coalition. 
During 1923 the NUA Executive began considering a national system of 
study circles, an idea that the 1923 NUA conference greeted with enthusi­
asm. Delegates urged study circles to teach constitutional principles to citi­
zens and to establish a broader base of support. Home and Politics carried 
an article with the suggestions of a local WUO chairwoman who had orga­
nized what she called "cottage meetings." By changing the meeting's loca­
tion and setting, facilitating the attendance of mothers with small children, 
and making sure that there were refreshments, she found, the meetings 
attracted many women. The group read The Times, "Communist newspa­
pers," and the local press. Members would then "chat of home affairs, the 
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price of food, the housing shortage, religious education for the children, 
unemployment, trade unions, the Socialist menace and Communism, the 
danger of apathy, National Credit and how we are meeting our liabilities— 
in fact, everything that people who have the privilege of voting ought to 
know." The meetings helped to educate and, at the same time, make each 
woman "feel, with a sense of pride and responsibility, that, in spite of a 
humble position, her country is looking to her to maintain the highest 
ideals of citizenship, for the sake of those who have died for her in the past 
and for the happy future of those to come."42 
Conservative interest in educational work increased after the party's 
defeat in 1923. In Yorkshire, for instance, the annual budget for lectures 
jumped from £13 in 1923 to £201 in 1924. Part of the upsurge in education 
came from the launch of a national plan for study circles. According to the 
NUA leaflet outlining the scheme, the object of the fortnightly circles was 
to enable an individual member to analyze and "ferret out for oneself an­
swers to difficulties." According to the leaflet, reliance on other members 
of the circle rather than outsiders made for a less costly but more enriching 
educational experience. The leaflet provided a list of possible topics (with 
suggested readings) that included economics, government, Conservatism, 
socialism, capitalism, the Empire, and tariff reform.43 
Initially the readings assigned for study circles were either Unionist 
Workers' Handbooks or propaganda pamphlets, but in 1924 Conservative 
leaders established the Westminster Library, a series of books published by 
Philip Allan in cooperation with an NUA committee composed of Leo 
Amery, John Buchan, Ronald McNeill, the author Edythe Glanville, and 
Philip Cambray. The Conservative Party was given the right to sell inex­
pensive editions of the books. The first nine works published were all by 
Conservative M.P.s or academics. The more prominent authors included 
the duchess of Atholl, Amery, the minister of agriculture, Edward Wood, 
and the former Labour Party minister, G. H. Roberts. Over the next few 
years a dozen more volumes were added to the series. Westminster Library 
works were available for purchase by individuals and study circles or by 
loan from the central office library.44 
Thousands of copies of "The Study Circle" leaflet were soon distrib­
uted by central office. In associations like Wood Green and Oswestry, 
circles were quickly organized, despite complaints about the reading mat­
ter and the lack of interest on the part of some male party members. Many 
associations failed to respond initially, and in December 1925 central office 
began to broaden its system of adult education. It first created an educa­
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tion department, under publicity, headed by Colonel H. Williams. The 
education department urged agents and associations to set up regular 
courses on constitutional history and politics, and gave them syllabi 
and books. Williams told them that educated party members would be 
a great resource, as ordinary men and women were the "most effective 
missionaries on our behalf in season and out of season, daily and almost 
hourly."45 
The new study circles were popular. During the first four months of 
1926, three hundred were established in half as many constituencies. By the 
end of the year Williams was able to report that the number had doubled. 
Led by volunteers, some of them graduates of the party college, the study 
circles numbered from a handful to several dozen students who met weekly 
or fortnightly for six to twelve sessions. They discussed a variety of histori­
cal and contemporary political questions, but the most common were so­
cialism, industrialization, the Empire, economics, and constitutional 
history. To supplement the study circle scheme, central office also began 
offering correspondence courses. Adult education prospered in the later 
1920s in part because the work of the education department was trans­
ferred to the Conservative Educational Institute. John Buchan led this 
quasi-independent organization, which was able to pursue its goals single-
mindedly. During peak educational season, autumn and winter, in 1926­
27, there were six hundred study circles with twelve thousand students. The 
next year there were over eight hundred groups and eighteen thousand 
students. The SUA developed a similar system with the assistance of the 
Scottish 1924 Club, and by 1927 there were over three hundred study circles 
in Scotland.46 
But general education was only one side of Conservative education; 
the other component was training the rank and file for direct use by the 
party. In part this task involved disseminating information to activists. 
Central office had long been a source of information for Conservative 
candidates and workers, and, after the war, Cambray reorganized and ex­
panded the Information and Research Department. He encouraged volun­
teer speakers, local officers, M.P.s, and candidates to seek information. 
They could obtain material on policy, the opposition parties, propaganda, 
and organizing. Headquarters published Gleanings and Memoranda, Hints 
for Speakers, Unionist Workers' Handbooks, informational pamphlets, and 
regular articles in the party magazines to guide its workers. This, however, 
was not sufficient for the hundreds of thousands of volunteers needed to 
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canvass, distribute literature, and electioneer among the postwar elector­
ate, so the Conservatives initiated a multitude of training courses and 
schools. 
A primary concern of Conservative leaders was training a sufficient 
number of political speakers. To meet the continuing need for speakers, 
Conservatives increasingly relied on trained volunteers. In 1920 central 
office began cooperating with various Conservative and business groups 
to operate evening classes on public speaking in London; in 1926 it began 
offering its own classes for women on public speaking; and later it added 
classes for men and advanced speakers. The Primrose League carried out 
its own training efforts by launching courses for speakers and workers and 
instituting a regular column, "Notes for Speakers and Workers," in its mag­
azine. In Scotland the GUA began offering regular courses for speakers 
in 1922.47 
One of the most successful educational innovations of the interwar 
period was the Conservative College. Once again the initiative came from 
Scotland. Jeanette Martin, the women's organizer, suggested, and the SUA 
Eastern Division agreed, to hold a two-week "Summer School of Political 
Study." They planned an August 1920 course that would so thoroughly 
ground wage earners and other students in economic and constitutional 
theory that the graduates would be impervious to socialism. It was hoped 
that the residential school would also create social solidarity "between 
widely different grades of society." Martin rented St. Ninian's School in 
Moffat, Dumfries, and agreed to serve as the school's warden. The Conser­
vative whips in London urged the Tory M.P. and historian J. A. R. Marriott 
to give the lectures on constitutional history. Harold Cox, editor of the 
Edinburgh Review, agreed to lecture on economic and social topics. Once 
it heard of the plan, the NUA Labour Committee immediately decided 
to send forty students. They obtained financial assistance from Chairman 
Whittaker and Sir Philip Stott, a successful Lancashire architect and cotton 
manufacturer who was interested in working-class education and Conser­
vative politics. Nearly all of the one hundred students who attended Moffat 
were trade unionists.48 
The Labour Committee organizer, R. M. Mathams, attended the 
school and afterward wrote about the exchange of views that took place in 
classes and elsewhere. It was, he believed, a vivid demonstration of the 
union of classes and races that would allow Britain and the Empire to re­
cover from the war. The success of Moffat encouraged the SUA and the 
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Labour Committee to collaborate on another school. This time they used 
St. Andrew's during July and August 1921. The Labour Committee's new 
educational subcommittee and the SUA agreed to organize two fortnightly 
courses open to one hundred students each. Following the example of 
Moffat, the cost of the course and accommodations was about £6. Ma­
thams, who was a co-organizer of the school, asked for the party's support. 
He argued that the school would win adherents, combat the "poisoned 
knowledge from the Labour 'Colleges of Unreason,'" and fulfill the Conser­
vative ideal of "Democratic self-expression and freedom."49 
Again following the Moffat precedent, the predominantly working-
class students in each course at St. Andrew's were lectured on consti­
tutional history and economics by pairs of eminent scholars: F. J. C. 
Hearnshaw and A. W. Kirkcaldy, and Sir William Ashley and Dudley J. 
Medley. The school also held mock elections and parliaments, which were 
a popular means of teaching constitutional issues and current politics. The 
contest between Unionist-Labour and Anti-Waste candidates, and the sec­
ond reading of a bill to establish contracting in for trade unionists were, 
said the Conservative Agents' Journal, particularly exciting. The participa­
tion of students in all activities demonstrated, as one newspaper noted, 
Hearnshaw's argument that democracy rests on the community's "corpo­
rate existence and spirit." Neither Moffat nor St. Andrew's taught "ready­
made answers." Instead they tried to teach students "sound economics and 
. .  . the lessons of history." In this way, it was thought, Conservative sup­
porters learned to think for themselves so that they would "be enabled to 
come to a right conclusion, not only on the questions of the moment, but 
on any future questions which may arise."50 
The success of Moffat and St. Andrew's encouraged Conservative lead­
ers to broaden their efforts. After the tumult of 1922 passed, Conservatives 
turned to creating more schools of study and to developing a Conservative 
College. In 1924 the SUA women's committee organized a school of study 
in Edinburgh. Students heard lectures on economics and socialism and 
were trained in public speaking. Later that year there was another school 
in the west at Dollar, East Renfrewshire.51 Scottish Unionist leaders ap­
preciated the practical training these schools offered. They also believed 
that they could attract more students, especially from rural areas, by 
changing the location and avoiding the cost of a permanent facility. The 
SUA accordingly held schools of study in various parts of the country, pre­
paring students to combat socialism. 
The SUA organized other party schools as well. In 1925 they held a 
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three-day course at Stirling in which students learned about women's is­
sues, economics, housing, trade unionism, Conservatism, and imperial 
and defense policy. In the same year there were seven such schools just in 
the SUA Eastern Division. Typically these schools were attended by ten 
or twenty of the most interested members—particularly women—from 
nearby local associations, who devoted themselves to studying contempo­
rary political issues, although more than two hundred students partici­
pated in a 1927 school at Stirling, studying constitutional history, 
Conservatism, and women in politics. They were also able to hear ad­
dresses by the duchess of Atholl and Arthur Shadwell. In Kincardine the 
association had enough funds to collaborate in a school for women held 
at Stonehaven in autumn 1926. The women learned about the "poisonous 
doctrines" of "envy, hatred, malice, and uncharitableness" that Bolshevik 
Sunday Schools allegedly spread, and they heard a lecturer from the Un­
ionist Workers' League explain how tariff reform would lead to higher pro­
duction, higher wages, and imperial unity. Students also met with local 
political notables, including their M.P.52 
In contrast to the Scottish Unionists, Conservatives in England and 
Wales tended to rely less on schools and more on the Conservative College 
and the party's expanding system of adult education. Still, Conservative 
organizations held a number of schools. Regular classes at Leeds were run 
by the Yorkshire provincial division and central office area agent. In 1924 
the WUO organized a weekend school in North Wales. After holding a six-
day course of lectures and public speaking classes at Torquay in 1928, the 
WUO decided to establish schools in each area. The JIL sponsored schools 
in Ilkley and Torquay in 1928, and it also began collaborating with the 
Conservative Educational Institute to offer regional weekend schools. Like 
the Scottish Unionists, the JIL organizers were trying to offer an experience 
more intensive than study circles and more practical and accessible than a 
college. Even the Primrose League had schools, the first being a two-week 
course at Torquay in 1925. Primrose League schools differed from party 
schools in their emphasis on recreational activities. They were generally in 
the south (where the Primrose League was strongest) and were inaccessible 
to many potential students.53 
As important as schools of study were, the creation of the Conserva­
tive College was the pinnacle of the party's educational effort. Stott was 
instrumental in creating the college. Having demonstrated his support 
for wage-earners' education by visiting the summer schools at Moffat 
and St. Andrew's and making substantial contributions to both, Stott de­
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cided to create a permanent college. In 1922 he purchased the late Lord 
Overstone's home, built in 1862 and located near Northampton. For a 
nominal rent he gave the Labour Committee use of the house and grounds 
for half of every year. While the Labour Committee created a fund for the 
college's operations, Younger, the party chairman, provided assistance 
from central office, the WUO, and the JIL. By spring 1923 the newly named 
Philip Stott College, which Marriott described as a "roomy, solid, ugly Vic­
torian structure," was ready.54 
For the first session ten fortnightly courses were planned in hopes that 
each would draw one hundred students paying £7 for course, room, and 
board. Before arriving, students were asked to read the works on a syllabus 
to ensure efficient use of their time at Stott. In the mornings Stott students 
attended two lectures followed by questions and discussion. As lecturers 
the college hired seven eminent scholars, five of whom had taught at the 
summer schools. These included the economists Cox and Kirkcaldy and 
the historians Hearnshaw, Marriott, and Dudley J. Medley. The new in­
structors, academics Arthur Radford and J. L. Morison, taught economics 
and imperial history, respectively. In the afternoons students could enjoy 
cricket, tennis, bowls, golf, boating, billiards, music, and dancing, or they 
could take classes on speaking or policy matters. And, for the first time, 
students had access to resident tutors and a small library. In addition, there 
were sometimes field trips to sites of historical or economic importance. 
Although none of their work at Stott was graded, students were expected 
to apply themselves.55 
At first Stott College continued along the path established at Moffat. 
Its founders' primary objective was to encourage Conservatives to study 
under "the greatest minds of our day" in order to become better citizens. 
Students were mainly wage earners. The college was, The Times noted in 
March 1923, "primarily intended to benefit working men and women of 
the parry who have not access to facilities for post-school education which 
Socialists obtain at the various Labour colleges." A Labour Committee 
member, Sir Francis Watson, told Conservatives in Bradford that they were 
attempting to fill the gaps in the education of working-class Conservatives 
to prevent Labour and trade union colleges from doing so. In addition, 
Conservative organizers believed that wage earners who attended Stott 
would spread a "gospel of goodwill" among their colleagues and neighbors. 
Some Conservatives considered this the chief benefit of Stott. But the stu­
dent body was not completely homogeneous: forty Imps, many of whom 
were given scholarships, attended, as did a few agents and organizers.56 
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Despite its promise, Stott College faced difficulties, particularly a 
shortage of students. In 1923 one of the courses had only two dozen stu­
dents, and there were only about five hundred students enrolled during the 
1923 session. Fortunately, the college received the endorsement of leading 
Conservatives, including Baldwin. On 27 September 1923 the National So­
ciety of Conservative Agents held its annual meeting at Stott with Baldwin 
in attendance. The prime minister toured the establishment accompanied 
by various Conservative leaders, including Davidson, Amery, who was a 
lecturer at the college, and F. S. Jackson, who was taking a course at Stott. 
The younger students responded enthusiastically to Baldwin, seeking his 
autograph and even "chairing" their placid leader. In a short address Bald­
win praised the college as part of Britain's tradition of voluntary and prag­
matic education. Stott's superior education, he stated, rejected materialism 
and "the east wind of German Socialism and Russian Communism and 
French Syndicalism." Instead, he added, the next generation was being 
taught to rely on native common sense and insight, which would enable 
them "to save democracy, to preserve it and to inspire it."57 
In the next few years changes were made to improve the situation at 
Stott College. First, organizers engaged leading Conservatives to address 
the students even as the capable staff of lecturers was expanded. Second, 
to improve the administration, the overburdened and ailing Mathams was 
displaced by a Philip Stott College subcommittee under the NUA Execu­
tive. The subcommittee included Amery, Stott, Whittaker, Dr. W. George 
Black, and Sir Geoffrey Butler. F. S. Jackson, who knew Marriott from the 
Oxford University Extension scheme, appointed the historian to head the 
subcommittee. Third, central office and other Conservative organizations 
gave the college publicity and general assistance. Before the 1926 session 
began, for instance, over nine thousand copies of the college prospectus 
was distributed to candidates, M.P.s, local officials, WUO and JIL branches, 
and clubs. Central office also provided more scholarships for students at­
tending Stott.58 
Response to the changes was an immediate increase in enrollments. In 
1924 there were more than nine hundred students, and, during the seventh 
course of the 1925 session, a milestone was passed when the college reached 
its maximum enrollment for the first time. In its first three years of opera­
tion, 2,500 students attended Stott. After 1923 the college also expanded its 
student body by drawing more non-wage earners. JIL headquarters sent 
and paid for more than fifty students in 1924, and the following year more 
than two hundred JIL students attended. Sixty of those were awarded 
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scholarships from headquarters. Special rates for Imps further increased 
the number of JIL students at Stott to 270 in 1926 and 370 in 1927. At the 
same time the number of women in attendance increased substantially. In 
1923 many women did not apply because of a mistaken belief that the col­
lege offered only dormitory accommodations. Thereafter Stott organizers 
made great efforts to attract women, making sure that curtained cubicles 
were available for all women and providing a ladies' drawing room. The 
party chairman was largely unable to obtain female lecturers or tutors, 
but he added Dame Helen Gwynne-Vaughan and Miss Flora Fardell, the 
founder of the Young Conservatives (a Primrose League youth group) to 
the governing committee in order to give women and youth more say in 
running Stott. By 1927 nearly six hundred of Stott's students, more than 
half, were women.59 
Following the model of the early summer schools, Stott's curriculum 
continued to be dominated by constitutional history and economics. This 
enabled the college to emphasize progressive Conservatism while avoiding 
some of the more contentious issues and violent partisanship. Lectures on 
constitutional history and economics inculcated students with the desir­
ability of continuity and unity. Commenting on the first session at Stott, 
the JIL magazine praised the lecturers for conveying the lessons of history 
and "the truths of economic laws which have resulted in human progress 
and national development." The assumption was that history and econom­
ics enabled students to appreciate reality and made them insusceptible to 
radicalism. "To understand how well the principle of evolution has served 
England," The Times claimed, "is to be armed with a thousand arguments 
against revolution." One Stott lecturer told his students that Britain's con­
stitutional history demonstrated how "'liberty' was always asserting itself" 
and how the constitution, which grew from "an acorn of mere custom" 
into a mighty oak, was endangered by "the axe of Communism." In the 
preface to Arthur Bryant's textbook for students, The Spirit of Conservatism 
(1929), John Buchan argued that Conservative beliefs were rooted in a re­
gard for "historic continuity" and the nation's "essential unity." A Conser­
vative, he elaborated, "believes that the State is an organic and not a 
mechanical thing, and that there should be no violent disruption in 
growth." Instead Conservatism should uphold individual opportunity 
and liberty and careful institutional reform while strenuously opposing 
bureaucracy.60 
The other subjects in the Stott curriculum were imperialism and reli­
gion. During 1923 Amery delivered a lecture on nationalism and imperial­
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ism, expressing his concern that Conservatives were "drifting into a mere 
acceptance of the old laissez-faire individualism as an alternative to Social­
ism." He was careful to dissociate Conservatism from both Liberalism and 
socialism. While Conservatism was based on a "historical, national, and 
Imperial conception," Liberalism and socialism were merely "a series of 
abstractions." Amery lectured as well on aspects of imperial economics and 
defense. Another tariff reformer, W. A. S. Hewins, frequently lectured on 
the Empire and imperial preference. He tried to inspire students with "the 
pomp and majesty" and "the Divine purpose underlying and influencing 
the rise and fall of Empires." Marriott and the Maharajah of Burdwan also 
taught courses.61 
The only other topic of importance at Stott was religion or morality. 
Each day's activities began with religious services, and on Sundays students 
attended the chapel in Overstone Park. Some lecturers, like Marriott, dealt 
with moral issues. His talks on personal ethics were the basis of Economics 
and Ethics (1923). Marriott claimed that his book showed students how "to 
order their daily lives, in the home, the shop, in the factory or on the farm, 
in conformity with the highest ethical standards, or in more familiar words 
in accordance with the will of God." In a 1926 lecture entitled "Christianity 
and Socialism," Marriott voiced the common Conservative cry that social­
ist tenets ran counter to Christianity.62 
Organizers repeatedly claimed that students found a sense of national 
community at Stott by fraternizing with a variety of students. Many reports 
emphasized the integrative function of the college and offered picturesque 
illustrations of the camaraderie. One contributor to Imp noted that, at his 
first dinner, he was seated between a Durham miner and a Surrey clerk. 
Later he played doubles with a lawyer, a weaver, and a parliamentary candi­
date. Such encounters were common at Stott, he wrote, and they revealed 
"the spirit of true democracy." In another party magazine, a graduate 
claimed that the college was "the most democratic institution in the world" 
because aristocrats "answered to their surnames in the same way as the 
miners, engineers, machinists, operatives, railwaymen, clerks, housewives, 
and the others." Such comments purported to demonstrate the claims of 
classlessness made by the college and the Conservative Party.63 
Conservative leaders were eager to develop this camaraderie. They en­
couraged Conservative M.P.s and ministers to visit the college and culti­
vated ties among alumni. In addition to Amery, who was a regular lecturer, 
Eustace Percy, Walter Elliot, Sir William Bull, Sir Leslie Scott, Henry Page 
Croft, Austin Hopkinson, Sir Herbert Nield, Robert Gee, Thomas Oakley, 
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and Oliver Locker-Lampson visited Stott in 1925. The next year Marriott 
brought Stott, Lord Cave, and Neville Chamberlain to the school. These 
visits created camaraderie within the party and encouraged rank-and-file 
members to identify with their leaders. In 1925 central office also began 
making more systematic use of Stott alumni by sending area agents lists of 
graduates in their region. With the assistance of the St. Stephen's Club, 
central office also developed Overstonian Clubs. These clubs' purpose was 
to help students maintain the enthusiasm of the Stott experience, provide 
them with libraries and expert organizers, and encourage them to carry 
out party work. By 1925 several clubs had been formed in Scotland, York­
shire, and Lancashire.64 
There was a noticeable shift in emphasis in the fourth year of the col-
lege's existence when it was designated the training school for party work­
ers. Critics declared that the curriculum was too impractical for a party 
college and that Stott was not training enough professional and volunteer 
workers. Discourses on economics or constitutional history, they com­
plained, would not produce the personnel the party needed to fight social­
ists. To a considerable degree, changes in Stott after 1926 were Davidson's 
work. Some years before, he had made it plain that he considered educa­
tion the key to creating a Conservative elite. For him education was a reli­
gion, and he made it a major concern of central office. Davidson led Stott 
College toward a firmer recognition of its role as a party training school as 
he shifted more responsibility for general education to study circles and 
schools of study. By 1928 only two of the fourteen courses at Stott were 
devoted to general education.65 
At Stott the most visible sign of these changes was the introduction of 
new classes and special courses for particular groups within the Conserva­
tive Party. To open the 1926 session, a one-week Easter course was arranged 
for members of the Young Conservative Union. Four other one-week 
courses followed, designed particularly for those who wanted more train­
ing in policy and organizing and were unable to devote two weeks to the 
endeavor. The National Society of Conservative Agents and the Conserva­
tive Agents' Journal urged that this practice be expanded. They wanted their 
own course on election law, advertising, propaganda, fund-raising, and or­
ganizing. The new approach proved so successful that in 1927 there were 
separate courses for the JIL, the Young Conservative Union, trade unionists 
and members of cooperatives, and WUO branch officers. In 1928 the col­
lege organized a two-week course for Imps, plus a one-week course for Imp 
officers. With the election approaching, JIL members received instruction 
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about key election issues—trade union reform, local government, derating 
(relief of businesses' local property taxes), and agriculture. They were also 
trained extensively in propaganda, speaking, and registration and elec­
tion law.66 
Another change in Conservative educational work was administrative 
restructuring. In early 1927 responsibility for Stott was completely removed 
from the Labour Committee and placed under a central office committee, 
although Marriott remained chairman, and less than a year later, Davidson 
moved central office's educational operations to the Conservative and Un­
ionist Educational Institute. This organization was nominally headed by 
Baldwin and Davidson, but Buchan was chairman. His assistant, the direc­
tor, Hugh Williams, controlled day-to-day operations. The institute ex­
panded the system of general education, increasing the number of study 
circles and local courses. It also took over Stott College, hiring professional 
staff for the school. Major General Sir Reginald Hoskins became the col-
lege's first principal.67 
Buchan, a former wartime director of information, planned a full-
scale educational and research effort to stop socialism. Within days of as­
suming control, Buchan sent Baldwin a pamphlet, "Political Research and 
Adult Education," outlining his plan for the organization. Like the prime 
minister, Buchan was a scholar-statesman who believed that it was neces­
sary to attract young people of intelligence, energy, and idealism to the 
Conservative Party. In his view the political future would be determined 
by the party's ability to create a graduated educational system including 
study circles, temporary schools, and a residential college to train the party 
cadre. He also believed that the Conservative Party needed a research or­
ganization comparable to Labour's research department and the Liberal 
Party's industrial inquiry. Buchan wanted the institute to assume this role 
and "co-ordinate the efforts of the industrialists . .  . give expression to sci­
entific interpretations of economic laws," and "inquire as to means by 
which a party may remain in power." He failed, however, to create such a 
research organization. Joseph Ball argued strenuously against the proposal, 
which would have seriously undermined his position as director of public­
ity. Only at the end of 1929, after the general election, was a Conservative 
research department created, with Ball in charge.68 
Buchan brought new vigor to Conservative educational activities. In 
the April 1928 issue of the Conservative Agents' Journal, he argued that the 
future of the Conservative Party depended on challenging the domination 
that Labour and its allies exercised over adult education. Thousands of 
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students "working directly or indirectly under the Socialist aegis" would 
become Labour supporters unless provided with an alternative. Buchan 
tried to counter Labour's perceived strength by increasing the number of 
classes, study circles, and schools of study, and by making Stott College the 
apex of a Conservative educational system. Some Conservatives, particu­
larly Stott and other Labour Committee activists, were angered by Buchan's 
changes because they had intended the college to educate trade unionists. 
In May 1928 Stott publicly criticized the college for failing to attract stu­
dents and abandoning its mission of educating wage earners. Both David­
son and Marriott denied the charges, noting that only the spring courses 
were not full and that more than four thousand students had already 
matriculated.69 
The achievements of Stott College were consolidated by Andrew Bonar 
Law Memorial College, which replaced it in 1929. Davidson had long 
hoped to develop a year-round facility where a greater number and variety 
of courses could be offered. In mid-1928 the party chairman learned that 
Ashridge in Hertfordshire was available. Ashridge, an early nineteenth cen­
tury Gothic house with beautiful grounds, was larger and more conve­
niently located than Overstone. Shortly before his death the successful 
engineer and railwayman Urban Broughton had bought the building and 
one hundred acres and donated it to an Andrew Bonar Law Memorial 
Trust for use as a party college. Other wealthy Conservatives established a 
handsome endowment for the school. The college opened in July 1929, and 
it quickly proved a success. After the first few years enrollments rose and 
remained steady at 2,500 students per year, more than twice the number 
at Stott. Andrew Bonar Law Memorial College, or Ashridge as it was popu­
larly known, offered both political training and general education courses. 
It ran a special eight-week course on citizenship for younger students, as 
well as courses for university students, peers, M.P.s and candidates, wives 
of M.P.s, and constituency officers. Ashridge courses retained the nonparti­
san but antisocialist flavor of Stott College.70 
Local associations' activities also show the importance Conservatives 
attached to education and political training in the 1920s. Many associations 
held canvassing and speaking courses. Oswestry was among the first to 
organize such classes in 1923, but others soon followed. In 1924 the North 
Cornwall association began holding regular public speaking classes, and a 
small sub-branch operated classes in both the afternoon and the evening. 
Similarly, in early 1926 the Chichester association contributed funds and 
students to a countywide educational scheme, and two years later they 
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were running their own canvassing class in preparation for the next elec­
tion. Some associations also operated lending libraries and hired profes­
sional advisers. Beginning in late 1925, local workers could use central 
office's new reading room, which had recent books, magazines, and propa­
ganda from all three political parties.71 
Local Conservatives also recognized the potential benefits of the Con­
servative College. The Stockton labour committee sent several students, 
including the committee chairman, James Gardner. The cost of attending 
Stott was an obstacle for others, however, although some associations tried 
to assist them. Prominent local Conservatives often gave scholarships to 
needy students. Associations like Bradford Central regularly offered schol­
arships but had difficulty locating worthy candidates, especially wage earn­
ers. Provincial divisions, too, often helped to pay for students. As Stott 
developed into a complete Conservative college, local associations re­
sponded with greater enthusiasm. A leading member of the North Corn­
wall association, for instance, argued that the college would train excellent 
speakers. Oswestry Conservatives were eager to send their Imps and 
funded scholarships for that purpose. Several Conservatives in Stockton 
were sent to Stott in 1926 with the assistance of Macmillan and their WUO 
branch. On their return, two students spoke about their experiences, par­
ticularly the camaraderie and invigorating nature of the college. The WUO 
member mentioned proudly that she had successfully chaired her first 
meeting. The wage-earner student described how he had portrayed a com­
munist agitator in a debate. His performance was so well received that Sir 
Philip Stott had invited him to tea afterward.72 
The emphasis on education in the decade after 1918 marks the begin­
ning of a long-lasting change in the Conservatives' approach to politics. In 
the 1920s some Tories were unwilling to accept these innovations, which 
they considered useless or even degrading. When he was asked in 1924 to 
help central office with its educational work, Sir Cuthbert Headlam was 
unenthusiastic. In his diary he commented that one "cannot teach people 
to be politicians.... These fellows seem to imagine that they can be spoon 
fed into Parliament and taught the requisite amount of history, economics 
and political claptrap by means of lectures and text books." Such views 
were still being advanced by the former Conservative official Sir John 
Green in the 1930s. Green described Ashridge as "a pretentious extension 
of the principles of political education" that demonstrated "the extent to 
which the Conservative Party is the slave of democratic values."73 
Headlam and Green, however, were not representative of the interwar 
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Conservative Party. During the 1920s Conservative interest in education 
reflected wider contemporary trends in party (and other) education. Be­
cause they could rely on the ILP, the Fabian Society, and the Workers' Edu­
cational Association, Labour leaders never bothered to develop their own 
educational system, while the Liberal Party relied on the research-oriented 
summer schools it had instituted in 1921. The Conservative Party created 
the most extensive network of party education in Britain. It included hun­
dreds of thousands of students working in local classes, correspondence 
courses, study circles, schools of study, and the Conservative College, the 
first permanent party college in Britain. 
Propaganda's utility and effect is more difficult to assess than educa-
tion's. What effect did the extensive use of propaganda have in the 1920s? 
By its nature propaganda attempts to shape politics by influencing the 
opinions and, therefore, the behavior of citizens. There is no sure way of 
measuring or verifying how well it worked, but we can say that propaganda 
was useful in conveying Conservative aims and attitudes to millions of vot­
ers. Different types of propaganda varied in their effectiveness. In part pro­
paganda, particularly in its more traditional forms, was best suited to 
maintaining enthusiasm and explaining policies to supporters.74 Speakers 
revitalized supporters and communicated information to party adherents, 
who transmitted it to the wider public. Pamphlets and, to a lesser extent, 
leaflets also helped Conservative voters' support remain strong. 
Other types of propaganda, such as lantern lectures, films, and news­
papers, were most effective at reaching the wider public. A study of one 
seat during the 1951 election found that only 10 percent of voters attended 
public meetings; 50 percent read party literature; and 80 percent read 
newspapers, listened to radio, or watched television broadcasts. As Higham 
recognized in 1920, "The best way of imparting . .  . information is not to 
tell the people how to get it, but to force it upon their notice, gratis; to 
eliminate, as far as possible, all need for initiative." Lantern lectures, films, 
and newspapers were most effective because they provided information in 
a seemingly objective or entertaining way.75 
In its propagandizing, the Conservative Party contributed to a long-
term shift in the character of British politics. Propaganda is most effective 
among new or unaligned voters when it encapsulates and conveys informa­
tion through readily accessible, nonrational means. During Britain's first 
years of universal suffrage, Conservatives found that propaganda enabled 
them to create favorable images for themselves and negative ones for their 
opposition. A significant portion of the electorate based its votes on these 
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fragmented and transitory political impressions. For some members of the 
political elite such a development was deeply disturbing, even if it was in­
evitable and helped to maintain Conservative dominance. In a thoughtful 
passage in his diary, Headlam claimed that politics was better and "good 
taste and good manners" reigned when "no one troubled about the lower 
classes." And in 1918 Baldwin had told the Commons how he deplored the 
clandestine nature of propaganda. This may have been just the grumblings 
of two aging Victorians. Yet, at a deeper level, as LeMahieu argues in A 
Culture for Democracy, interwar propaganda, and the media generally, de­
veloped new types of literacy. Politics was shaped by the public's familiarity 
with the new, nonrational techniques, just as voters today are affected by 
their extended exposure to television.76 
This development also explains in part why politics in the 1920s was 
characterized by personalities at the expense of complex issues and logical 
analysis. Amery once noted after a speech that his audience responded to 
him as the "ploughing, climbing, [and] bathing . .  . film star" of the pho­
nofilm more than as colonial secretary. One who most benefited from the 
emphasis on personality was Baldwin, who came to personify the assorted 
elements of postwar Conservatism just as Ramsay MacDonald seemed to 
embody Labour. As one journalist noted in 1932, film was especially ef­
fective in promoting this sort of appreciation. "To me," she wrote, "Mr. 
Ramsay MacDonald, Mr. Baldwin and others have only become real per­
sonalities since I met them on the screen." Of course there were critics. 
One Conservative attacked the cult of personality, which was based upon 
a false view of Baldwin as "a sort of yeoman farmer who had been pitch­
forked . .  . into the onerous role of Premier." Baldwin's pipe and manner­
isms, the writer complained, were "props, like Charlie Chaplin's little cane," 
and his actions were the rituals of a cult of mediocrity. Ironically, a large 
part of Baldwin's attraction rested on what one Conservative propagandist 
termed Baldwin's "deep repugnance towards the spectacular side of poli­
tics." In his speeches, especially those to nonpartisan organizations, the 
Conservative leader successfully associated himself and his party with En­
glish values threatened by "the smooth and clever tongues" of unscrupu­
lous or radical politicians.77 
There remains, however, the question of cause and effect: did pro­
paganda create public opinion or only reflect it? In their wholehearted 
acceptance of the new techniques, professional party workers usually over­
estimated the power of propaganda. For instance, in the early 1929 issues 
of the Conservative Agents Journal an advertisement for a duplicator ma­
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chine reads, "Your member goes to Parliament on Propaganda." Such 
simplistic views permeated politics in the 1920s. A more careful assessment 
of propaganda must first recognize that in part effectiveness depended on 
the circumstances of the exercise and the information being imparted. 
Conservative propaganda's potential was obviously limited by Conserva­
tive principles and aims. In contrast to commercial publicity, which pro­
moted sales—a tangible result—propaganda worked more obliquely. On 
occasion this had a debilitating effect. One SUA meeting was unable to 
decide on propaganda material and could agree only to distribute it more 
effectively.78 
Political operatives in the 1920s tended to accept a too simple Pavlov­
ian model for the voting public. As one agent noted in 1927, publicity 
stunts are often ineffective precisely because the public refuses to believe 
them. In addition, propaganda is predicated on common determinates 
rather than on responses which, of course, differ with individual and cir­
cumstances. One person might respond as desired and vote Conservative, 
but another might not. Under a different set of circumstances, neither or 
both might respond as desired. "Safety First," for example, was an effective 
slogan in 1922 and 1924, but a failure in 1929. The lesson was that propa­
ganda was only effective insofar as it tapped existing opinions and moods. 
As Milne and MacKenzie noted in 1954, "Propaganda may provide a stimu­
lus to some latent impulse, but the key to the problem of behaviour still lies 
in the social and mental background of the elector." Propaganda cannot, in 
other words, create opinion and bring about a specific action unless it cor­
rectly appeals to existing conditions; it must be absolutely relevant. In the 
years immediately after World War I, "Safety First" was appropriate, but 
by 1929 it was much less so.79 
The Conservative Party propaganda and education system developed 
after 1918 is one indication of how "the party of the status quo" successfully 
adapted to the postwar era. Propaganda and publicity were a key factor in 
the party's performance, as by these means Conservative leaders were able 
to compete successfully against the opposition parties and reach out to 
the vastly increased—and seemingly unknowable—electorate. No single 
factor was decisive in creating the Conservative Party's domination of in­
terwar politics. The party's educational efforts enabled it to win adherents, 
but just as important, it trained a growing number of members to work 
for their beliefs on behalf of the Conservative Party. Such trained personnel 
were crucial in spreading Conservatism among the populace, as propa­
ganda was most effective when its dispersal was carefully monitored and 
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controlled by trained party members. In large part both education and 
propaganda depended on the WUO, the JIL, and the Labour Commit­
tee. The popular organizations and the propaganda and educational 
tools of the Conservative Party were put to the test in the 1929 general elec­
tion, the last election of the 1920s, after the passage of the equal suffrage 
act in 1928. 
The Representation of the People 
Act of 1928 and the General 
Election of 1929 
By the late 1920s the Conservative Party had largely adapted to 
mass politics. It had successful mass organizations, extensive propaganda 
capabilities, and a system of party education. Yet as the Conservatives ap­
proached a mandated general election in 1929, they faced a new challenge: 
the Representation of the People Act of 1928. The property and age require­
ments of the 1918 reform act had restricted women's vote to three-fifths of 
adult females, but the 1928 act established equal suffrage, confirming that 
the franchise was a right of all adult citizens. The history of the 1928 reform 
act and the Conservative Party's response to it has been largely ignored 
by historians. The standard history simply states that nearly all Conserva­
tives, including the party's professional staff, considered equal suffrage at 
twenty-one anathema.1 
Many Conservatives greeted the changes engendered by the reform act 
of 1918 with what David Close describes as "reluctant, and somewhat cyni­
cal, resignation."2 Although many never considered the measure beneficial, 
they accepted it as inevitable and, with Baldwin, realized that the role of 
the party for the foreseeable future was not to obstruct this development, 
but to win elections while educating the new electors and maintaining po­
litical stability. In effect, Conservatives, or at least an increasing number of 
them, accepted the principle of universal adult suffrage even if they dis­
agreed on when to equalize the franchise. The different female and male 
franchises of 1918 were an expedient but illogical halfway measure. By late 
1924 all three parties were pledged to full women's suffrage. Baldwin's gov­
ernment was expected to introduce an equal suffrage bill, and it did. The 
resulting Representation of the People Act of 1928 established universal 
suffrage in Great Britain. 
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In May 1929, as soon as the new voter registers were ready, Baldwin's 
government called a general election. During the campaign the Conserva­
tives mobilized all their organizational capabilities but failed to present a 
program that appealed to the mass electorate. Their most innovative pro­
posal was the partial derating of industrial and agricultural property to 
increase British competitiveness. Derating, however, inspired as much hos­
tility as enthusiasm, and Baldwin and the party were thrown back on their 
record of small but steady achievements and their ability to provide safe 
government. The 1929 campaign was closely associated with the Conserva­
tive Party leader and his opposition rivals. In contrast to the 1918 election, 
in which Lloyd George's appeal helped the coalition to a major victory, 
Baldwin's personal appeal, as great as it was, was not enough. A decade of 
economic trouble and unemployment, the decline of internal and foreign 
threats, and five years of safe but unremarkable government had sapped 
voters' patience. When presented with a Conservative campaign domi­
nated by Baldwin and a "Why Change?" slogan, many electors seem to 
have had a ready answer. They voted for Labour and Liberal candidates in 
unprecedented numbers, and the Conservative Party lost its parliamen­
tary majority. 
The Representation of the People Act of 1928 
Before the Representation of the People Act of 1928, there were attempts to 
enfranchise adult women who lacked the vote in 1918,1919,1920,1922,1923, 
and 1924, but each collapsed in the face of Conservative opposition. The 
Labour government of 1924 introduced the most important of these failed 
bills. The 1924 bill provided universal adult suffrage but abolished the busi­
ness vote and removed the property qualification for the local government 
franchise. Conservative agents led the attack on the bill, pressing the NUA 
into action and creating a subcommittee akin to the one that had altered 
provisions of the 1918 reform bill. Together Conservative agents and M.P.s 
shelved the bill.3 
Although Close defines all Conservative opposition as a rejection of 
the principle of equal suffrage, most Conservatives attacked the bill by crit­
icizing it as premature, unnecessary, and a threat to the business and local 
government franchises. Yet the debate revealed tensions among Conserva­
tives on the question of universal suffrage. Some were pledged to equal 
suffrage at twenty-one, while others opposed equal suffrage or demanded 
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a higher minimum age. Opponents of equal suffrage used many of the 
same arguments that had dominated the suffrage debate before 1918. They 
claimed that an equal suffrage bill would enable women to dominate the 
three-fourths of the parliamentary divisions where they outnumbered the 
men. Conservative opponents were also worried that enfranchising young 
women, particularly factory workers who might be trade unionists, would 
give Labour an insurmountable electoral advantage. Many opponents 
claimed that there was no public demand for reform or that the 1918 act 
had been passed on the understanding that it would remain in effect for at 
least ten years. (According to Butler, this claim was unfounded, but it 
might have been based on an unrecorded agreement.) And some Conser­
vative opponents just could not accept votes for all citizens. They still be­
lieved, with the Tory historian Hearnshaw, that voting was a responsibil­
ity limited to "worthier" citizens. In other words, they were hostile to 
democracy.4 
Quite a few Conservatives accepted equal female suffrage but thought 
that the minimum voting age for all citizens should be raised to twenty-
five. This proposal received nonpartisan support from educational elitists 
like the Labour peer Viscount Haldane and the Liberal M.R Sir John Si­
mon. Some Conservative women also supported the idea, and the 1926 
WUO conference passed a resolution in favor of it. Such a measure might 
satisfy the demand for equality while excluding ignorant young people, 
particularly factory girls. Conservative backers of this proposal deplored 
the frivolity of the younger generation. To them, people under twenty-five 
(of whatever sex) were too immature to exercise their franchise properly.5 
Other Conservatives, particularly women, supported universal suf­
frage at twenty-one. Nancy Astor and Dame Helen Gwynne-Vaughan pub­
licly supported the Labour bill during a debate on equal suffrage at the 
1924 WUO conference. Most proponents of universal suffrage believed that 
(1) political elitism was dead, (2) the state could not exclude adults from 
voting because they happened to be women, and (3) the Conservatives 
might as well concentrate on educating voters and bringing them into the 
party. As John Buchan had said in 1910, if "duty to the State" was the crite­
rion for the franchise, then intelligent and politically active women and 
hardworking mothers of Britain ought to have it. There was no way to 
distinguish these women from the rest. Once voting became a right for all 
men in 1918, whole groups of women could not be excluded indefinitely, 
and many thought that it would better to pass a conservative reform mea­
sure and earn the credit from doing it than to leave the question to left-
wing parties/1 
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The new Baldwin government, particularly the prime minister, was 
pledged to equal suffrage. Since 1918, both Bonar Law and Baldwin had 
publicly supported equal suffrage. During the 1924 campaign Baldwin 
vowed to call an all-party conference to devise an equal franchise measure. 
Baldwin did not detail specific franchise qualifications, but most believed 
he would allow women to qualify for the existing male residential fran­
chise. In response, one speaker at a WUO branch in North Cornwall 
agreed that the government should "level up" the franchise. Moreover, 
some Conservatives argued, if they raised the voting age to twenty-five, 
they might alienate a large number of voters to whom another government 
would grant the franchise.7 
Conservatives divided over the suffrage question again when Labour 
introduced a franchise bill in 1925. One of the chief Conservative com­
plaints was that the bill would nullify dual voting. Others accepted the 
argument of one M.P. that the electorate already included too many "unen­
lightened people" and immature women who were "apt to be attracted by 
those glittering prophecies" of Labour "like a moth attracted by a candle." 
During the debate, however, the home secretary, Sir William Joynson-
Hicks, rejected the bill but vowed to pass an equal franchise bill "within 
the lifetime of the present Parliament."8 
A number of Conservatives were already impatient with the govern­
ment. Astor pointed to the party's election pledge. She also attacked the 
"antiquated and out-of-date" M.P.s from ultrasafe Conservative seats. She 
urged Conservatives "to take a leap in the light towards trusting women." 
Astor's remarks indicated the growing support for equal female suffrage 
among Conservatives, especially women. In early 1927 the Conservative 
Agents' Journal urged the government to establish universal suffrage at 
twenty-one. It was inevitable, the magazine argued, and the Conservatives 
might benefit by passing such a measure. But the king's speech in February 
1927 did not include equal suffrage. Several women on the NUCUA council 
responded by criticizing the government's lethargy. Astor again voiced her 
dissatisfaction in the Commons and led a nonpartisan deputation de­
manding equal suffrage. Outside Westminster the issue was becoming 
something of a concern. Conservatives in Bradford, for instance, passed 
a resolution "emphatically in favour of the granting of the Parliamentary 
Franchise to both Men and Women . .  . on attaining the age of 21 years."9 
In March 1927 the Cabinet finally formed a committee to investigate 
the franchise question. One of the committee members was the chancellor 
of the exchequer, Winston Churchill. With the assistance of the secretary 
of state for India, Lord Birkenhead, Churchill vehemently opposed equal 
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female suffrage, but it was too late to stop universal suffrage at twenty-
one. Even Cabinet ministers like Neville Chamberlain and Leo Amery, who 
wanted equal suffrage at twenty-five, admitted that it was not a feasible 
option. Davidson, the party chairman, polled central office agents and 
found that the older minimum age was considered impractical. Agents 
thought it would disfranchise large numbers of men and irritate propo­
nents of suffrage reform. In any case, Davidson and many other Conserva­
tives did not believe that universal suffrage would have a detrimental effect 
on the Conservative Party. On 14 April the Cabinet announced that it 
would introduce legislation to give women the same residential franchise 
as men. Birkenhead later complained that the Cabinet had been forced to 
make this decision by Joynson-Hicks's 1925 promise, but this is not true. 
Despite their wariness ministers were not forced to provide equal suffrage 
at twenty-one as a consequence of Joynson-Hicks's statement, which, after 
all, simply reiterated earlier Conservative pledges.10 
During the months that followed the Cabinet decision there was con­
siderable debate within the party over the merits of a twenty-one or 
twenty-five year voting age. Proponents of equal suffrage at twenty-one, 
for example, the duchess of Atholl, stated that many women who would 
be given the vote were not flappers, but mature wives and mothers. The 
franchise, she argued, would encourage "a dawning sense of a wider life 
and comradeship." On the other side of this controversy, the newspaper 
magnate Lord Rothermere began attacking equal suffrage with a series of 
articles, "Stop the Flapper Folly," in April 1927. Rothermere cultivated the 
image of the flapper as asocial and ignorant. He tapped contemporary 
worries that changing gender roles and falling birthrates were a sign of 
racial and cultural decay. The Daily Mail's flapper agitation was a mish­
mash of contradictory worries about deviant youths, uncontrollable fe­
males, and social disorder.11 
Conservative leaders notified the party organizations of the govern-
ment's intentions and tried to relieve their anxieties. In a 27 May 1927 
speech at the Albert Hall, Baldwin castigated Conservatives who wanted to 
set the voting age at twenty-five. He pointed out that equal suffrage at 
twenty-one was neither revolutionary nor unexpected. Bonar Law had ac­
cepted it in principle in 1922, and Baldwin had all but promised it in 1924. 
Most English-speaking nations already had universal suffrage at twenty-
one. Besides, he added, it would be electorally disastrous to take away the 
voting rights of some men by raising the age requirement. The Conserva­
tive Agents' Journal explained the government's proposal, emphasizing that 
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less than 30 percent of the women who would be enfranchised would be 
under twenty-six, and more than a third would be over thirty. Many of 
these potential women voters would be college women, public servants, 
wives, and mothers, who wanted security and stability like other Conserva­
tives. One agent canvassed his constituency, Plymouth, and reported that 
59 percent of the potential new voters were Conservatives.12 
Conservative organizations demonstrated a mixed reaction to the 
prospect of universal suffrage. Of the messages received by the NUCUA 
Executive, a majority advocated equal suffrage at twenty-five. Both the 
Chichester and the Skipton associations supported the vote at twenty-five, 
and the GUA Executive warned party leaders that equal suffrage at twenty-
one would be disastrous in industrial seats. At a SUA women's conference, 
Sir Robert Home drew prolonged applause when he spoke in favor of equal 
suffrage at twenty-five. Some groups were unable to agree on the issue. JIL 
leaders pressed for the franchise at twenty-one, but delegates at the 1927 
conference were divided and left the matter unresolved. The Oswestry as­
sociation also decided not to take a position. Yet other Conservatives sup­
ported the government's plan. The young Conservative M.P.s for North 
Cornwall and Wirral, A. M. Williams and John Grace, both welcomed 
the proposal as an extension of the 1918 act. Williams especially attacked 
the notion of young women as flappers incapable of mature political 
decisions.13 
The ongoing debate within the Conservative Party made the 1927 
NUCUA conference held in Cardiff particularly significant. On the eve of 
the meeting the Conservative Agents' Journal again tried to calm worried 
party members by reminding them that there was no longer any reason to 
discriminate against women, who had proven to be as mature as men (and 
possibly more so) and who did not use their vote for feminist purposes. 
On the first day of the conference, a member of the NUCUA council made 
a motion in favor of extending the residential suffrage to all citizens above 
twenty years of age. A delegate proposed an amendment that only women 
above twenty-four years of age be given the vote. He was supported by the 
diehard A. Maconachie, who protested that the party did not wish to give 
women control of the political system. He added tactlessly that there were 
"too many unintelligent and hopeless electors on registers already." In 
reply, Captain Ian Fraser, a blind war veteran and an M.P., delivered a prag­
matic defense of government policy that drew loud cheers and destroyed 
the doubts planted by Maconachie. Fraser emphasized that the Conserva­
tives had to fulfill their pledge by establishing universal suffrage at twenty­
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one. To do otherwise would be both impractical and dangerous. There 
was no reason to fear women, because they would never use their vote to 
"promote the domination of their own sex." The amendment garnered 
only a handful of votes, and the original motion passed.14 
At a mass meeting following the debate, Baldwin claimed that he 
wanted to complete the work begun in 1918. Conservatives had to accept 
full democracy and recognize that it meant adopting "a national policy 
which will bring to our support the armies of those who owe no particular 
allegiance, and . .  . who prefer a stable Government." Refusal to accept uni­
versal suffrage at twenty-one, he said, would demonstrate a lack of faith in 
women and "would be an unwarrantable slur on the efficiency and enthu­
siasm of [the women in] the party organisation."15 Using a tactic to which 
he later resorted frequently, the prime minister called on loyal Tories to 
support the proposal and lambasted opponents as tools of Rothermere, 
who was supporting Lloyd George and the Liberal Party. 
The Cardiff conference boosted the government's efforts to pass an 
equal franchise measure, and the momentum increased when, less than a 
month later, the SUA conference debated the issue and passed a resolution 
of support. Forwarding a motion passed by a women's conference, Lady 
Findlay, the first female president of the SUA, moved that the government 
establish universal suffrage at age twenty-one. She attacked the flapper im­
agery of the antisuffragists and argued that equal suffrage was the natural 
consequence of the 1918 act. After further discussion on the merits of uni­
versal suffrage at twenty-one as opposed to twenty-five, Davidson im­
plored the delegates "to face facts and be practical." They must accept 
women and demonstrate their faith in Conservatism by accepting univer­
sal suffrage at twenty-one. The delegates passed the equal suffrage motion 
by an overwhelming majority.16 
With the introduction of an equal suffrage bill now approved by the 
party, opponents generally bowed to the inevitable. They were continually 
assured that most prospective female voters were neither trade unionists 
nor Labour supporters. Furthermore, as Harold Macmillan told his Stock­
ton constituents, if Conservatives really believed in their fellow Britons, 
they had to give voting rights to all citizens. The Conservative M.P. for 
Skipton, E. R. Bird, and his wife admitted that they still felt that twenty-
five was the best minimum voting age, but they rejected the flapper agita­
tion and acknowledged that equality at whatever age was crucial. The 
former party chairman, Lord Younger, was offended by the lack of "a rea­
sonable pause" before establishing universal suffrage, but he accepted it, 
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praising the contributions of Conservative women. The 1922 Committee 
of Conservative M.Rs also accepted twenty-one as the minimum. At a late 
1927 meeting of Yorkshire Conservatives, a motion against equal suffrage 
at twenty-one was defeated by a large majority.17 
On 12 March 1928 Joynson-Hicks introduced the Representation of the 
People (Equal Franchise) bill. The editor of The Times noted that the bill's 
success was a "conclusion foregone," and, facing only sporadic opposition, 
the bill quickly became law in early July. Both opposition parties accepted 
the measure, although in committee Labour M.Rs tried halfheartedly to 
abolish the business franchise. The government proposed to make the 
spouses of those who occupied business premises eligible for the business 
vote, and, for the first time, to allow women to cast votes under both resi­
dential and business franchises. Despite their dislike of the business fran­
chise, Labour M.Rs supported the equal suffrage bill, but a small band of 
ultraconservatives opposed the bill on principle. During the second read­
ing these M.Rs again rehearsed the arguments that reform was unwar­
ranted and dangerous because, as one M.R stated, it would give the Labour 
Party "absolute supremacy at the polls." Opponents also claimed that 
women were too concerned with their families to seek the public good and 
that they would use their votes to take away men's freedoms, recklessly 
increase government spending, and ignore the Empire. In an especially 
histrionic speech, the historian and diehard M.R for Oxford, Sir Charles 
Oman, even claimed that the party would be destroyed.18 
Sir Robert Sanders, a former chairman of the NUCUA council, dis­
missed Labour criticisms, denounced claims that the Conservative Party 
was being harmed by its leaders, and reminded his audience of Conserva­
tive support for equal suffrage, which the NUCUA conference exemplified. 
Establishing equal suffrage at twenty-one, he went on, was more practical 
and responsible than disfranchising young men by raising the minimum 
voting age. Astor and the WUO chairman, Lady Iveagh, ridiculed argu­
ments that the bill would cause conflict between the sexes and create insta­
bility. Rather than enfranchising a sex, she said, the bill simply recognized 
that women were equal citizens who had something special to contribute 
to public life. The prime minister ended the debate by reiterating his pledge 
to equalize the franchise and outlining a progressive vision of the effects 
of franchise reform: "To-night marks the final stage in the union of men 
and women working together for the regeneration of the world. It may 
well be that by their common work together, each doing that for which 
they are the better fitted, they may provide such an environment that each 
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immortal soul as it is born on this earth may have a fairer chance, a fairer 
home than has ever been vouchsafed to the generations that have passed." 
Opposition to the bill, the former suffragette Frederick Pethick-Lawrence 
derisively noted, was "but the twitterings of sparrows, that can no more 
delay the progress of events than Mrs. Partington with her mop could 
sweep back the ocean." The bill easily passed its second reading with only 
ten M.P.s, all Conservatives, voting against it.19 
During the committee stage of the bill, the elderly Scotsman Sir Alex­
ander Sprot moved an amendment to establish a universal residential fran­
chise for citizens at twenty-five. The home secretary quickly attacked the 
motion, arguing that the party was committed to twenty-one and that a 
higher minimum age would be a terrible electoral liability. Sprot's amend­
ment won the support of a few diehards who were angry that the govern­
ment had failed to reform the House of Lords, but it was easily defeated, 16 
to 359. The committee did agree, however, to alter the maximum election 
expenses for candidates in county seats, a question the government had 
left open for discussion.20 
In the Lords there was rather more opposition to the reform bill than 
in the other house. A diehard and virulent opponent of female suffrage, 
Sir Frederick Banbury, now Lord Banbury of Southam, moved to reject the 
bill. The right-wing duke of Northumberland seconded the motion, noting 
that women should never have been given the vote and that democracy 
was destroying the country. Viscount Sumner argued that it would be im­
possible to reform the Lords once this "gigantic, amorphous, unmanage­
able electorate" was created. Lord Balfour of Burleigh, a proponent of the 
bill, appealed to the peers' practical sense. There is no argument against a 
measure, he stated, that springs directly from the universal education sys­
tem, the reform act of 1918, and the party's pledges. In a suitably cynical 
speech, the antisuffragist Lord Birkenhead closed the debate by recounting 
"the slippery slope" of events that had led to the equal suffrage bill. "The 
moment that you had settled the principle that women were to have votes 
at all," he declared, "it became a lost cause to argue that there should be 
differentiation between people of the same ages." There was no choice but 
to accept the measure with "resolute resignation." The bill passed 114 to 35. 
After a futile attempt in committee to set a minimum voting age of twenty-
five, the House of Lords passed the Representation of the People bill on 18 
June, and it became law on 1 July i928.:i 
The Representation of the People Act contained three significant ele­
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ments. First, women became eligible for the same residential franchise as 
men. Second, about 150,000 women gained a second vote because of their 
husband's business premises, and some men also received a second vote 
through their wives' businesses. (The increase in the business vote was neg­
ligible, from about 1 percent to 1.5 percent of the electorate, and it re­
mained unimportant.) Third, after 1928 women were allowed to exercise 
either a business or university franchise in addition to their residential 
franchise. In all, the act increased the number of women voters by more 
than five million. Women accounted for approximately 53 percent of all 
voters. In 70 percent of parliamentary divisions, female voters outnum­
bered male voters. Through the reform acts of 1918 and 1928 (and the 5.5 
percent increase in population between 1914 and 1929), the British elector­
ate increased from less than eight million in 1914 to nearly twenty-nine 
million in 1928.22 
Preparations for the General Election 
Conservatives responded to the creation of universal suffrage with a mixture 
of confidence and uneasiness. A contributor to one party magazine argued 
that the 1928 act demonstrated the Conservatives' faith in democracy, 
while, the writer claimed, Labour "stands to-day for class privileges." In 
the same issue the Conservative scholar Arthur Shadwell congratulated 
Britons for their good sense. They had accepted universal suffrage "step by 
step by force of circumstance" and thereby avoided both revolution and 
chaos. The vice-chairman of the WUO, Lady Newton, confidently argued 
that women were inherently moderate and would thus be attracted to Con­
servatism. Women, she told the 1928 party conference, "were out for peace 
and quiet and the safety and advancement of their children. They stood 
for the happiness of their husbands, and the peace and security of their 
homes. They did not believe in a noisy minority, and were determined to 
uphold the grand old constitution of this country. (Applause.)"23 
But other Conservatives were uneasy about the large electorate. In the 
1930s Sir Gervais Rentoul, the first chairman of the 1922 Committee, de­
scribed universal suffrage as "the greatest political experiment ever under­
taken by any democracy.... We have now reached the stage when every 
man and woman possesses a direct vote in the government of the coun-
try—not by reason of any property or educational qualifications, but 
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simply because they happen to have been born British citizens and have 
reached the mature age of twenty-one. The majority of them have no fixed 
political ideas. . . . The existence of this large unattached floating vote with­
out any definite political principles obviously possesses dangers against 
which we need, as a nation, to be constantly on our guard." The act reawak­
ened Conservative concerns about an unmanageable electorate that might 
be attracted to opposition parties. Like many others, the Conservative 
agent in North Cornwall was "stunned" by the huge increase in voters. The 
Conservative Party had to redouble its efforts to reach out to the millions 
of voters, many of whom had no political allegiance, if it was, as Baldwin 
had said, "to make democracy safe for the world."24 
To reach those enfranchised by the 1928 act, the Conservative Party 
used all its propaganda and organizational techniques. Under Davidson's 
leadership, central office continued to enlarge its operations. Shortly after 
Davidson had taken over as party chairman in late 1926, Lord Irwin sug­
gested to him the need for "broad-based propaganda." Davidson accord­
ingly expanded party propaganda. From October to December 1928, 
central office distributed more than a million leaflets and pamphlets, and 
in the four months before the 1929 election, they circulated sixteen million 
pieces of literature.25 
Conservative literature appealed to women, playing on their gratitude 
by reminding them that the government had trusted their common sense. 
Such a claim was made in "Mademoiselle of 1928," set to the tune of "Ma­
demoiselle from Armentieres" and published by the National Conservative 
Musical Union. Its lyrics ran: 
Mr. Baldwin thought it time 
Parley vous, 
To bring the ladies into line 
Parley vous, 
Along with the men, an equal vote 
If only to stop the Socialist dope, 
Inky, pinky, parley vous. 
Join our ranks and show your worth 
Parley vous, 
Accompany us in work and mirth 
Parley vous, 
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If social ills you wish to cure, 
Vote for Baldwin then you're sure, 
Inky, pinky, parley vous.26 
Central office described the Conservative record of helping women in the 
leaflet "What the Conservatives Have Done." They distributed millions of 
copies of "The Woman of To-day and Tomorrow," a leaflet outlining the 
party's concern for women's issues. In autumn 1928 the WUO magazine, 
Home and Politics, introduced new features, including the "Mrs. Maggs and 
Betty" column, in which the older, sensible charlady, Mrs. Maggs, guides a 
young and formerly apathetic maid named Betty through the perils of poli­
tics. Mrs. Maggs accomplishes this feat with frequently memorable com­
mentary, calling the Liberals, for example, as fickle as the weather on 
washday.27 
The real work of maintaining and expanding Conservative influence 
among women was given to the WUO, by now an invaluable part of 
the party machinery. Shortly after the equal suffrage bill was passed, the 
NUCUA rules were changed to increase representation of women on the 
NUCUA Executive from one-third to one-half. The women's advisory 
committee of the NUCUA Executive was given a more powerful and secure 
position, in effect becoming the oversight body for the WUO and its ex­
panding network of area committees and area agents. The advisory com­
mittee was assigned the role of channeling women's views to the NUCUA 
Executive, and it proved so successful in promoting understanding be­
tween men and women's groups that in 1930 the quota of female con­
stituency delegates at the NUCUA conference and council was allowed to 
lapse.28 
The women's advisory committee was accepted as an official, represen­
tative organ, partly because of the rapid development of WUO area com­
mittees. Outside Yorkshire the first regional WUO organization was 
established in the Southeastern Area in 1920. Wives of Conservative M.P.s 
from Southeast England and women from the county associations formed 
the Women's Parliamentary Committee. Members raised their own funds 
and hired a missionary, who cycled through the area organizing women 
voters. This and other area committees varied in their composition and 
activities, but most tended to operate more like select women's clubs than 
popular organizations. In 1927 central office began urging area committees 
to re-form as committees of their provincial divisions. The Southeastern 
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Committee had recently adopted this plan, becoming the Southeastern 
Area Women's Advisory Council. Other areas soon followed. Each associa­
tion selected one of its female delegates at the provincial level to serve on 
the women's area committees, which acted as subcommittees of the pro­
vincial divisions. Female area agents served as secretaries. Area committees 
raised funds and monitored women's opinions.29 
At the local level, Conservative associations responded to universal 
suffrage and an expected election by hiring women organizers. They were 
faced with an average of eight thousand newly enfranchised women in each 
constituency. One of the first decisions of the North Cornwall women's 
committee, created in 1925, was to hire an organizer. Other WUO associa­
tions also hired woman organizers in hopes of bringing new female voters 
into the party. Inspired by their central office area agent, the officers of the 
Wrexham women's branches met in late 1926 to discuss hiring an organizer. 
They appointed Mrs. Palin, the chairwoman of a ward branch, as unpaid 
secretary for a six-month trial period. The area agent continued to press 
the women to hire an organizer, but they were able to pay Palin only as a 
part-time worker. Kincardine Unionists did nothing about a woman orga­
nizer until their defeat in the 1929 election.30 
The JIL also grew significantly in the late 1920s as it assumed responsi­
bility for younger new voters. Baldwin emphasized the JIL's heightened 
importance in an address at a March 1928 rally of young Conservatives. JIL 
members used leaflet, phonograph, and film versions of the speech for 
recruiting and campaigning during the next year. Central office also en­
couraged the development of JIL divisional councils that could work more 
closely with the senior associations. In addition, Lady Myra Fox and Mar­
jorie Maxse were added to the JIL's governing bodies, and Fox became the 
first female vice-chairman of the JIL. Davidson increased financial support 
for the JIL, took responsibility for its literature, provided it with organizers, 
and trained its members in special courses at the Conservative College.31 
The JIL and the WUO launched major recruiting and canvassing 
drives during the months before the May 1929 election. Maxse suggested 
that WUO and JIL branches cooperate in canvassing new voters by divid­
ing electors between the two organizations according to age. She proposed 
that branches of both organizations invite new voters to special social 
events, during which the women would be told about current politics, 
Conservatism, and the benefits of belonging to the JIL or the WUO. Maxse 
thought that many women would join one of the groups for the social 
activities and the sense of solidarity. With the assistance of central office 
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agents, many youth and women's organizations adopted Maxse's sugges­
tions. JIL recruiting drives in November 1928 and March 1929 gave rise to 
hundreds of new youth branches by April 1929. JIL activities, organized by 
a horde of JIL recruiters known as the "Baldwin Brigade," attracted press 
coverage and encouraged many associations to prepare for the election. 
During recruiting drives, JIL headquarters distributed more than 183,000 
"Voluntary Service Forms" to JIL secretaries and constituency agents to 
sign up volunteer workers for the election, and JIL headquarters sold 
nearly 14,000 copies of its Hints for Canvassing handbook.32 
The WUO held a more subdued recruiting drive in February 1929. A 
special issue of Home and Politics offered suggestions for publicity, meet­
ings, entertainments, and speeches designed to appeal to women's desire 
"to be made to feel they are wanted." Mrs. Baldwin and the WUO chair­
woman, Lady Iveagh, asked readers to have confidence in a prime minister 
who understood women's interests. The WUO also organized a special 
campaign among nurses, whose work brought them into contact with 
many women. Sixty thousand registered nurses received a letter from the 
chairwoman and the administrator of the WUO, information on the gov-
ernment's work for women and children and equal suffrage, and an invita­
tion to join the WUO. Women's branches were then given the names of 
nurses in their area so that they could follow up. With speakers provided 
by the SUA women's department, Unionist women in Scotland canvassed 
and held more than a thousand meetings for female voters.33 
The months prior to the 1929 election saw considerable organizing 
in the divisions. During autumn 1928, for example, Kincardine and West 
Aberdeenshire Unionists overhauled their organization. They expanded 
the parish and district committees and purchased a car for the agent, who 
had to crisscross the large division in the course of his work. In addition, 
the association planned propaganda, checked the new voter register, and 
arranged for the transportation of voters on polling day. A Chichester 
branch organized an extensive program that included a visit by a Conser­
vative cinema van. In Wrexham and North Cornwall, WUO branches re­
cruited members with meetings during New Voters' Week in February 
1929. The North Cornwall and Stockton WUO branches also sent women a 
letter from their M.R appealing for their vote. Local associations, especially 
WUO branches, worked hard to canvass and distribute the appropriate 
material to each household.34 
Despite notable improvements in the party's organization, quite a few 
Conservative leaders were unsure about the upcoming general election. 
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Support for the Conservative Party was expected to decline from the 
spectacular levels of the previous election, and some sections of the party 
were suffering a kind of malaise. Grumbling over second chamber reform 
and equal suffrage was part of the problem, but some Conservatives were 
also unhappy at the government's failure to lower taxes and cut spending. 
Publicans, shopkeepers, and Conservative club members, all important 
Conservative supporters, complained about restrictions on public houses 
and shops. For these Tory critics the government's failings were more note­
worthy than such successes as the Pensions Act (1925). The first lord of the 
admiralty, William Bridgeman, had already, in 1927, lectured Conservative 
critics "in the Club" who were distracting attention from the opposition's 
faults but acknowledged that the euphoria of 1924 was gone. Davidson 
made a similar assessment in September 1928.35 
The Conservative government had scored some midterm successes; its 
deft handling of the General Strike, the Trade Disputes and Trade Union 
Act, and the Chinese Crisis of 1927, provoked by clashes between British 
troops and Cantonese, certainly increased its popularity. During the last 
eighteen months before the election, however, the government seemed un­
willing to act decisively on serious issues, and it lost popularity. In summa­
rizing the achievements of the session ending in August 1928, Man in the 
Street was forced back on the trivial Protection of Lapwings and the Post 
Office (Sites) Acts. Such inactivity encouraged apathy among supporters. 
Even in relatively safe seats like Wirral and Wood Green party morale 
seemed to be declining; in Labour or Liberal preserves like Glasgow the 
effect was much stronger.36 
Although they worried about their own supporters, Conservative lead­
ers were more concerned about nonaligned voters who might think that 
the government was unresponsive to international and economic troubles. 
The government's inability to bring about lasting international peace was 
a potent issue for the opposition. The Conservative government refused to 
accept the Geneva Protocol establishing compulsory arbitration for League 
of Nations members, and in 1927 the Geneva Naval Conference failed 
mainly because of Anglo-American disagreements on parity. After signing 
the Locarno Treaties in 1927, the ailing foreign secretary, Austen Chamber­
lain, had become increasingly out of touch. The president of the board 
of education, Lord Percy, later recalled how the public believed that the 
government was missing opportunities to cooperate with its former allies. 
Instead, according to the M.P. Sir Reginald Mitchell Banks, ministers were 
being labeled incompetent.'7 
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Even more damaging to Conservative election chances than the peace 
issue were the high level of unemployment and continuing economic de­
pression. After a brief drop in 1927, the percentage of insured workers who 
were unemployed returned to double digits; in the year preceding the elec­
tion, unemployment averaged more than 11 percent. Even in the Midlands, 
the north of England, and Scotland, where unemployment levels were sta­
ble, the Conservatives were in trouble. Except for the General Strike, the 
winter of 1928-29 was the worst period of unemployment since 1923. Be­
tween 1924 and 1929 unemployment in strongly Labour areas, especially 
the mining and heavy industry regions of northeastern England and Wales, 
increased. There was ample opportunity for the revived Labour Party to 
exploit the economic issue. Labour's new program, Labour and the Nation, 
used R. H. Tawney's lofty moral language to attack the government for 
protecting the interests of the rich and propertied, while ignoring the eco­
nomic and social problems of ordinary Britons. Labour leaders pushed 
trade unionism, the General Strike, and nationalization into the back­
ground to present what Jones calls "a pose of studious moderation."38 
Another problem facing the government was the continuing agricul­
tural depression, which allowed the Liberals to gain support in rural Brit­
ain and jeopardized Conservative chances of winning the next election. 
Between 1924 and 1929 the amount of land devoted to wheat, barley, and 
oat cultivation declined by 773,764 acres. After 1926 wheat and barley prices 
fell steadily, and during the twelve months before the election wheat prices 
dropped to their lowest level since 1923. The government was also blamed 
for higher costs, particularly the petrol tax, food quality injunctions, and 
higher benefit and wage costs for laborers. As a result, rural regions were 
easy game for Lloyd George, who launched a land campaign in 1925. With 
a radical plan to empower county committees to expropriate land and lease 
it to farmers, Lloyd George and the Liberals scored several by-election vic­
tories. North Cornwall was representative of the rural seats where Conser­
vatives faced growing Liberal support. Once local Liberals had restructured 
their organization and selected a strong candidate, Sir Donald Maclean, 
their vigorous campaigning against "arrogant, swanking Toryism" gener­
ated considerable support.39 
Since most Conservative leaders had rejected food subsidies in 1921 
and tariffs in 1924, the ministry of agriculture was hard-put to come up 
with something for farmers. Edward Wood, minister of agriculture in 
1924 and 1925, later wrote that he found the job one of "almost complete 
futility and frustration." The government, however, pointed to its record 
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of building roads, spurring sugar beet farming, and requiring imported 
foods to be labeled. As a 1926 white paper lectured farmers on the need for 
"realism," the government rejected requests from central office, the NU­
CUA council, and the Conservative M.P.s agricultural committee to enact 
barley duties and wheat price guarantees, preferring to try to undermine 
Liberal support. The Liberal Party, Davidson told a Bradford audience in 
1927, was "try[ing] to breach that [Conservative] dam, the only result of 
which will be that the waters of Socialism will pour over the land and 
destroy it." Davidson's claim was reinforced by the defection of the former 
coalition Liberals Hilton Young and Sir Alfred Mond to the Conservative 
Party. The Conservatives also claimed that the Liberal Party was a rump 
controlled by a Welsh mountebank, Lloyd George, using "tainted money," 
a reference to the sale of honors by the coalition government. Finally, the 
Conservative propaganda attack, spearheaded by Sir John Green, central 
office's agricultural expert and the author of Political Pills for Farming Ills 
(1926), tried to raise fears about Lloyd George's land plan. Green argued 
that subsidies would lead to inflation, higher taxes, and more bureaucracy. 
Conservative propagandists even claimed that the Liberal model was Soviet 
collectivization. The Conservatives nevertheless continued to lose support 
in rural areas. The National Farmers Union was so disgruntled that it con­
sidered adopting its own slate of candidates in 1929.40 
As the mandated 1929 election drew nearer, the Cabinet considered a 
variety of programs and tactics to revive Conservative support. Shortly 
after he had become party chairman in late 1926, Davidson urged the prime 
minister to form a Cabinet policy committee. Baldwin agreed, and the 
committee was created in September 1927, but Davidson had difficulty 
arousing interest in the work. Under Worthington-Evans the policy com­
mittee met sporadically until mid-1928. The thirty-four Cabinet and junior 
ministers who worked on the committee were asked to study future Con­
servative policy, particularly with regard to agriculture, industry and trade, 
social reform, and the Empire. In anticipation of an equal suffrage bill, the 
duchess of Atholl was placed on the social reform subcommittee specifi­
cally to handle women's issues. But the committee's vague report in July 
1928 was no basis for a clear and substantive program.41 
Some Conservatives felt that the party's platform should still be tariff 
reform. Virtually all Conservatives had accepted the safeguarding policy 
that the government established in 1925. The Safeguarding of Industries 
Act empowered nonfood trades to petition for a committee of inquiry, 
which considered unfair trade conditions, the efficiency of domestic pro­
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ducers, and the effect of safeguarding on prices and employment. If the 
board of trade and the treasury approved, the government could introduce 
a bill to protect the industry. Conservatives claimed that safeguarding pro­
vided jobs and higher wages for some British workers while keeping prices 
low by encouraging economies of scale among home producers. A few in­
dustries were protected by safeguarding, but, except for the automobile 
and motorcycle industry, larger concerns were excluded.42 
Conservative tariff reformers, however, believed that the party had to 
move beyond safeguarding to full protection. Among the most important 
tariff proponents were the Cabinet ministers Amery, Joynson-Hicks, and, 
to a lesser extent, Neville Chamberlain. Each was active in the Empire In­
dustries Association, an important tariff organization founded in 1925 and 
headed by Sir Henry Page Croft, a leading protectionist in the NUCUA. 
Amery, the colonial secretary, pressed protection on the prime minister, 
claiming that only it would free Britain from the high unemployment and 
high taxes that "breed Communism at the lower end of [the social] scale, 
and apathy at the upper." Tariff reformers could not, however, win the 
policy committee's approval for tariffs or even extensive safeguarding.43 
After the policy committee's failure, leading tariff reformers attempted 
unsuccessfully to steer the party toward a protectionist platform. Joynson-
Hicks made a statement in July 1928 in favor of more tariffs, particularly 
for the iron and steel industry. The ensuing controversy was an embar­
rassing show of ministerial squabbling on a divisive issue. In a leading ar­
ticle, the editor of The Observer, J. L. Garvin, a longtime tariff reformer, 
argued that safeguarding iron and steel necessitated agricultural protec­
tion, which would destroy the party's election chances. The Times also 
warned that the Cabinet's plans would "disappear in a faction fight over 
tariffs." In early August Baldwin denounced protection and food taxes in a 
public letter to the Conservative chief whip.44 
But tariff reformers did not admit defeat, in part because many Con­
servatives were still searching for an election program. In a letter to the 
prime minister, Bridgeman offered some thoughts on the coming struggle. 
Although his wife, Caroline, the former WUO chairwoman, thought that 
the government should campaign on its social reform record, Bridgeman 
believed that the Conservatives had to offer something else. According to 
him the government should promise to expand safeguarding, possibly to 
include the iron and steel trade. At the NUCUA conference in September 
1928, Page Croft moved a resolution critical of the government's "slow 
progress" and urged "the widest possible extension" of safeguarding. The 
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conference rejected a moderating amendment in favor of an amendment 
that specifically asked for protection of iron and steel. At the mass meeting 
that evening, Baldwin expressed his support for safeguarding but rejected 
protectionism, warning, "It is not wise in a democracy to go too far in 
front of public opinion." Shortly before the 1929 election the issue resur­
faced when a board of trade committee proposed safeguarding lightweight 
woollens. Ignoring the demands of the NUCUA council and Amery, Bald­
win decided to quash the report in order to avoid a tariff campaign.45 
Winston Churchill, the chancellor of the exchequer and the most im­
portant Conservative to oppose protectionism, proposed an alternative 
program. Like Lord Derby, the party organizers, and many other ordinary 
Conservatives, Churchill remembered vividly the debacles of 1906 and 
1923. He believed that he had found a less risky means of aiding domestic 
production by lowering local rates. Agricultural land had already been par­
tially derated, and progressive Tories, like the young M.P.s who wrote In­
dustry and the State (1927), proposed that it be applied to industry. In his 
April 1928 budget, Churchill announced a plan to reduce three-quarters of 
the burden of local rates on industrial properties and railways and to re­
move all rates from agricultural land. Much of the shortfall in local reve­
nues would be compensated for by a national petrol tax. Such a measure 
would fill the need, foreseen by Churchill in 1927, for a "large new con­
structive measure which, by its importance and scope, by its antagonisms 
as well as by its appeal, will lift us above the ruck of current affairs." Such 
a policy would sidetrack protectionists and avoid the electoral risks of tar­
iffs. In a letter to his mentor Churchill, Macmillan predicted that derating 
would unite and revive the Conservatives: "If it goes right, it will put new 
life into the Party. It will provide a constructive policy other than Protec­
tion. It will rally the waverers. It will consolidate the moderate vote. It 
will put fresh hope and enthusiasm into the hearts of all those who have 
supported the Conservative Party because they honestly believed it to be a 
Party capable of constructive thought and progressive effort."46 
The derating scheme seemed like a natural campaign issue, and Con­
servatives tried to convey its merits to the public. Speaking in Stockton in 
mid-1928, Macmillan claimed that derating demonstrated the "democratic 
and progressive" character of the new Conservative Party, which was will­
ing to risk an appeal to voters on this complex program. In Man in the 
Street, Macmillan claimed that, with derating, "the Conservative Party . .  . 
definitely turns its back on the policy of negative, and enters the lists with 
a clear and definitely constructive plan, audacious and comprehensive.... 
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After a long period of comparative inaction, the bugle is sounded for a 
general advance." Despite Macmillan's claim, derating was not an immedi­
ately successful rallying cry, though less from opposition than from lack of 
enthusiasm. At a 1928 meeting of the NUCUA council, Churchill's derating 
presentation evoked no response, and at the SUA conference a prospective 
candidate criticized the plan as incomplete. Derating proved difficult for 
both Conservative workers and voters to understand and appreciate; many 
linked it with Neville Chamberlain's complicated administrative reform, 
the Local Government Act of 1929. Even the party magazines admitted that 
the public did not understand these measures. The records of the library 
and information department at central office show that Tories in the con­
stituencies were less interested in derating and local government reform 
than in such issues as Lloyd George, international peace, socialism, unions, 
farming, pensions, and tariffs. During 1928 and 1929, of more than seventy-
five queries from my sample constituencies, only three concerned derating 
or local government.47 
With no popular program, the government was increasingly forced to 
rely on its record and on its claim to be the only party able to provide 
stable government. In his address to a women's meeting at the 1928 
NUCUA conference, the Conservative M.P. Major Sir Archibald Boyd-
Carpenter tried to turn Lloyd George's land plan and the absence of a 
Conservative alternative to the benefit of the government: 
What was Mr. Lloyd George's solution? You were to be in­
spected and directed to the prosperity of agriculture; to 
have people sit above you who did not know a turnip from 
a potato, telling you what crops to grow upon your land; 
hordes of officials coming down. (Laughter.) Just fancy one 
coming down who mistakes a pheasant for a peasant. 
(Laughter.) . .  . It would be absurd if it were not so wicked 
to try and delude people into the belief that there was help 
and comfort in that way. Mr. Lloyd George believed that 
by waving the magician's wand he could produce prosper­
ity. . .  . Mr. Baldwin, one of the honestest and straightest 
men in England to-day, told the people of this country that 
he would not promise them sugar when he could not even 
promise them bread. He told them what he could do and 
that it could only be done by patience, striving, struggle, 
faith, and hope. (Applause.)48 
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Boyd-Carpenter's theme of safe and steady government guided the Conser­
vative Party as the election approached. In October 1928 Baldwin accepted 
the advice of central office that it was best to call an election as soon 
as the new registers were ready in May 1929. The Conservatives, whose 
party organization was unrivaled, should have an advantage in a short 
campaign.49 
The slow pace leading to the 1929 election ended abruptly when Lloyd 
George announced a startling plan for economic recovery. After he became 
leader of the Liberals, he authorized an investigation by politicians and 
economists, among them John Maynard Keynes. They developed an inno­
vative program based on deficit spending and government planning. The 
research had already led to the publication of the Liberal "Yellow Book," 
Britain's Industrial Future, in February 1928. On 1 March 1929 Lloyd George 
delivered an astonishing address to Liberal M.P.s and candidates in which 
he pledged to reduce unemployment to normal levels within a year of tak­
ing office. Less than two weeks later he published the "Orange Book," We 
Can Conquer Unemployment, an electioneering pamphlet that set forth a 
program for rebuilding Britain's infrastructure and lowering unemploy­
ment to 5 percent. The central feature of the plan was a massive road-
building and home construction scheme. He energetically publicized the 
plan, beginning with a question-and-answer luncheon for reporters in 
Westminster the day before the pamphlet was released. He followed this 
with a rally at the Albert Hall that was broadcast to fourteen sites across 
the country. He then threw himself into a countrywide campaign, begin­
ning in southwestern England.50 
Lloyd George's maneuvers severely undermined the position of the 
Conservatives, who were already set to campaign by defending their unim­
pressive record. Conservatives generally responded to Lloyd George's un­
employment plan by calling it empty rhetoric. But the plan put the 
Conservative Party on the defensive and shamed its proposals. By 22 
March, the editor of The Times was warning of a "dangerous despondency" 
among Conservatives. They now faced serious tactical problems as the 
press concentrated its attention on Lloyd George and the Liberal Party. 
Like other Conservatives, the North Cornwall M.P., A. M. Williams, was 
forced to attack the plan as a stunt, but all he was offering voters was more 
years of apparently mediocre government. At Plymouth Lloyd George en­
joyed himself at Conservative expense by ridiculing Baldwin's claims that 
increased broccoli exports from Cornwall indicated that the government 
was reviving the economy. (Baldwin's response was to wear broccoli on his 
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lapel and display it at his rallies.) Central office responded to Lloyd 
George's plan with a detailed analysis of its shortcomings. Conservative 
Party magazines condemned the plan as a bureaucratic scam without long-
term benefits and denounced "the Welsh Wizard" for financing a desperate 
"gambler's throw."51 
The General Election of 1929 
The government doggedly pursued its campaign plans even after they had 
been seriously undermined by the Liberals, kicking off with Churchill's 
budget, which abolished the tea duty. Baldwin quickly established the tone 
of the campaign in a speech at the Drury Lane Theatre on 18 April that 
was reprinted as a pamphlet and carried by the party magazines. In this 
age of democracy, he told his audience, people are apt to expect sensational 
promises, but voters should remember that they are shareholders in Britain 
and the Empire and, as such, should seek leaders capable of managing the 
enterprise efficiently and prosperously. The Conservative government had 
performed well, and it would continue to do so by encouraging emigra­
tion, training young people, and reducing the costs of manufacturing and 
agriculture through derating. These policies, Baldwin said, would lead to 
real economic improvement without borrowing and inflation. He also 
noted the need for colonial development and for social reforms, among 
them slum clearance, education, and health care for mothers and children. 
Baldwin ended by appealing to voters' sense of responsibility: 
There is a new spirit abroad in the land. People who 
think that pre-War electioneering is going to win a post-
War election are making the mistake of their lives. The 
people think: they are thirsty for knowledge, they want to 
learn, and, above all, they want to do the right thing, and 
I cannot stand up, and I will not stand up, before a people 
like that and go one iota beyond what I know I can per­
form if I have the opportunity. 
The responsibility of our people is tremendous. For 
the first time . .  . we are a complete democracy of men and 
women. There has never been anything in the world like a 
complete democracy responsible for what our people are 
responsible for.... 
We cannot live, if we would, for ourselves alone; and 
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it is that deep sense of responsibility of our people, that 
will make them deaf to the appeals of cupidity that will 
reach them on the one hand or those of credulity which 
will be offered to them on the other. 
In his Drury Lane speech, Baldwin set out the line he pursued throughout 
the election. He was offering more of the same: moderate and steady 
government.52 
Among members of the Conservative Party, the response to Baldwin's 
speech varied. At the annual meeting of the Cornwall provincial division, 
the chairman, Lord Falmouth, expressed pleasure that the party was not 
bribing voters but offering "a great constructive policy . .  . of enormous 
importance to every man and woman in the country." But many other 
Conservatives rejected this assessment. Baldwin's approach could backfire 
and give the opposition parties a chance to denigrate a less than stellar 
record. Amery thought that the speech conveyed the notion of "perfor­
mance versus promise," but it was hardly inspiring that Baldwin seemed 
to be "reading out a certain amount of stuff from sundry dockets without 
much skill." The diehard Conservative and historian Sir Charles Petrie ex­
pressed disappointment, but added that "Bonar Law won without a policy 
in 1922, so perhaps history will repeat itself." The Conservative press was 
also uneasy. Lord Beaverbrook feared that Lloyd George was putting Bald­
win to shame, although he admitted that the prime minister might get 
support for "cunningly posing as the typical John Bull." In The Observer, 
Garvin commented that the Conservatives had to offer more than "Safety 
First" to win the election.53 
In the weeks following his Drury Lane speech, the prime minister ex­
panded on the theme of performance, not promises. On 22 April a "horri­
bly nervous" prime minister delivered the first of two BBC addresses. 
Beforehand Baldwin told his confidant Thomas Jones, deputy secretary to 
the Cabinet, that he was appealing to "the decency of the English people." 
With a measured and appealing delivery, Baldwin asked listeners to ap­
proach the election soberly and to ignore critics who expected the govern­
ment to engage in "a kind of circus or auction." The welfare and peace of 
the whole Empire, Baldwin told listeners, "depend on the maintenance of 
stable government and wise statesmanship." To turn the government out 
now would undermine a decade of reconstruction. On 4 May, Baldwin 
issued a short "Message to Britain." Using an old rural saying, he empha­
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sized that the Cabinet would always "Cut the cackle and get to the 'osses," 
in its search for prosperity. The statement claimed that the government 
had raised the standard of living, expanded social benefits, and revived the 
economy. Why then, Baldwin asked voters, would you gamble on "rash 
Socialist schemes" or impractical Liberal plans? Ignoring the differences 
between the previous and present elections, Baldwin said, "All that we ask 
is that you should give us an opportunity of carrying on and bringing to 
completion the great work which we have so successfully begun. . . . To 
build up on permanent and solid foundations the health of the individual, 
the health of industry, and the health of the nation is our aim and object, 
and we regard the fulfillment of our pledges in the past four years as a 
guarantee that once again we shall keep faith and shall not promise more 
than we can perform."54 
In a long article entitled "Stable Government: How to Get It," the 8 
May issue of Daily Notes repeated this argument, claiming that only a Con­
servative majority would give Britain stability and progress. Again alluding 
to Lloyd George's promises, Baldwin repeated his theme in a speech at the 
Albert Hall before setting off on his campaign tour: "While others talk and 
promise we are building roads, roads to prosperity. (Cheers.) If we can 
only all march together . .  . and we pursue no devious routes down the red 
road or lose ourselves down the yellow by-pass (laughter), if we only go 
straight forward and united, we shall reach the goal of greater prosperity 
for our whole people."55 
The references to moderation and achievement in both speeches and 
the "Message to Britain" also characterized Baldwin's election address, the 
party manifesto. Unlike earlier documents, the 1929 manifesto was a com­
pilation of achievements and suggestions for future policy culled from var­
ious departmental papers, not a statement of aims and principles. A 
committee under Lord Chancellor Hailsham hastily assembled the mani­
festo, and central office wrote the introduction and the conclusion. The 
manifesto emphasized the Conservative record and promised to continue 
"the solid work of reconstruction." The Conservatives claimed to have re­
vived the economy and lessened unemployment because, the coal industry 
aside, unemployment was less than in 1924. Unfortunately, however, coal 
miners made up 9 percent of all insured workers, and unemployment in 
their industry was 19 percent. The manifesto offered voters safeguarding 
and derating to spur economic growth, and a collection of practical but 
minor proposals for farmers and fishermen. Among these was a promise 
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to use more domestic beef and flour to feed soldiers stationed in Britain, 
the result of discussions with farmers and the Conservative M.P.s agricul­
tural committee.56 
The manifesto presented a list, compiled by Neville Chamberlain, of 
the government's achievements and promises in social reform. Conser­
vatives claimed credit for more housing, better pensions, and healthier 
children; they vaguely promised a more comprehensive and effective 
health-care system for children and pregnant women. The document also 
appealed to women by claiming that the government had improved living 
standards, lowered taxes, and protected mothers and children. Liberals and 
Labour, all voters were warned, intended to impose heavy taxes that would 
depress living standards and damage the economy. In conclusion the Con­
servatives asked if their record was better than the alternatives: "Socialism 
. .  . or a state of political chaos and uncertainty." In this there was little to 
inspire voters.57 
At no time during the four weeks of campaigning was the 1929 election 
dominated by a single issue. Observers noted the campaign's relative calm­
ness and the apparent lack of voter interest. Party organizers, however, 
pointed out that such impressions were in part due to the preference for 
house-to-house campaigning (especially for women voters) over rowdy 
public meetings. In addition, as the Glasgow Herald noted, this was the 
first election since 1906 not caused by a divisive policy or a crisis. As a 
consequence, small issues and incidents assumed greater importance, al­
though unemployment and peace remained the most commonly discussed 
topics. On both these issues the government was forced onto the defensive, 
despite its intention of exploiting incumbency and offering voters safe, 
stable progress.58 
During the campaign the government was assailed for failing to do 
anything to lessen unemployment. A Liberal campaign song seemed to 
characterize the government's outlook: 
Unemployment's so vast 
That for some years past 
For some cure we've been leisurely groping; 
But the thing's so involved 
That at last we're resolved 
Just to let the thing slide and keeping hoping.59 
Some Conservatives responded by trying to downplay economics. 
Churchill claimed that unemployment was not a dangerous electoral issue 
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since it was largely confined to Labour seats. The Campaign Guide mini­
mized the issue by arguing that the unemployed were not "a stand­
ing army" but scattered individuals who were often unemployed only 
briefly.60 
In general, however, Conservatives emphasized the economic progress 
achieved by the superior character and statesmanship of Baldwin's govern­
ment and by safeguarding and derating. This type of argument dominated 
candidates' election addresses. Some of them used the national election 
address, the "Conservative Sun-Ray Treatment." The cover of this docu­
ment showed the Houses of Parliament overlaid with a photograph of the 
candidate and a rising sun spreading its warm rays across Britain—a pic­
ture of the government's steady and practical work. Other Conservative 
candidates' addresses echoed Baldwin's emphasis on the government's 
achievements and denied charges that the party had no program for em­
ployment and peace. The Skipton candidate, Roy Bird, used phrases from 
Baldwin's speeches like "Performances Not Promises" and "Our First Duty 
Is to Run Straight." Candidates stressed derating and safeguarding as sig­
nificant measures for economic revival, although even tariff reformers, like 
the Chichester candidate, Major Courtauld, downplayed protectionism. 
Local government reform was virtually ignored. Even Macmillan noted 
only that it would relieve Stockton's ratepayers, who were supporting un­
employed shipyard workers. All candidates mentioned such government 
social policies as home construction and pension reform.61 
The peace question was the second campaign issue that was troubling 
to the Conservatives. Because of rising antiwar sentiment, which the oppo­
sition parties mobilized, peace and disarmament figured prominently in 
the 1929 election. Central office advised Conservative candidates and work­
ers to support pragmatic disarmament and pointed to the government's 
cutbacks in military spending and expected early withdrawal from the 
Rhineland. During the campaign Conservative candidates invariably noted 
the Baldwin government's successes, for example, the Locarno Treaties 
and the Kellogg Pact, and its support for reciprocal disarmament. Like 
most Conservative candidates, Sir Edmund Bushby supported disarma­
ment and national security. Other Tory candidates showed their concern 
for peace by emphasizing their interest in cooperation and the League of 
Nations.62 
Because the platform lacked a stirring issue, candidates generally based 
their campaigns on the prime minister's person and his government's re­
cord. The Conservative campaign exploited Baldwin's personal appeal in 
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many ways. His speeches and radio addresses were heard by millions and 
sometimes distributed in printed form. Between 1926 and 1929, central 
office did a brisk trade in photographs, portraits, and Christmas cards that 
featured Baldwin. At the start of the campaign it released a biographical 
leaflet, "Stanley Baldwin: The Man," which claimed that the personality of 
its leader exemplified the party. The leaflet included extracts of Baldwin's 
better known, largely nonpartisan speeches, showing his esteem for "the 
spirit of our people, [and] the ideals that distinguish and unite English-
speaking races." It was hoped that the leaflet would encourage nonaligned 
and new voters to put their trust in a leader who "speaks to them as man 
to man, revealing in homely, straightforward words his deeper feelings and 
his widest visions." The Conservatives also exploited its leader's appeal 
through songs and poems. The most famous of these, "Stanley Boy," was 
first sung to Baldwin by the audience at his Albert Hall meeting on 9 May 
1929.63 The words, written and first performed by the stockbroker and 
Conservative M.P. Waldron Smithers and set to the tune of "Sonny Boy," 
may have lacked artistic merit, but central office distributed ten million 
copies of the songsheet and ten thousand pressings of the record: 
England for the Free; Peace and Faith your Creed 
Stanley Boy! Stanley Boy! 
You're the man for me True in Word and Deed, 
Stanley Boy! Stanley Boy! 
You've no way of knowing, Socialists will hamper, 
But I've a way of showing Lloyd George prove a damper, 
What you mean to me, In our hours of need, 
Stanley Boy! Stanley Boy! 
Chorus: When there are grey skies, 
We don't mind the grey skies, 
You make them Blue, 
Stanley Boy! 
Tho' foes may mistake thee, 
We'll not forsake thee, 
You'll pull us through. 
Stanley Boy! 
For country's sake you've striven, 
As we know your worth. 
Happiness you've given 
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To us right here on Earth. 
Whatever you may say, Sir, 
You will never stray, Sir, 
For we love you so! 
Stanley Boy! 
An "anagram sonnet" in The Times conveyed the people's eternal trust and 
love for the prime minister, "custodian of your country's fate" and "the 
statesman that preserved the State." In his election address, A. M. Williams 
emphasized that Baldwin's "sound judgment and character" would pro­
vide stability.64 
In conjunction with their Baldwin and "Safety First" campaign theme, 
Conservatives launched an attack on the opposition parties. Initially they 
concentrated on the failings of the Liberal Party and its leader. The first 
issue of Daily Notes developed what became a common line of attack. It 
quoted the Liberal M.P. Sir John Simon, who had warned his party in 1928 
not to go into the election "like a cheap jack in a fair and announce we 
have got some patent remedy which will sweep unemployment away." Con­
servatives elaborated on this image to call Lloyd George a "cheap-jack." 
According to them, however, the government had enacted useful social re­
forms, lowered living costs and taxes, and had devised derating and safe­
guarding. Baldwin, "the steady Englishman," was compared to Lloyd 
George, the excitable Welshman, "flip-flopper," and dishonest "balloon 
man" (from a popular poster of Lloyd George as a seller of gas-filled bal­
loons that burst), who was always ready to con voters. The anti-Liberal 
attack gained momentum after 12 May, when the government released a 
white paper detailing the shortcomings of the Liberal plan.65 
Conservative campaigners were also not hesitant to attack the Labour 
Party. Months before the election, Churchill suggested to Baldwin that "ev­
erything should be done to confront the electors with the direct choice 
between Socialism and modern Conservatism." In a 12 February 1929 ad­
dress to the Anti-Socialist and Anti-Communist Union, published as Ring­
ing the Bell, Churchill launched an antisocialist offensive by speaking 
against the "sinister forces" of "a small secret international junta" within 
the Labour Party. In a speech on 8 May, he claimed that Labour supporters 
were working with Bolsheviks in India, Egypt, and China to destroy the 
Empire. Daily Notes soon began publishing information on the League 
against Imperialism, which, it alleged, channeled "Bolshevik propaganda" 
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into the Empire. Because the league included Labour Party members and 
was headed by the ILP leader James Maxton, Daily Notes claimed that La­
bour was tied to the extremists. "Under MacDonald you find Maxton," 
Daily Notes stated, "and under Maxton you find Marx."66 
Conservatives also tried to frighten voters with allegations about the 
Labour program. Both before and during the campaign, Conservatives 
claimed that a Labour victory would lead to the repeal of the 1927 trade 
union reforms and another general strike. They also attacked what 
Churchill termed Labour's "policy of plunder," or reckless taxation and 
spending, exemplified by Poplarism and the proposed 10 percent surtax 
on investments and property. Such policies, Conservatives claimed, would 
undermine British government and morality. In his Albert Hall speech on 
the third anniversary of the General Strike, Baldwin had already sounded 
the antisocialist theme. He reminded voters of Labour's support for the 
capital levy and for nationalization and warned of a possible increase in 
domestic violence if Labour won. He also claimed that Labour lacked the 
qualities of statesmanship and unity necessary for government. The argu­
ment was simple. Labour, according to this interpretation, never "hesitated 
to put Party interests before National interests," and its internal divisions 
were so great that "on many occasions . .  . control over Party policy . .  . 
passed into the hands of extremists."67 
The fact that the Conservative campaign initially focused on Lloyd 
George and the Liberals may have reflected Conservative pique. After 1924 
many Conservatives regarded the Liberal Party as an outdated organization 
that undermined antisocialist efforts. Yet despite their irritation, they ap­
pealed for Liberal support. During the Tavistock by-election in October 
1928, Davidson arranged Liberal and non-party support for the Conserva­
tive fight against socialism and nationalization. Later attempts at this type 
of cooperation failed, however, when a number of Conservatives objected. 
In my constituency sample, only Conservatives in Bradford Central partic­
ipated in an antisocialist pact, even though local election pacts already ex­
isted in Oswestry and Skipton. While some Conservatives attempted to 
appeal to Liberals by obtaining the support of local Liberals and espousing 
Liberal ideals, others bitterly rejected cooperation. Nationally there was 
little antisocialist cooperation. In fact, 1929 saw a record number of candi­
dates. Only twenty-two divisions—mainly in Lancashire, the West Riding, 
and Bristol—lacked Conservative candidates, so it was impossible for Con­
servatives to support Liberals.68 
Although the Conservative Party had difficulty appealing to Liberals 
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in 1929, they were somewhat more successful with women. During the 
campaign there was a lot of discussion about the new woman voter; few 
observers could guess how women would vote. Despite the uncertainty, 
Conservatives tried a number of approaches. The April 1929 budget had 
removed the tea duty and lowered sugar duties. Macmillan flattered Chur­
chill by calling this "a first class canvassing point," as WUO canvassers 
could mention the lower cost of living while casually drinking tea with 
women voters. But derating and the reassessments imbroglio made it ap­
pear to some women that the government was "giving with one hand and 
taking away with the other." The Conservative campaign also emphasized 
the government's passage of the equal suffrage act and its work on behalf 
of mothers and children. Concerned about the effect of the government's 
image as warmongering, campaigners printed a short message from Mrs. 
Baldwin emphasizing the Conservatives' desire for peace and security.69 
In an election installment of "Mrs. Maggs and Betty," Mrs. Maggs ex­
plained that the choice was stability and progress under the Conservatives 
or "the country all turned topsy-turvy" under Labour. While the govern­
ment had protected the nation's interests, she said, Labour would under­
mine the Constitution and leave "British people in China at the mercy of 
Chinese mobs." Furthermore, a Labour government would demand higher 
taxes from ordinary citizens in order to pay for handouts. In one of his 
speeches, Birkenhead showed his extemporaneous wit while presenting the 
chief Conservative appeals to women voters. Responding to a woman at 
a public meeting who complained that the government had done little, 
Birkenhead said, "My dear lady, the light in this hall is so dim as to prevent 
a clear sight of your undoubted charms, so that I am unable to say with 
certainty whether you are a virgin, a widow, or a matron, but in any case 
I will guarantee to prove that you are wrong. If you are a virgin flapper, we 
have given you the vote; if you are a wife, we have increased employment 
and reduced the cost of living; if you are a widow, we have given you a 
pension—and if you are none of these, but are foolish enough to be a tea 
drinker, we have reduced the tax on sugar." During the campaign Conser­
vatives tried to convince women voters that the party cared about them, 
sending out 8.5 million copies of "The Woman To-day and To-morrow" at 
a cost of £17,984/° 
In the second half of the campaign, Conservatives stepped up activity 
as they faced increasing resistance to derating, safeguarding, and several 
new issues. Under Churchill's derating plan, only a portion of the revenue 
lost by local government was made good by the exchequer, so that the 
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policy was susceptible to claims that it was a dole for business paid for by 
the populace. This criticism was particularly effective in places like Brad­
ford, where many voters thought that the government had not done 
enough to help unemployed workers. Liberals were quick to attack de­
rating for subsidizing firms that were either already profitable or morally 
reprehensible (e.g., breweries). The issue became more difficult after a pe­
riodical reassessment that happened to occur during the campaign led to 
higher rates. Although the increases were primarily a result of higher prop­
erty values, they were seen as part of derating. This cost the Conservatives 
support, especially among middle-class voters. Even in rural areas, where 
derating benefited farmers, the policy was vulnerable because it benefited 
large property owners more than tenant farmers. This was embarrassing 
for Conservative candidates like A. M. Williams and C. M. Barclay-Harvey, 
who were major landowners in their constituencies. Candidates in rural 
seats were already devoting a great deal of effort to defending the govern­
ment record; derating hardly helped them.71 
In the later stages of the campaign, protection became a significant 
issue despite Baldwin's earlier efforts to avoid it. Leaders of the National 
Farmers Union demanded agricultural safeguarding, but Conservative 
leaders firmly rejected it on the grounds that safeguarding would not lead 
to greater production at home and lower costs. The 1929 Campaign Guide 
also made it clear that the party was committed to Baldwin's 1924 pledge 
not to adopt a system of import tariffs. Meanwhile, Conservatives were 
discussing the possibility of modifying the safeguarding procedure to facil­
itate wider application, and farmers, like the rest of the population, faced 
the possibility of higher prices if safeguarding was extended to a broad 
range of manufactured goods. The Liberals played upon fears that safe­
guarding was the beginning of protection and high prices. 
So long as a Tory is left to strive, 
Protection shall always be kept alive, 
For British traders we [Tories] fear the worst, 
If they are not coddled, and bribed, and nursed; 
But we won't tax foodstuffs—not just at first.72 
Some Conservatives seemed to grasp safeguarding as, at the very least, 
a means of awakening the slumbering electorate. They tried to argue that 
safeguarding meant more jobs or, as an NUA Labour Committee leaflet 
stated, "safeguarding employment." When possible, campaigners used spe­
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cific examples to prove the merits of safeguarding. In Stockton, the success­
ful Teesside operation of Imperial Chemical Industries was credited to 
safeguarding, and Benjamin Talbot, head of Teesside iron and steel con­
cerns and a Macmillan supporter, promised to open a plate mill if iron and 
steel was safeguarded. The West Riding appeared to have a great deal at 
stake in safeguarding. During the campaign, woollen workers staged walk­
outs over proposed wage cuts, and it was widely rumored that the woollen 
trade's request for safeguarding had been approved by the board of trade. 
Yorkshire Conservatives believed that safeguarding woollens would win the 
West Riding for the party. Contrary to their hopes, however, Baldwin did 
not mention safeguarding when he visited Bradford on 22 May, and the 
board of trade report was not published until after the election.73 
In working-class areas like Camlachie and Bradford, there were 
"storms" of questions and complaints against the "injustices" of the gov-
ernment's social policies. Although half a million people benefited from 
the Pensions Act, central office believed that the exclusion of sixty thou­
sand people from the plan for technical reasons hurt the party in some 
seats. Conservative candidates in the cities were also attacked for the gov-
ernment's reduction of housing subsidies and milk grants. And Conserva­
tives were unable to make use of the union issue until 17 May, when 
MacDonald vowed to repeal the "insulting and unjust" Trade Disputes and 
Trade Unions Act.74 
Some issues were peculiar to certain constituencies. Conservatives had 
difficulties in areas like North Cornwall and Kincardine, where fishing was 
important. Fishermen had been promised assistance in 1924, but instead 
continued to suffer from foreign competition and high costs. Safeguarding 
and derating were unhelpful to them, although the provision of national 
insurance to fishermen was appreciated. In North Cornwall voters were 
concerned about whether Cornwall would benefit from Lloyd George's 
road construction plan. Toward the end of the campaign, Conservatives 
attacked the Liberals for neglecting Cornwall, and A. M. Williams re­
printed the map from We Can Conquer Unemployment, which showed no 
road construction planned for Cornwall. Religious schools were an impor­
tant issue in areas with large Catholic populations, such as Liverpool and 
Glasgow. The Conservative Party was committed to religious education, 
and some of its candidates explicitly supported religious schools. As a re­
sult, some Catholic leaders advised their largely working-class flock to vote 
Conservative. Near the end of the campaign, Lewis Shedden, secretary 
of the SUA Western Division, quietly published and distributed a leaflet 
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containing excerpts from a statement by Cardinal Bourne, the Archbishop 
of Westminster, that criticized Labour for promoting class antagonisms 
and denying the rights of private property.75 
Conservatives became increasingly concerned that their platform was 
being labeled "standstillism." Before the election Lord Beaverbrook had 
warned of this possibility, especially since Baldwin "frittered away his heri­
tage . .  . and sits down in the garden with his arms folded and talks about 
the beauty of it while the weeds grow all about him." Some Conservatives 
tried to dispel the complacency implied by the "Safety First" theme. Speak­
ing on behalf of Macmillan, Lord Percy tried to invoke a heroic spirit: "We 
are prepared to use every means; public credit, private enterprise, safe­
guarding, derating, and to get agreement between all sections of the coun­
try, and to base our policy on that agreement, representing all that is best 
in the policies of all the prewar Parties. That is our policy, that is our prin­
ciple, and that is mainly why I ask you to back up a policy above all of 
national union." Baldwin himself tried to allay criticisms of "Safety First" 
during a 20 May speech at Blackpool. He explained that the campaign 
theme did not mean "smug self-satisfaction" but the opposite of "Rashness 
First." Conservative speakers and literature promulgated this "clarifica­
tion," but with limited success. Lloyd George ended his campaign with a 
speech claiming, "Members of the Tory Party have been standing with their 
hands in their pockets, and in ours, looking on instead of trying their best 
to extricate the poor [unemployed] people."76 
The Conservative campaign closed with a 27 May letter from the prime 
minister, sent to all voters, in which he appealed to their sense of national 
unity. Baldwin followed the letter with a tour of the Manchester area on 
29 May. After speaking to more than a hundred thousand appreciative lis­
teners at ten meetings, he delivered his second radio address from the 
BBC's Manchester studio. In his homely but effective manner he talked of 
his yearning for "peace and cooperation" after the turmoil of war, strikes, 
and economic disruption. He again spoke of each elector's duty to vote 
for the leader "you would prefer to see forming a Government . .  . [and] 
hold [ing] the responsibility for your country and for the . .  . Empire." He 
closed the address by saying, "You trusted me before; I ask you to trust 
me again." Once again the prime minister tried, as he had throughout the 
campaign, to exploit his reputation as "Straight, Steady & Sure."77 
Voters went to the polls on 30 May with nearly all observers unable to 
predict the outcome. The great expansion in the electorate and the sedate 
pace of the campaign made it difficult to gauge opinion, particularly in the 
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absence of any decisive issue. A correspondent from The Times concluded, 
"No party's campaign has furnished compelling progress measured against 
its rivals." Central office nevertheless estimated that the Conservatives 
would suffer a net loss of approximately sixty seats, while retaining a work­
ing majority of fifty to sixty. Baldwin was impressed by his favorable recep­
tion around the country and, confident of the outcome, he was already 
considering the composition of his next Cabinet. Those few, like Beatrice 
Webb and Lord Beaverbrook, who predicted a Conservative defeat, seemed 
unduly pessimistic. Several ministers and central office officials were con­
fident enough to place substantial bets on a Conservative majority.78 
It was thus with shock that Conservatives met the results on 31 May. 
Thomas Jones describes the rising disbelief in the small group that had 
gathered in the early morning at Downing Street. As the situation 
worsened, Churchill, never one to accept defeat easily, became quite angry 
and, according to Jones, "often [went] to glare at the [teletype] machine 
himself, hunching his shoulders, bowing his head like a bull about to 
charge." By 3:30 in the morning, Labour had amassed 117 victories to the 
Conservatives' yy, and already Steel-Maitland, the minister for labor, had 
been defeated. When the results were all in, the Labour Party lacked an 
overall majority, but it had won the election and become the largest party 
in the House of Commons. Labour built on its continued growth since 
1918, winning 37 percent of the national popular vote and 287 seats. The 
Conservative Party's popular vote of 38 percent was slightly higher than 
Labour's, but, with only 260 seats, the Conservatives had a smaller parlia­
mentary contingent. Despite winning more than 23 percent of the popular 
vote, the Liberals collected only 59 seats.79 
Why Did the Conservatives Lose? 
Several factors help to explain the Conservative Party's defeat in 1929. First, 
the Conservatives contested a record number of constituencies and faced 
a record number of opponents. Altogether there were 1,730 candidates in 
1929 compared to 1400 plus in each of the three elections between 1922 and 
1924. All but four of the 590 Conservative candidates who stood in 1929 
were opposed; in most cases they faced two candidates. This explains in 
part why the average poll for opposed Conservative candidates was 39.4 
percent, the lowest in a twentieth-century election, although slightly higher 
than the Labour candidates' average of 39.3 percent. Second, analysis shows 
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that Conservative success varied greatly from region to region. In many 
cases these variations did not match those of the 1923 election, when Con­
servatives won 258 seats, almost the same number as in 1929. In 1923 the 
south, the core of Conservative support, was jeopardized by Liberal gains, 
but in 1929 Conservative losses were largely in urban and mining districts, 
particularly in the north of England, where Labour took more than seventy 
seats from the Conservatives. In every major city except Liverpool, the 
Conservatives failed to win a majority of constituencies. Nationally La-
bour's net gain over the Conservatives was about 120 seats; the Liberal Par-
ty's was only fourteen seats, mostly in rural and traditionally Liberal 
80 areas.
While the decline in its representation was nearly 37 percent, and many 
candidates were defeated in some areas, the Conservative Party's results 
were fairly good in southeast England, and respectable in southwest En­
gland and the North Yorkshire and Cumbria regions. The Conservatives 
remained strong in the southeast, where they returned 100 M.P.s from 167 
divisions. The worst results were in London, where the Conservative dele­
gation was reduced from 39 to 24. This was the lowest number of Conser­
vatives elected from London in the five interwar elections. For the first 
time Labour won a majority of the sixty-two London divisions, taking east 
London as well as seats in Islington, Wandsworth, and Hammersmith. In 
the rest of the southeast the Conservative Party won 76 of 105 seats, less 
than the 1924 record (97) but better than the 1923 results (68). The large 
middle-class and suburban vote in the southeast made the Liberal Party a 
more serious threat in this part of the country. In three-way contests at 
Wood Green and Clapham, Liberal candidates won approximately 28 per­
cent of the vote. In both cases the incumbent Conservative retained his 
seat on a minority poll, with Labour and Liberal candidates splitting the 
opposition. Against a single Liberal opponent, the Conservative M.P. for 
Chichester, J. S. Courtauld, actually increased his poll slightly. Although 
the Conservatives kept many seats in the southeast, they may have lost 
voters through abstentions, since turnout in the three seats included in my 
sample declined more (from 72.7 percent in 1924 to 68.4 percent in 1929) 
than the national average (77.4 and 76.6 percent, respectively).81 
In the southwest and North Yorkshire/Cumbria regions of England the 
Conservatives suffered a higher rate of loss than in the southeast, but still 
less than the national average. In southwest England the party retained a 
majority of the 43 seats, although dropping from 39 to 26 as a result of 
Labour's gains in Cardiff and Plymouth and of the Liberal sweep of Corn­
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wall. A. M. Williams was unable to hold North Cornwall. (Here Liberal 
revival produced an 86 percent voter turnout, compared to 77 percent in 
1924.) Conservative representation in the North Yorkshire and Cumbria 
region fell from 19 to 13 of the 21 divisions. The Liberals failed to score any 
wins, and Labour's victories were confined to mining seats and a few cities 
like York, whose M.P., Sir John Marriott, never again returned to Parlia­
ment. Skipton's energetic Liberals won more than 29 percent of the vote 
for Councillor Woffenden, but he placed third in a three-way contest. 
In other regions of Britain, the Conservative Party suffered a major 
setback in 1929. Conservative representation in the West Midlands declined 
from 33 to 20, slightly more than the national average. The losses were 
particularly notable in the formerly Unionist seats of metropolitan Bir­
mingham, which for the first time returned a large number of Labour 
M.P.s. Outside the metropolitan area, many Conservatives held their seats. 
In place of William Bridgeman, B. E. Parker Leighton, a local landowner, 
coal owner, and disabled war veteran, defeated two opponents to win Os­
westry for the Conservatives with a respectable 47 percent of the vote. In 
the industrial regions of Lancastria and the Mid-North, Conservative rep­
resentation declined by almost half, from 64 to 34. The Conservatives failed 
to win any seats in the borough of Bradford, where a record turnout bene­
fited Labour. In Bradford Central the moderate Conservative M.P. An­
thony Gadie was unable to prevent the former Labour M.P. William Leach 
from regaining his seat with 59 percent of the vote. The Liberal candidate 
in Wirral benefitted from his party's recovery, taking second with nearly 31 
percent of the vote in a three-way contest. The Conservative M.P. John 
Grace retained Wirral, but with only about 48 percent of the vote. In 
nearby Birkenhead, the Conservative M.P. was defeated by a Liberal, but 
in heavily working-class Lancastria, the Conservative Party was decimated 
by Labour, which won its first regional majority with 43 of the 80 seats. 
In East Anglia, the eastern Midlands, and northeast England the Con­
servatives did worse than the national average. They suffered many defeats 
in East Anglia, where their delegation in the nineteen divisions dropped 
from seventeen to nine. Most of the damage was caused by Liberals who 
revived the radical tradition and tapped farmers' resentments. Liberals 
took five Conservative seats and won a total of seven divisions in the re­
gion. In the eastern Midlands and northeast England, Conservative repre­
sentation in the 66 seats (formerly 42) fell to a record low of 19. With the 
Liberal Party managing to elect only four M.P.s in the two regions, Labour 
took control of the East Midlands and Northeast England by winning 43 
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seats. In Stockton, Macmillan lost his seat. In the three-way contest he 
polled slightly more than 36 percent, but some Liberal voters apparently 
switched to the Labour candidate, who won with 41 percent. The result 
was symptomatic of an unexpectedly poor showing for Conservatives in 
the region. 
In the 71 Scottish divisions, Unionist representation declined from 36 
to 20. In Strathclyde's 36 seats there were few strong Liberal candidates, 
but they may have siphoned off enough votes to push the Unionists back 
to their pre-1924 position of holding only eight constituencies. Despite the 
larger electorate, the Unionist vote in half of Glasgow's divisions actually 
declined in 1929, and Labour was able to regain the two Glasgow constitu­
encies it had lost in 1924.82 In Camlachie the entry of a Scottish Nationalist 
candidate created excitement, but it did not enable James Stevenson to 
defeat the ILP M.P., the Rev. Campbell Stephen. In the rest of Scotland 
the Unionists fared somewhat better, although the Liberals defeated a few 
Unionists in northeast Scotland, including the M.P. for Kincardine and 
West Aberdeenshire, C. M. Barclay-Harvey. Like the rest of northeast Scot­
land, Kincardine was traditionally Liberal, but it had elected Barclay-
Harvey in 1923 and 1924. In 1929, however, Barclay-Harvey lost by 668 votes 
to James Scott, a lawyer and champion of the crofters. Of the 39 Scottish 
divisions outside Strathclyde, Labour won seventeen (mainly in the indus­
trial areas near Strathclyde), Unionists twelve, and Liberals ten. 
The worst election results for the Conservative Party were in Wales, 
where the Conservative delegation fell from nine to one, leaving the Con­
servatives in control only of the Tory redoubt of Monmouth. This abysmal 
showing occurred despite the fact that the Conservatives contested every 
seat. The number of Conservative candidates increased from seventeen to 
thirty-five, but the party's share of the vote went from 28 to 22 percent. A 
third of the Conservative candidates forfeited their deposits after failing to 
poll the minimum 12.5 percent of the vote. The high unemployment in 
Wales created a great deal of voter interest, as demonstrated in a turnout 
in excess of 82 percent. Welsh voters did not want a Conservative govern­
ment that seemed to offer very little, particularly since the Welsh identified 
Conservatism with English outsiders.83 This was an important factor in 
Wrexham, where the Conservative candidate, the Englishman Sir Edmund 
Bushby, finished at the bottom of the poll, with 22.1 percent to the Liberal's 
31.5 percent and the Labour candidate's 46.4 percent. The result was that 
the former Labour M.P. Robert Richards retook the seat from the Liberal 
incumbent, C. P. Williams. 
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Once it was clear that the government had been defeated, there was 
a flood of contradictory analyses and recriminations from Conservative 
newspapers, leaders and officials, and rank-and-file party members. 
Among the explanations offered for the defeat, the most common were the 
intervention of Liberal candidates, the unreasonable hostility of news­
papers, and the flapper vote. The editor of The Times claimed that the 
election results were less a result of Labour popularity than of Liberal 
"maddogging." According to this interpretation, Liberal candidates' inter­
vention in three-way contests gave Labour "at least 80" seats on minority 
polls. The Conservative principal agent, Robert Topping, agreed that Lib­
eral intervention was responsible for some Conservative losses to Labour, 
but he put the number at about forty. Certainly Macmillan, among others, 
blamed his defeat on Liberals who abandoned him and allowed Labour to 
win a minority victory. Some critics of the party leaders agreed about the 
Liberals' role, but blamed "'stiff-necked, rubber-bottomed fools' in . .  . 
Central Office" for alienating them in the first place.84 
Although it is true that the Conservatives were not so successful in 
attracting Liberal voters as in 1924, the Liberal Party did not cause the 
Conservative defeat. In its survey of local Conservatives after the election, 
the NUCUA Executive found that Liberal intervention was considered sec­
ondary. A careful study of the Stockton results, for instance, shows that 
Liberal and Conservative candidates each increased their poll by about 
fourteen hundred votes—but the Labour candidate added seven thousand 
to his. Even if every Liberal vote had gone to Macmillan, he would still 
have been defeated by four thousand votes. In Bradford, where the same 
parties fought each of the four seats in 1924 and 1929, the pattern was simi­
lar. Between 1924 and 1929 the average poll of Conservative candidates in 
Bradford declined from 41 to 34 percent, but the Liberal vote also dropped 
from about 35 to 32 percent as Labour swept the city. Among the six divi­
sions in my sample (Oswestry, Skipton, Stockton, Wood Green, Bradford 
Central, and Kincardine) in which the same parties ran candidates in 1924 
and 1929, the Conservative vote fell from 51 to 42 percent. In those same 
seats, the Liberal vote rose from 28 to nearly 33 percent, and the Labour 
vote increased from 30 to 35 percent. This small sample suggests that the 
decline in Conservative support benefited both the Liberals and Labour. 
Butler found that, in seats with three-way contests in both 1924 and 1929, 
the average Conservative vote fell 9.1 percent, increasing the average poll 
for Labour and Liberal candidates to 3.5 percent and 5.6 percent, respec­
tively. The struggle between Labour and the Liberal Party in 1929, did, how­
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ever, give the Conservatives two or three dozen victories in rural, usually 
Liberal, seats. Triangular contests had a hand in Conservative losses, but 
the defeat was also due to Labour's popularity and to voter dissatisfaction 
with the government.85 
One complaint raised by Conservatives after their defeat was that 
newspapers did not support the Conservative campaign. It was felt that 
editors of the major Conservative dailies, except the Daily Telegraph, had 
neglected their duty. The lack of support and even hostility of Conservative 
newspapers, compounded with the ceaseless attacks of opposition newspa­
pers, it was claimed, pushed the public, especially new electors, into voting 
against the Conservatives. In the NUCUA questionnaire of Conservative 
associations, more than half the 315 respondents mentioned the hostility 
of the press as a major factor in the Conservative Party's defeat. In North 
Cornwall the association was so angered by press coverage that it later tried 
to buy a regional newspaper.86 It is true that the Conservatives did not 
receive the ringing endorsements that they had in 1924, but then their cam­
paign was not one to excite journalists, editors, or publishers. 
The NUCUA Executive also found that many Conservatives blamed 
the new female voters, particularly young women. This was a popular ex­
planation, since the stagnant Conservative poll allowed people to believe 
that the new electors had voted en masse for the opposition. A Stockton 
newspaper, for instance, surmised that the 7,013 additional votes polled by 
the local Labour candidate meant that 7,000 of the 10,000 new female elec­
tors had voted Labour. One of the most vehement attacks on "the flapper 
vote" was by Garvin, who now strongly criticized the Baldwin government 
for passing the reform act of 1928. In a 16 June editorial in The Observer, 
Garvin attacked the Conservative leaders who had "biassed the electoral 
and constitutional system of the country against Conservatism, not tempo­
rarily but permanently. That is why we say that 1929 marks a new epoch 
like 1832. Anyone tempted to doubt this conclusion has only got to look at 
the thing in another way. The older pre-war voters, full of traditional ideas 
and reserves, are dying off the electoral register every day. And every day 
more and more of the advanced younger people are coming on."87 This 
sort of argument is easy to debunk. Many young men had always had the 
vote and millions of women were enfranchised in 1918—yet the Conserva­
tives had not suffered. 
The WUO Administrator, Marjorie Maxse, dismissed the attacks on 
women voters, and, at least in private, experienced Conservative officials 
agreed that women were not a decisive factor in the election outcome. In 
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Table 2 
1924 and 1929 Conservative Vote in Sample Constituencies with 
Greater and Less than Average Increases in Women Voters after 1928 
Conservative Vote (%) 
1924 1929 
Greater than average increase 53.5 44.6 
Less than average increase 54.4 45.0 
the estimation of P. J. Blair, political secretary to the Scottish whips' office, 
the new women's vote "accentuated the 'Labour' vote in strongly 'Labour' 
areas, although it is not apparent that a loss of any seats is due to the new 
women's franchise." Topping agreed after comparing the results in divi­
sions with greater and less than average increases in electorates (on the 
assumption that this was a function of more or fewer numbers of new 
women voters). He concluded that Conservative candidates in seats with a 
greater than average increase in the electorate fared better than their col­
leagues, and Labour was more successful in those divisions where there 
were fewer new voters. If the eleven seats in my sample (no Tory contested 
Wrexham in 1924) are divided into those with higher and lower than aver­
age increases in female electorates, the fall in the Conservative vote is 
slightly less in seats with greater increases in women voters. This is not 
conclusive, but it tends to disprove claims that women were responsible 
for the Conservative defeat in 1929.88 
The problem with explanations for the Conservative defeat is that 
losses are blamed on some outside force—the Liberals, the press, the 
"flappers"—rather than working through the reasons voters rejected the 
Conservative Party. Most Conservatives realized that the government's pol­
icies, its program, and its approach to the campaign undermined its 
chances in the 1929 election. After the election, the "wets" or so-called 
YMCA wing of the party argued that Baldwin and his government lost 
because they had not pursued a more progressive program. Other gener­
ally more influential Conservatives held that the party was defeated be­
cause it had not adhered to distinctively Conservative causes—low income 
taxes, Lords reform, and tariffs. In particular, although the demand for 
tariffs was in fact limited, proponents regarded tariffs as the Conservative 
Party's only "positive policy." In July a majority of the NUCUA council 
passed a resolution in favor of "Safeguarding of all the principal trades of 
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the country, particularly of Iron and Steel." The economic depression that 
began in autumn 1929 further encouraged disaffected Conservatives to 
support the tariff campaign of Rothermere and Beaverbrook, which threat­
ened to divide the party and destroy Baldwin. Tariff reformers' beliefs to 
the contrary, however, the Conservative Party's experiences in 1906 and 
1923 showed that protectionism had disastrous electoral consequences.89 
The Conservative Party was defeated in 1929 because it relied on what 
the Glasgow Herald called a "Ministerial" campaign, rather than presenting 
a substantial program. As Amery had predicted in late 1924, the govern­
ment was so comfortably immersed in administrative matters that it was 
unable or unwilling to fight an election, and Baldwin was incapable of 
pushing the party toward it. The few policies presented to voters, especially 
derating, alienated more than they attracted. Derating and local govern­
ment reform confused and sometimes irritated electors who associated 
them with higher assessments. Farm workers and most ratepayers saw 
farmers and businessmen receiving tax cuts, while they had to pay more, 
and the NUCUA questionnaire found that most supporters considered de­
rating a major cause of defeat. The Conservatives simply did not present 
an attractive program as they had in 1924.90 
Most of the government's other pledges were too vague to have much 
impact during the election, so candidates and voters focused on the gov-
ernment's record. Unfortunately, its achievements received as much criti­
cism as praise. The public was as concerned about the lack of pensions for 
some people as it was pleased about the benefits for many more, as irritated 
with high income taxes as happy with the end of the tea duty. As Neville 
Chamberlain wrote, "Every grievance has been exploited to point to this 
moral—people who have not got pensions, people who have their assess­
ments raised, people who could not get a municipal house, people whose 
wages were low or who were unemployed or were excluded from benefit, 
etc., etc.—all these were told this is what you must expect as long as you 
have a capitalist Government. And though they hardly expect the millen­
nium, they have said well let us give these fellows a chance. Something is 
wrong, the present Govt haven't put it right, the other side say they would 
have righted it, let us see if they cant [sic] do something for us."91 Voters, 
many of whom were suffering from the country's economic difficulties, 
thought that the Conservative Party had not done enough for them. In 
response the Conservatives tried to appeal for support based on its ability 
to provide stable government at home and peace abroad. Given, however, 
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the government's failure to solve economic problems and secure interna­
tional peace, and the quiescence of domestic threats, many voters were not 
attracted to promises of "Safety First" that really seemed to mean more 
suffering, insecurity, and uncertainty. The Conservative promise to con­
tinue to provide competent and experienced leadership failed to draw vot­
ers in 1929. 
Because the Conservatives campaigned on the government's record 
more than on an attractive policy platform, they gave full rein to what 
contemporaries termed the "pendulum swing." A contributor to the Octo­
ber 1929 issue of the Conservative Agents' Journal presented a cogent expla­
nation. The Conservative defeat, he argued, was a by-product of its 1924 
victory. The government concentrated on fulfilling election pledges and 
providing stable government, and then asked voters in 1929 if they were 
happy with the results. Electors responded with a resounding negative, in 
the process demonstrating a key principle of modern elections: 
A democracy never elects a Government, it always rejects 
one. The verdict of the people [in 1924] was unques­
tionably against the Socialists, with a rider condemning 
the Liberals who had put them in office. It was pro-
Conservative only in . .  . that the Conservatives were the 
trusted enemies of Socialism.... 
The upshot was a Conservative triumph which sur­
prised everybody.... There was nothing for the Conserva­
tive Government to do but to go ahead . .  . with its 
programme, which was long enough and formidable 
enough to occupy every moment of its t ime. . .  . [Mean­
while] the country was asking, "Why doesn't the Govern­
ment do something?" . .  . 
As early as 1927 one could perceive that, if things pro­
ceeded according to plan, the Conservatives would stagger 
to the polls under the load of their good deeds, while the 
Opposition would have the benefit of the accumulated dis­
content, resentment and boredom of the electorate.92 
The claim that "a democracy always rejects" a government is untrue, but 
the author was right to regard an election as a referendum on a govern-
ment's performance. 
The only way the party might have escaped defeat was for its leaders 
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to have devised a simple and far-reaching program. In his attack on the 
government, Garvin criticized Conservative leaders for failing to provide a 
good program until the last moment, when they 
adopted a meritorious and big policy of reforming local 
taxation and Local Government. They called it by the 
hopeless name of "Derating." Then they failed to realise 
that by itself it was not enough . .  . for the social and eco­
nomic requirements of the country. 
MR. LLOYD GEORGE forced Unemployment into 
the centre of politics—the question never really faced by 
Ministers, whether spending £50,000,000 for nothing [un­
employment insurance] was the best thing we could do. 
They left a wide impression that it was the best thing they 
could do. 
They denied that Unemployment was very important 
at all. They said MR. LLOYD GEORGE'S proposals were a 
stunt. It was untrue.. . . 
MR. BALDWIN'S real programme was "moi." In the 
name of "performance against promise"—a threadbare tag 
in politics—he asked, in effect, for a blank cheque 
whereon he might write as much or as little as he pleased. 
It never is done that way.93 
Given the worries about the economy and peace, "Safety First" meant more 
of the same, but voting Labour (or Liberal), no longer a risky experiment, 
at least gave some hope for change. 
Five days after the government was replaced on 5 June, the defeated 
Wakefield M.P., Geoffrey Ellis, chairman of the Yorkshire provincial divi­
sion and a key figure in the NUCUA Executive, wrote to Baldwin. He urged 
the party leader to recognize that the election verdict was not a conse­
quence of flippancy or boredom. Unemployment, underemployment, and 
the threat of wage reductions, Ellis wrote, "left the people almost in de­
spair. Without, as a rule, expressing any bitter feeling, they just turned 
quietly & voted for the only possible alternative Govt. Especially as the 
promises [by Labour] of high minimum wages & general employment 
were so profuse & general."94 The public, bombarded with posters of Bald­
win and a "Why Change?" slogan, voted in favor of change, any kind of 
change. 
In the postelection rush to establish blame for the defeat, critics first 
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attacked central office and its "Safety First" campaign, then implicated the 
Conservative leadership, and finally turned on Baldwin. Disgruntled Con­
servatives like Beaverbrook, who had long criticized Baldwin's failings as a 
leader, believed that the election confirmed their opinions. Baldwin's 
friend and former colleague, William Bridgeman, admitted to "a small crit­
icism" of the former prime minister, who tended to be "too sanguine that 
things will come right without his having to take a strong line." Privately 
Neville Chamberlain also criticized Baldwin for having "no power of rapid 
decision and consequently no initiative." Some critics within the party, es­
pecially those who were never reconciled to Baldwin's leadership, began to 
attack the former prime minister. On 1 June 1929 Headlam, the defeated 
M.P. for Barnard Castle, was already condemning "Mr. B's stupidity." As a 
result of the election and of his shortcomings as an opposition leader, Bald­
win faced a revolt that ended Davidson's tenure as party chairman and 
nearly brought down Baldwin himself before it collapsed in 1931.95 
It is important, however, to remember the difficulties confronting 
Conservative leaders in the 1920s and the limited nature of the Conserva­
tive defeat in 1929. Although he overstates the case, Williamson is right to 
point out that contemporary critics were too harsh in their condemnation 
of Baldwin and his performance in the election.96 In many cases they be­
lieved that he should have pursued such ultraconservative policies as in­
come tax cuts and Lords reform. But these would have created greater 
difficulties, because they were never popular with the mass of electors. A 
Conservative Party that adopted such measures was liable to lose votes by 
becoming associated with the selfishly rich or privileged classes. Other crit­
ics, Beaverbrook, Garvin, and Amery among them, wanted what Garvin 
called an "Employment and Empire" program—duties and imperial pref­
erence. Tariff reform generated some popular support and had an idealistic 
element, but it alienated consumers, especially the middle-class and subur­
ban voters on whom the Conservative Party depended. By avoiding tariffs, 
Baldwin retained many middle-class seats and avoided a repetition of the 
1923 disaster. 
In 1929 the Conservatives were not successful in appealing to voters 
who could choose between three viable parties, but conditions soon 
changed dramatically, as Labour's victory was tenuous. Labour's popular 
vote was less than the Conservatives', and more than two-fifths of Labour's 
287 seats were minority victories in three-way contests. A small swing away 
from Labour could bring the Conservatives a working majority in the next 
election. This was especially true once the Liberal Party resumed its descent 
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into obsolescence. After the burst of activity inspired by Lloyd George (and 
his money), the Liberals ceased to present a national challenge to the other 
parties in the 1930s. Conservative leaders were then able to present their 
party as the only effective antisocialist party. At the same time the growing 
influence of Neville Chamberlain and his newly created Conservative Re­
search Department ensured that the Conservative Party benefited from the 
constant study and formulation of future policy. In his recent study of the 
1931 election, Thorpe argues that by mid-1931 the Conservatives "were on 
course for a victory at least as conclusive as that of 1924." Conservative 
governments, however, particularly ones led by Baldwin, remained vulner­
able to circumstances like those of 1929. That election demonstrated that 
the success of the innovative Conservative organization depended in part 
on the party's positioning itself as the safe yet progressive option.97 
Conclusion

In May 1997, after a record eighteen years' continuous Conserva­
tive government, the Labour Party scored its greatest electoral triumph to 
date. This event has raised new questions about British politics, past and 
future. In part the questions have involved a revived interest in the fate of 
the Conservative Party. The Tories dominated politics for so long only to 
lose an election while the country experienced peace, stability, and eco­
nomic growth, conditions that should have guaranteed a Conservative tri­
umph. As one commentator wrote, "What, pray God, are the voters trying 
to tell their leaders?"l 
These recent developments also compel the investigator to consider 
the party's history in the twentieth century. How does this history help us 
to interpret the significance of the recent turn of events? Some pundits see 
in the election only the regular swing of the political pendulum. Voters, 
tired of the government and, possibly, politics in general, reject incumbent 
M.P.s and parties. Other observers emphasize the resurgence of the Labour 
Party under Tony Blair. Undoubtedly both of these explanations help us to 
understand the last election, and similar interpretations can be applied to 
earlier episodes in Conservative history. In a new book, A History of Con­
servative Politics, 1900-1996 (1996), John Charmley argues that the Conser­
vatives have sought power and, as the party of the status quo, reaped the 
reward of their divided and at times incompetent opposition.2 But is there 
more to the party's history of success punctuated by occasional failures? 
Moreover, how have Conservatives responded to social, cultural, political, 
and international changes in the twentieth century? What attitudes, prin­
ciples, or policies have guided party members? Why, despite their recent 
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defeat, have they usually managed to remain the strongest party in Britain? 
When they were unsuccessful, what were the reasons? 
The Conservative Party established itself as the dominant twentieth-
century party during the 1920s by adapting to the era of mass politics after 
the First World War. During the period between the two world wars, Brit­
ain changed, in the words of the historian and civil servant Max Beloff, 
"from a society based upon distinctions largely of property to a mass soci­
ety in which privilege could fight at best only a rearguard action."3 The 
years from 1918 to 1929 witnessed the final episodes of a century-long pro­
cess of electoral reform that culminated in the Representation of the People 
Acts of 1918 and 1928, establishing universal adult suffrage in Britain. The 
Conservative Party played a largely reluctant role in the passage of the first 
measure, which transferred ultimate political power to the mass of citizens, 
and were also not eager to pass the second, which was more or less man­
dated by the remaining inequities against women. In the course of a de­
cade, the two reform acts increased the number of voters from eight to 
twenty-nine million. 
As they faced the expansion of the electorate and the introduction of 
women into the political arena, the Conservatives also confronted other 
associated developments. Among the most important were the growth of 
powerful trade unions, the increased interest in socialist thought, and the 
rise of the Labour Party. In addition, the aftermath of the Great War 
brought economic dislocation, long-term unemployment, and an uproot­
ing of established politics and culture. These developments followed the 
dramatic constitutional crises of Edwardian Britain—Irish Home Rule and 
women's suffrage. Ultimately, however, all of these elements were linked to 
a central concern, the amorphous electorate that now controlled Britain's 
political system. This predicament led at least some Conservatives to think, 
as Headlam wrote in his diary, "Democracy is hurrying to its ruin."4 Even 
Conservatives who were more optimistic about British politics had serious 
misgivings about the future of their country and their party. In a 1927 letter 
to Lord Irwin, Baldwin, who piloted the Conservative Party and the coun­
try through the tumultuous interwar decades, expressed his deep concern: 
"Democracy has arrived at a gallop in England, and I fear all the time that 
it is a race for life."5 
With so much uncertainty in a political system that depended on a 
volatile mass electorate and three competing parties, how would the party 
survive? In 1924 the progressive Conservative M.P. Noel Skelton character­
ized the difference between prewar and interwar politics. Previously party 
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battles were, he wrote, "fought on a narrow front and by small armies of 
professionals, whose passage through the life of the nation affected it 
hardly more than a charabanc disturbs the countryside to-day—some va­
pour and much noise, a rut left in the highway, a film of dust on the hedge­
row. But [now] Socialism fights on the broadest of fronts, and this breadth 
of front must dominate the strategy and tactics of the new era; for envelop­
ment and the crushing defeat... form the danger against which Conserva­
tism must guard in the great battles ahead."6 For interwar Conservatives 
there was no possibility of returning to a romanticized Edwardian period 
(during which, in any case, they had suffered some of their greatest fail­
ures). In an October 1918 letter to Balfour, Bonar Law, the leader of the 
Unionist Party, wrote, "I am perfectly certain, indeed I do not think any 
one can doubt this, that our Party on the old lines will never have any 
future again in this country."7 Yet the Conservative Party not only survived 
after 1918; according to the most important indicator—elections—it pros­
pered. Except for a two-year period from 1929 to 1931, the Conservatives 
were always the largest party, and they were the governing party for more 
than eighteen of the twenty-one years between the wars. 
As I have shown, one of the most important reasons for the party's 
success was the innovative reorganization instituted by Conservative lead­
ers. This involved both more intensive propaganda efforts to shape the 
voting decisions of tens of millions of voters and a new commitment to 
the education of the citizen voters who set the course of politics in Britain. 
Only then, Baldwin told the Cambridge University Conservative Associa­
tion, would voters, particularly the new women voters, not "jump at any 
form of remedy that can be put before them by the smooth and clever 
tongues of those who propagate heresies in our country."8 
At the very core of the Conservative Party's efforts was the develop­
ment of mass organizations for women, young people, and wage earners. 
By combining a judicious mixture of political, social, and educational ac­
tivities, these groups, particularly the Women's Unionist Organisation 
(WUO) and the Junior Imperial League (JIL), attracted hundreds of thou­
sands of members. These two groups and, to a lesser extent, the Labour 
Committee, played a vital role by creating a base of electoral support for 
the Conservatives. Members of these organizations were, moreover, the key 
to the party's superior electioneering and organizational capabilities. 
Nearly all aspects of Conservative activity—from canvassing to propa-
ganda—depended on thousands of volunteers. As the chairman of the JIL, 
Lord Stanley, noted in 1927, the party's efforts were based on these mass 
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organizations, whose framework resembled, he said, "a stool with three 
legs to it—the men, women, and the juniors."9 
Coupled with innovations in organization, Conservative leaders even­
tually developed political tactics and rhetoric that enabled them to estab­
lish their party as the only effective national and antisocialist party. Their 
first effort in the new political framework was to try to incorporate Lloyd 
George and his Liberal followers into the Conservative Party. The failure 
of Bonar Law and his successor, Austen Chamberlain, to achieve this goal 
led to the coalition's fall in October 1922. Once Bonar Law's Conservative 
government—the first since 1906—won a parliamentary majority in the 
succeeding election, the Conservatives abandoned fusion, but not their 
hope of drawing moderates. Unfortunately Conservative leaders had yet to 
settle on a distinctive response to democracy. Initially Baldwin pursued 
the old issue of tariff reform in the 1923 campaign, but the party's defeat 
confirmed for Conservative leaders the absolute necessity of attracting 
middle-class and moderate working-class voters and avoiding divisive 
rhetoric and policies. 
The approach Conservative leaders successfully developed in the 1920s 
was based on mobilizing various segments of the electorate by presenting 
a national and antisocialist stance and by offering moderate government, 
safety, and a return to normality after years of upheaval. In concrete terms 
this meant a deflationary monetary policy, low taxation, trade union re­
form, moderate, largely consolidating, social reforms, the maintenance of 
order and stability at home, and the preservation of international peace. 
The Conservative defeats in 1923 and 1929 were the direct result of weaken­
ing the anti-Labour consensus and contravening its objectives. The tariff 
election of 1923 jeopardized the middle-class desire for prosperity and sta­
bility. The "Safety First" campaign of 1929 alienated a range of voters who 
were disappointed with the government's apparently lackluster record, par­
ticularly after mid-1927. Some voters felt that the second Baldwin govern-
ment's inability to deal with the troubled economy—despite notable 
efforts in reforming local government, encouraging labor mobility, and 
pursuing business rationalization—was an indication of the Conservative 
leaders' poverty of ideas and lack of will.10 Some voters preferred the alter­
natives offered by the other parties, neither of which seemed threatening 
in 1929. 
The Conservatives' political strategy in the 1920s rested on two inter­
twined rhetorical tactics. First, the party dominated moderate opinion by 
conveying to the electorate the principles of Conservatism, its regard for 
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what Skelton termed "the reality, the life, the organic, as opposed to the 
mechanical, quality of politics." •1 In a 1924 letter to The Times, a leading 
Conservative woman and future junior minister, the duchess of Atholl, 
provided a statement of her political faith, arguing that, most of all, Con­
servatism "stand[s] for national unity and good will—the promotion of a 
better understanding between all sections of our people." She argued that 
Conservatism offered a constructive approach to satisfy all segments of the 
nation. In her view, the Conservative Party stood "for the fullest develop­
ment of individuality, desiring to see our country enriched not only by 
greater material prosperity . .  . not only by opportunities for wider and 
more varied intellectual development for all, but by the encouragement 
and strengthening of those great qualities of rectitude and personal inde­
pendence and habits of industry and thrift on which the greatness of our 
country has been built up."12 
Baldwin played a crucial role in the party's rhetorical triumph. As 
Conservative leader, he reformulated the Disraelian concept of national 
unity by integrating it with liberal constitutionalism. Beginning with his 
leadership during the October 1922 party crisis, Baldwin consistently pre­
sented political choices in moral, ethical, and religious terms. In a typical 
statement, made during the General Strike, he articulated a heartfelt oppo­
sition to amoral Liberalism and socialism and advocated the ancient no­
tion of the Englishman's birthright: the English traditions of individual 
liberty and the rule of law. As one historian notes, Baldwin "consciously 
attempted to build an organic and active relation between past and present, 
while at the same time suggesting that this relationship was already an 
integral, constitutive and permanent feature of English culture." In his 
most famous speech Baldwin evoked the sounds of rural England, which, 
he said, "strike down into the very depths of our nature, and touch chords 
that go back to the beginning of time and . .  . are chords that with every 
year of our life sounds a deeper note in our innermost being." He adapted 
his party's message to universal suffrage in his actions and speeches so as 
to confront the dangerous and divisive present by evoking traditional, in­
nately "English" values and a notion of Britain's historical evolution toward 
constitutional democracy. Baldwin argued that only the Conservative Party 
could be trusted as guardian of this delicate process. He created a Conser­
vative (but antifascist) consensus that survived the tumultuous interwar 
years and, in somewhat different form, continued to dominate political 
discourse until the rise of Margaret Thatcher.13 
Coupled with its conquest of the political middle ground was the 
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Conservative Party's attempt to push the opposition to the margins. Un­
derlying Atholl's view of Conservatism was a critique of parties that alleg­
edly attacked social classes, pursued destructive policies, and oppressed the 
individual. Members of the WUO often attached negative labels to Labour, 
claiming that it was antifamily and antiwoman. The Conservatives claimed 
to offer voters safety and nonintrusive government, which would protect 
them from organized labor and socialists while enabling them to pursue 
individual and family interests. Led by Stanley Baldwin, they dismissed the 
politics of the coalition era and of socialism as amoral, irreligious, overly 
intellectual, and subversive: in short, as an "un-English" disregard for duty 
to country and service to constitutional democracy.14 This approach en­
abled the Conservatives to unify ideologically and socially diverse groups 
in British society. 
In 1926 the prime minister and party leader, Baldwin, delivered one of 
his many successful expositions of interwar Conservatism. In his address 
to the party conference, he criticized opposition leaders and condemned 
"that spirit of faction . .  . [whose] inevitable result is that public passions 
are excited for private ends, and popular improvement is lost sight of in 
particular aggrandisements."15 After the Great War, he said, Britain was 
"giddy," and a majority of the electors, only recently enfranchised, were 
"without fixed principles . .  . driven about this way and that, the prey of 
every specious speaker, of every quack." With three parties competing for 
votes and the party structure still in flux, Baldwin said, the Conservatives 
must act so that voters "believe that we are trying to the best of our ability 
to govern the country for the good of the whole country and not for a 
class. It is only by that support that any Government to-day can come in 
and can have the requisite power . .  . to govern in this country at all." This 
was the image of itself that the interwar Conservative Party successfully 
projected as it struggled to deal with the aftermath of war, universal 
suffrage, and the rise of Labour. The 1920s inaugurated a political domina­
tion by the Conservative Party that lasted three-quarters of a century. 
Appendix A

Conservative Election Results by Region, 1918-1929 
Region and 
Number of Seats 1918 1922 1923 1924 1929 
Southeast (71) 59 64 51 71 58 
London (62) 44 43 29 39 24 
London suburbs (34) 28 25 17 26 18 
Southwest (43) 31 31 14 39 26 
East Anglia(19) 8 13 7 17 9 
East Midlands (36) 22 15 14 31 14 
West Midlands (46) 32 36 30 33 20 
Mid-North (43) 13 12 10 12 6 
Lancastria (80) 51 48 28 52 28 
N.Yorkshire (21) 
and Cumbria 16 13 15 19 13 
Northeast (30) 11 7 6 11 5 
Strathclyde (32) 17 8 8 16 8 
Scotland outside 
Strathclyde (39) 13 5 6 20 12 
Wales (35) 4 6 4 9 1 
Universities (24) and 
Ulster 18* 18 19 20 18 
Total (615) 367 344 258 415 260 
*For comparison purposes the 1918 figure used for Ulster is an estimate based 
upon a proportional allocation of the actual results in the much smaller divisions 
that existed between 1918 and 1921. 
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Women Voters in the Sample Constituencies 
Parliamentary 1921 1927 1928 
Division No. % No. % No. % 
Bradford Central 19,335 43.8 18,825 44.4 28,826 54.7 
Camlachie 14,436 40.5 15,385 43.6 22,592 52.6 
Chichester 18,685 42.9 25,022 46.0 36,138 53.7 
Clapham 16,069 45.3 17,345 46.8 26,482 55.1 
Kincardine 9,386 41.0 9,483 42.6 15,066 53.0 
North Cornwall 12,164 43.7 14,317 45.3 20,990 54.2 
Oswestry 12,797 40.8 13,995 41.7 21,714 51.7 
Skipton 15,535 42.2 17,266 43.3 26,953 53.5 
Stockton-on-Tees 14,444 39.5 16,858 40.8 26,104 49.5 
Wirral 12,929 40.0 20,361 43.0 33,496 53.2 
Wood Green 20,826 44.8 25,454 45.9 39,435 55.2 
Wrexham 15,157 38.7 16,715 39.3 25,378 48.5 
National average (%) — 42.6 — 42.8 — 52.7 
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Conservative Vote in Sample Constituencies 
Vote % and No. of Candidates 
Constituency 1918 1922 1923 1924 1929 
Bradford 
Central 51.0(3) 36.1 (3) 30.4 (3) 51.7(2) 41.0(2) 
Camlachie 62.9 (3) 40.2 (3) 43.8 (2) 49.6 (2) 42.0 (3) 
Chichester 68.4 (2) 74.3 (2) 47.9 (2) 59.3 (3) 60.2 (2) 
Clapham 60.2 (4) 58.7 (3) 46.4 (3) 64.1 (2) 41.7(3) 
Kincardine 0.0* (1) 0.0 * (2) 51.0(2) 54.5 (2) 48.2 (2) 
North 
Cornwall 0.0* (1) 0.0* (1) 43.5 (2) 53.6 (2) 42.3 (3) 
Oswestry 59.2 (2) 50.2 (3) 46.6 (3) 55.1 (3) 47.0 (3) 
Skipton 55.0 (2) 41.7(3) 39.9 (3) 46.0 (3) 39.5 (3) 
Stockton-on-
Tees 0.0* (1) 0.0* (3) 34.3 (3) 42.0 (3) 36.1 (3) 
Unopposed 51.0 46.4 60.2 47.5 
Wirral Unionist (1) (3) (2) (2) (3) 
Wood Green 71.9 (3) 70.0 (2) 46.5 (3) 57.9 (3) 47.6 (3) 
Wrexham 0.0* (2) 31.6(3) 27.6 (3) 0.0* (2) 22.1 (3) 
Averages for 61.2 50.4 42.0 54.0 42.9 
sample (2.1) (2.6) (2.6) (2.4) (2.8) 
Averages for 58.1 48.6 42.6 51.9 39.4 
Britain (2.3) (2.3) (2.4) (2.3) (2.8) 
*No Conservative candidate. 
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Analysis of Constituency Sample 
My work is largely based on twelve parliamentary divisions carefully chosen 
and researched in depth. These constituencies are broadly representative of the 
591 non-university divisions in Britain between 1922 and 1945. The 89 Irish and 
twelve Ulster divisions have been excluded. The most important socioeco­
nomic and cultural factors affecting modern political activity are regionalism, 
class composition, ruralism, and religion, although the importance of region­
alism is a matter of some debate. William Miller considers geographical loca­
tion to be relatively unimportant, but other historians note that the traditions 
of the different regions of Britain are not explicable solely in terms of social 
and economic determinants.1 My twelve constituencies are a diverse group 
echoing the geographical, economic, social, religious, and political character 
of twentieth-century Britain. 
The standard work on the geographical regions of Britain establishes a 
framework of fourteen provinces or regions. I have adapted this scheme by 
creating fewer, more politically homogenous regions.2 First, I carved the region 
of London and its satellite suburbs out of rural Southeast England. Second, I 
incorporated Fawcett's Bristol, Wessex, and Central—each with eighteen or 
nineteen divisions—into the larger surrounding regions of the Southwest, 
Southeast, West Midlands, and East Midlands. Third, I created the industrial, 
mining, and anti-Conservative region of Mid-North from Peakdon, Der­
byshire, and southern Yorkshire. I combined the rest of Yorkshire, which was 
rural and generally pro-Conservative, with the similar adjoining area of Cum­
bria. In Scotland I divided the industrial Strathclyde region surrounding Glas­
gow from the rest of Scotland, which was predominantly rural. The result is 
two Scottish regions, Wales, and ten English regions. 
During the two decades after 1918, patterns of Conservative strength and 
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weakness were fairly constant and followed earlier trends.3 In the interwar pe­
riod the Conservative Party had the strongest support in Southeast England 
and, until the 1930s, London, particularly the suburban and wealthy urban 
divisions. Another region that, despite Labour's gains, continued to incline 
toward Conservatism was the West Midlands. Southwest England also tended 
to favor the Conservatives, but Cornwall and parts of Devon were strongholds 
of English Liberalism. Labour's dominance of the Mid-North and Northeast 
regions meant that there were few opportunities for the Conservative Party, 
but the rural Yorkshire (similar to present-day North Yorkshire) and Cumbria 
regions produced a considerable number of Conservative M.P.s in the 1920s. 
The modern Conservative Party has always been weak in Wales and Scotland, 
making its only advance in "the Celtic fringe" in formerly Liberal, rural 
Scotland. 
In choosing constituencies from each region for this study I considered 
four political factors: class, rusticity, religion, and party allegiance. There was 
a consistent correlation between the middle class and Conservative voting dur­
ing the interwar years. Seats with a large trade-unionist population tended to 
support Labour, but as a group the rest of the working class and shopkeepers 
did not demonstrate a consistent party affiliation.4 Although it is commonly 
claimed that rural Britain was Conservative, in the interwar period these areas 
were more anti-Labour than pro-Conservative. Furthermore, the Liberal Party 
depended more heavily on agricultural seats than the other two parties. There 
were, however, considerable differences in rural areas, especially between those 
with open and closed settlement patterns. Constituencies with nucleated vil­
lages and arable farming, like Chichester, tended to be Tory, while the others 
tended to be Liberal.5 
The last determinant of political deviance was religion. Nonconformism 
was traditionally linked to Liberalism, but many middle-class Nonconformists, 
especially Wesleyans and residents of Southeast England, were voting Conser­
vative by the end of the Edwardian period. In Wales and certain other areas, 
however, many Nonconformists shifted their allegiance to the Labour Party 
after the Great War. Nevertheless, after 1918, Nonconformists—and Catho-
lics—were still more likely to vote Liberal or Labour than Conservative.6 
In selecting twelve parliamentary seats for the sample, I made a careful 
attempt to include at least one constituency from every region and to reflect 
the religious, socioeconomic, and party characteristics of interwar Britain. One 
third of the seats studied had a significant Nonconformist population, com­
pared to about 30 percent of the divisions nationally. Middle-class constituen­
cies composed one third of the sample (the national figure is 32 percent). Safe 
Conservative seats were 43 percent of all seats, compared to one half of 
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the sample. Another 35 percent of the nation's divisions were safe non-
Conservative seats, compared to one third in the sample. The sample has a 
few shortcomings. First, there are no divisions from the East Midlands, which 
encompassed 8 percent of the constituencies in Britain, and there is also no 
East Anglian seat because no records from an association in a representative 
East Anglian constituency were located. (Fortunately, East Anglia accounts for 
only 3 percent of parliamentary divisions.) Second, only a quarter of Britain's 
seats were agricultural, compared to 42 percent in my sample (five seats).7 
Third, the Southeast and Lancastria regions represented 12 percent and 13 per­
cent, respectively, of Britain's non-university seats, but only about 8 percent 
each of the sample. Nevertheless, the sample broadly reflects the factors rele­
vant to political orientation in interwar Britain (see appendix E). 
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List of Sample Constituencies 
Social Geography Dominant Political Party 
Parliamentary Settlement Dominant Other 
Division Region Pattern Social Class Characteristics pre-1914 1918-1939 post-1945 
Bradford Mid-North urban working class Nonconformist Liberal marginally marginally 
Central Labour Labour 
Camlachie Strathclyde urban working class Catholic marginally Labour Labour 
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Chichester Southeast rural and middle class Conservative Conservative Conservative 
England suburban 
Clapham London suburban middle class Conservative Conservative Conservative 
Kincardine Northeast rural mixed Liberal marginally marginally 
Scotland Conservative Conservative 
North Southwest rural mixed Nonconformist Liberal marginally marginally 
Cornwall England Liberal Liberal 
continued 
List of Sample Constituencies continued 
Social Geography Dominant Political Party 
Parliamentary Settlement Dominant Other 
Division Region Pattern Social Class Characteristics pre-1914 1918-1939 post-1945 
Oswestry West rural mixed Nonconformist Conservativ 
Midlands and Welsh 
Skipton North rural mixed Nonconformist marginally marginally Conservative 
England Liberal Conservative 
Stockton-on-
Tees 
Northeast 
England 
urban working class Nonconformist marginally 
Liberal 
none Labour 
Wirral Merseyside suburban middle class Conservativ e Conservative Conservative 
Wood Green Southeast suburban middle class [new seat] Conservative Conservative 
England 
Wrexham North mixed working class Nonconformist Liberal marginally Labour 
Wales and Welsh Labour 
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